The âJTB-Manâ
In October 2007 I was at Narita Airport in Tokyo, at the end of a trip to Japan. Needing to buy a magazine, I stopped by the magazine stand near the departure gate. In addition to regular magazines, newspapers, and daily necessities, the shop also had on offer a range of touristy souvenirs. Along with the expected Hello Kitty mobile phone straps and inexpensive lacquer chopsticks-type kitsch was a selection of pocket-sized illustrated guidebooks published by the national tourism authority, the Japan Travel Bureau (JTB). Judging from the titles, these guides seemed designed to âexplainâ Japan to first-time visitors â hence such titles as Festivals of Japan, Eating in Japan, and Living Japanese Style. Given the publisher and the series they were being published under, these publications were not particularly surprising. However, one guidebook did stand out a little from the others; it was called âSalarymanâ in Japan.
At one level, the presence of such a title alongside works introducing Japanese festivals and traditions was not wholly unsurprising. After all, societies and nations come to be associated with particular tropes in the global imagination. In the case of Japan, the figure of the besuited urban, white-collar office worker/business executive âsalarymanâ (or, in Japanese, sarariiman)1 came to be associated with Japanâs transformation from a war-devastated society in the years following defeat during World War Two to the worldâs second largest economy within a period of three decades. Typically the salaryman would be a middle-class, university-educated middle-aged man, with a dependent wife and children to support, working for an organization offering such benefits as secure lifetime employment guarantee for permanent employees, and a promotions and salary scale linked to seniority. He would spend long hours commuting to the office in a jam-packed train, from a house or apartment in a public housing estate in the suburbs. After spending the day toiling away at his desk, or visiting customers and suppliers on sales rounds, the salaryman would stop by a Japanese-style izakaya bar for a couple of drinks with colleagues, before returning to his home in the suburbs long after his children have gone to bed. This was a figure who came to be regarded as something of an âeverymanâ of Japanâs postwar social landscape, the âcorporate soldierâ (kigyĂ´ senshi) who exerted a powerful influence on imaginings of Japan, both within the country and outside of it. Indeed, the ubiquitous salaryman came to signify both Japanese masculinity and Japanese corporate culture. In this sense, the salaryman embodied âthe archetypal citizen ⌠[someone who] is a male, heterosexual, able-bodied, fertile, white-collar workerâ (Mackie 2002: 203). In other words, in the socio-cultural imaginary of postwar Japan, the salaryman was the quintessential male shakaijin (literally âsocial beingâ, but more generally, a âsocially responsibleâ adult).
This seemingly powerful presence of the salaryman finds expression in the Illustrated âSalarymanâ in Japan guidebook mentioned above. The guide covers virtually every aspect of the salarymanâs lifestyle. These include his daily schedule â how he commutes to work, what he reads while commuting, morning calisthenics when he arrives at work, what he eats for lunch, working overtime, and his after-work nightlife. The reader is enlightened about his leisure activities and pastimes, what he does on seasonal holidays, his conduct when attending weddings or funerals, what constitutes required reading for the salaryman, right through to the various health problems that plague him (headaches from hangovers and a weakened liver from drinking too much, haemorrhoids and stiff shoulders from sitting at his desk for too long, stomach ulcers from irregular diet and stress) (Japan Tourist Bureau (JTB) 2006: passim). Even the woman the salary-man is supposed to marry is depicted in some detail â ideally a so-called âOLâ (Office Lady) clerical/administrative staff, who, according to the stereotype, upon marriage to the salaryman, would quit work to become a full-time homemaker.
