Political Conditionality

Georg Sorensen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781135200978
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic Theory
• Index: Economics

Political conditionality involves the linking of development aid to certain standards of observance of human rights and (liberal) democracy in recipient countries. Although this may seem to be an innocent policy, it has the potential to bring about a dramatic change in the basic principles of the international system: putting human rights first means putting respect for individuals and rights before respect for the sovereignty of states.

Democracy, Authoritarianism and State Strength

GEORG SØRENSEN

I. INTRODUCTION

There is a substantial debate on possible consequences of democratisation/democracy for economic performance [Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990; Marsh, 1979; King, 1981; Dick, 1974; Weede, 1983; Donnelly, 1984]. I have studied this question at length in earlier contributions [Sørensen, 1991; 1993]; here I wish to address a specific aspect of the issue, concerning the possible importance of the East Asian success stories.

It is clear that an important component in both Taiwan’s, South Korea’s and, in an earlier phase, Japan’s success in economic development is the fact that they are strong states with a high capacity for promoting economic development, also called developmental states [White and Wade, 1985; Deyo, 1987]. At the same time, both South Korea and Taiwan have also been authoritarian states and one experienced observer has characterised the Japanese state as ‘soft authoritarian’ [Johnson, 1987]. Does this mean that we must consider authoritarianism as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the making and upkeep of developmental states? And if this is the case, must we, as indeed some observers do (see the summary of arguments in Sørensen [1993], consider democracy an expensive item in development terms, because democracy will mean a decline of the state’s strength, that is, its ability to pursue economic development? It would be somewhat embarrassing for the whole notion of political conditionality if it could be demonstrated that important dimensions of ‘good governance’ are best taken care of by authoritarian regimes and yet this is indeed a possible claim on the basis of the East Asian experience.

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to introduce the concept of developmental state in further detail; this is the task for the following section. I proceed to set forth some hypothetical consequences of regime form for the developmental strength of states. An empirical analysis of cases from Latin America, Africa and Asia leads to two conclusions: (a) the East Asian experience, where authoritarianism helped promote a developmental state, cannot be widely generalised; in other words, the claim sometimes heard on the basis of the East Asian success stories that authoritarianism is necessary for the creation of strong, developmental states must be rejected; (b) a more democratic form of regime may lead to a state with more developmental strength, but this is no assured outcome; it depends on the specific kind of democracy which is emerging. The democracy which is growing presently in many developing countries will not necessarily help promote a strong, developmental state. Current frail, elite-dominated democracies must change towards systems with a more solid, popular basis in order to secure a framework for increased state strength.

II. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

There are a number of different contributions towards the identification of the developmental state [White and Wade, 1985; Johnson, 1982; Deyo, 1987; Evans, 1985; 1989; Clark and Lemco, 1988]. I shall comment on this debate in order to arrive at the understanding of the concept which will be employed here.

The reflections on the possible features of a developmental state have from the very beginning been plagued by the fact that they commenced, not with deliberations concerning state theory and the proper content or definition of states in general and developmental states in particular, but with the empirical assessment that some East Asian countries are remarkably more successful than other Third World countries in terms of a number of rather conventional economic indicators; the most important ones are economic (especially industrial) growth, manufactured exports, and trend/level of national income per capita.

While such information may be helpful in identifying interesting cases for analysis, it also contains two possible pitfalls when tied in with the notion of a developmental state. First, when a developmental state is simply defined by success in terms of certain economic outcomes, the developmental state cannot simultaneously be employed as explanatory variable for economic success without formulating a tautology [Lauridsen, 1990: 13]. Second, there is the problem of choice of indicators of economic development success. Even if they have also performed well in terms of welfare for the population in general, countries like Taiwan and South Korea (or even Japan) are less spectacular successes on this dimension. Furthermore, the working population in these countries have shouldered heavy burdens during the process of economic development [Chan, 1990a: 53].

If economic outcomes are useful indicators rather than definitional backbones of strong states, it is necessary to focus on the states themselves in order to situate their possible developmental strength at the proper locations, that is, in the states’ possibilities for acting in promotion of development and the measures which they actually take towards this end, their policies. And it is indeed these elements which are at the core of the deliberations of the ‘statists’.

