Freedom and Happiness in Economic Thought and Philosophy

From Clash to Reconciliation

Ragip Ege,Herrade Igersheim

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136666810
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Starting from a distinction made by the American philosopher, John Rawls, in 2000 between two kinds of liberalism, "liberalism of freedom" and "liberalism of happiness", this book presents a range of articles by economists and philosophers debating the most fundamental aspects of the subject. These include the exact significance of Rawls' distinction and how it can be related to European political philosophy on the one hand and to utilitarianism on the other hand; the various definitions of happiness and freedom and their implications and the informational basis of individual preferences.

The objectives of the book are twofold: first, it is devoted to a thorough analysis of the founding texts of both liberalisms. It aims to determine the logic of selection of the concepts which these traditions consider as relevant. The Kantian pair "Reasonable"/"Rational" can be seen as the basis on which these concepts are defined, our final concern being to reveal the profound relations of complementarity between them: we call it reconciliation. Secondly, we consider a fundamental issue of welfare economics – how to appraise individual preferences – in light of the Rawlsian distinction. It is emphasized that neither a criterion based on liberalism of freedom by itself, nor an evaluation in terms of liberalism of happiness by itself exhausts the question of utility. One must combine both aspects in order to cope with that issue. To do so, it is claimed that one can resort to the concept of metaranking of preferences.

All the contributions included in this book are the outcomes of a collective research project of three years. The contributors come from a variety of backgrounds and yet are unified in developing a specific position about freedom and happiness. This book should be of interest to those focusing on the history of economic thought as well as moral, political and economic philosophy.

Part I

Freedom and Happiness in the Light of the Rawlsian Opposition

1 Rawls

The Construction of a Democratic Thought

Rima Hawi

Introduction

“We may note first that there is, indeed, a way of thinking of society which makes it easy to suppose that the most rational conception of justice is utilitarian” (Rawls 1971b: §5, 20–1). Utilitarian theory seems to have strong appeal among individuals, Rawls tells us in A Theory of Justice, because it clearly and simply embodies rationality. This likely explains why Rawls was initially influenced by this doctrine, then dominant, which puts forward the first principle of the greatest happiness summed over all individuals.

In Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (2000), Rawls labels this utilitarian doctrine the “liberalism of happiness” because of its first principle: it is liberalism because utilitarianism does not rule out freedom but rather conditions it to the principle of greatest happiness. Going against this vision, Rawls put forward the theory of justice as fairness, which he classified in the traditional field of “liberalism of freedom,” liberalism which gives priority to certain basic liberties over any other principle.

Our work is aimed at showing the path of Rawls: from his first utilitarian influences to the formulation of an alternative theory written in the tradition of liberalism of freedom. This will lead us to show how the principles of this tradition allowed him to reconcile some necessary concepts for the understanding of the requirements of justice.

In order to do this, the first part of our work will deal with what influenced Rawls in the writings of utilitarian authors according to Rawls’ definition. We will focus our analysis on two authors: first, David Hume, whose influence is mostly felt at the starting point of Rawls’ theory, the very idea of justice; and second, Sidgwick, who developed a method of ethics that inspired Rawls in establishing his initial position, and became a reference for Rawls regarding the vision of utilitarianism he wanted to confront.

Throughout Rawls’ works, his opposition to utilitarianism becomes clearly visible, to the point of constituting an alternative theory. In order to build it, Rawls first called on the ideas of social contract theories. By using the concept of a state of nature, these theories introduce the notion of fairness and, more importantly, insist on the fact that the principles (of justice) must be subject to an agreement between individuals who are placed in a situation of equality, a stance that became the original position in justice as fairness. We will favor Rousseau’s approach, which is best suited to represent the requirements of fairness and cooperation between individuals.

In order to be sure that the agreement between the parties in the original position was possible regarding the existence of conflicts of interest, Rawls was inspired by some ideas taken from the “liberalism of freedom.” In the third part, we will attempt to demonstrate that these authors – John Stuart Mill, Kant and Hegel – allowed him to reconcile the Rational and the Reasonable (in the original position under a veil of ignorance): to bring people to see further than their private interests, to search for the fair terms of social cooperation, and thus to make possible the agreement on principles of justice based upon the conflicts of interest between individuals.

