Saudi Arabia

Society, Government and the Gulf Crisis

Mordechai Abir

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415093255
• eBook ISBN: 9781317799337
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This much-revised edition of Professor Abir's Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era now includes consideration of both Gulf Wars. Abir examines the social and political forces that have shaped Saudi Arabia, including the impact of Islam and of Westernization, drawing heavily on Saudi sources. There is also essential analysis of regional security dilemmas and of the country's prospects in the post-Gulf War era.

Part I

Ruling Class and Elites in Saudi Arabia

1

The Consolidation of the Ruling Class

The Saudi population, at the beginning of the twentieth century, could be considered, with some exceptions, a classless society. There was no upper class to speak of in Arabia at the time. Only a small proportion of the merchants and the ulama in the towns of Hijaz and Najd could be described as ‘middle class’. The great majority of the Arabians – townspeople as well as the rural nomads and agriculturalists – lived at or near subsistence level. The unification of the Saudi kingdom by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, in the first decades of the century, consolidated the power and authority of a new Saudi ruling class – the aristocracy. The development of the kingdom’s oil industry since 1938 and the modernisation of Saudi Arabia after World War II, produced, moreover – in addition to existing regional and other differences – new classes and a relatively rigid social structure. The latter depends not so much on power, wealth and education as on affiliation to the ruling family and on regional (Najd), tribal (noble) and urban or rural origin.

The reconquest of Dari‘yya (Riyadh) in January 1902 is considered in Saudi annals as the beginning of the modern Saudi kingdom. The small army of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud was composed at the time of a few score relatives, in-laws and some bedouin. Abdallah ibn Jiluwi was said to have twice saved the life of his ‘cousin’ Abd al-Aziz (henceforth also Ibn Saud). Subsequently, the Jiluwis, a cadet branch of Al Saud,¹ gained a key position in the kingdom’s ruling class. Such a development is typical of considerations which influenced the formation of that class in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, members of other important families who helped Ibn Saud in the consolidation of his kingdom were incorporated into the Saudi aristocracy. At their side, the ulama led by Al al-Shaykh (the descendants of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabiyya), and important tribal and regional umara’ (singular amir) who joined Ibn Saud’s camp at this stage can be considered part of the Saudi ruling class.

Ibn Saud continued to expand his power base by numerous matrimonial arrangements with traditional regional rulers and important tribal shaykhs (umara’).² Most significant, however, was his affiliation with the powerful Sudayris of northern Arabia, who had already intermarried with the Sauds in the past.

Contrary to the Wahhabi-Saudi jihad of previous centuries, Ibn Saud’s military campaigns were not aimed at spreading the Wahhabiyya but rather at re-establishing the authority of the House of Saud. The historical alliance between the Najdi ulama and Ibn Saud had not been automatically reinstated. The ulama viewed Ibn Saud’s government with reservation, if not with suspicion, and did not regard him as sufficiently pious. He toyed with technological innovations which they considered heretical innovation (bid’ah). He did not conduct jihads against the polytheists (mushrikun) in the region, and he was known to associate with the British infidel authorities in the Persian Gulf.

The cementing of the relationship between Al Saud and Al al-Shaykh through matrimonial arrangements, and the preferential treatment accorded to the religious hierarchy, undoubtedly contributed to the improvement of relations between the king and the majority of the urban Najdi ulama. Moreover, in order to establish a loyal military force to carry out his plans and overcome the natural opposition of bedouin tribes to law and order, about 1912 Ibn Saud revived the Ikhwan movement. Ulama volunteers (muttawwa‘in³), some of tribal origin, were sent to teach the bedouin the principles of the Wahhabiyya, and land and funds were apportioned for their settlement. By 1930 this movement led to the settlement of approximately 150,000 bedouin in over 200 military-agricultural villages (hujar).⁴

After 1913 the Ikhwan were principally responsible for Ibn Saud’s conquests including Jabal Shammar, the Hijaz and Asir, and became the mainstay of his regime. As a result, the importance of the tribal umara’ and the muttawwa‘in, and the Najdi ulama in general, rapidly increased.

As he became more dependent on them, the leading tribal umara’, some of whom had previously been Ibn Saud’s bitter enemies, and the more fanatic ulama, exploited their new leverage to coerce their ruler to accept their extreme interpretation of the Wahhabiyya and their right to intervene in the running of the kingdom. Yet Ibn Saud chose to overlook the Ikhwan’s excesses in order to avoid an open breach with them.

