Syria Under Assad (RLE Syria)

Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks

Moshe Maoz, Avner Yaniv

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781317818380
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

One of the most striking recent developments in the modern Middle East has been the transformation of Syria under Hafez al-Assad from a weak, vulnerable and internally divided state to a leading regional power. While this is increasingly acknowledged by observers of the Middle Eastern scene , the scholarly discussion of the origins, the scope, the durability and the implications of this change is only beginning to take place.

Syria Under Assad addresses itself to this discussion. Based on a carefully selected collection of original articles, this volume focuses on the elements of Syria's power, on Syria's relations with each of its neighbours as well as on Syria's relations with the superpowers. In the final analysis, conclude the editors, Syrian policies appear paradoxical. Its conduct ever since the advent of Hafez al-Assad exhibits subtle and hard-nosed pragmatism. Yet, in order to consolidate the domestic legitimacy of the Alawi Ba'athist regime, Syria has been impelled to articulate its foreign policy goals in the far-flung rhetoric of the Ba'athist ideology. As a result Syria is widely perceived of as a menace and, treated as such, it often responds in kind.

1

The Study of Syria

Moshe Ma‘oz and Avner Yaniv

Research on Syria has evolved in three fairly distinct perspectives. The first, and so far most elaborate, has focused primarily on politics and society within the Syrian state. Scholars in this area have concerned themselves primarily with the power struggle that has dominated Syrian politics since the inception of an independent Syrian polity. What were the traits of the generation of leaders who received the reins of power from the French? What were the causes and the consequences of the succession of coups d’état which took place between 1949 and 1963? What were the social bases of the new political and military elites which took over from the ancien régime during the 1950s? What were the emerging patterns of relations between the rising military, on the one hand, and the politicians, on the other hand? What were the social, ideological and personal origins of the power struggle among the Sunnis, the Alawis, the Druzes and the Christians and within each one of these religiously distinct communities, both before and after the advent of the Ba’ath? What were the socio-economic and political relations between town and country and among Syria’s competing regional centres? Finally, and perhaps most important of all, has a genuine political community emerged in the Syrian state? Or has Syria remained a largely artificial administrative edifice, hopelessly caught between the magnetic attraction of Pan-Arabism, on the one hand, and the even more vigorous attraction of local, particularist loyalties, on the other hand?¹

The second, but far less significant, focus of attention has been essentially a scholarly response to Syria’s growing involvement in Lebanon in the course of the 1970s. Writers on this topic have been concerned with Syria’s motives for steadily increasing its visibility in and impact on the troubled Lebanese scene. Specifically they have asked themselves whether Syria was out to fulfil a historic dream of glory or was merely acting in a strategic, damage-limiting fashion, responding to challenges as they presented themselves and ultimately more disposed to avoiding than to expanding intervention and making it permanent. In addition some writing in this area has also attempted to assess the viability, endurance, capabilities and operational reflexes within crisis contexts of the ever-growing Syrian state machinery.²

By shifting the emphasis of inquiry from the Syrian domestic scene to Syria’s external posture, this second perspective in the study of Syria has formed a necessary link between the domestic-political perspective and a third perspective, whose main concern is Syria’s foreign and security policies. This last trend, the most recent, clearly reflects the visible ascent of Syria as a regional actor. The roots of the foreign-policy perspective can be found in two larger assumptions. The first is that a ‘normal’ (as the term is employed by Kuhn³) Arab state system is rapidly emerging from the debris of the fading myth of Pan-Arabism. Once the most powerful force in the life of Arab individuals and Arab communities alike, a source of hope and inspiration, a blueprint for an Arab risorgimento, a welcome challenge to an illegitimate internal and wider regional order foisted upon the Arabs by European colonialism, a source of wars, revolutions, writings and ultimate despair, this myth has become, some writers argue forcefully, a spent force. It has led the Arabs to an abyss of internecine fighting, spectacular defeats at the hands of the Israelis and neo-colonial control by the superpowers.⁴ Inevitably, therefore, it led to the rise of a new reference point: namely, the individual Arab state, which by developing capabilities and dispensing extensive services is gradually and successfully turning itself into a focal point of enduring loyalty.