By retracing the genesis of John Rawls’ thought process, we will demonstrate his path toward the liberalism of freedom, a tradition that is better equipped to show the coherence between his theory of social justice presented in A Theory of Justice and the more recent developments of his thought dedicated to political practice: two fundamental questions that a democratic society faces.

Rawls’ Critical Eye on Utilitarians: Influences and Limits

Historically, Hume – whom Rawls considers a utilitarian – was one of the first figures who influenced Rawls. The influence of this author, who “by any standard … was precocious” (Rawls 2000: 21), could be felt as early as in Rawls’ second article, “The Two Concepts of Rules” (1955), right to his final works, through the idea that any theory of justice finds its origin from circumstances of justice, and that justice, ultimately, presents itself as a system of rules (subsection “Hume and the idea of justice as a system of rules”).

However, according to Rawls, choosing these rules must be subject to an agreement between different individuals. To express this idea, Rawls found inspiration in Sidgwick’s methodology – the rational methodology of the selection of principles – which, through several aspects, is close to Rawls’ original position, more particularly in the way in which the choice of principles of justice by the parties in the original position is made (subsection “Sidgwick: the rational method of justice as fairness”).

For Rawls, this utilitarianism – referred to as classical utilitarianism – is the most important form of utilitarianism, the one that he wants to first understand, then correct. This doctrine does not exclude freedom, but with its first principle being the greatest happiness for the greatest number – it is in this sense that it is a “liberalism of happiness,” according to Rawls – it can quickly take a detour, according to its interpretation.

Hume and the Idea of Justice as a System of Rules

According to Hume, justice is an artificial virtue relying upon the artifice of men, and more generally, upon the fruit of reason as it manifests itself through our projects and conventions, our laws and our institutions. In this way, Hume means by justice the system of conventions mutually recognized, going from what motivates people to put rules of justice into place to what motivates them to abide by them.

It is a case of finding the best scheme in practice, which entails taking into account two circumstances defined by Hume. First, the “situation of external objects,” meaning the scarcity of nature, of external goods, compared to the needs and desires of human beings, and nature’s incapacity to fulfill all of our needs; and second, “circumstances of mankind,” the natural temper of man, which Hume describes as “limited generosity.” Because a world of perfect abundance and extensive generosity would make justice useless, “but tis evident, that the only cause, why the extensive generosity of man, and the perfect abundance of every thing, wou’d destroy the very idea of justice, is because they render it useless” (Hume 1739, III: 496).

For Rawls, any theory of justice originates in these circumstances: he calls the former “objective circumstances” and the latter “subjective circumstances”; justice does not concern the direct actions of individuals but applies to the system of rules defined by the institutions: by putting into place rules or principles of justice, these institutions determine the adequate distribution of fundamental rights and duties of individuals.

This idea appeared in “The Two Concepts of Rules” and became more apparent in A Theory of Justice. Indeed, in the first text, Rawls attempted to defend utilitarianism against a certain number of criticisms – debate on the question of punishment and the obligation to keep promises – that were often aimed at it: “I am going to defend utilitarianism against those objections which have traditionally been made against it in connection with punishment and the obligation to keep promises” (Rawls 1955: 21).

So he suggested differentiating between justifying a practice, rule or convention and justifying a particular action falling under a rule. Justifying a punishment, keeping a promise or signing a contract are social rules that must have, for reference, a general and abstract principle, the principle of utility. Whereas justifying a particular action – keeping a promise, in a precise case – is rarely done using the principle of utility. Thus, the rules are established directly following the principle of utility, so related to their consequences on society. And our isolated actions, our everyday behavior, following the rules, are indirectly linked to the principle of utility.¹

In Rawls’ prior work, this idea of justice as a system of rules became the building blocks of what Rawls called social justice; it appears in the idea that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, “or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls 1971b: §2, 6).

However, Hume sought more to understand why we follow rules of justice rather than describing those rules. Consequently, Hume’s theory of justice is a theory of the sense of justice. This idea is not too far from Rawls’ preoccupations as it puts the stability of his theory of justice into question. Rawls’ idea was that a well ordered society – governed by the principles of justice – “is presumably stable: … when institutions are just … those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them” (Rawls 1971b: §69, 398). The more this sense of justice – the profound desire to act according to the principles of justice – is present, the stronger the concept of justice becomes.