The packaging of the salaryman in this way points to the culturally iconic position occupied by him (and for that matter, the âOLâ he is supposed to marry). The Foreword to the volume highlights to readers that it âis a historical fact that salarymen and the companies they work for have been the driving force behind the economic rise of postwar Japanâ. Accordingly, it entreats readers who are âtired of fragmentary or over intellectual reports of Japanese business ⌠[to] take a stimulating journey into the practical workaday world of the salaryman â a journey guaranteed to deepen your understanding and enjoyment of Japanâ (JTB 2006: Foreword). Moreover, the description in the volume comes across as a deliberately crafted projection of the salaryman as being the embodiment of âJapanese cultureâ, in much the same way that the other cultural icons in the series (traditional food, architecture, the ancient imperial capital of Kyoto, etc.) are presented. This is reflected in the Afterword accompanying the guide, where the authors declare that âthe âsalaryman societyâ is a realm possessing its own special rules and ethics, much like the worlds of politics or student life in Japanâ (JTB 2006: 186). Attempting to âexplain why such a diverse range of people can be grouped together under the âsalaryman spiritâ headingâ we are told is futile. Rather, ultimately, âthe old standby â âoriental magicâ â may have something to do with it after allâ (187).
Yet, we are talking about the 2006 edition of the guidebook, not 1986 or 1976. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, the discourse one is more likely to encounter, in the media or in the course of conversations with friends and acquaintances, rather than being about the âoriental magicâ of the âsalaryman spiritâ is more than likely to be about Japan as an increasingly traumatized society characterized by a widening class divide (kaksusa shakai) and socially disadvantaged groups like long-term furiitâ, casual/temporary workers with little chance of finding permanent work, or NEET (âNot in Employment, Education or Training) or hikikomori (âsocially withdrawnâ) youth with little hope of a non-dysfunctional future (see Allison 2009). Indeed, a casual observation of the media and social landscape may initially suggest that the suit-clad salaryman is no longer the embodiment of the âarchetypalâ male citizen of modern Japan, an impression aptly captured by the title of a 2008 Economist feature on the changing corporate and social landscape in Japan â âSayonara, Salarymanâ (The Economist, 5â11 January 2008: 56â58). Rather, thanks to the diffusion of the âsoft powerâ of Japanâs popular culture, the signifier of Japanese masculinity is more likely to be the âfunkyâ commodified youth masculinity exemplified by the male stars of Japanâs pop idol industry, or the âfeminizedâ masculinity of the so-called âherbivorous menâ (sĂ´shokukei-danshi), or even the otaku âgeek coolâ associated with visual culture products like anime and computer graphics, than the middle-aged (or even young), besuited salaryman. No doubt, the far-reaching economic, socio-cultural, and even political shifts that Japan has undergone since the âBubble Economyâ boom of the 1980s and the subsequent recession plagued âLost Decadeâ of the 1990s and 2000s have undeniably had major repercussions for the salaryman and his position within Japanese society. Many of the earlier assumptions associated with the salaryman â the guarantee of employment for life, promotion tied to length of employment rather than merit, and a paternalistic regard for the employee, for instance â became increasingly redundant as a consequence of the corporate downsizings and restructurings of the post-Bubble years. Replacing the older model of the salaryman situated within its framework of corporate paternalism has been the emergence of a ânewâ discourse of the salaryman, premised on significantly different corporate and life expectations (see Taga 2011b). This new discourse draws upon a globalized Euro-American-inspired neo-liberal corporate ideology, one emphasizing efficiency, individual ability, and performance over the group (and indeed, over the corporation). This newer style of corporate masculinity stands in marked contrast to the company-centred hard-working but not necessarily âefficientâ salaryman represented in the JTB guide described above.
