Domestic and International Perspectives on Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution’

Motives, Mobilization and Meanings

Sally Cummings

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781317989660
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Civil Rights in Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In early 2005 regional protests in Kyrgyzstan soon became national ones as protesters seized control of the country's capital, Bishkek. The country's president for fifteen years, Askar Akaev, fled the country and after a night of extensive looting, a new president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, came to power. The events quickly earned the epithet 'Tulip Revolution' and were interpreted as the third of the colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space, following Ukraine and Georgia. But did the events in Kyrgyzstan amount to a 'revolution'? How much change followed and with what academic and policy implications? This innovative, unique study of these events brings together a new generation of Kyrgyz scholars together with established international observers to assess what happened in Kyrgyzstan and after, and the wider implications.

This book was published as a special issue of Central Asian Survey.

March and after: what has changed? What has stayed the same?

Erica Marat

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, USA

Introduction

Three years after the Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan is a country facing a severe hydro-energy crisis and double-digit inflation; a pro-regime party dominates the parliament, while business structures are plagued by corruption. Although 24 March, the day of the Tulip Revolution, is an official public holiday, it is mostly the government that still celebrates it. For the majority of the Kyrgyz public, the day is rather a mockery of their hopes to end endemic corruption in the state with the ousting of the former president, Askar Akaev. The incumbent president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, is infamous for his even greater involvement in corruption and for seating his relatives and associates into key political and business positions. Elected in June 2005 on a wave of anti-corruption rhetoric, Bakiev turned out to be an incubator of the previous regime’s mistakes. Worse still, he plunged the country into a deep hydro-energy crisis by failing both to manage water resources adequately and to prevent corruption in the energy sector. Organized crime is booming and there is more evidence of collaboration between state and criminal structures. Any changes since the Tulip Revolution appear to be largely negative and unwanted.

However, despite these shadowy developments, compared to neighbouring states, Kyrgyzstan still remains a country with a solid culture of free expression in mass media, growing civil society activism, and a myriad of brave NGO leaders able to take a critical look at the ruling regime’s actions. The Tulip Revolution, in which several prominent NGO leaders participated, empowered local civil society, becoming an example of sizeable change in the political life brought about by the masses. Local NGOs learned ways of spreading their messages to the masses through media and public protests. In particular, the November 2006 protests set a precedent for a constitution with an elaborate system of checks and balances. Civil society groups, together with MPs, staged a six-day protest and were able to broker a compromise with the government and opposition on constitutional reform. Although that version of the constitution was soon abolished, it nevertheless proved to be an important element in local NGOs’ ability to frame political issues, co-operate with political forces, and engage the masses. Because it became habitual for the local public to organize in mass protests, the government was cautious to announce shortages of hydro power in late 2008, making sure that the information campaign is implemented gradually, and hopes for the improvement of hydro-power supplies are outlined.

To show these important changes in the behaviour of the Kyrgyz government and public, this article recalls the major events that have taken place since 24 March 2005 (Table 1). It will examine Bakiev’s new government formed in December 2007, analyse the changes in criminal world dynamics, explain problems in the hydro-energy sector, and conclude with a section on civil society groups. The two questions this contribution seeks to answer perplex many in Kyrgyzstan: what has changed since the removal of Akaev? And what has remained the same? It will complement existing research on the events in Kyrgyzstan since March 2005 by showing how, on the one hand, corruption, crime and politics are interlinked in the country and how, on the other, local civil society groups have proved to be considerably more stable compared to political parties. The stability in civil society activities has thus proved to be among the most important developments after the revolution.

Table 1. Timeline of major events since 24 March 2005.