After the First World War Ibn Saud accelerated his efforts to establish a united centralised kingdom in the Arabian Peninsula. For this purpose he planned to introduce aspects of modern administration and Western technology not contrary to the principles of Islam. Moreover, aware of the political realities in the region, he co-ordinated his activities, as much as possible, with the British authorities.

Such policies were anathema to the Ikhwan and to most of the Najdi ulama. The fact that the ruler had also begun to consolidate his dynastic rule and had taken to himself, instead of the traditional title of Amir Najd, the title of ‘Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies’ (1921) and ‘King of the Hijaz’ (1926) added fuel to the fire. Indeed, both tribal shaykhs and ulama connected to the Ikhwan were convinced that if they were not to stop Ibn Saud, or at least limit his authority, they would be incapable of doing so in the future.

The Ikhwan rebellion (1927–30)⁵ was not only a challenge to Ibn Saud’s policy but also a desperate attempt on the part of the leading Ikhwan amirs and some fanatic ulama to preserve their power and the traditional socio-political frameworks from which they derived it. It was especially dangerous because its leaders, supported by a few prominent ulama, took on the mantle of defenders of puritanic Wahhabism and underscored the community’s inherent right to replace a leader who betrayed its principles or who was incapable of carrying out his duties.

Ibn Saud’s final victory over the Ikhwan in 1929/30, with the establishing of a national army and a centralised administration, deprived the tribal shaykhs and the ulama of the power to intervene, on their own initiative, in the conduct of state affairs. It led to a sharp decline in the power of the latter and eroded the ulama’s political influence.

There are about 50 senior tribal amirs and a few hundred shaykhs (umara’) of secondary tribes and sub-tribes in Saudi Arabia.⁶ The power and authority of these amirs has been gradually declining since 1930 as the power and authority of the Saudi kingdom and its government were consolidated and its administration and army expanded. Most important, Ibn Saud’s revenues dramatically increased following the conquest of the Hijaz and commercial exploitation of oil in Saudi Arabia (1946). Thus the Saudi ruler was now able to purchase armaments and transport and to ‘buy’ the loyalty of the tribesmen. Thereafter the amirs’ potential to resist him was completely nullified and they became part of the Saudi regime’s power base. They are considered a component of the ruling class, although inferior to the others.

After 1930, Ibn Saud still upheld whenever possible the golden rule of shura (consultation) and ijma‘ (consensus) concerning most non-political major decisions. Nevertheless, he was now able to disregard the ulama’s objections to his limited modernising measures, essential for the consolidation and development of his kingdom. Otherwise he devoutly espoused Wahhabi principles, his kingdom’s raison d’être, and confined the process of modernisation to the most essential.

Notwithstanding the consolidation of his power, Ibn Saud continued to show respect for and pamper the ulama, whose support was still essential for the legitimisation of his regime. Yet, consultations with their rank and file during the king’s daily council (majlis)⁷ and with the senior ulama in a far more important weekly majlis, could no longer be viewed as a recognition of their supreme authority and right to participate in decision-making. Indeed, in matters of importance, although he consulted them, he made his final decision according to what he considered right and, whenever necessary, disregarded their opinion.

The ulama, who were coerced into accepting the new status quo, realised that, none the less, Wahhabi hegemony and their special position in the kingdom were still guaranteed, but their actual power and influence were to be dependent on the ruler’s good will. Even as junior partners of the Sauds, they enjoyed high prestige, privileges and influence. As the kingdom’s government and administration developed they were given, in addition to control of religious institutions, key positions in it, including justice and the educational system.

Paradoxically, the role and authority of the ulama further declined after the rise of King Faysal, whom they helped bring to the throne in 1964. Related through his mother to Al al-Shaykh, and known for his piety, Faysal, nevertheless, deliberately eroded the ulama’s power and independence. Frequently he ignored their opposition to aspects of his accelerated modernisation. Lastly, he curbed the authority and activities of the Committees for Encouraging Virtue and Preventing Vice (Hay’at al-Amr bi’l-Ma‘ruf wa’l-Nahy ‘an al-Munkar) (henceforth the Morality Committees and the Morality Police).

The above notwithstanding, both the Sauds and the ulama, each for their own reasons, have a vested interest in the preservation of their historical alliance. On the one hand, it contributes to the regime’s legitimisation, to stability and to national integration. On the other hand, it helps preserve the Wahhabi character of, and the role of the ulama in, the kingdom.

