Eurasia's Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics

Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?

Robert Bedeski, Niklas Swanström

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781136306402
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Sino-Russian relationship has experienced several permutations in recent decades as both states have undergone radical domestic changes, including the end of Soviet communism and the abandonment of Maoism. This volume brings together scholars to address the current status of Sino-Russian relations in the political, military, energy and trade sectors.

In this comprehensive new volume, authors offer a detailed account on the both the historical context and current status of relations between Russia and China and the geo-political realignments in Eurasia. This analysis of the evolving relationship addresses global strategy, energy politics, national security, human security, and Central Asian links. Individual chapters examine key issues such as China's economic ascendancy, military relations, the geostrategic position of Mongolia, Japan's views and historical background. With authors representing a broad range of current active experts and researchers working in Europe, the US, Central Asia, China and Japan, this book offers a long-term and in-depth analysis of the relations and potential developments in both bilateral and international relations.

This work will be of great interest to scholars of international relations, Asian security, and the Eurasian region.

1 Transformation of the Sino-Russian relationship

From Cold War to the Putin era

Niklas Swanström

This volume brings together scholars specializing in Sino-Russian relations to address the current status of Sino-Russian relations in the political, military, energy and trade sectors. The authors produce a comprehensive account on the current status of relations between Russia and China and the geopolitical realignments that have occurred in Eurasia in just the last two to three years along with a strong historical context. This is accomplished by exploring overlapping interests and tensions between these two states. Apart from the purely bilateral relations, there is focus on Central Asia as the region which serves as a major determinant of contemporary Sino-Russian relations in a context of national and human security. Although the respective Chinese and Russian roles regarding Iran and North Korea affect the bilateral relationship as well, it is mainly on the basis of events in the greater Central Asian theatre that China's and Russia's policies could potentially converge or clash to any major degree. The Central Asian focus in the contemporary relationship enables the authors to go in depth into Sino-Russian relations in order to produce a long-term analysis of the relations and potential developments in both bilateral as well as international relations.

The authors highlight the relative importance that Central Asia plays for both China and Russia, while addressing the varying degrees and different areas in which activities are undertaken. What has been highlighted is that there are increased tensions in a number of areas that are significant and these have directly impacted bilateral relations – the focus of interaction between China and Russia is not necessarily similar. It becomes apparent that gaining or retaining influence in Central Asia has emerged as a focal point for both states and a weathervane for their bilateral relations.

The chapters moreover highlight the importance of human security and national security – two complementary concepts that encompass a broad range of social, economic, military, government and global concerns. The Sino-Russian relationship is often characterized by a diverse view on security where Russia tends to have a preponderant military focus in its national security concerns, while China demonstrates a broader mix of security that includes the military dimension and has consciously stressed human security – especially in the economic realm through the far-reaching reforms initiated in the late 1970s. Chinese authoritarianism has not pursued the forms of human security where protection and enabling of individual latitude and liberty is the central focus, but increasingly there are hints that parts of the state apparatus recognize that national security cannot be achieved without addressing and enlarging human security categories of economic and social rights.

The importance of Sino-Russian relations to global peace, well-being and long-term interests in the region should not be minimized or neglected. The progress or decline of those relations will be a factor in:

• the ability of Europe, India, the US and Japan to have any significant influence in Central Asia;

• ensuring that China and the transitioning states in Central Asia are engaged in a way to maximize the well-being of their populations as measured by human security;

• a need to improve observers’ nuanced understanding of how much substance and how much rhetoric is involved in contemporary Sino-Russian relations;

• what may be expected from this relationship in coming years. It is necessary to achieve a greater understanding in order to apprehend the resilience (or brittleness) of this strategic partnership (to the extent that one exists), and the implications this may have for Russian and Chinese interests as well as for external actors.

Sino-Russian relations at the start of the new millennium in Central Asia and beyond

Sino-Russian relations have oscillated considerably in the second millennium, as noted in the historical perspectives by Dittmer and Parrott. During the Yeltsin era, China-Russia relations were still strong, but this changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000 and his initial pro-Western ventures. This was in no small part due to Russia's involvement in the war on terror, together with Russia's complicity in a US military presence in Central Asia that did not sit well in Beijing. Putin's domestic constituency found his swing into Washington's fold equally awkward, and it also created no small amount of criticism in Russia. Convinced that affairs could not get much worse, Putin's acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) expansion into the Baltics, his approval of US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and his quiet consent of American military presence in Georgia raised additional fears in the Duma, within Russian public opinion and to some extent among the Chinese. This was perceived as a direct surrender to American hegemony, and it did not last for long.

Between 2003 and 2004 Russian foreign policy became less Western-oriented and more China-focused, or at least on the surface. Instead of following the lead of the US, the Kremlin chose to shift its attention to a Russo-Chinese balance in an attempt to counter US advances in the region. This was manifested within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consisting of China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, although its military security and economic development direction are still unclear. The primary factor accounting for this strategic shift of Moscow was likely the fact that Russia gained no tangible benefits from the engagement with Washington, yet was forced to make numerous discomforting (from the domestic perspective) concessions which were highly unpopular among public opinion, the Duma, the Defense Ministry and other ministries where Soviet nostalgia still lives. The pressure exerted by these groups was one of the reasons Putin started to explore overlapping interests with China.