The process, to be sure, is not complete. Pan-Arabism remains officially a sacrosanct, overriding purpose. Arab nations in the European sense, connoting both internal and international legitimacy, have not yet fully emerged. Indeed, Arab state particularism is still formally a partially legitimate, but essentially transient phenomenon. But a notion of ‘stateness’ — i. e. a legitimate, enduring intermediary between specific Arab communities and the larger Arab nation — has already, some argue, become a preponderant fact.⁵ The second source of the foreign-policy perspective on Syrian politics follows logically from the first. If Arab ‘stateness’ has become a reality, then one can speak of the political process in the Middle East, not as a special case, but rather in the same terms employed for the analysis of international politics elsewhere. Some may invoke the European concept of a balance of power.⁶ Others may prefer to view the foreign relations of an Arab state as a test case of ‘linkage theory’.⁷ A third group of specialists prefer decision-making theory as the primary tool with which to analyse Arab foreign-policy-making in general and the Syrian case in particular.⁸

Assuming implicitly that the emergence of Syrian ‘stateness’ has led to a Syrian foreign policy in this ‘normal’ sense, and tending to de-emphasise the question of whether or not Syria is a fully integrated political community, this third perspective in the study of Syria, especially its decision-making variant, focuses on the foreign policy of the Assad regime as the enactment by a small group of decision-makers of a more or less distinct state policy, with goals, capabilities and apparatus. What these studies ask themselves more specifically are questions such as the following: What is the Syrian foreign-policy environment? What is the structure of the Syrian government that makes foreign policy? How does the Syrian political system operate, and how do internal interest groups and parties affect the government’s external behaviour? What are the main issue areas on the Syrian foreign-policy agenda? What foreign relations does Syria have? What are the objectives of its foreign policy, and what strategies and instruments does it employ to realise these objectives? Finally, how successful has Syria been in attaining these goals?⁹

Broadly speaking, such questions have guided the editors of this book, and it, therefore, falls squarely into the foreign-policy rather than in either of the two other perspectives. Yet by its very emphasis on decision-making, this approach raises an important general question that is particularly pertinent in the case of a polity as ‘closed’ as Syria. The foreign-policy perspective having its emphasis on decision-making makes two general assumptions: first, that foreign-policy-making is what de Gaulle defined as a domain reservé, the exclusive prerogative of a small, especially knowledgeable elite; second, that there is no way of understanding a country’s foreign policy without penetrating the decision-making ‘black box’, that secret nerve centre in which critical decisions are made. If this is the case, how does one collect sufficient evidence to account for Syria’s foreign policy? Is this at all possible? And if not, are we not advocating a research strategy whose requirements are totally beyond fulfilment?

The answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. ‘Yes’, because literally penetrating the Syrian ‘black box’ is, indeed, impossible. ‘No’, because there are ways of circumventing this seemingly insurmountable obstacle. Specifically it is arguable that the guiding principles, premises, preoccupations, techniques and objectives of any foreign-policy decision-making body will tend to fall into discernible patterns; the longer this body remains in power, the easier it should become to decipher its operational code as a functioning collectivity.¹⁰

The Assads — both Hafez and Rif‘at — Abdal-Halim Khaddam, Mustafa Tlas, Hikmat Shihabi and their colleagues have been in power for a long time. When they first emerged, King Idris was still ruling Libya, Nasser was still President of Egypt, Faisal King of Saudi Arabia, Golda Meir Prime Minister of Israel. Brezhnev then ruled supreme in Moscow and Nixon was making his first steps as President of the United States. The Ba’ath regime in Syria, more or less in its present configuration, is thus close to breaking not only Syria’s (unimpressive) record of ruling longevity, but also that of the Middle East as a whole (with the notable exceptions of Hussein in Jordan and the Taqritis in Iraq). It is, therefore, becoming increasingly easier, though not yet easy, to identify long-term patterns in the conduct of the Syrian regime even without penetrating the thick veil of secrecy in which Syria’s foreign-policy-making is shrouded. In practical terms, what this implies is a simple research strategy. The starting point is an investigation of the broader Syrian domestic scene, with a view to tracing emerging patterns. This entails two separate investigations. The first emphasises the political aspects, the second focuses on the main features of the Syrian economy. Decoupled for research purposes and then reintegrated again, such analyses (offered in this volume by Moshe Ma‘oz and Kais Firro, respectively) should yield a sound evaluation of strengths, weaknesses, problems, prospects and critical trade-offs faced by the Syrian system.

But this is surely not enough. If the elements of Syrian power — the most important domestic ‘givens’ affecting its foreign policy — are to be soundly appraised, they should be accompanied by a measurement of the evolution of Syria’s power over time relative to the international environment in which Syria operates. This methodologically demanding exercise calls for the participation, side by side with economic and social historians, of an international relations specialist. Zeev Ma‘oz offers an interesting example of what this entails in Chapter 4.