The policy element is strongly emphasised in Chalmers Johnson’s analyses, both of Japan and of Taiwan and South Korea [Johnson, 1987: 145]. However, there are three problems in making ‘good policies’ a core element of the developmental state. First, there is the danger of tautological reasoning here also, if developmental state = good policies = success in development. Second, it may be unwise to outline specific policy elements as characteristic of the developmental state. For example, the policy of ‘investment in education for everyone’ [Johnson, 1987: 145] may be optimal for development in specific contexts and phases, but not always and everywhere. Finally, a one-sided emphasis on policies may convey the false impression that decision-makers are not subjugated to any noteworthy structural constraints.

Yet the concrete actions of decision-makers should not be disregarded in identifying the developmental state. That would only lead to a one-sided focus on state structures and, as Chalmers Johnson has noted [1986: 557n], structures in themselves cannot explain anything. State and domestic as well as international societal structures define the boundaries or constrain the range of choices open to actors; but structures do not make policy choices. It is, moreover, possible to make ‘good policies’ an element of the developmental state without defining the specific contents of these policies. On a more general level, ‘good policies’ have to do with abilities to respond constructively to domestic and international challenges within the overall context of promoting economic development. What is meant here with ‘good policies’ is covered by the apt phrase of ‘statecraft’ used by Steve Chan [Chan, 1988a: 219]. Following this reasoning, statecraft is a feature of developmental states or, with White’s formulation, states with developmental strength.

Structures define the possibilities, the range of options open to actors. The other element in the identification of the developmental state is thus structures, more specifically state structures. If the debate on developmental states had been guided by state theory rather than by concrete examples of development success, this is probably where it would have begun. The reason is, of course, that issues concerning state structures and the room for manoeuvre for state actors is at the heart of theoretical debate on the state.

It is not possible in the present context to comprehensively address the debate on different understandings of the state. On the other hand, it is necessary to suggest how the subject of developmental states fits in to the more general pattern of approaches to analysis of states. A recent contribution from Edward Greenberg [1990: 11–41] is helpful in this regard. Greenberg identifies three main approaches to the state. The first is ‘The Citizen-Responsive State Model’ which builds primarily on the pluralist and voter-centred literature concerning politics in liberal democracies. This approach basically sees ‘the sources of state action in the articulated demands of popular majorities or intense minorities, and in the need for public officials to respond to such demands as the price for their retention of power or office’ [1990: 18]. In this model, the bureaucratic apparatus is often fragmented, split into different coalitions with various interest groups and political groups.

The second approach, ‘The Capitalist State Model’ springs from the Marxist tradition, where the state is basically an integrated part of society as a whole. This means that the economic basis and the social structure of society determines the structure and policies of the state. There may be short term deviations and a certain room for maneuvre, but in the long run the state in a capitalist society promotes capitalism and the interests of the capitalist class.

Finally, ‘The State-Centric Model’ is the one from which most of the contributors to the developmental state debate draw inspiration. In this model the state is a much more autonomous entity defining its own interests and goals. It is against this background that the focus of developmental statists, not only on state policies, but on state structures, the capacities for action of different states and the actual degree of freedom of operation for elected and bureaucratic officials – their autonomy – must be seen. Having already identified the policy component of statecraft as an element in the developmental state, I proceed to the two structural components, autonomy and capacity.

The Autonomy of Developmental States

As a minimum, autonomy must mean that states ‘may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society’ [Skocpol, 1985: 9]. The question is how far autonomy can go from there. In structural Marxism, there are two ‘negative’ borderlines around autonomy; on the one hand, state policy (or the political level) is not mechanically determined by economics or by purely economic interests. On the other hand – and this is autonomy’s upper limit following this approach – state policy is never completely independent from economics and the dominant class interests [Ougaard, 1989: 64]. In the view of at least some working within the state-centric perspective, even more autonomy is possible; not only can it be possible for the state to fend off, insulate itself from powerful social forces, it can lead the way and impose ‘its own vision and goals on them’ [Greenberg, 1990: 22; also Krasner, 1978; Trimberger, 1978; Johnson, 1982].