Regardless of the decline in their power and influence, the ulama thus remain an important component of the Saudi ruling class. In the scale of importance of the traditional elites they come immediately after the royal house and its collateral and associated families, but above the umara’. Indeed, in contrast to the umara’ they are organised, have a hierarchy, leadership, state-supported institutions and common interests which bind them as a cohesive group. The activities of the Al-Shaykhs, moreover, are no longer restricted to religion. Many are now to be found in key positions in the administration, educational system, security services, armed forces and in the private sector of the Saudi economy.⁸

It is generally accepted that the House of Saud, the ulama and the umara’ – the most important components of the regime’s power base – are in fact the Saudi ruling class. The size of this class is difficult to determine. The ‘recognised’ branches of Al Saud, and their associated important families, are generally estimated to be about 10,000 strong. The ulama, their associates and all the members of the religious hierarchy in Saudi Arabia probably number tens of thousands. Indeed Al al-Shaykh has intermarried with all the other branches of the ruling class, by itself believed to consist of about 7,000 people. As for the umara’ and their extended families, their number is probably equal to that of the religious establishment. Thus, the size of the Saudi ruling class, in the wider sense, is quite substantial.

Some scholars classify the Saudi kingdom as an autocracy. Others call it a ‘desert democracy’.⁹ The more appropriate description of the Saudi regime after the death of Ibn Saud is probably an oligarchy whose pillars are the Saudi royal house, the ulama and the umara’. The conduct of its government still follows Ibn Saud’s golden rule of consultation (shura) and consensus (ijma‘) within the ruling class.

The monarch has a power of veto over all the decisions of the executive system (government and administration). Indeed, notwithstanding the principles of shura and ijma‘ the king can also veto, at least in theory, decisions of his informal royal Consultative Council (majlis al-shura),¹⁰ the representative organ of the Saudi oligarchy. Yet in certain circumstances, the oligarchy, through its unofficial leadership – ahl al-hal wa’l-‘aqd (lit. ‘those who loosen and bind’) – may overrule the king, limit his authority and, in extreme cases, even depose him, as was the case with King Saud (1964). Thus, if the policies of the king were to threaten the kingdom’s stability and the regime’s power, a similar coalition to that which deposed Saud could re-emerge.

Unlike the traditional Islamic concept of the ahl al-hal wa’l-‘aqd, this informal institution is not dominated in Saudi Arabia by the ulama. Most sources agree that membership in the Saudi ahl al-hal wa’l-‘aqd is limited to about a hundred and fifty members of Al Saud and its associated families – and some outstanding ulama and several extremely important umara’.¹¹ The criteria for membership in this authoritative body are origin, seniority, prestige and leadership qualities (scholarship and piety for the ulama), according to bedouin tradition.

Leading ulama have usually participated with the other components of ahl al-hal wa’l-‘aqd in consultations preceding or following dramatic developments impacting the Saudi government. These included Saud’s coerced abdication, the Mecca rebellion in 1979, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the invitation extended to the US to protect the kingdom in 1990. In several such instances fatwas (religious-legal opinion) were also issued by the ulama leadership. Yet, the ulama’s participation in the above and in the informal royal Consultative Council, the kingdom’s decision-and policy-making organ, is largely ad hoc and conditional on the need for religious sanction for specific decisions.¹²

The umara’ – tribal shaykhs and members of regional dynasties – provide the third leg of the tripod of the Sauds’ traditional power base. Yet, just a handful of the most important umara’ are considered ahl al-hal wa’l-‘aqd. Indeed, only a few exceptionally important amirs have been invited in times of crisis or in relation to major policy debates, to participate in consultations of the informal royal majlis al-shura.¹³

Despite their role in the provincial government, the importance of the umara’, as mentioned above, has declined steadily, a process accelerated by the reorganisation and strengthening of the central government by King Faysal. Simultaneously, the strengthening of central government and the extension of its administration and welfare services to the provinces eroded, until the early 1980s, the authority of the provincial governors (umara’ al-manatiq) and government. Moreover, the decline in authority of the umara’ gathered momentum after the 1960s, also, as a result of the rapid urbanisation of the bedouins and agricultural population. Indeed, the average Saudi found himself increasingly turning to the ce...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Tables
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Ruling Class and Elites in Saudi Arabia
• Part II Modernisation and Struggle for Political Reform
• Part III Crises in the Gulf
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Glossary
• Index