The EU's Shifting Borders

Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications in the New Neighbourhood

Klaus Bachmann, Elzbieta Stadtmuller

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781136575266
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique comparée

The EU's internal borders have become mostly invisible. Today, external borders are at the centre of controversy about an alleged 'fortress Europe'. Using different theoretical and methodological perspectives this book examines the challenges facing the EU's external borders, including Neighborhood Policy, migration issues and the diffusion of norms and values to other countries.

Divided into two parts, the book first presents different theoretical approaches and empirical studies of the EU's external borders, mobility and security issues. It is an invaluable guide to border research within a framework of European Integration and Globalization Studies. The second part of this volume focuses on the analyses of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, the approach to Eastern Europe and EU energy policy. Expert contributors collaborate to explore debates about migration, the EU as a normative, 'civil' power, energy security and the securitization of borders. Highly relevant and insightful, the text provides a timely assessment of EU borders in an increasingly globalized and integrated European neighbourhood.

The EU's Shifting Borders will be of interest to students and scholars of European Union Politics and International Relations.

Part I

Investigating Borders and Integration

Theoretical Aspects and Their Methodological Implications

1 External Aspects of European Identity Construction

Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski

Introduction: the Problem at Hand

Many authors have discussed issues connected with the EU’s quest for more legitimacy through establishing collective identity (e.g. Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Karolewski 2009). Internally, the EU is facing enormous challenges, since support has been dwindling for the EU among European citizens. This makes the European Union prone to crises and stress. Hence, the research on European integration increasingly deals with two questions: how much pressure can the EU withstand and what holds the organisation together in times of economic crisis, conflict and threat? In this context, a plethora of publications stress the necessity of societal and political cohesion via collective identity among EU citizens and EU élites. The emergence (gradual, rather than rapid) of a sense of community among Europeans is believed to be an instrument of overcoming centrifugal tendencies arising from the increased heterogeneity of today’s European Union of 27 member states and a population of nearly 500 million, as well as growing outside pressure for action of the EU as a unified actor (Kaina and Karolewski 2009).

Against this backdrop, the EU is said to apply identity techniques to its own citizens in an attempt to construct collective identity. These identity technologies are constructed in a top-down manner, as citizens become ‘receivers’ of a collective identity whose orientation is constructed by the political authorities. In order to generate collective identity, the EU reverts to various identity technologies including, among other things, the promotion of positive self-images (such as a ‘green Europe’), generation of common symbols (such as the European anthem and the common currency) or enhancing the visibility of common values (in the form of, for instance, the Charter of Fundamental Rights). However, the effectiveness of the EU’s identity techniques is mixed at best. Moreover, citizens’ support for European integration has been decreasing since the early 1990s (e.g. McLaren 2007; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Hooghe 2007; Kaina and Karolewski 2009). Research on euroscepticism highlights that Europe suffers from what has been termed the ‘Post-Maastricht Blues’ (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007, Kaina and Karolewski 2009, Kaina 2009) and the permissive consensus has been displaced by a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 248). The citizens’ detachment from the EC/EU has hardly been a problem as long as the permissive consensus allowed national and European élites to push forward with European unification. However, as the European community and later European Union have territorially expanded and institutionally deepened, the European unification has increasingly become vulnerable to the instability of the public support, in particular in times of crisis.

Against this background, the issue of collective identity appears to be increasingly relevant for the EU today. Apart from the difficulties with the EU’s politics of internal identity generation, the EU also diffuses its visions of European identity beyond its own borders. In particular, the EU promotes its collective identity in the so-called European neighbourhood. Even though it might sound paradoxical (as the EU promotes something beyond its borders that is still in the process of being generated within the EU), I argue that the EU externally promotes its ‘institutional identity’ consisting of its own procedures, regulations and institutions, which are transplanted into third countries. This ‘institutional identity’ differs from the ‘symbolic’ European identity being produced within the EU. While symbolic identity draws on shared symbols of commonality – such as common currency, common anthem, common holidays or even common past – institutional identity is based on specific institutions (in the larger sociological sense including norms, procedures, regulations) and on a belief in the superiority of these institutions.

This brings us to the second question: are internal identity-making and external identity-promotion connected to one another? Empirically, it is difficult to trace back a motivational link between the internal problems of the EU collective identity and its external identity promotion. However, these two fields of EU identity politics are potentially linked, as the internal identity problems of the EU could at least be partially mitigated or reinforced through (positive or negative) feedback mechanisms in the European neighbourhood. On the one hand, the EU acts vis-à-vis its neighbourhood as an ‘identity hegemon’, who might face fewer constraints outside the EU than within, given its attractiveness to potential new member states or associated partners. On the other hand, ‘identity hegemony’ might equally generate resistance to EU identity politics, in particular if the policies of third countries towards the EU are instrumentally motivated.

