Rethinking Peacebuilding

The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans

Karin Aggestam, Annika Björkdahl

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780415525039
• eBook ISBN: 9781136260001
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Eastern European History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book presents new theoretical and conceptual perspectives on the problematique of building just and durable peace.

Linking peace and justice has sparked lively debates about the dilemmas and trade-offs in several contemporary peace processes. Despite the fact that justice and peace are commonly referred to there is surprisingly little research and few conceptualizations of the interplay between the two.

This edited volume is the result of three years of collaborative research and draws upon insights from such disciplines as peace and conflict, international law, political science and international relations. It contains policy-relevant knowledge about effective peacebuilding strategies, as well as an in-depth analysis of the contemporary peace processes in the Middle East and the Western Balkans. Using a variety of theoretical perspectives and empirical approaches, the work makes an original contribution to the growing literature on peacebuilding.

This book will be of much interest to students of peacebuilding, peace and conflict studies, Middle Eastern Politics, European Politics and IR/Security Studies.

Part I
Just peace in theory

1
Linking peace and justice in peacemaking

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov

Introduction

Ideas connected with linking justice and fairness with peace have, over the past decade, been the focus of theoretical and empirical literature of conflict resolution and peacemaking, as well as reconciliation studies. Looking at the relevant studies in the field indicates that we can differentiate between two basic approaches that refer to the link between peace and justice.

The first approach calls for a tight link between justice and peace because the issue of justice is a major cause of conflict, and justice is a foundation for peace. Hence justice is required and necessary for peace. The second approach has two variants: the first denies any necessary link between justice and peace, while the second does not negate this link in principle and objects to the absolute conditional demand for such a link because it may prevent peace.

This chapter aims (1) to explore the reasons for the demand of linking justice to peace as they are presented in different approaches in the field; (2) to examine the implications of linking justice to peace in formulating peace negotiations and concluding, implementing and stabilizing a peace agreement, as well as the effects on durability and the prospects for reconciliation; and (3) to explore alternative ways to balance the relationship between justice and peace that may enable the conclusion of a peace agreement and ensure its durability.

Firstly, the concepts of justice and injustice are discussed. Second, approaches that demand a link between justice and peace are presented. Third, the approaches that argue against linking justice with peace are elaborated. Fourth, different ideas will be examined regarding how to balance between justice and peace when the concepts of justice and their link with peace differ and confront each other. Finally, it is suggested that justice should be linked with reconciliation instead of peacemaking, because justice, which is central to reconciliation, is not a central part of, or applied in, conflict resolution, and insistence on its inclusion in conflict resolution is a barrier.

Between justice and injustice

Justice is the quality of being just – the quality of being correct or right; righteousness, equitableness, or moral rightness; to uphold the justice of a cause, the moral principle determining just conduct, fair representation of facts, vindictive retribution (Webster’s 1994: 776, 993), conformity to right relationships, making things right, honesty, impartiality, rectifying the wrong, restitution, and fairness (Lederach 1997: 28).

Justice and truth are the first virtues of human activities and natural characteristics of human interactions. As such they are uncompromising. Justice is nevertheless a “contested concept” that is not necessarily a universal, objective and agreed concept, but a subjective and relative one, which has different understandings, interpretations and applications (Gallie 1956; Swanton 1985; Garver 1987). As a contested concept, justice involves endless disputes about its proper uses on the part of its users, and these disputes “cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone” (Gallie 1956: 169; Gray 1977: 344). Moreover, such disputes are “perfectly genuine”, “not resolvable by argument” and “nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence” (Gallie 1956: 169). Indeed, the question of justice arises only where there are competing interests or competing claims. Each party tends “to defend its case with what it claims to be convincing arguments, evidence and other forms of justification” (Gallie 1956: 168).

Because of its “contested” characteristics, a shared conception of justice, or at least some measure of agreement about its meanings and applications, is the source of harmony and cooperation among individuals and societies. The value and the procedures that define justice may develop by negotiation among the conflicting parties. In the absence of an agreement or shared understanding on what is just and unjust, individuals and societies will fail not only to cooperate, or to coordinate their interaction effectively, but will find themselves in a conflict situation (Deutsch 1985: 6–9; Rawls 1999a: 3–11).

The ideas of justice are influenced by the specific context and situation, and by the interpretations and expectations of the initial situation. There are many interpretations of a just situation. Therefore there is a need to formulate the criteria to identify what sort of situations are defined as just or unjust (Rawls 1999a: 14, 47; Campbell 2000). Justice generally relates to a distribution of goods (distributive justice), and to the way of distribution (procedural justice). The relationships between the kind and the procedure of the distribution link justice with fairness or, in Rawls’ terms, “justice as fairness”. The principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargaining. Justice as fairness “conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair” (Rawls 1999a: 11).

Justice requires the recognition of certain basic needs. The notion of needs tends to be controversial when it is culturally defined and when needs are converted into rights, which make demands on other people. Therefore the sense of “absolute needs or rights” ignores the differences in needs and rights between different people and different cultures (Solomon 1995: 187–93).

