1 Conceptualising radicalisation
Islamist radicalisation in current academic literature seems to enjoy the same status as pornography in the 1960s ‘we know it when we see it’ (Jacobellis v. Ohio 1964). There is a widespread assumption that the term is somehow self-explanatory, definitions are scarce and when they do appear, the focus is usually on the symptoms or the results of radicalisation rather than on what it is and how it works. Adding to the confusion is the occasional overlap with other concepts such as extremism and fundamentalism. The report prepared by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism (Reinares et al. 2008: 6, 7) starts off with the definition provided by the European Commission ‘embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism’ and makes some important distinctions as to whether it might necessarily include the use of violence or not and whether or not adherence to ideas needs to be accompanied by corresponding behaviour. Yet a definition or explanation of what radicalisation might be is nowhere provided. Furthermore, the conceptual delineation between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent radicalisation’ and the analogy to ‘socialisation’ might suggest that the term radicalisation is superfluous.
Apart from being a prominent example of conceptual confusion, this definition points out a series of other general trends with regard to the way we have come to see radicalisation. The context of discussion, and arguably the underlying situation which makes radicalisation an issue in the first place, is homegrown Islamist terrorism in Europe and the West in general. Before 9/11 and in spite of previous waves of terrorism in Europe – left-wing, nationalist and even Islamist but not of the Al Qaeda type and not homegrown, radicalisation was not a commonly used term and was not a matter of utmost concern; one would combat terrorism, not radicalisation. Some European countries such as France continue to deal with Islamist terrorism as terrorism, while some others, such as the Scandinavian countries, pushed the entire extremist spectrum under radicalisation. Yet the majority of EU Member States and indeed the EU Commission itself have increasingly focused on processes of radicalisation as a sort of preliminary phase to engagement in terrorism. A second underlying trend, although not explicitly mentioned in definitions, is the focus on Islamist radicalisation rather than radicalisation in general. The somewhat misleading yet understandable implication of this has been a preoccupation with the role of Islam and Islamist movements in the Middle East and the Maghreb in the radicalisation process. This is an important issue to consider since it not only artificially isolates Islamist radicalisation from other types of engagement in political violence and political protest, but also has the potential of stigmatising certain groups in society as harbouring specific features which would make them more prone to radicalise. Finally, and perhaps understandably considering the locus of responsibility and concern at the state level, there is an implicit association with violence.
This set of underlying assumptions has serious implications on the adequacy of the way radicalisation is not only conceived but also researched in terms of levels of analysis and corresponding literature. If, for instance, radicalisation is conceived as the process leading to terrorism, the literature of reference would be that on terrorism, the phenomenon of interest would be ‘becoming a terrorist’, while the analysis could consider the levels of individual involvement, organisational logic, historical development and chronologies, or more recently the construction and securitisation of the term. If radicalisation is understood as the politisation of Islamic fundamentalism, this would mean resorting to the literature on political Islam and the respective social movements; one would look at things like the political, economic and cultural situation in Islamic countries, the role of state repression, the interaction between the state and political challengers and, on a broader level, Islamist radicalisation in Europe would be a spill-over of external conflicts. If radicalisation refers to the resort to violence over the trajectory of existing engagement in political protest, the discussion would need to shift towards psychological and social theories of aggression, as well as perhaps social movement theories on conflict escalation.
By and large, radicalisation has been conceptualised as a process of individual evolution towards certain ideas, in some cases accompanied by a corresponding behaviour and of violence. Ongering (2007: 3) defines it as a ‘process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politic-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods’. In Taarnby Jensen (2006: 61), ‘Radicalisation, in this context [jihadism in Denmark], is understood as a process during which people gradually adopt views and ideas which might lead to the legitimisation of political violence.’ Neumann and Rogers (2008: 5, 6) see radicalisation as a process of drifting into ‘political extremism’, and as a term that ‘describes the changes in attitude that lead towards sanctioning and, ultimately, the involvement in the use of violence for a political aim’. Olesen (2009: 8) defines radicalisation as ‘the process through which individuals and organisations adopt violent strategies – or threaten to do so – in order to achieve political goals’. (Korteweg et al. 2010: 31) see radicalisation as ‘the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to the democratic structures and institutions’. Waldmann (2010: 8) states that ‘a person with radical goals questions the status quo of the socio-political order with a view to replacing it with another – either a revolutionary or an extremely reactionary one.’ Belaala (2008: 17) takes a more functionalist approach to the definition, arguing that radicalisation is a ‘process of rupture’ with the previous cultural group in a first phase and then with the national community with regard to the political order in the second phase.
