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Part I
Introduction
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1 How Media Inform Democracy
Central Debates
Toril Aalberg and James Curran
Public opinion constitutes one of the cornerstones of democracy. Citizens are assumed to hold preferences for particular polices, know where parties and candidates for office are located on the relevant policy dimensions, and cast their votes accordingly. In other words, democracy functions best when its citizens are politically informed. Access to information is essential to the health of democracy for at least two reasons. First, it ensures that citizens make responsible, informed choices rather than act out of ignorance or misinformation. Second, information serves a âchecking functionâ by ensuring that representatives uphold their oaths of office and carry out, broadly, the wishes of those who elected them.
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) have demonstrated that informed citizens are better citizens as judged by the standards of democratic theory. They are more likely to participate in politics, more likely to have meaningful, stable attitudes on issues, better able to link their interests with their attitudes, and more likely to choose political candidates who represent their views. But in order to express political views and identify their self-interests, citizens need relevant and up-to-date information about current affairs.
Politically relevant information is now more widely available than at any time in the past. But never before has it been so easy to avoid news and current affairs in the media (Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Prior 2007). The rise of cable TV and the Internet have given people greater control over what media they consume. In the US, this has enabled people with a strong preference for entertainment to limit their exposure to public affairs information, and the world of politics more generally (Prior 2007).
Some researchers also criticize the quality of information provided by news media. Increased market influence and changing news values are said to have depleted the information environment, even for those who seek out the news (Entman 1989; Postman 1985; Patterson 1993; 2000a). One of the main problems, it is argued, is that increasing competition in the news market has encouraged journalists to sensationalize the news (Vettehen et al. 2006; Ărnebring 2003; Slattery et al. 2001), and to present politics as a game or a soap opera in order to make it more interesting (Witelbols 2004). It is also argued that television news is becoming softer and more de-contextualized, and that many newspapers have adjusted to TV competition by shifting to more entertainment-oriented and less fact-based reporting.
The overall aim of this book is to study the information given by the news media to the public cross-nationally and to investigate how this information influences the publicâs knowledge, awareness, and perceptions of current affairs. The book will add, it is hoped, to knowledge in two main areas: first, the comparative study of media systems and second, the role of political communication and media influence.
MEDIA SYSTEMS AND THE STRUCTURAL BIAS OF NEWS COVERAGE
Although empirical political communication research can be traced as far back as the 1930s, it has never developed a strong comparative tradition. Most political communication research is based on studies of individual countries, and the vast majority of this research is concerned only with the US. This single-country approach has encouraged researchers to ignore the influence of different media structures on news coverage, and on what people know. Yet, how broadcasting is organized within a country, or the relative importance of newspapers in relation to television, are factors that can influence the information provided by the news media, and thus its potential effect on the political knowledge and culture of society.
The dearth of comparative research can also give rise to misleading generalization. There is a tendency for scholars to assume that research findings from their country are valid everywhereâwhat Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 75) refer to as ânaĂŻve universalismâ. It is also a problem that most previous research has been based on evidence from the US since there are good grounds for thinking that the US is significantly different from other western democracies in terms of its media environment, political system, history, and culture (Lipset 1996; Wilson 1998). Against this background, it is important to study cross-nationally the relationship between media systems, the supply of information, and public knowledge and perceptions.
In their influential work on comparing media systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) suggest that an important media system characteristic is the structure of media markets, and in particular, the relative strength of the mass circulation press. What is especially significant, they argue, is whether or not newspapers are read mainly by the political class or whether they reach a wider public. They also contend that the presence or absence of a mass circulation press is accompanied by differences in the respective roles of print and electronic media (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 24). In countries where per capita newspaper circulation is low, the mass public relies more heavily on electronic media for information. Press differences are linked to geography. Scandinavian and other North European countries tend to have high rates of newspaper circulation while Southern Europe has low rates; North Atlantic countries tend to fall between two rates.
Some also argue that the relative popularity of the newspaper press matters because newspapers convey more information than general TV. The format of newspapers allows them to offer more news, and potentially more issue-specific and contextualized news than TV (Esaiasson and HĂ„kansson 2002; Iyengar 1991). By contrast, the time available for a TV newscast allows for fewer words or stories than a newspaper. This is one reason, it is claimed, why television generally offers less coverage and less informative reporting (Druckman 2005; Just et al. 1996; Mondak 1995; Neuman et al. 1992; Robinson and Davis 1990).