An exemplar of this newer style of corporate masculinity would be an individual like Carlos Ghosn, the Brazilian born CEO of Nissan and Renault. Ghosn, after being appointed to the helm of automobile manufacturer Nissan in the early 2000s, was credited with turning around the flagging fortunes of the organization over a surprisingly short time-span, thanks to his introduction of a radically new, individual style of corporate leadership, quite different to earlier paradigms of Japanese corporate leadership (Nathan 2004: 84â98). As a consequence of the apparent âmiracleâ he generated at Nissan, Ghosn became both a role model for a new style of management, and a popular culture icon â his autobiography was a bestseller, and he even became the hero of a popular manga revolving around his exploits. A more controversial (and notorious) exemplar of this new style of corporate masculinity in the early 2000s was the disgraced e-business entrepreneur Takafumi Horie, former CEO of the internet company Livedoor Corporation. Horieâs meteoric rise to prominence, and his equally dramatic fall following his arrest, and subsequent conviction, on grounds of financial fraud, made him the centre of widespread public and media attention. Much of this attention revolved around Horieâs unconventional business practices as well as his flamboyant personality and uniquely individual style of self-presentation. The image he projected (and continues to project despite his fall from grace) is quite contrary to the image of the conventional salaryman-style corporate executive.2 Given such radically different projections of corporate identity, it is no surprise that the media discourse â particularly outside of Japan â about the âdeath of the salarymanâ seems convincing.
Yet, ironically, Carlos Ghosn or Takafumi Horie notwithstanding, the reality at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century is that the salaryman continues to be pivotal to the ways in which Japanese corporate culture, Japanese masculinity, and indeed Japanese national identity continue to be imagined and framed. One of the most popular shows on the national broadcast network NHK in the mid-to late 2000s, for instance, was the series Sarariiman Neo, which took the salaryman and salaryman culture as an object of comical parody and even derision. Underlying the unexpected popularity of this series was perhaps its ability to effectively tap into feelings of (often uncomfortable) identification with the salaryman lifestyle which many in Japan still feel. A similar sense of simultaneous identification/parody also comes through, for instance, in the popularity of the J-Pop/hip-hop group Ketsumeishiâs 2010 single, Tatakae! Sarariiman (âFight! Salarymanâ),3 or in the continuing success of bestselling salaryman manga comics like Sarariiman KintarĂ´ and Shima KĂ´saku, which have been around since the 1980s and 1990s (see Matanle et al. 2008). Indeed, the salarymanâs very visible presence in popular culture spaces as varied as advertising, television dramas, and manga attests to the salarymanâs continuing presence in the collective national imaginary.
Even within the context of corporate culture, despite the media hype about the salaryman being an anachronism from the past, research evidence seems to point to, if anything, important continuities with the past. Peter Matanle, in discussing the shifts in employment patterns, points out that while changes have quite definitely occurred in many of the workplace institutions and practices, at the core the ideology of lifetime employment continues to underpin Japanese corporate culture (Matanle 2006; see also Inagami and Whittaker 2005). In a similar vein, drawing upon research conducted with mid-level managers across a number of large-scale organizations, McCann et al. (2006) note that despite the uncertainties and pressures faced by mid-level managers, the âemphasis placed on seniority, loyalty and internal skills development in promotion decision-making remain largely unchangedâ (100). Quite clearly then, there seem to be contradictory pressures and pulls at work in relation to discourses about the salaryman in contemporary Japan. On the one hand, what it means to be a salaryman in twenty-first-century Japan is seemingly quite different to what being a salaryman might have meant twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago. At the same time, it would appear that certain underpinnings and assumptions continue to inform and underpin the discourse surrounding the salaryman (see Taga 2011b).
The âmanâ in âsalarymanâ
There is a substantial body of academic and non-academic literature, in both Japanese and English, dealing with various aspects of the salaryman â as an indication a search on the English and Japanese engines of Google for the term âsalarymanâ (and âsarariimanâ in Japanese) generated close to 400,000 hits in English and over 14 million in Japanese. Given this continued visibility of the salaryman in imaginings of post-World War Two (hereafter âpostwarâ) Japan, it is no surprise that over the years a not insubstantial body of popular and academic literature has emerged around the salaryman and all that he signified (see e.g. Hazama 1996; Takeuchi 1997; Umezawa 1997; Tanaka and Nakamura 1999; Okamoto and Sasano 2001; Iwase 2006; Taga 2011d). Moreover, the salaryman was a visible presence in some of the early postwar studies of Japan which were to have an impact on academic and research circles in anglophone countries. These included works such as Ezra Vogelâs Japanâs New Middle Class, originally published in 1963, and Ronald Doreâs City Life in Japan, originally published in 1958, which went on to become âclassicsâ within the emerging field of âJapan studiesâ in the West. Subsequent works, including those by Plath (1964, 1983a), Ballon (1969), Rohlen (1974), Clark (1979), van Helvoort (1979), Fruin (1978), Hamabata (1990), Allison (1994), Beck and Beck (1994), Ogasawara (1998), Sakai (2000), Matanle and Lunsing (2006), and Sedgwick (2007), have been concerned in one way or another with the salaryman.
