Policing: Toward an Unknown Future

John Crank, Colleen Kadleck

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415618182
• eBook ISBN: 9781317981855
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

The enclosed papers are the culmination of a project Dr. John Crank and Dr. Colleen Kadleck carried out assessing issues facing the police into the early 21st century. The papers are future oriented, in the sense that they anticipate trends visible today. Everywhere, the contributing scholars found that the organizational concept, practice, and function of the police were undergoing transition. Yet, the seeming state-level hardening of the police function was ubiquitous. Two themes were noteworthy. On the one hand, in developing or 'second world' countries, police face endemic problems of corruption, organized crime, and drugs. Police, in response, are undergoing centralization and intensification of law enforcement activities. In countries with first world economies – Canada, the United States, and Australia – contributors discovered trends toward expansion of the police function, a trend described by Brodeur as toward 'high policing'. It reflects the growing reliance on surveillance for crime control and for the tracking of minority, indigenous, and immigrant populations in crime prevention efforts. The results suggest that governments, sometimes encouraged by their citizenry, seem increasingly to rely on the police to deal with a broad array of social as well as criminal problems.

This book was originally published as a special issue of Police Practice and Research.

The challenges to developing democratic policing in post-Soviet societies: the Russian experience

Adrian Beck^a and Annette Robertson^b
aUniversity of Leicester, Leicester, UK; ^bGlasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK

This paper reviews the nature of policing in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, focusing on the major challenges the country continues to face in transforming the police from guardians of the former Communist Party to servants of the public. It concludes by offering an evaluation of the reforms undertaken to date, the prospects for a more democratic and transparent Russian police service in the future, and the broader lessons that can be learnt about the deep-seated problems faced by countries emerging from a post-Soviet past.

Introduction

The extent of democratic reform in the societies emerging from Soviet control and influence can best be described as patchy and inconsistent, with some countries making considerable progress while others continue to reflect many of the autocratic practices of the past. Reforming criminal justice systems – the quintessence of the former regime – has proved to be a particularly difficult, drawn out, and contentious task for many countries (Ferreira, 1996). Although the rhetoric of modernizing and democratizing the criminal justice system is regularly espoused by political elites, particularly in terms of signing up to international conventions on human rights and inviting overseas groups to participate in reform projects, political discourse has been dominated by issues of crime control and order maintenance rather than broadening access to justice and increasing transparency and accountability: ‘increased crime rates and fear of crime have resulted in order maintenance replacing freedom and democracy at the top of political agendas’ (Mawby, 2001, p. 31). Indeed, for many states of the former Soviet Union, the start of the twenty-first century has seen them continuing with criminal justice systems that remain highly centralized and for the most part politicized and militarized police forces (Mawby, 2001; Shelley, 1999).

In Russia relatively little progress has been made in democratizing police relations with the public despite numerous declarations, presidential edicts, and changes to the law. Declarations expressing the need to re-orient the police towards public needs, develop more transparency, and make public opinion the main criterion for evaluating police performance have in reality produced very little change in practices and procedures. Their reputation continues to be one of an agency that routinely violates human rights, is involved in corruption, and acts primarily in the pursuit of their own interests (Gilinsky, 2000; Shelley, 1999). Consequently, public trust in the police remains extremely low (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Zvekic, 1996).

This paper reviews the nature of policing in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, focusing on the major challenges the country continues to face in transforming the police from guardians of the former Communist Party to servants of the public. It concludes by offering an evaluation of the reforms undertaken to date, the prospects for a more democratic and transparent Russian police service in the future, and the broader lessons that can be learnt about the deep-seated problems faced by countries emerging from a post-Soviet past.

Historical context of policing and police reform in Russia

The collapse of the Soviet Union left 15 newly independent states with criminal justice systems characterized by a legal, cultural, and organizational framework that firmly bore the mark of totalitarian regimes (Shelley, 1996). In the chaos that followed many countries faced the unenviable challenge of overhauling their criminal justice systems at the same time as their economic, social, and political infrastructures crumbled. In Russia this abrupt transition was accompanied by soaring crime rates, including violent crime, and weakening social control (Gilinsky, 2006). Unlike other governmental agencies such as the KGB and the Ministry of Justice, which were relatively quick to respond to the challenges ahead, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the MVD – Ministertsvo Vnutrennykh Del), which is responsible for policing and the police – or the militsiya (the militia), as they are known in Russia – performed much more poorly. Although extensive attempts have been made to reform the militia since the early 1990s, they continue to be seen as part of the problem of the lack of law and order in the country, rather than the solution.