In addition, television viewers usually have no control over the pace at which they receive information, unlike newspaper readers. The visual aspects and conventions of television can also lead to an emphasis on personality rather than policy, and on episodic rather than thematic news (Bennett 2003; Druckman 2005; Eveland and Scheufele 2000; Graber 1993; Iyengar 1991; Keeter 1987; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). Some even claim that modern television must, by its very nature, be entertaining rather than educational (Postman 1985). However, these technology-centered generalizations tend to ignore the fact that newspapers vary greatly between countries. There is a striking contrast, for example, between the relatively devolved, public affairs-oriented Finnish press, and the more nationally centralized, entertainment-centered British press (Curran, Salovaara-Moring, Coen, and Iyengar 2010).
Another important media system characteristic, in Hallin and Manciniâs schema (2004: 41), is the role of the state in funding broadcasting. In some countries, public television remains both well-resourced and important, while in others it is impoverished and marginalized. In general, public funding of television is much higher in Europe than in North America. However, PBS dependence on commercial revenue varies considerably within Europe.
It is also argued that Americaâs commercial media system gives relatively little attention to public and foreign affairs. âSoft newsâ has grown at the expense of âhard newsâ on American network television during the last two decades (Hamilton 2004: 184). According to one estimate, the time devoted to entertainment, disasters, and accidents more then doubled in network television newscasts between 1990 and 1998 at the expense of public affairs coverage (Bennett 2003: 14). The US media coverage of foreign affairs also declined during the post-Cold War period of 1988â1996 (Schudson and Tifft 2005: 35), as did its investment in foreign news-gathering (Shanor 2003).
Although researchers have pointed to the increasing commercialization of European media systems, âinformation programsâ still account for a substantial proportion of both total and prime-time output in much of West-European television (Curran 2002: 192). However, within the European context there are significant differences between different types of channel output. Syvertsen (2002: 42) and Carlson and Harrie (2001: 121â25) demonstrate that news and information constitute a larger share of the programs in the traditional public service channels compared to the commercial channels, where the focus tends to be more oriented towards drama, entertainment, and sport.
These and related studies provide a cue for this inquiry. Drawing on this literature, one hypothesis that will be explored, through a systematic content analysis, is that strong commercial television, with limited regulation, gives rise to a high level of soft news, and a small proportion of contextualized public and foreign affairs news. We also anticipate that strong public service television, and extensive regulation, will result in a higher ratio of hard news relative to soft news. While the indicators are less clear-cut in the case of the press, we expect press systems that receive significant public subsidies will be more public affairs oriented than unsupported press systems.
We will also investigate whether there is a connection between market imperatives and how the news is reported. We hypothesize that the episodic framing of news (see Iyengar 1991), which takes the form of narrowly event-focused or human interest-centered news reports, will be more dominant in commercial and TV-dominated media systems. The reasoning behind this is that this type of reporting is less time-consuming, is perceived to be more entertaining, and makes fewer demands on the audience. By contrast, we anticipate that thematic framing, which relates a news story to a wider context, or the general public good, will be more in evidence in systems where public service broadcasting and print media are strong.
In short, we expect there to be systematic national variations in the supply of news, reflecting differences in the way in which the media are organized. We also anticipate that variations in news supply will be linked to differences in news demand. A lifelong process of political socialization can transmit a variety of psychological resources that predispose individuals to keep abreast of current events. For some citizens, attentiveness to news and current affairs may reflect a strong sense of civic duty. How strong this sense of duty is may be influenced, in turn, by the degree of trust in government and in the news media. Individuals who believe that they are capable of influencing the actions of government officials will also be more likely to monitor the actions of these officials. Similarly, high trust in the news media is likely to be associated with high media consumption. Conversely, those who feel that the news media rarely can be trusted or that it makes no difference which party is in power may feel less of an obligation to keep up with public affairs news.
