Iraq and Iran (RLE Iran A)

Jasim Abdulghani

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780415608329
• eBook ISBN: 9781136834264
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Behind the Iran-Iraq war rests a history of conflict stretching back to the Ottoman Turks and the Persians. This book examines the deep-seated and complex factors involved in the rivalry between these two nations. It focuses particularly on the period between 1969 and 1984, a time that saw both the rise of the Ba'th party in Iraq and Khomeini's return to power in Iran. These changes did much to escalate tensions. The Ba'th party's ideological, socialist regime and its emphasis on political secular concerns stood in marked contrast to Iran under Khomeini and his efforts to spread an Islamic revolution among the nation's Shiite majority. The author discusses how these differences have affected three long-term problems: Iraq's and Iran's rivalry for dominance in the Arabian Gulf region; disputes over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which serves as a boundary between the two nations; and the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, supported by Iran. The volume also looks at the most recent episodes of crisis and analyzes the evolution of the Iran-Iraq war and its implications both regionally and globally. Unlike other studies of Iraq's relations with Iran, Abdulghani's is distinguished by its systematic and comprehensive synthesis which interlocks legal, cultural, historical and political issues that have characterized relations between the two countries.

1 THE HISTORICAL LEGACY

The Iraqi-Iranian conflict is rooted in the sixteenth-century Ottoman-Persian geopolitical rivalry over Iraq, which became one of the battlefields on which both Ottomans and Persians fought their wars. Both sides valued Iraq as a strategic asset, partly because it is an important route to the Arabian Gulf and partly because it serves as a significant land bridge between East and West. In addition, Iraq’s significance is rooted in her rich and glorious past. Great civilizations, such as the Assyrian, Babylonian and Sumerian, flourished in ancient Iraq, and the choice of Baghdad as the capital of the Abbasid Muslim Empire conferred on the city a unique prestige and distinction which prompted foreign powers to cast a covetous eye on it.

Moreover, the existence of holy Shi’i shrines in Iraq makes the lure of Iraq all the more powerful for the Shi’i Persians. Consequently, the Persian rulers, who viewed themselves as the guardians of Shi’i dogma, exerted constant pressure to extend their control and influence over Iraq, in order to protect and defend the holy shrines of Shi’ism. On the other hand, Persia’s unceasing attempts at expansion into Iraq were checked by her rivals, the Ottomans, who sought to curtail the burgeoning power of the Safavids and who regarded Persia’s control over Iraq as jeopardizing the Ottomans’ grip on the rest of the Arab East. Iraq’s fractured society, composed of multi-ethnic religious and linguistic minorities, rendered it more vulnerable to outside intervention. Chief among these social divisions are the Kurdish-Arab dichotomy and the Sunni-Shi’i polarization.¹ To this one might add some disruptive social forces which fostered regionalism, inhibiting the process of nation-building and the development of a sense of political community and national loyalty in Iraq. These disintegrative forces manifested themselves in tensions between the people of the desert and the village, those of the mountain and the plain, and those of the tribe and the town.²

Arab-Persian Relations and the Rise of Shi’ism as Persia’s State Religion

The rise of the Safavid dynasty in Persia (1502–1736) was a momentous historical event with profound implications for Iraq and the Near East. Upon his accession to the throne, Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, proclaimed Shi’ism as the state religion. This was a novel phenomenon, for Shi’ism was viewed by the Sunni orthodoxy as a set of heretical and extremist ideas. However, with its adoption by the Safavids, Shi’ism ‘found itself organized as a political entity’.³ Thus it was able to provide the nucleus for modern Persian nationalism by defining Persia’s territorial boundaries and giving the country a distinctive cultural and political identity.⁴ Furthermore, the institutionalization of Shi’ism provided the new state with a shield with which to resist the Sunni community’s attempt to subject Iran to its domination. Shi’ism was also instrumental in saving Iran from being assimilated into the Ottoman Empire.⁵

Richard Frye contends that:

the creation of the Shi’ite state of the Safavids in the sixteenth century also sharpened the antagonisms, some of them latent, between the Persians and their neighbours to the west. New relationships and exacerbations replaced the religious and cultural unity of the Arab and Iranian worlds. Certainly after this period relations and influences between the two declined. Not only did their religious paths part, but the development of culture and thought went more and more along separate ways.⁶

Nonetheless, it was not merely the rise of Shi’ism as the state religion in Persia which sharpened the ethno-cultural polarization between Arabs and Persians, but also the cumulative historical relations of the two peoples since the Arab conquest of Persia in the seventh century. Yahya Armajani argues that the Persian hatred of the Arabs is deeply rooted in history. Ever since the Arab destruction of the Sassanian Empire at the battle of Qadisiyya in 638, the Persians have viewed this defeat as a ‘great calamity’ which ‘has not been forgotten’. This hatred is so deeply embedded in the Iranian psyche that Armajani contends that the Persians have forgotten almost all the various invasions except that by the Arabs.⁷

Some historians maintain that, despite the Arab conquest, Persia never lost her distinctive identity and character.⁸ Thus, while accepting Islam, the Persians remoulded and adapted it to their own cultural particularism. In the words of Richard Frye, ‘Iran accepted Islam but changed it by making of it an Iranicized international religion and culture not wedded to Arab or Bedouin customs and beliefs.’⁹