Since the early 1990s, a series of reforms of the militia has been introduced, admirably guided by the principles of guaranteeing human rights and freedoms, providing a more determined fight against crime, and maintaining public order and safety. Much new legislation was introduced and many changes made to the organization and functions of the militia (see Beck & Robertson, 2005 for details), but the success of these changes has been mixed, with many changes being perceived as piecemeal, partial, and problematic. Consequently, many key characteristics of policing in Russia continue to challenge the reform process, as detailed below.

Violating human rights

The militia’s record in terms of observing and respecting the rights of the Russian public can best be described as poor. For example, abuses of power are widespread in their treatment of suspects, as reported by the Russian media and human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (2002, 2003, 2007) and Human Rights Watch (2006). Moreover, depending on the source of information, between one-third (Ekho Moskvy Radio, 2005) and one-half (Coalson, 2004) of all complaints made to Russia’s Human Rights’ Ombudsman concern the activity of the militia. Complaints include allegations of torture, beatings, unlawful detention, planting evidence, and illegal searches, leading the Ombudsman to describe the state of human rights in law enforcement agencies as ‘a most important and pressing issue’ (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2004). Russian citizens increasingly turn to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for assistance, and the latter regularly issues edicts against Russia for breaches of its citizens’ human rights, including the militia’s continued use of torture and other illegal methods to secure confessions (Amnesty International, 2006). It is likely that Russian citizens, frustrated by the lack of perceived justice obtained from their national judiciary, which is not always seen to act impartially, will continue to turn to the ECHR to protect and uphold their rights.

Problems of impartiality and political bias

Particularly problematic is the prevailing attitudes of some members of the militia towards certain ethnic minority groups, particularly those from the Caucuses and former Soviet Asian republics, who are often labeled as ‘drug dealers’ and more recently as ‘terrorists’ (Amnesty International, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Shelley, 1999). The militia are also seen to discriminate against other groups in society, including political opponents of the regime and gay rights’ activists, who have found themselves on the receiving end of the heavy hand of the law, whilst according to Gilinsky (2006) nationalist, anti-Semitic, neo-fascist, and skinhead groups act with impunity.

Moreover, the militia also have a checkered record of protecting individuals and businesses from crime. This is particularly evident in their involvement in commercial disputes (Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huerou, 2004; Solomon, 2005), whereby the militia simply support whichever side pays them to do so.

This lack of neutrality extends to politics: again in keeping with the Soviet tradition of acting as ‘instruments of the Communist regime’ (Conquest, 1968, p. 30), the Russian militia remain far from a-political (Timoshenko, 1997) and political affiliation appears as strong now as it was during Soviet times. To a significant extent this is dictated by political structures and allegiances, since at the highest level of government the Minister of the Interior is appointed by the President. From 2001 to 2004 militia reform was spearheaded by Boris Gryzlov, one of the leaders of the United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) political party, which supported President Putin. Whilst in post as Minister of the Interior, Gryzlov faced criticism about his political affiliation and reliance on the MVD at all ranks to support the Party and the President – by, for example, campaigning during elections – given that the militia are expected to be politically neutral (Latynina, 2003).

This type of political allegiance continues down through the ranks as regional militia chiefs are directly responsible to the President, whilst local militia units are largely dependent upon the local authorities for resources such as office buildings and their upkeep, as well as housing for militia personnel. At grass roots level officers (and also militia cadets/students) are subservient to their superior officers (who, in turn, are under the control of the local, regional, or national authorities), facilitating a type of political association and interference, which directly contravenes the law on the militia, forbidding engagement in political activity, including campaigning. In this respect the political hierarchy not only supports but reinforces the status quo, whilst simultaneously ruling out any possibility of dissent or deviation within the militia from the official line, a dynamic which is likely to continue as there are strong indications that Russia is once again moving towards being a state dominated by one party, which will clearly have implications for militia reform.