This chapter mainly reflects upon the EU’s external identity promotion with respect to its neighbouring countries. By so doing, it deals with external aspects of the EU’s identity generation, identity promotion and identity projection. The main thesis of the chapter is that in terms of its external identity politics, the EU faces a twofold identity dilemma. The EU promotes a European identity in its European neighbourhood by ‘shaping conceptions of the normal’ (Manners 2002) as well as conceptions of the superior. While ‘conceptions of the normal’ legitimize the implementation of the EU’s own institutional rules, norms and standards (as the appropriate ones) in neighbouring countries, the ‘conceptions of the superior’ promote the EU self-image of normative superiority. Thus, the EU aims to spread both norms of appropriateness and norms of superiority in third countries. As a consequence, European institutions, procedures, norms and values become new rules of conduct for non-member states: their internal institutions as well as policies are judged by the EU’s norms. Thus, by adopting these norms, third countries also assume the institutional identity of the EU.

The external identity dilemma of the EU occurs at both levels. Firstly, the EU refuses to offer a perspective of formal membership to countries in its neighbourhood such as Belarus, Ukraine or Moldova. Regardless of the question of whether these countries are capable of joining the EU or even whether the EU is able to integrate them, the lacking membership perspective undermines its credibility as a benevolent ‘identity hegemon’ and thus the effectiveness of the EU’s external identity politics. Therefore, the EU itself weakens its own chances of promoting European identity abroad. Secondly, the EU does not always live up to its positive self-image which results in the EU’s credibility as ‘identity hegemon’ being put into question. Cracks in image consistency therefore promote an instrumental approach to the EU by third countries, which poses an additional challenge to the EU’s external identity politics.

The chapter starts with some reflections on Europeanization literature, in particular from the angle of external identity promotion. Next, it reflects upon the general trend of the EU’s identity promotion abroad, consisting of the creation and promotion of positive self-images. Here, specific problems of positive self-images such as cracks in the normative consistency of the EU will be discussed. Next, I discuss the EU’s identity promotion regarding the post-Soviet countries. Here, it elaborates some general problems of the EU vis-à-vis these and discusses specific instruments of identity promotion, mainly within the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Europeanization and European Identity

Europeanization and Identity Construction

The term ‘Europeanization’ can refer to different aspects of European integration. There are almost as many definitions of ‘Europeanization’ as there are authors using this term (cf. Börzel and Risse 2000). A survey of the literature by Featherstone (2003) reveals the diversity of applications of the term in different research contexts (for instance, growth of European institutions or impact of the EU on domestic institutions) (cf. also Cowles et al. 2001). However, most studies of Europeanization have an explicit emphasis on policy-making or institution-building processes within the EU and their Europeanization effects for EU member states. In this perspective, Europeanization is synonymous with a ‘EU-ization’. In contrast, I argue that for analytic purposes we should expand our understanding of Europeanization also to include processes that occur in non-member states which are subject to the EU’s normative and institutional impact and also to European identity promotion.

Only a limited number of authors go beyond the research mainstream and apply the concept of Europeanization to, for instance, the European Neighbourhood Policy, meaning to states that are not necessarily applicants for accession to EU (cf. Sedelmeier 2006; Schimmelfennig 2009a; Coppieters et al. 2004). In this case, Europeanization is primarily associated with the transformation of domestic structures and policies that occur in the non-EU nation-states as a response to European policies and political practices. In the process, European rules, mechanisms and collective understandings interact with the given domestic structures.

This notion does not limit Europeanization to the EU member states or even their immediate neighbours. Instead, it remains territorially open by including, for instance, cases of regionalism in Africa and Latin America (Schimmelfennig 2009a). Thus, the concept of Europeanization becomes more inclusive and can be applied in the context of the promotion of European identity in neighbouring countries. The aforementioned ‘institutional identity’ of the EU mainly relates to different aspects of enactment of European norms. As European norms, procedures and regulations become adopted in non-European countries, we can point to a transfer of European ‘institutional identity’. This understanding of identity is in tune with the concept of Europeanization offered by Radaelli (2003: 4) who argues that

Europeanization consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization, of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

Mechanisms of External European Identity Making

As the identity aspects of Europeanization relate to the penetration of European norms into the domestic spheres of non-EU countries, the notion of ‘identity transfer’ concentrates on their domestic adaptation in the non-member nation-state as a result of the normative and institutional influence of the EU. However, there is no consensus as to the mechanisms that are at work and through which norms have an impact and operate in creating the ‘institutional’ identity. Here, the main issue of disagreement is whether actors (mainly governments) use norms genuinely or instrumentally. In the former case norms become a part of actors’ identities through socialization, whereas in the latter actors act in tune with norms as long as it is in their interest.