24–25 March 2005	Crowds seize government headquarters in Bishkek. President Askar Akaev reported to have fled the country with his family in an unknown direction. Opposition declared Kurmanbek Bakiev as interim president.
13 May 2005	After weeks of tensions, Bakiev and Feliks Kulov enter into a tandem agreement signifying unity between Kyrgyzstan’s north and south.
17 June 2005	Businessman Urmat Baryktabasov, allegedly supported by the former regime, draws crowds in front of government headquarters to remove Bakiev; the protest is quickly dispersed.
10 June 2005	Presidential elections win Bakiev almost 90% support.
June–November 2005	Three MPs with alleged ties to the criminal world killed in Bishkek.
September 2005–September 2006	Bakiev loses most of his political supporters who helped him to gain power in March 2005, including Roza Otunbayev, Azimbek Beknazarov, Omurbek Tekebayev, Almazbek Atambayev, etc.
10 May 2006	A reputed mafia kingpin, Rysbek Akmatbayev, killed in Bishkek; his death changes the dynamics of state-crime relations.
6 September 2006	Bakiev supporters allegedly plot intrigue against Opposition MP Omurbek Tekebayev.
2–8 November 2006	Opposition protests achieve the endorsement of new constitution to increase parliament’s role.
30 December 2006	Parliament changes the constitution, returning powers to the president.
January 2007	Parliament denies Kulov the position of prime minister. Bakiev chooses unknown, Azim Isabekov, to lead the government.
11–19 April 2007	Kulov organizes a United Front protest in central Bishkek, pressuring Bakiev to step down. Government brings a violent end to the opposition rallies. Short of victory, Kulov leaves the political stage.
September–October 2007	Bakiev introduces his version of the constitution and begins forming the AkZhol political bloc, preparing for snap parliamentary elections.
21 October 2007	New constitution endorsed through rigged referendum, increasing Bakiev’s powers; the parliament is dissolved within 24 hours after the referendum results
16 December 2007	Snap parliamentary elections held with Ak Zhol majority in the 75-member parliament.
June 2008	Bakiev appoints his brother Zhanysh to lead the SNB security service.
May–August 2008	Government calls citizens to save energy as water in Toktogul reservoir reaches a critical low level; power outage widespread in Bishkek and throughout the country against the background of high inflation of food prices.
24 August 2008	A plane crash nearby Manas airport kills 65 passengers and hints at endemic corruption in the government.
September 2008	Bakiev and Chudinov announce a rapidly unfolding crisis in hydro-energy and natural gas.

Timeline: 24 March 2005–September 2008

Three years ago, both local and international observers regarded the ousting of Akaev on 24 March as Kyrgyzstan’s step towards democratization. However, today Kyrgyzstan’s course towards democracy is often assessed as having been disrupted by President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s corrupt regime. Even Bakiev himself avoids defining 24 March 2005 as the Tulip Revolution, rather referring to it as the ‘March 2005 events’. Disappointment in Bakiev already became apparent in the first few months of his leadership. During his first year in power, Bakiev failed to clean up the Augean stables of Akaev’s corruption, despite promises made before the ‘revolution’ and after acquiring power. Bakiev was able to gain quick, yet short-lived popularity among the masses, even though he was largely unknown before the removal of Akaev. However, within weeks after winning presidential power in June 2005, Bakiev began to quickly lose the support of his colleagues who had risen with him against Akaev’s regime. At times then Prime Minister Feliks Kulov enjoyed stronger support than Bakiev. Unlike Bakiev, who was largely unknown prior to March 2005, Kulov had already earned popularity among the masses for his stern opposition of Akaev’s regime.

Bakiev was appointed as president by the Peoples’ Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK), which comprised former Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva, NGO leader Edil Baisalov, leader of Social Democratic Party Almazbek Atambayev, opposition MPs Azimbek Beknazarov and Omurbek Tekebayev, and many other prominent opposition leaders. PMK, in turn, was a short-lived union of opposition leaders that was able to consolidate local protests across the country and bring them together in Bishkek on 24 March. As Akaev fled the country and a power vacuum appeared for a short time, PMK nominated Bakiev as interim president. Among the reasons for choosing Bakiev was an informal pact between opposition forces to nominate a representative from southern Kyrgyzstan who would balance power sharing among northern and southern political elites. Since 1961, Soviet Kyrgyzstan was led solely by representatives of the north, and Absamat Massaliyev, First Secretary of the Kyrgyz SSR between 1985–1991, was the only southern leader in decades.

By the end of 2005, Bakiev had become infamous for his deep involvement in corruption and plotting intrigues against his opponents. He sought to centralize political and economic power in the country by removing unwanted figures and putting his associates in their place. In January 2007, almost two years after the ‘revolution’, Bakiev broke ties with Kulov, who then occupied the position of prime minister and enjoyed a high popular approval rating. The Bakiev–Kulov breakup was symbolic of the worsening confrontation between the north and south of the country. However, Bakiev, a native of south Kyrgyzstan, often intentionally played up the ongoing competition between the two parts of the country, seeking to enhance public approval of his hold on power. Instead of Kulov, Bakiev appointed previously unknown Azim Isabekov. However, two months later Bakiev’s opposition insisted on appointing Alamzbek Atambayev, leader of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan.

After being removed from the government, Kulov formed his own opposition bloc, United Front that aimed to topple Bakiev. In April 2007 he organized a protest in central Bishkek, threatening that it would be the largest political campaign since the revolution. However, Kulov’s aggressive endeavours were only partially supported by another major opposition bloc, For Reforms, that insisted on constitutional reform and not another change of regime. Kulov’s protests were violently dispersed after a few days by the police, and signified a major loss for the politician. Following this fiasco, Kulov left the political stage altogether.