At the level of content, several implications and difficulties arise from these definitions. First, that radicalisation is a process involving a cognitive and/or a behavioural component. It remains however unclear how these two components might interact, in particular whether and how radical ideology affects violent behaviour or whether the relationship is perhaps inverse. Additionally, the exact location in time of the process is not consistent: while some authors emphasise the process nature of a cognitive change, some others place it at the level of behaviour. Also unclear remains the conceptualisation of the process as such, as for instance social learning, passage, crisis or something else. Indeed, except for Belaala's definition, the definitions above rather elaborate on the ideological and behavioural result of radicalisation, rather than on what radicalisation is in itself, namely what types of stages or mechanisms ‘adopting certain ideas and behaviours’ actually consists of. Another implication is the association with a series of other concepts namely extremism, political violence and violence. Apart from the apparent liberal use of essentially different concepts, this raises questions into the level of overlap or possible identity of meaning between the radicalisation process and others, such as ‘becoming an extremist’ or ‘becoming a terrorist’. Finally, there is ambivalence as to whether violence is a necessary or a contingent element of both radicalisation and its end result. In terms of sphere of application, most of the conceptual approaches refer to the radicalisation of ‘individuals’, although there are also references to radicalised communities or social movements. Githens-Mazer (2008: 555) sees for instance radical violent Takfiri jihadism in Britain as a form of insurgency – social movements that challenge basic state legitimacy. Waldmann's (2010) Diaspora theory is also focused on second-generation Muslims in Europe in general, considered prone to radicalisation, rather than on particular individuals.
A workable definition of radicalisation needs to clearly identify and delineate conceptually the content and sphere of application of the term. Concretely, at the level of content, one needs to see
1 whether we are dealing with a phenomenon, a set of ideas or ideology, or a type of behaviour;
2 the relationship with other concepts, in particular terrorism, Islamism, extremism and democracy; and
3 its main characteristics, including the incidence of violence and legitimacy.
From the point of view of the sphere of application, it needs to be clarified whether it is applicable to individuals, groups or masses, in particular geographical areas and stages in time and whether Islamist radicalisation is a sui generis concept or a variation of a more general concept, that of radicalisation.
At this stage, there are several aspects that need additional elaboration and investigation. Given the variety of-isms towards which ‘radicalisation’ seemingly progresses, it is necessary to clarify the conceptual differences between radicalism, extremism and fundamentalism in order to ascertain whether their interchangeable use is warranted. More importantly, given the recurrent association between radicalism and extremism, or indeed the tendency to consider radicalisation a process leading to extremism, it needs to be clarified how this has occurred in time and whether it is warranted. After all, in grammatical terms, radicalisation is a derivate from the verb ‘to radicalise’, which in turn derives from ‘radical’ (radicalisation n.d.). Furthermore, definitions of radicalisation in the broader context of political movements maintain the same basic structure as the ones mentioned above, yet with reference to ‘radical’ rather than ‘extreme’ and ‘extremism’. Thus radicalisation is ‘the process, in whose course, within a political movement, radical objectives and the readiness to use extraordinary means develop’ (Schönpflug, 2002: 16–17). This means for the remainder of this chapter that an investigation into the potential conceptual differences between radicalism, extremism and fundamentalism as well as an overview of the use and historical evolution of radicalism are needed, in order to arrive at a workable definition of radicalisation. The last section of the chapter will approach radicalisation as ‘process’ and make a series of observations on the way it should be conceptualised to make it fit for analysis.
Radicalism, extremism, fundamentalism
A survey of the definitions and usages of radicalism reveals three main elements of content: a predominantly political nature and usage; the idea of sweeping change; and resorting to the ‘roots’ or some basic principles. Additional features that do not consistently come up are: the use of or the readiness to use violence (in the political sense); a conceptualisation of degree departing from something ‘regular’ or ‘mainstream’ (in this sense displaying similarities with extremism); and the idea of uncompromising stance or absolutism and that of rebel or provoker.