In other words, our general hypothesis is that the organization and structure of the media influences what information is available to national publics, and that national differences of media systems give rise to different national information diets. But before we turn to the question of how this may influence public knowledge and perceptions we also have to consider an alternative, competing hypothesis. Within the research community there is a growing conviction that globalization is making media systems more similar. Hallin and Mancini (2004: 47â48) are leading proponents of this view, arguing that the North Atlantic âLiberal Model ⊠is indeed the wave of the future, in the sense that most media systems are moving in important ways in its directionâ. Their argument is based on four broad claims. First, there is increasing market influence on media systems, typified by the âcommercial delugeâ in western Europe during the 1980sâ 1990s when public service broadcast monopolies were broken, and new commercial TV enterprises were launched. This encouraged a shift, they argue, towards âthe dramatized, personalized and popularized style [of news reporting] pioneered in the United Statesâ (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 252). Second, there has developed a global culture of journalism, strongly influenced by the Anglo-American professional model. Third, newspapers linked to political parties and organized social groups are in decline. And, fourth, a number of social and political changesâsuch as increased secularization (leading to a decline of political-religious dogma) and the growing marketization and professionalization of politicsâhas contributed, in their view, to a general process of homogenization that is influencing media systems in many parts of the world.1
These arguments are supported by other studies. Numerous accounts bear witness to the increasing commercialization of media systems (Hardy 2008; Iosfidis 2007; Klimkiewicz 2010). Plasser (2005) demonstrates a convergence of journalistic norms across two different media systems. Others claim that globalization and modernity reduce the need for cross-national studies of geographically located and bounded communities (Appadurai 1996). The rise of international TV networks and the Internet allegedly diminish the significance of national media (Held et al. 1999; Volkmer 1999). Norris (2000a) is among those who suggest that intensified globalization is encouraging cosmopolitanism to spread well beyond elite circles to the mass public. In other words, globalization trends may have reduced differences between national media systems. According to this alternative hypothesis, we should expect to find cross-national similarities rather than differences. Indeed, variations in news coverage and public knowledge could be greater within than across countries.
NEWS CONSUMPTION AND THE INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS
The second main aim of this book is to investigate whether variations in news content influence political knowledge, awareness, and perception. If different media systems result in different information environments, does this influence what is known? Some studies have already suggested this to be the case. Dimock and Popkin (1997) showed that Europeans were much better-informed about world events than Americans, and argued that this is due to âsubstantial differences between countries in the communication of knowledge by TVâ (1997: 223). Similarly, Kull et al. (2003) found that more than a quarter of the American public believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction a considerable time after the end of the Iraqi War. They also demonstrated that these misperceptions vary according to respondentsâ primary source of news.
Dimock and Popkinâs (1997) seminal essay suggested that national media content influences national knowledge, although they did not demonstrate this to be the case. However, subsequent attempts have been made to relate a comparative empirical analysis of countriesâ information environment to levels of political knowledge. Thus, in a study of fourteen countries, Milner (2002: 102) showed that on the aggregate level, there are systematic differences in political knowledge based on a countryâs âTV dependencyâ score (the relationship between the percentage following commercial television and the percentage reading newspapers). In particular, he found a strong negative correlation (r = 0.88) between the level of knowledge about the United Nations and the countryâs TV dependency score. In the US, which has the highest TV dependency score, the public knows very little about the UN. At the other end of the scale was Norway, with the highest level of UN knowledge and the lowest TV dependency score.
Likewise, on the individual level, Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001) found a significant positive correlation between self-reported exposure to public television news programs and levels of factual knowledge about the European Union. Their results supported, they suggested, a pessimistic conclusion about the consequences of the introduction of commercial broadcasting. In most countries, higher levels of knowledge were positively correlated with preferences for public broadcasting, and in particular with a preference for public TV combined with regular exposure to its news. They do suggest, however, that this was caused by an interactive process rather than by simple, unidirectional causation. As opposed to Milner (2002), Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001) did not find a systematic pattern underlying the ranking of the sixteen West European countries included in their study (2001: 133). Therefore, they stress that future research on political knowledge and media use also needs to include more detailed information about the patterns of television broadcasting and the content of programming. We agree, and would add that the type of knowledge measurements that are used should be expanded.
The propositions advanced by these studies are worth exploring further. Throughout this book we will systematically examine the information environment in different countries and its relationship to public knowledge. We will also investigate within country differences. For example, are knowledge gaps greater in some information environments than others, as the studies of Jerit et al. (2006), Prior (2007), Barabas and Jerit (2009), and Jerit (2009) suggest? Are knowledge gaps bigger on questions about public and foreign affairs then on âsoftâ issues, and are these gaps smaller in countries where media supply more âhard newsâ? If commercial and TV-dominated media systems provide poor news quality, will citizens in these environments be less knowledgeable, have greater misperceptions, and be more inclined to support political candidates and parties who do not represent their views? Conversely, will citizens in countries with strong public service television and high newspaper circulation be better informed and more effective citizens?
âRATIONAL IGNORANCEâ DEBATE
The answer to these questions depends not merely on empirical evidence but also on the normative standard one requires of a âgood citizenâ. Patterson (2000a) and Bennett (2003) are two of the many scholars who argue that the growth of soft an...