China, for its part, has been no passive bystander in this new trend. Already in 1999 with the US/NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the Electronic Patrol-3 incident in 2001, China became interested in broadening its international engagement against what they considered to be a strong tendency of uni-polarity (in favour of the US) in world politics and a neglect of their increased political and economic power. The US role in the Sino-Russian relations is analysed by Lo in the chapter on trilateral relations. Russia was, with its geographic location and relative declining economic and military strength, the perfect partner for a rising China. The Chinese government was, as a result, very supportive toward improved relations with Russia, and the Chinese government invested a great amount of political prestige, as well as financial resources, into a new partnership with Russia. This was not due to admiration of Russia, but on the contrary, due to the political situation at the time and the need for new (old) friends despite serious hesitation of where Russia's future is moving.

The rapidly improved relations after the fall of the Soviet Union have been undeniable. Today, China and Russia have settled most of their outstanding border disputes, are enjoying a booming bilateral trade, and have held large-scale military exercises such as Peace Mission 2005 and Peace Mission 2007. The military relationship is outlined in detail in Stephen Blank's chapter. Bilateral trade in 2007 topped $48 billion, while a high-level mechanism devoted to bilateral security talks between Russia's Security Council and the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo has been formed.¹ The trade did drop to $38.3 billion in 2009, a decline much depending on the decline of Russian imports and a decrease in Chinese weapons imports.² Looking at these factors, it seems evident that the bilateral relations are at an all-time high and that the shared vision of partnership between Russia and China has never been clearer. However, reality has a tendency to surprise anyone that takes the time to look under the rocks and cross a few more rivers. Government relations do not always transfer over to people-to-people relations and there is much fear of a Chinese expansion into the Russian Far East, as well as a decline of Chinese interest in Russia's greatest export success – the weapons industry.

China-Russia relations: more rhetoric than substance?

Despite major re-engagement between China and Russia since Putin's initial embrace of the West, the rhetoric often does not reflect reality. There has been significant internal competition and tensions that continue to have a negative effect on Sino-Russian relations, and the vivid statements on the flourishing partnership are often more declaratory than substantive. A case in point is the SCO and Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia. Both Russia and China know that they can raise their bargaining power vis-à-vis the US and the post-Soviet successor states (as well as Taiwan) by speaking in concert or at least cooperatively. But this is inhibited by decades of deep distrust and fierce bargaining that is a harsh reality in the bilateral relationship. As it is, it may be highly questionable that Sino-Russian relations could endure a major setback, should crisis occur. Considering the current strains, this is unlikely. China did not come to the rescue of Russia after its invasion of Georgia in 2008.³ In point of fact, the deafening silence from the Central Asian states and China indicated the differences between China and Russia to be deeper than they have been in a long time. Russia ‘accepted’ that China and the Central Asian states in SCO refused to accept the Russian de facto separation of Georgia into three separate entities, i.e. Georgia, and Russian-controlled Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was not only caused by the Russian failure to follow international law, but also because China fears separatism more than anything else, and that the Russian active engagement in this could have an impact on Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. Authors Sun and Zhao have closely examined the Russian attack on Georgia and its consequences for Sino-Russian relations. This is not the only indication of the fragility in bilateral relations, and is only the tip of the iceberg. China's increased presence in Iran and Africa has not gone unnoticed in the Kremlin and there is reluctance to accept the increasing influence in the traditional Russian spheres of influence, especially as China was always seen as a somewhat backward state by Russians.

Both China and Russia suspect that either would betray the other for a healthy and long-lasting relationship with the United States (and even potentially the EU) should such a window of opportunity arise – this has been a consistent feature under Yeltsin, Putin as well as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. However, so far the bilateral relationship with the US has been seen as something fragile and the Sino-Russian relations are, despite their shortcomings, still preferable. This is due in part to the antagonistic position that the US and the EU have taken toward China and Russia, and in the case of the EU, an inherent weakness that has disqualified it from a deeper engagement with China and Russia. Russia fears that it will be used as a subordinate provider of natural resources to China, while China's rise confirms that Russia has declined in importance. It has become a cold reality that Russia's value to China, apart from natural resources, has declined significantly as export and import markets are primarily west of Russia and east of China. This can be noted in the significant downturn of bilateral trade between them and that they are struggling to make each other useful.