The Persians’ assertion of their ethno-cultural particularism and their determination to preserve a cultural identity were manifested in their efforts to dismantle Arab dominance, which reached its zenith during the Umayyad rule. The Persians collaborated with the opponents of the Umayyad dynasty in order to destroy the Arab Empire. Thus the triumph of the Abbasids in 750 and the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty are viewed by some historians as signalling the victory of the Persians.¹⁰

Another manifestation of the Persians’ assertion of their own cultural identity was the emergence of the Shu’biyya movement. The Persians spearheaded this movement, which advocated the equality in Islam of non-Arab and Arab Muslims. Some Persians, however, also preached the superiority of Persians over Arabs.¹¹ Hence, Shu’biyya was not only a manifestation of Persian rejection of Arab cultural and political domination, but also a revolt against the concept of ‘Asabiyya (tribal loyalty) which characterized the Umayyad Empire. In that sense, Shu’biyya was viewed as a tool for the destruction of the Arab monopoly of power.¹²

Historical factors such as these shaped the cultural perceptions of the Arabs and the Persians towards each other. Each viewed the other as culturally inferior, and it is this perception which influenced their experience and history. Thus, ‘the cultural particularism of these two ancient peoples proved too powerful for the integrative influences of Islam’.¹³ Such conflicting cultural perceptions partly explain the Arab-Iranian antagonism which continues to the present day.

Ottoman-Persian Rivalry over Iraq

The rise of the Safavid state based on Shi’ism as the state religion posed an ideological and political threat to the Ottoman Empire. In the early sixteenth century the Ottomans were concerned at the spread of Shi’ism within Asia Minor. They feared that the Safavids might incite and encourage Ottoman Shi’i subjects to revolt. This concern was heightened by the presence of a large number of Shi’i subjects with strong pro-Safavid sentiments in Asia Minor. The Ottomans’ mistrust of the Shi’is’ allegiance to the Safavids led Sultan Selim to massacre 40,000 Shi’is who lived within Ottoman territory, accusing them of being Safavid spies. Repressive measures were also instituted against some Shi’i elements in Asia Minor.¹⁴

Shah Ismail paid regular visits to the Ottoman-Persian borders, inciting his followers to propagate Shi’i teachings.¹⁵ After consolidating his power in 1510, Shah Ismail conquered Iraq, where he destroyed several Sunni shrines and tombs, persecuted Sunni Muslims and built shrines for Shi’i saints. He then annexed Mosul to his empire and became the undisputed master of Persia and Iraq.¹⁶ What exacerbated the Ottomans’ apprehensions, however, was the fact that ‘Shah Ismail belonged to the Baktashi order of dervishes, to which the Janissaries also belonged’.¹⁷

Faced with mounting ideological and political challenges from the Safavid state, Sultan Selim led his army against Shah Ismail. In 1514 a decisive battle took place at Chaldiran, where the Safavid army was defeated. Thus the battle of Chaldiran checked the rising power of the Safavid state, halted the penetration of Shi’ism into Asia Minor and conferred legitimacy on the Ottomans as the guardians of Sunni orthodoxy.

After the defeat of the Safavids at Chaldiran, Ottoman-Persian relations were characterized by intermittent wars and continuous rivalry over the control of Iraq, which became a virtual battlefield. In 1529 the Safavids occupied Iraq again but were expelled by Sultan Sulaiman the Magnificent in 1534.¹⁸ The intensification of Ottoman-Persian rivalry manifested itself in the unceasing attempts on the part of both powers to delineate their boundaries, especially those in the southern part of Persia and Iraq.

Persia’s objectives in Iraq were: (a) to increase her influence in Iraq; (b) to acquire unrestricted access to the holy Shi’i shrines in Najaf and Karbala, especially since the Safavids saw themselves as the protectors and defenders of Shi’i dogma; and (c) to maintain the security of the Basrah-Baghdad-Khanaqin trade route along which foreign goods and commodities flowed into Persia.¹⁹

Persia’s determination and drive to extend her influence in Iraq were so powerful that some historians maintain that, had it not been for the Ottomans, today’s Iraq would have been Persian in culture and religion.²⁰ In other words, the Ottomans were instrumental in preventing the Persianization of Iraq.

One of the most significant factors which influenced the Persians’ perception of and attitude towards Iraq was the existence of the holy Shi’i shrines in Iraq. The lure of Karbala and Najaf was too powerful for Persia’s rulers to resist. This religious dimension helps to explain Persia’s ceaseless endeavours to gain paramount influence in Iraq. For example, when Sultan Selim’s son Bayazid sought refuge in Persia, the Ottomans asked for his extradition. In return, Persia’s Shah demanded the annexation of Baghdad to his territory, a demand totally rejected by the Ottoman Sultan. The Shah then put forward a ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Abbreviations
• Preface
• 1. The Historical Legacy
• 2. The Return to Power of the Iraqi Ba‘th Party in 1968
• 3. The Onset of Cold War and Confrontation (1969–1975)
• 4. Iraqi-Iranian Rivalry Over the Gulf (1968–1975)
• 5. The Shatt Al-Arab Boundary Dispute
• 6. The Kurdish Question in Iraq
• 7. Détente and Rapprochement: the Algiers Agreement, 1975
• 8. Return to Cold War and Confrontation: The Iraq-Iran War
• Conclusion
• Appendix A. 1937 Irano-Iraqi Boundary Treaty
• Appendix B. Algiers Declaration 6th March 1975 Joint Communique between Iraq and Iran
• Appendix C. Treaty on International Boundaries and Good Neighbourliness between Iraq and Iran Signed on June 13, 1975
• Bibliography
• Index