Though the question of stability became central from the passage of A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism,² it appears, however, in Rawls’ first works: in “The Two Concepts of Rules”, through the question of promise or in “The Sense of Justice” (1963) or “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play” (1964). It was only in these last two articles that Rawls sought other answers than those brought forward by Hume.

Indeed, the sense of justice for Hume – “when the injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our interest” (1739, III: 499) – is based on the principle of sympathy, “which makes us partake of the satisfaction of every one, that approaches us” (1739, III: 358). In fact, it is not sympathy alone that interests us in the good of mankind, but sympathy corrected by the “judicious spectator.” Indeed, our true sympathy is varied and biased, depending on our affinities and our relationship with others: we feel more sympathy for people who are similar to ourselves, who are close to us, who share more or less the same culture and the same interests. So it is impossible to have a reasonable discussion with any hope of reaching agreement if we insist on only seeing matters the way they seem from our own point of view, if we do not correct these momentary appearances of things and if we do not overlook our current situation:

In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation.

(Hume 1739, III: 581–2; original italicization)

Thus, we take on the point of view of the “judicious spectator,” an expression that appears only in the following example cited by Hume in the Treatise:

But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator. The sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem. Our esteem, therefore, proceeds not from sympathy.

(Hume 1739, III: 58; original italicization)

Rawls noted in Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy that the idea of the judicious spectator, which appeared for the first time in Hume’s work, is one of the most interesting and important ideas in the history of moral philosophy (Rawls 2007: 186). In addition, he wrote with no explanation in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy that Hume’s judicious spectator is different from Smith’s “impartial spectator”: “I use Hume’s term ‘judicious spectator’ … and not ‘impartial spectator,’ since the latter is used by Adam Smith for a somewhat different idea” (Rawls 2000: 84). However, references to this spectator in his own works and not in the two works cited above, which transcribe the lectures he gave to his students, are marked by confusion and misinterpretation.

Indeed, the “judicious spectator” expression appears only in the chapter on the definition of the objective point of view (Rawls 1993: 116, fn 20). In Rawls’ other works, he refers only to the impartial spectator. In A Theory of Justice, he equates Hume’s and Smith’s approaches; both authors spoke of an ideal spectator, both rational and impartial:

Consider the following definition reminiscent of Hume and Adam Smith. Something is right, a social system say, when an ideally rational and impartial spectator would approve of it from a general point of view should he possess all the relevant knowledge of the circumstances.

(Rawls 1971b: §30, 161)

Thus, a society is well ordered from a utilitarian point of view, if, according to Rawls, it brings approval from such an observer. In his works prior to A Theory of Justice, and more precisely in “Justice as Reciprocity” (1971), to speak of this spectator, Rawls did not refer to Hume or to Smith, but rather to Bentham’s ideal spectator. However, he noted that Bentham did not believe that there needed to be a real legislator or administrator with absolute power who would adjust the rules of the system from a center, but

He did think, as a principle of justification that one institution is better than another if, in the course of the way in which it could be expected to work, it is reasonable to suppose that on the whole it will have better consequences from the standpoint of an ideal legislator so defined.

(Rawls 1971a: 218, fn 22)

Thus, in his first works, Rawls reduced classical utilitarianism to the idea of this impartial sympathetic spectator whose source varies depending on the texts, but that seems, in the end, to be founded on Bentham’s approach. According to Rawls, in utilitarian theory, nothing connects people to one another;³ individuals do not find their reflection in other people, and they overcome their disagreements thanks to the sympathy of a spectator who pushes individuals to place themselves in each other’s shoes, without any limit: we can sympathize with someone who is suffering thousands of miles away. Utilitarianism fails to take the differences between individuals seriously. And yet for Rawls, the principles of justice must be subject to an agreement between free and rational individuals who find themselves in a position of equality and must not come from an outside observer. The conflicting claims of individuals – circumstances of justice – must not be obscured, as they are the starting point for justice. Justice must find a balance in these claims, which must be the result of a deliberation pro...