Both China and Russia are dissatisfied with the current state of mutual engagement. Russia is disappointed with the type of commodities traded; it would rather be an exporter of technology and machinery than the current concentration on raw materials and energy. The latter category comprised almost 90 per cent of Russia's total exports to China in 2005. From the Chinese perspective there is clear frustration with Moscow's hesitancy in permitting Beijing to explore gas and oil deals in full detail, as well as the tendency of settled agreements to be more of a ‘framework nature’ that are rarely put into practice. This was also revealed by the vice-director of China's National Development and Reform Commission, Zhang Guobao, in an interview with Interfax, where he stated that Russia had complied with commitments on oil exports by rail to China, but as for cooperation in other areas, there had been much contact and communication but ‘little actual progress’, even as he claimed that this had been eased in 2010.⁴ Besides, Russia seeks to diversify its exports, primarily energy and natural resources, to the wider Asia-Pacific, especially Japan, where Russia thinks it can extract a higher price, which will affect its export market to China. The significance and potentials of bilateral trade are often overestimated. The low purchasing power parity between the two countries will prolong the time needed to develop sufficient demand and transnational companies that could match the demand and market conditions available in OECD countries. The energy and economic relationships are discussed in detail in Shoichi Itoh's and Christoffersen's chapters in the book.

The large-scale immigration of Chinese into the Russian Far East is another source of tension. Russia annexed the territory from China from 1858 to 1860, and China has since been eager to restore this loss, albeit not officially. At the grass-roots level and privately there is much more dissatisfaction with the loss than what the government would like to acknowledge. On the Russian side there is a fear of a Chinese ‘invasion’ of immigrants. In the Russian Far East there are only approximately 6.7 million Russians and on the Chinese side of the border there are more than 110 million Chinese (almost equal to the total Russian population).⁵ This has resulted in a flow of immigrants streaming across the border and Russia has expressed great concern over ‘Sinicization’ of the area and even the possibility of Chinese tanks rolling up to Siberia in a reprise of events of 1969 on the Ussuri River. Considering the historical and current role of nationalism within the two countries, uncontrolled migration may very well produce antagonisms, putting severe strains on the bilateral relations, something that Laruelle has dealt with in detail. The likelihood of a Chinese military invasion is very low, but with an increased flow of Chinese immigrants, Russia's Far East could easily turn into a Chinese ‘Near North’.

When discussing relations between China and Russia, Central Asia has become one of the more important factors, and in terms of regional and international cooperation the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has turned out to be a significant player and thermostat in Sino-Russian relations. SCO can be described as a cooperation conduit for Sino-Russian relations as the interaction in SCO reflects the status, characteristics and trends in Sino-Russian relations. Russia acceded to the SCO despite the fact that it has other, more preferred organizations to work with. Russia has worked with Central Asian governments in an effort to monitor China's rise in Central Asia – not necessarily a negative enterprise as it facilitates discussion and decreases possible misunderstandings as well as being a platform for cooperation on a general level in Central Asia.⁶ On the other side, the Central Asian governments are deliberately countering Russian influence with China, even if not exchanging one overlord for another. The rise of SCO as a regional organization has been complicated by the fact that SCO has been very successful in creating too many declarations, agreements and statements, with little real impact in the policy realm. It could be argued that SCO provides ‘Rules of the Game’, even if these rules (or for that matter ‘game’) are not very well defined. The failure to further the cooperation is embedded in the relationship between China and Russia and their differing perceptions on what should be the purpose of the SCO, and how they view the future at large.

Although China and Russia have achieved a notable degree of cooperation within the SCO, the likelihood that the form of cooperation will move beyond anti-terrorism is limited at best. Besides disagreement in the trade sector, tensions are frequent within related areas of potential cooperation. China is reluctant to let SCO become a military bloc that could be directed against any outside actor, but Russia has taken a more aggressive policy in its cooperation strategy, so military matters have taken a pre-eminent position.⁷ In 2007 there was a joint Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)-SCO exercise under Russian leadership that made it very clear that Russia views the region from a military perspective, a trend that has been apparent since 2005. China has viewed the SCO with a much broader interest, where economic development and anti-terrorism are the most prevalent policy issues. The fundamental difference in the perception of SCO and how it should be used is a tremendous stepping-stone for furthering the utilization of SCO in regional and international affairs. There have been numerous discussions focusing on the question of Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia. Chinese scholars tend to be more willing to see this relationship as something positive and regard it as a ‘win-win’ situation. In Russia there is a higher degree of fear (and jealousy) of the Chinese role in the region, and for its rise at large.⁸ This does not mean that China has no military interest with SCO, but these interests are primarily directed at its own Muslim minority in Xinjiang, and the fear of sepa...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge Contemporary Asia Series
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Preface
• List of acronyms and abbreviations
• 1 Transformation of the Sino-Russian relationship: from Cold War to the Putin era
• 2 Political and cultural roots of Sino-Russian partnership
• 3 The Russia-China-US triangle and its post-Cold War fate
• 4 Russia and the geopolitics of Eurasia in historical perspective
• 5 Moscow’s China dilemma: evolving perceptions of Russian security in Eurasia and Asia
• 6 Power differential and security issues in Central Asia: threat perceptions of China
• 7 Recent trends in Russo-Chinese military relations
• 8 Multiple levels of Sino-Russian energy relations
• 9 Sino-Japanese competition over Russian oil
• 10 Does the Shanghai Cooperation Organization represent an example of a military alliance?
• 11 Chinese views of the Russia-Georgia conflict and its impact
• 12 Asiatica: Sino-Russian heartland and the Mongolian state
• Index