It is clear that a high degree of autonomy is considered a characteristic of states with developmental strength, and vice versa: with little or no autonomy the state cannot be expected to play a leading, constructive role in the promotion of development.

Yet the notion of ‘the higher autonomy the better’ poses at least two sets of problems. The first has to do with explaining the interests and actions of highly autonomous states. Why is it that some autonomous state actors ‘choose’ to promote development in a consistent and efficient manner while others do not? The state-centric notion of high autonomy tends to ‘insulate’ itself from explaining this to the extent that it ‘insulates’ the state from the rest of society: ‘Why actors may hold certain goals or how they might go about selecting among conflicting goals is left untheorized’ [Greenberg, 1990: 31].

Two examples of the empirical puzzles raised by this problem will suffice here. The successful developmentalist state of Taiwan has been run for many years by the Guomindang. In its early years on Taiwan (before 1948– 49), the brutal and militarised Guomindang regime showed every sign of being as oppressive, inept, reactionary and corrupt as it had been during its last years on the Mainland. How could such a leadership turn around in a very short period of time and start seriously promoting economic development on the island? (For a brief attempt at an answer, see Sørensen [1991: 122].)

Another aspect of this puzzle is the insight that some states may enjoy a high degree of autonomy without exploiting it in the service of development; it may even contribute to a downward trend of maldevelopment. This is the case, for example in Zaire, even if ‘the Zairian state is strikingly unconstrained by any set of organized social interests and in this sense very autonomous’ [Evans, 1989: 571].

The second problem with the claim that a high degree of autonomy is a feature of developmental states is the fact that not all of the most successful cases of developmental states can boast such autonomy, at least not in all areas. Taiwan is again a good example. In the early years, Taiwan simply depended on the United States for survival. Had it not been for the sealing off of the Taiwan Strait and the guarantees issued for the island’s safety, the Chinese communists would have recaptured Taiwan. Without significant economic and ‘developmental’ assistance (pushing of agrarian reforms, striking a balance between private and public presence in the economy, etc.) from the United States, Taiwan would have been much less of a success story. It is very difficult, in other words, to claim that Taiwan has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in its external relations, especially as regards the relationship with the United States [Chan, 1988: 38–52].

The reaction to these problems among statists has been to abandon the abstract notion of autonomy and speak instead of more specific varieties of autonomy as the important ones for the states’ developmental strength. Working in this direction, Clive Hamilton suggests that the autonomy the state needs is from ‘classes which derive wealth from unproductive activities or which are otherwise hostile to industrial development’ [Hamilton, 1987: 1243]. This solves at least some of the puzzle mentioned above. Taiwan enjoyed a high degree, not of overall autonomy, but autonomy from classes and groups involved in what Hamilton calls zero-sum activities (speculation, corruption, landlordism, usury). External dependence was no drawback because for reasons primarily having to do with the East-West confrontation, the United States was keenly interested in making a showcase of economic development success out of Taiwan.

At the same time, autonomy from forces predominantly involved in zero-sum activities does not appear to be sufficient. Hamilton notes that the state must also be able to discipline industrial capital, that is keeping it out of rent-seeking activities, on the path of sustained accumulation. Evans, against the background of the Japanese experience, stresses the two-way character of the relationship between the state and private business. On the one hand the Japanese state represented by MITI is meshed into a maze of external networks with private interests; on the other hand, MITI retains enough autonomy to be able to design and implement overall development policies which set aside individual corporate interests. Evans names this Japanese situation ‘embedded autonomy’ [Evans, 1989: 574].

In summary, a specific form of autonomy is a core characteristic of the developmental state. It is a form of autonomy highly dependent upon the larger socio-historica...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Democracy, Authoritarianism and State Strength
• The World Bank and the New Politics of Aid
• ‘Do as I Say, Not as I do’: The Limits of Political Conditionality
• Aid, Democracy and Political Conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa
• The Complexities of Conditionality: The Case of India
• Values for Money? Political Conditionality in Aid – The Case of China