Defining radicalism
In terms of dictionary definitions, radicalism is ‘the holding or following of radical or extreme views or principles; the principles or practices of radicals’ (radicalism n.d.a); ‘the doctrines or practices of radicals; the quality of being radical’ (radicalism n.d.b); ‘the political orientation of those who favour revolutionary change in government or society’ (radicalism n.d.c). Radical is defined as ‘of or going to the root or origin; fundamental’; ‘thoroughgoing or extreme, especially as regards change from accepted or traditional forms’; ‘favouring drastic political, economic or social reforms’; ‘forming a basis or foundation; existing inherently in a thing or person’; in science ‘pertaining or forming a root’, ‘denoting or pertaining to the radical sign’; radical as a noun is ‘a person who holds or follows strong convictions or extreme principles; extremist’; ‘a person who advocates fundamental political, economic, and social reforms by direct and often uncompromising methods’; in science ‘a quantity expressed as a root of another quantity; the set of elements of a ring, some power of which is contained in a given ideal’ (radical n.d.a). Some of the synonyms are: extreme, fundamental, revolutionary, ahead, provoker, unconventional, hippie, with antonyms conservative, moderate, mainstream, minor (radical n.d.a).
Etymologically, radical comes from the Latin ‘radix’, the root and ‘radicalis’, rooted (Canu 1997: 21). The first recorded use is from 398 in a medieval philosophical sense, ‘of, or having roots’. The meaning ‘going to the origin, essential’ dates from 1651. The political sense of ‘reformist’ (via the notion of ‘change from the roots’) is first recorded in 1802 in relation to the extreme section of the British Liberal party. The meaning ‘unconventional’ dates from 1921. The surfer slang meaning ‘at the limits of control’ dates from the 1970s and the US youth slang use is from 1983 (radical, n.d.b).
Definitions of radicalism in the political science literature generally focus on two content features: sweeping change and the return to the roots or basic principles. Schönpflug (2002: 16–17) defines radicalism by identifying two features of movements historically considered as radical: the objective of fundamentally changing politics and society and the readiness to ‘use extraordinary and in certain circumstances also violent means’. The idea of sweeping social, political and cultural change has also been acknowledged by other authors (Beck 2001; Blee 1998; Lipset 2002; Rhodes 2005; Riukulehto 1998; Sewell 1992). An additional feature is that of going to the root of things (Douglas 1990), and returning to the first principles (Belchem 1996). Some authors combine the two in one definition, in the form of inducement of drastic change in society by means of reforms that go to the root of a problem (Blee 1998; Bradley 1990; Lewis 1992; Scarce 1990; Sontheimer 1970; B. R. Taylor 1995). An important qualification of the sweeping change element can be borrowed from Irwin (1979), who spoke of reform outside or against the established institutions, against the system. Opinions differ as to the sphere of radicalism, whether it comprises only a movement or only social and political movements (Blee 1998; Canu 1997; Douglas 1990), or actually could be found in any area of life (Riukulehto 1998).
The usage of radicalism in humanities reveals the same two features: sweeping change and ‘going to the root’ of things, but also at times the idea of exaggeration, militancy, uncompromising stance or violence. In literary and art criticism, radicalism is used for instance in the sense of ‘fundamental’, ‘to the root’ (Koller 1987; Thumfart 1995), ‘taking something further’, or ‘to the extreme’ (Rathjen 1995), or ‘exaggerating’ (Ulland 1997). Historical accounts also seem to generally use radicalism and radicalisation in the sense of ‘fundamental’ or ‘escalating [conflict]’ (Cleveland 2004).
Defining extremism and fundamentalism
With respect to extremism, starting with the etymological meaning of ‘extreme’ as opposed to ‘moderate’, Backes and Jesse (1993) trace extremism to the concept of ‘extreme political opinions’ as opposed to moderate ones and to the political meaning of moderate in ancient Greece – between extremes. From the meaning of ‘extreme’ as ‘exceeding’ or ‘last’ and the meaning in the French language since the thirteenth century ‘which is at the end of something’ or ‘the last frontier of something’, Canu (1997: 19) places extremism in a movement from the centre towards the limits of normality and on the fringes of subversion. Extremism is therefore defined as far or farthest away from the (moderate) middle in ideology and means (Riukulehto 1998). Lang (2006) considers this approach not sufficiently clear since it is always relative to a particular context. It seems, however, that this type of argument is beside the point, since the intrinsic meaning of the term ‘extremism’ implies a relation to something, while the variation of the political, cultural and social context needs to be assumed as such.