Inertia in organizational reform

While on the surface a great deal of organizational reform has been planned and/or implemented in the Russian militia during the last 10–15 years, this has occurred with apparently little real impact on the efficiency or effectiveness of policing. Landmarks in organizational change include the transfer in 2000 of the penitentiary system from the MVD to the Ministry of Justice, and in 2001 of the fire department to the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Relief. These transfers of responsibility were seen as a means of allowing the MVD to rid itself of significant logistical burdens, enabling it to focus on core law enforcement duties, but the measures were in fact required under the membership terms laid down by the Council of Europe.

Perhaps more importantly, in 2002 plans were announced for the decentralization of certain elements of policing with the creation of new municipal or local public security units, funded by regional governments and controlled by the local authorities: these were to maintain the name ‘militia.’ This was to be accompanied by the reorganization of criminal investigation departments (CID), which were to be funded and controlled by the MVD at the federal level, and renamed ‘the police.’ These two organizations were to be complemented by a third, a National-Guard-type organization that encompassed the MVD’s special units and internal troops (Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huerou, 2004). These proposed changes could have resulted in a measure of decentralization of public policing that would have both weakened the centre’s control over local policing – a positive step in terms of democratic models of policing (Solomon, 2005) – whilst also lessening its financial burden to the localities. Despite assurances that the new structure would be in place by 2004, it never materialized. Why these plans were not implemented is unclear: much criticism was leveled at the proposals from many quarters, including the MVD, which highlighted the lack of preparation by local authorities to assume such responsibilities and raised fears of local crime groups being able to exert too much influence, but a key issue here was doubtless the probable undermining of government control that could have resulted from such decentralization. The end result, however, is that policing in Russia remains highly centralized, with decision-making lying at the top of a pyramid system of control, which ensures that, although responsibility is devolved throughout the federation to regional, city, district, and local policing units, it is organized on the basis of a strict hierarchy, limiting the extent to which local needs can be addressed and instead prioritizing centrally determined targets set by national diktat.

Maintaining the status quo

In Russia the militia are responsible for many functions traditionally carried out by police forces in other countries, such as the maintenance of public order, crime prevention and investigation, and traffic control, but their remit extends to additional areas, not generally associated with policing in advanced democracies, for example, vehicle registration, transportation security, issuing visas, internal passports and residence permits, as well as licenses for printing presses. The militia – in the form of local or beat officers – also act as a probation service for millions of ex-prisoners (Nurgaliev, 2005). Most of the latter functions are, again, largely a legacy of the Soviet era, whereby the militia were part of the system of totalitarian control and supervision over the population as a whole, primarily through the use of internal passports and residence permits.

The issuing of internal passports – used as a type of national identity card – began in 1932 as a means of controlling the movements of the Soviet population, and in particular to regulate the urban and rural populations (Conquest, 1968). As such they were deemed to be one of a series of ‘quasi-political controls’ that also included the licensing system and the police ancillary and informer networks, all of which were used to enforce the system on which the Communist dictatorship depended for its existence (Conquest, 1968). Given this background, it is hugely significant that, despite the collapse of the Soviet regime, much of this system continues to exist.

For example, the internal passport system worked hand in hand with the propiska (permit) system, whereby in order to secure work in the cities, everyone was required to have a valid residence permit provided by the militia. Although acknowledged as being anti-constitutional (Shelley, 1999), the propiska system is still widely used in Russia’s larger cities and still closely administered by the militia. As well as regulating population movements, the propiska and internal passports systems provide ample opportunity for abuse, for example, the militia use the regulation to extort bribes from those found not to be in possession of one or the other. Likewise, for some people not eligible for residence permits in cities such as Moscow, offering a bribe to a militia officer is perhaps the only way to remain in the city.

Two-speed policing —...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Series Editor's Preface
• Introduction: remarks by the Editors
• 1. The challenges to developing democratic policing in post-Soviet societies: the Russian experience
• 2. Venezuela: the shifting organizational framework for the police
• 3. Canadian crime control in the new millennium: the influence of neo-conservative US policies and practices
• 4. Afghanistan at a crossroads: the quest for democratic policing in a post-9/11 era
• 5. Reforming La Policía: looking to the future of policing in Mexico
• 6. The futures of policing African states
• 7. Policing in an era of uncertainty
• 8. Trends in police research: a cross-sectional analysis of the 2006 literature
• 9. The USA: the next big thing
• 10. International Police Executive Symposium
• Index