However, only recently has the âmanâ in salaryman started to come under some sort of tentative scrutiny. In other words, the salaryman as a gendered construct remained outside the orbit of scrutiny for many decades.4 This is ironic, given that one of the core underpinnings of the discourse around the salaryman has been the equation of work with masculinity. Specifically, as reflected in the JTB guide mentioned in the opening pages of this chapter, the notion of being the daikokubashira (literally, âthe central supporting pillarâ), the primary income provider for a dependent wife and family, was axiomatic to the salaryman discourse.5 Furthermore, despite all the apparent modifications to the contours of the salaryman discourse in the wake of the economic slowdown and restructurings since the 1990s, this core underpinning â work defining the salaryman â appears to be as firmly entrenched as in the past.
A primary reason as to why the salaryman and all that he stands for had not been adequately addressed through the prism of gender has to do with the fact that until recently in Japan (as in other countries) the concept of âmenâ as a category needing to be teased out and problematized was not given serious consideration. âMenâ were the default against which all other âvariantsâ â women, transgender persons, non-heterosexual men â were measured. Given the salarymanâs position as a metonym for all Japanese men, the extension of the âmen as defaultâ logic meant that the salaryman was studied from virtually every angle conceivable (class, income, age, lifestyle patterns, work habits, consumption patterns, etc.) save from the angle of his gender.
This theoretical blindness towards men and âmasculinityâ started to be gradually remedied from the 1990s onward, both in the West and in Japan. There were several factors at work here. First, a growing body of academic and non-academic work, both in anglophone and European countries, as well as in Japan, interrogating and problematizing âmasculinityâ as a construct, started to become visible.6 Many of these works, both in the West and in Japan, emerged from, or were influenced by critiques of patriarchy by feminist scholars in the 1960s and 1970s (see, e.g. Brod 1987; Connell 1987, 1995; Kaufman 1987; Hearn and Morgan 1990; Morgan 1992; ItĂ´ 1993, 1996; Brod and Kaufman 1994; Inoue et al. 1995). Many of these were also influenced by the theoretical and empirical work carried out in the emerging field of lesbian and gay studies, and subsequently queer theory, particularly in relation to the pivotal role of homophobia and heterosexism in informing dominant gender ideologies (see Sedgwick 1985; Edwards 1990; Kimmel 1994; Connell 1995, 2000; DâEmilio 1997; Inoue et al. 1995: 235â262). What these studies had in common was their highlighting of the fact that masculinity, rather than being a biological given, constant over time and space, âis historical ⌠created in culture ⌠[and] means different things at different times to different peopleâ (Kimmel 1994: 120). Moreover, while many of these early works fully acknowledged the stake in patriarchy that many men have, they also drew attention to the fact that different men had differing degrees of access to the dividends of patriarchal power. Thus, this growing body of research and theorizing in the late 1980s and the 1990s brought to attention the fact that we need to recognize the plurality and diversity in menâs lives and experiences â the existence of masculinities in the plural, rather than a singular masculinity extending across all men, throughout the globe.
In the context of Japan, these theoretical and academic framings of masculinity cross-fertilized with indigenous scholarship to define the shaping of a body of research which came to be referred to collectively as âdanseigakuâ (literally, â...