In November that year For Reforms organized a demonstration to bring in changes to the constitution that had been ignored by Bakiev’s government since the Tulip Revolution. After almost a week-long protest, For Reforms finally managed to broker a compromise between the parliament and President Kurmanbek Bakiev, to endorse a new constitution that would considerably empower the legislative branch and strip the president of key prerogatives. Despite earlier outbreaks of violence between the opposition and government-hired crowds at Bishkek’s central square, the almost week-long confrontation between Bakiev and the opposition was yet another manifestation of Kyrgyzstan’s move towards a democratic state with high rates of civic engagement.

Importantly, protests by Kulov and For Reforms showed that the government and individual politicians had learned ways of countering mass demonstrations. For example, in the November 2006 demonstrations, the government mobilized hundreds of public employees, including law-enforcement representatives, against opposition forces. As most Kyrgyz experts agree, the government-hired mobs intended to provoke the opposition into starting a fight. Before the United Front’s April 2007 demonstration, the opposition sought to warn the public that pro-government political forces might hire criminal leaders to provoke fights among opposition demonstrators, as well as to stir looting throughout Bishkek.

However, the political situation became even murkier when Bakiev announced a constitutional reform in September 2007 that allowed him to gain virtually unlimited powers and entirely alienate the opposition. Bakiev gave one month’s notice for the public to become acquainted with his constitutional project before a referendum was held. On 22 October, the constitution was passed with 76% support, and was viewed by many local and international observers as having been largely falsified. However, within a few hours after the referendum, Bakiev dissolved the parliament and set 16 December as a date for snap parliamentary elections. Simultaneously, Bakiev quickly formed his own political bloc, Ak Zhol, that embraced virtually all employees of the public sector. The new constitution allowed him to appoint the government and control the parliament.

Bakiev’s opposition has adopted a rather passive position since its defeat in the December 2007 elections. Although opposition parties underwent rapid development in the three months prior to the vote, most of them remained silent about the government’s widespread falsifications during the elections. Bakiev adopted a somewhat careful strategy to neutralize the opposition who lost in the December 2007 elections. A number of opposition leaders were given positions in regional governments or higher diplomatic ranks. For example, Omurbek Suvanaliyev, former interior minister and an active supporter of Kulov, was made governor of Naryn oblast. Several reshuffles then followed in the Foreign Service branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Bakiev’s loyal advisors remained in the government. Among them were influential politicians such as Usen Sydykov and Daniyar Usenov.

Bakiev’s government

In the 16 December parliamentary elections, Ak Zhol gained the majority of seats. The party became a dominant political faction in the parliament and infamous for being replete with unprofessional people with uncertain political views. As one political observer in Bishkek commented, despite a better representation of women, ethnic minorities, and young politicians: ‘The parliament is full of “dead souls” willing to follow the regime.’¹ The new Kyrgyz government, formed following the elections, consisted mostly of old faces who had survived the numerous reshuffling efforts of Akaev and the change of presidents in March 2005. Bakiev surrounded himself with loyal political supporters primarily interested in the continuity of the current political regime and their public offices. He also reshuffled security structures, appointing his brother Zhanysh to lead the SNB security service. The pro-regime bloc Ak Zhol’s majority in the parliament, and the president’s family and business connections in the security agencies, allowed him to control all cadre decisions in the government and parliament. This political clique was potentially interested in having Bakiev re-elected in 2010, preventing Bakiev from transforming state power peacefully and predictably.

The president’s choice of Igor Chudinov – a former businessman, director of KyrgyzGaz, and minister of energy – as prime minister came as a surprise for many. The energy sector in Kyrgyzstan was known for its endemic corruption, and Chudinov was often regarded as part of a chain of corrupt management. Furthermore, Saparbek Balkibekov, former chair of Elektricheskiye stansii, replaced Chudinov in his ministerial position. Under Balkibekov, Elektricheskiye stansii, Kyrgyzstan’s major producer and retailer of hydropower, was infamous for having embezzled up to $40 million a year.² Former Bishkek mayor Arstanbek Nogo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Abstracts
• Notes on contributors
• Preface
• Introduction: ‘Revolution’ not revolution
• 1. March and after: what has changed? What has stayed the same?
• 2. Situating the ‘Tulip Revolution’
• 3. Kyrgyz democracy? The Tulip Revolution and beyond
• 4. The dynamics of regime change: domestic and international factors in the ‘Tulip Revolution’
• 5. Organized crime before and after the Tulip Revolution: the changing dynamics of upperworld-underworld networks
• 6. The north–south cleavage and political support in Kyrgyzstan
• 7. Informal actors and institutions in mobilization: the periphery in the ‘Tulip Revolution’
• 8. March 2005: parliamentary elections as a catalyst of protests
• 9. The power of precedent?
• 10. Diffusion as discourse of danger: Russian self-representations and the framing of the Tulip Revolution
• Index