Part I of the volume seeks to identify patterns in the evolution of Syrian power. The intention of Part II is to underline patterns in Syria’s relations with its neighbours. The growth and the limits of Syria’s accommodation with its powerful neighbour to the north, Turkey, are discussed in Chapter 5 by David Kushner from the Turkish perspective. The steadfast, though somewhat incongruous alliance between Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran is analysed by Yair Hirschfeld in Chapter 6. Syria’s feud with its ideological twin to the east, Ba’athist Iraq, is appraised by Amazia Baram in Chapter 7. The significance and causes of Syria’s severely fluctuating relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan are studied in Chapter 8 by Joseph Nevo. Syria’s strategic behaviour in the context of its ever-escalating conflict with Israel is explored in Chapter 9 by Avner Yaniv. To complete the circle, Chapters 10 and 11 by, respectively, Itamar Rabinovich, Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv shift attention to Syria’s role in Lebanon and to its puzzling attitude to the PLO.

The discussion now moves to Part III, in which Yair Evron and Robert O. Freedman each discuss relations between the Ba’athist republic, on the one hand, and one of the two superpowers, on the other hand.

Most of the contributors to this volume are country specialists or, at least, area specialists. Most of them look at Syrian policy from the perspective of one of the other countries that have frequently been at the receiving end of Syrian policy. Consequently these various authors contribute not only to the identification of patterns in Syria’s behaviour, but also to the understanding of the far wider canvas of Middle East politics over the past decade and a half. The blend of historical survey and contemporary analysis which runs throughout the book provides the basis of the editors’ conclusion which addresses the primary questions: Where is Syria, especially as an actor on the Middle East scene, heading? What makes it such a seemingly restless, dangerous and obstinate entity? What, ultimately, makes Syria tick?

Notes

1. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1966); I. Ben-Tzur, ‘The Neo-Ba’ath Party of Syria’, Journal of Contemporary History vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1968), pp. 161–81; John Devlin, The Ba’ath Party (Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1976); William E. Hazen, Selected Minority Groups of the Middle East: The Alawis, Berbers, Druze and Kurds (American Institute for Research, Kensington, MD, 1973); Raymond A. Hinnenbusch, ‘Local Politics in Syria: Organization and Mobilization in Four Village Cases’, Middle East Journal vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter 1976), pp. 1–24; Malcolm H. Kerr,’Hafez Assad and the Changing Patterns of Syrian Politics’, International Journal vol. 28, no. 4 (Autumn 1973), pp. 689–706; Thomas Koszinowski, ‘Die Innenpolitische Entwicklung in Syrien seit der Machtergriefungdes Ba’ath im Marz 1963’, Orient vol. 13, no. 3 (September 1972), pp. 95–100; Avigdor Levi, ‘The Syrian Communists and the Ba’ath Power Struggle, 1966–70’, in Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir (eds.), The USSR and the Middle East (Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1973), pp. 395–417; Moshe Ma‘oz, ‘Alawi Military Officers in Syrian Polities’, in H.Z. Schiffrin (ed.), The Military and State in Modern Asia (Academic Press, Jerusalem, 1976), pp. 277–97; Moshe Ma‘oz, Attempts at Creating a Political Community in Modern Syria’, Middle East Journal, vol. 26, no. 4 (Autumn 1972), pp. 389–404; Tabitha Petran, Syria (Praeger, New York, 1972): Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba’ath, 1963–6; The Army-Party Symbiosis (Halsted Press, New York, 1972); Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (Oxford University Press, New York, 1965): Martin Seymour; ‘The Dynamics of Power in Syria Since the Break with Egypt’, Middle Eastern Studies vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1970), pp. 35–47; Gad Softer, The Role of the Officers Class in Syrian Politics and Society’, PhD dissertation, American University, Washington DC, 1968; Michael D. Suleiman, ‘Syria: Disunity in Diversity’, in Tareq Ismael (ed.), Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East (Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill., 1970), pp. 213–30; Gordon H. Torrey, ‘Aspects of the Political Elite in Syria’, in George H. Lenczowski (ed.), Political Elites in the Middle East, (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1975), pp. 151–61; George H. Torrey, ‘The Ba’ath: Ideology and Practice’, Middle East Journal Vol. 23, no. 4 (1969), pp. 445–70; N. Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (Croom Helm, London, 1979); Michael H. Van Dusen, ‘Syria: The Downfall of a Traditional Elite’, in Frank Tachau (ed.), Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East (Shenkman, Cambridge, MA, 1975), pp. 115–55; Michael H. Van Dusen, ‘Political Integration and Regionalism in Sy...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 The Study of Syria
• Part I The Elements of Syrian Power
• Part II Syria and Its Neighbours
• Part III Syria and the Superpowers
• Part IV The Syrian Paradox
• Index