PART I
1
Introduction: Review of Armed Conflicts in South Asia in 2011
P. R. Chari
✪
Prelude
In the last (fifth) Annual Review (2011) of Armed Conflicts in South Asia the transformative processes occurring in the region were examined. The fourth Annual Review (2010) had underlined the growing left wing extremism and religious violence in the region. Earlier volumes had emphasized growing violence, continuing violence and failing peace processes in South Asia. The present volume (2012) spotlights the causes of armed conflict in the region to enable peace processes to be pursued. The country chapters would, as in earlier years, address the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Northeast India, and the Naxalite-affected areas. But, the special essays will focus on assessing the peace processes in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), Nepal and Sri Lanka. Myanmar has been included in the present review since its armed conflicts impinge on peace and stability in South Asia, especially Northeast India and Bangladesh; besides, trafficking of drugs and arms through Myanmar from the Golden Triangle seriously affects the security of eastern India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan. Burma, incidentally, was a part of British India until 1936, and shares its colonial heritage with other countries in the region.
Two contrary trends in the regional and international security milieu accentuated in 2011. First, a more complex global order is emerging with new State and non-State players asserting themselves, while the older power centres are weakening. Second, the need for greater interdependence to manage global problems such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, climate change, energy security, which cannot be countered by individual nations, became emphasized. Enlightened self-interest, therefore, requires enlightened interdependence, but modalities for beneficial interactions are eroding.
No doubt a state of chaos distinguishes the natural state of the international system. Further, war, not peace, has marked the course of human history. Total wars in the Clausewitzian sense are no longer viable after nuclear weapons entered the calculus. But threats falling in the genre of international terrorism and non-traditional security such as climate change forebode a permanent state of conflict, interspersed with short intervals of peace. Within this understanding of peace and conflict, it is urged that peace negotiated between contending parties in the present age would only be transitory.
Despite this bleak prognosis the likelihood of inter-state armed conflicts in South Asia has markedly reduced in tandem with global trends. Territorial and other disputes arising from competition for diminishing natural resources, migration and socio-economic issues are persisting. But, it is unlikely that these disputes would escalate to armed conflicts. Apropos, considerable diplomatic energy has been expended over the years to mitigate the tensions and instabilities underlying India-Pakistan relations. But fair confidence obtains now that, despite the rhetoric, their asymmetries will not trigger any major armed conflict, since a state of nuclear deterrence is obtaining between them. The ‘Cold Start’ doctrine enunciated by India and the ‘defensive’ deployment of tactical nuclear weapons planned by Pakistan could, however, trigger a major conflict by accident, misperception or inadvertence. Moreover, Pakistan has tested its short-range (113 miles) Hatf 2 ballistic missile that has ‘high accuracy’ and can be equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads.1 It is intended for a tactical role, but its deployment could generate a destabilizing ‘use-or-lose’ psychology in a conflict situation.
Fortunately, India-Pakistan restraining crisis behaviour during the Kargil conflict (1999), the border confrontation crisis (2001–02), and after the Mumbai attacks (2008), has been reassuring, and highlights their strategic circumspection.
The absence of hostilities, obviously, does not connote normality in their relations. Pakistan's decision to grant Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India some 15 years after New Delhi extended this privilege to Pakistan is a hopeful sign, but there are several conflicts of interests within Pakistan—notably the divide between traders and manufacturers — that need resolution before this initiative reaches fruition. Meanwhile, the danger remains of another Mumbai-style terror attack in India, which could trigger a dangerous slide in bilateral relations.
Armed conflicts in South Asia with an inter-state remit may have abated; but their focus has visibly shifted to its intra-state dimensions. No country in the region is free of internal security threats that could rapidly escalate. The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of Left Wing Extremism, identifying it, along with cross-border terrorism and religious fundamentalism, as the key internal security challenges facing India.2 The need for early recognition of emerging internal strife and averting it is evident. Apropos, the danger from ‘flash mobs’ requires greater attention, which implies mindless violence being triggered by a minor incident, which then spreads like wildfire. Such unpredictable violence derives from dormant and unresolved grievances such as demands for greater autonomy; communal, sectarian and caste-based grievances; ethno-political, socio-economic and communal-religious tensions, and so on. Consequently, the importance of early warning systems to forewarn about internal strife cannot be over-emphasized.