Fundamentalism has been used in many contexts, in relation to religion (Friedman 1990), to religious ‘fanatics’ (Antoun 2001; Kienzler 1996; Marty and Appleby 1996; Stump 2000), or to only one religion – a current of American Protestantism at the end of the nineteenth century (Giuriato and Molinari 2002); to the contemporary militant right-wing religious extremism in the USA (Melling 1999); to political movements with religious underpinnings (Tibi 1997; Kailitz 2004; Lustick 1988; Meyer 1997), or as a phenomenon currently occurring in religious, political, social and scientific contexts (Vorhofer 2001). The sphere of Islamic fundamentalism is clearer: it is a political movement and/or social movement, depending on the levels at which it acts (Burgat 1996; Choueiri 1990; Du Pasquier 1990; Giuriato and Molinari 2002; Guolo 1994; Lewis 1991; Roy 1994, 2004). With respect to the content, one clear feature is the return to some basic principles which are very specific, a holy text considered infallible and which cannot be interpreted critically (Giuriato and Molinari 2002). The fundamentalist objectives are the return or the creation of an idealised religious-political reality (Friedman 1990), the ‘politisation of religion and its use for political actions’ (Tibi, 1997: 197), ‘a belief system … [in which] its adherents regard its tenets as uncompromising and direct transcendental imperatives to political action oriented towards the rapid and comprehensive reconstruction of society’ (Lustick 1988: 5–6). In its Islamic variation this would correspond to currents in modern and contemporary Islam that aim at the restoration of a social and political order consistent with the rules of the Islamic law (Burgat 1996; Choueiri 1990; Du Pasquier 1988; Guolo 1994; Lewis 1991).
Delineating radicalism, extremism and fundamentalism
From these conceptualisations it would appear that the relationship between radicalism on the one hand and extremism and fundamentalism on the other is that of genus and species. While radicalism implies sweeping change and resort to some basic principles, extremism and fundamentalism are more specific in the type of change and the ideological principles on which they rest. Additionally, extremism is largely dependent on, and conceptualised in relation to concrete and localised ideologies. Thus, we usually speak of left-wing extremism and right-wing extremism rather than extremism in general. In terms of sphere of application, radicalism covers a larger range of movements, from political to social and cultural, whereas extremism is limited to the political spectrum and is usually set in opposition to the democratic order. Some authors have, however, engaged in a series of other types of conceptual relationships and overlaps, some of them contradictory.
There are thus a series of genus-species relationships between the concepts under study: religious fundamentalism as a variation of extremism (Backes and Jesse 1993; Kailitz 2004; Klump 2003), extremism as a variation of fundamentalism – the one being against all cultural expressions of modernity, the other only against democracy and human rights (Pfahl-Traughber 1995), extremism as a variation of radicalism – radicalism being a deviation from democratic norms, not necessarily values (Canu 1997; Klingemann and Pappi 1972), and radicalism as opposed to liberal/constitutional democracy, but not to democratic processes, as in the case of extremism (Mudde 2006). The conceptual debate on Islamic fundamentalism allows for a series of additional conceptual relationships: radicalism as a variation of Islamic fundamentalism (Giuriato and Molinari 2002), radicalism as a variation of Islamism and neofundamentalism (Roy 1994), Islamism as a variation of Islamic fundamentalism (op. cit.), Islamism as a type of fascism (Laqueur 1997), or as a form of religious-political extremism (Klump 2003; Pfahl-Traughber 1998).
One of the apparent reasons for these overlapping and contradictory conceptualisations is the choice of approach to definitions, namely negative (what the concepts are not rather than what they are). A second reason is the focus on concrete, empirical features rather than the essence of the concept. Thus, radicalism refers to political attitudes which depart from conventional norms of politics (Blee 1998), attitudes denoting distanc...