Therefore, we can identify three major arguments about causal workings of norms in relation to identities. First, ‘identity giving’ actors can apply incentives and rewards to change the behaviour of other actors in tune with the norms of identity-givers. Here, the learning processes of ‘identity receiving’ actors can ensue, as soon as they show behavioural adaptation regarding the transferred norms. This perspective is rooted in instrumental rationality, and it therefore questions the autonomous (not instrumentally applied) role of norms vis-à-vis creation of identities. Here, so-called conditionality policies are deemed to be the right tools for the transfer of norms, provided they are applied in an effective manner. Effective conditionality policies mainly work through learning processes on the part of the identity receivers. In this sense, norm-orientated behavioural conditioning of actors occurs as long as the learning process is progressing or at least remains stable. Conditioning in particular works when the targeted governments expect the promised rewards to be greater that the costs of norm compliance. However, the instrumental rationality perspective also implies that identity receivers can be aware of the conditioning process and resist by pretending that the identity transfer has indeed taken place. This can be observed, for instance, in cases where countries adopt EU norms but do not implement them. In this context, identity generation outside the EU is dependent on a two-fold credibility of the EU. On the one hand, the subjects of the EU identity politics have to be certain that they will receive the promised rewards after meeting the EU’s demands. On the other hand, they also have to believe that they will receive the reward only if they fully meet the requirements (Sedelmeier 2006).

Second, it is believed that interactions and communication between the identity-producing actors and the identity-adopting actors can lead to an internalization of norms and identities by the latter, rather than their manipulative pseudo-adaptation. This argument is in tune with the (neo)-functionalist perspective pointing out that the long exposure to norms of the EU can draw other countries into the EU’s identity orbit (Deutsch et al. 1957; Risse 2005). A means to ascertain a durable exposure to EU norms and ongoing interactions between the EU and the objects of identity transfer is the establishment of common institutions, which on the one hand convey the EU norms and on the other hand integrate other actors. However, I argue that not only the durability of exposure to EU’s norms is crucial but also the consistency of the EU’s normative arguments. If EU communication regarding norms is inconsistent – for instance by using diverging normative standards for different countries – it undermines its identity-making potential. Hence, the consistency of the EU’s normative self-images is central, as they convey EU supremacy. Cracks in the normative consistency of norms and normative self-images of the EU render the exposure to the EU norms less effective and might even question the very appropriateness of a given norm.

Thirdly, we can discern the Habermas-inspired argument of normative (per) suasion, which is supposed to be based on an unselfish exchange of arguments with the goal of finding a consensus rather than negotiations based on individual interests. Whereas instrumental rationality and the interactionist perspectives imply a one-directional identity-giver/identity-receiver framework, the suasion mechanism includes both parties in the identity-making endeavour. According to Checkel (2007: 227), ‘when normative suasion takes place, agents actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness’. As a consequence, this perspective suggests inclusive socialization, where all actors suppress their interests and act according to the logic of appropriateness of shared norms.

Theoretical Approaches to External Identity Making

From the hardcore rationalist perspective, normative statements of the EU belong to the category of the so-called ‘cheap talk’, which only serves the purpose of instrumentally concealing the underlying motives of self-interest. For moderate rationalists such as Schimmelfennig (2001), actors primarily follow the logic of self-interested calculation rather than the logic of appropriateness, even though the boundaries of rational interest calculation can be constrained by norms to a certain extent. This also applies to the transfer of norms outside of the EU. Relations between the EU and its neighbourhood are therefore characterized by the strategic use of norm-based arguments, by appealing, for instance, to democratic identities and values. In other words, the EU instrumentally employs norms to change the behaviour and institutions of non-member states. In the case of the EU’s enlargement to the east, it steered the member states into a rhetorical trap, as EU member states had to support the enlargement against their own interests in order to save their reputation as a trustworthy community. In this view, the strategic behaviour of EU member states is constrained by the constitutive ideas of the EU as a community of certain values. According to the rationalist approach, the ‘receivers’ of the EU institutional identity are also driven by both pragmatic self-interests and strategic calculation of costs and benefits when considering institutional change in accordance with EU demands, even though they might use norms-related arguments (Schimmelfennig 2001: 58). Rationalists therefore view conditionality as a far more effective mechanism of identity transfer than the generation of interactions or normative suasion. The latter, however, might be useful if employed instrumentally.

In contrast, from the hardcore constructivist perspective conditionality can produce merely short-term results in behavioural and institutional adaptation whereas socialization through normative suasion can lead to a more durable identity transfer. Common institutions are necessary for it to work, as normative suasion cannot occur in an institutional vac...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of Contributors
• Introduction
• Part I Investigating Borders and Integration Theoretical Aspects and Their Methodological Implications
• Part II Assessing Policies Neighbourhood Policy, Governance and Security Issues
• Further reading
• Index