The structure of this Annual Review follows the pattern set by the earlier volumes. It is divided almost equally between country-specific and issue-based chapters. The country chapters follow a standard pattern, which includes a brief history of the armed conflict; the principal actors involved — State and non-State; the course of the conflict in 2011; conflict management efforts; and the conclusions that can be drawn. It would be unfair to summarize the conclusions reached by the authors in their respective chapters, which is the practice generally followed in edited volumes. This would discourage readers from studying the chapters to appreciate their nuances.
Parsing the Zeitgeist
Some general issues that were underlying the armed conflicts and peace processes in South Asia during 2011 have been addressed here.
Against the backdrop of a global recession, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that are winding down, and Iran's single-minded nuclear quest, 2011 marked an inflection in post 9/11 history. South Asia could not insulate and island itself in this milieu. An unfolding Af-Pak imbroglio, growing strains on Pakistan's unity and integrity, and India's steadily diminishing United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in 2011 are strategic developments that shall influence South Asia's neighbouring regions and the wider international system in the future. Two events — one without and the other within South Asia — were of an epochal nature.
The first is the Arab Spring, which made large scratches on the minds of people in Central Asia, major powers such as the United States, Russia and China, and, inevitably, South Asia. The messages conveyed are many. Intrinsically, civil society assertion has gained a new relevance with the vox populi (voice of the people) acquiring greater weight to strengthen the democratic principle, reflecting a greater egalitarianism arising within the international system. Smaller and weaker nations have successfully defied larger and stronger nations; witness the retreat of the Soviet Union earlier and the United States currently from Afghanistan. Within nations, minorities of all descriptions have successfully defied the majoritarian proclivity to ignore their sensibilities; indeed, autocratic governments now find themselves entrenched against popular unrest.
Unrepresentative regimes were removed by popular movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, while the struggle is continuing in Syria. The causes underlying these movements include pervasive corruption, suppression of free speech, media censorship, inflation leading to food insecurity, lack of socio-economic development, and growing unemployment, especially among the educated youth. A youth bulge aggravated this discontent, leading to violent agitations against the state. The revolutionary potential of internet and the social media can also not be ignored. Finally, a common denominator fuelling the Arab Spring was the unwillingness of the rulers to parley with the protesters due to creation of
the sultanistic regime. Such governments arise when a national leader expands his personal power at the expense of formal institutions. Sultanistic dictators appeal to no ideology and have no purpose other than maintaining their personal authority. They may preserve some of the formal aspects of democracy — elections, political parties, a national assembly, or a constitution but they rule above them by installing compliant supporters in key positions.3
Regrettably, no consensus has emerged on what form of government should replace the sultanistic regime, since both communist and Islamist successor regimes have proved to be failures.
In essence, citizens in the Middle East and Maghreb countries have asserted their social contract with these states, under which they had abridged their individual rights and empowered their rulers to ensure the commonweal.4 It would be naive to believe that the removal of autocratic and unrepresentative governments that are perpetuating themselves by force to plunder the nation will automatically ensure a more democratic and equitable political order. In Egypt, for example, the failure of the protesters to unite and usher political reforms has ensured the ascendancy of the military. Religious fundamentalists have strengthened themselves, which presages future armed conflicts. The radicalization of educated youth leading to domestic unrest and a restoration of military primacy is a plausible outcome unless gainful employment is found for this educated youth.
There are obvious lessons here for the ruling elites in South Asia. Clearly, insensitive absolutism is clashing with a new consciousness about the basic rights of citizens, which includes employment, and an equitable distribution of national wealth. In fact, corruption and lack of accountability and transparency has become synonymous with insensitive governance — autocratic or democratic. Security forces can no longer ensure autocratic and unrepresentative rulers remaining in power. Gaining office through rigged elections with support from the military and/or civilian bureaucracy has also become problematical, and has currently become an issue in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The zeitgeist has also manifested in Myanmar. A new constitution preserves a major role for the military, including appointments to important posts and guaranteed representation in the legislature. But, Myanmar's obdurate military government finally relented and legitimized the outlawed National League for Democracy (NLD) headed by Aung San Suu Kyi. It was allowed to contest the elections in 2011. Subsequently, Aung San Kyi was released, and her overwhelming victory in the elections, later talks with President Thein Sein, and release of a large number of political prisoners have radically changed the political dynamics in the country that will enable diplomatic relations being established with the US and west European countries. Several reasons might explain Myanmar's volte-face o...