Although in Theory of Justice Rawls applies the idea of justice mainly to individuals in society, in his book The Laws of Peoples he extends the political conception of right and justice to constitutional liberal democracies. These peoples are different because “their basic needs are met and their fundamental interests are fully compatible with those of other democratic peoples. There is a true peace among them because all societies are satisfied with status quo for the right reasons” (Rawls 1999b: 3).¹

The principles of laws of the peoples (which are the same as those of international law) are as follows. (1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. (2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. (3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. (4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. (5) Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence. (6) Peoples have to honour human rights. (7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. (8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. This principle, according to Rawls, is especially controversial (Rawls 1999b: 37). These principles must satisfy the criterion of reciprocity (Rawls 1999b: 41).

Rawls maintains that the principle of distributive justice does not refer to the laws of peoples: “inequalities are not always unjust, and that when they are, it is because of their unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, and on relations among peoples and their members” (Rawls 1999b: 113). As to the right of self-determination, Rawls indicates that “no people has the right of self-determination, or a right to secession, at the expense of subjugating another people” (Rawls 1999b: 38).

Injustice is defined as the quality or fact of being unjust; inequality; violations of rights of others; unjust or unfair action or treatment; an unjust act; wrong; and unfairness (Webster’s 1994: 733). People develop a sense of injustice after experiencing injustice, or when they feel that they are denied promised benefits, or when they do not get what they believe they deserve, or when they are deprived of their rights and needs.

The sense of injustice may develop as “a reaction to a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits” (Lerner 1981: 12–13). In other words, a perceived discrepancy develops between what an individual obtains, and what he/she is entitled to obtain. The greater the extent of relative deprivation, the more intense is the sense of injustice. “The intensity of the sense of injustice is also undoubtedly influenced by the prior experience and future anticipation of relative deprivation” (Deutsch 1985: 51).

Feelings of injustice are not only a function of objective situation, but also a result of psychological factors (Solomon 1995: 4–6, 30–33, 187–91; Deutsch 2000: 41–52). Awareness of the injustice consists a constellation of feelings and is cultivated mainly from negative emotions such as outrage, anger, indignation, envy, resentment, depression, disappointment, humiliation, vengeance, a sense of helplessness, and all other passions that people feel when they have been deprived of their rights and basic needs. People are likely to feel humiliated both by the circumstances of the situation and by their inability to change them. Nevertheless, people in this situation may also develop positive emotions such as self-esteem, the sense of power, and pride when they act to eliminate injustice and to correct it.

In a complex and often conflicting set of feelings that vary with the context judgment of justice, justice “is not simply an application of a clearly defined, already established and internalised set of rational principles of justice” (Solomon 1995: 172). When people feel that they are in an injustice situation, they can develop a strong justice motive to correct it. The justice motive is defined as “the drive to correct a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits” (Welch 1993: 20). For the justice motive to lead to an action, whether or not those perceptions are accurate is an entirely irrelevant issue. Even an unfounded perception may trigger the justice motive. The justice motive can move people to “extremes of self-sacrifice in order to promote justice”; sometimes they act even “out of raw-interest” regardless of the cost to themselves (Lerner 1981: 13). Perceived claims of injustice will focus on satisfaction of these claims even at the cost of excluding other concerns, sometimes even more crucial.

Welch mentions that the sense of injustice and the motive to correct it differs from an aversion of losses or securing gains in three significant aspects. (1) It triggers a unique emotional response, embodying a powerful passion that increases the stridency of demands, amplifying intransigence, reducing sensitivity to threats and value trade-offs, and increasing willingness to take risks, including those of violence. (2) It differs prescriptively in terms of behaviour. (3) It tends to be categorical and deontological rather than utilitarian. Nothing short of full satisfaction is accepted (Welch 1993: 20).

People perceive their injustice as the responsibility of others, and tend to see themselves as potential victims of injustice. They demand not only recognition by the other side of its responsibility for the injustice done, but also its acceptance of the validity of certain rights and needs of which they were deprived, as well as the correction of the particular injustice that was inflicted on them. Victims of injustice tend to look for compensation, retaliation and justification. These demands are perceived as just, fair and honest demands that cannot be subject to any political negotiation and bargaining. Compensation is likely to be the most popular demand because it not only benefits the victim for the loss, but restores equity. When compensation is denied, the victim may look for extreme means including violence. Retaliation is perceived as a legitimate way to correct the injustice. However, when the victim is not sufficiently powerful to obtain compensation or to retaliate, they justify their weakness as an outcome of their victimization (Deutsch 1985: 22).

What makes the sense of justice regarding some rights so essential is the fact that it remains and consolidates, and the more it is discussed, mentioned and stimulated, the more it is entrenched in people’s minds. People become more committed to it and refuse to compromise. The sense of justice gives people the feeling of rightness about their case that others cannot reasonably reject, and justification for their attitudes and behaviour. While people are keenly aware of their own concern for justice, they tend to ignore the other’s concern for justice. They view the other’s sense of justice as distorted by self-interest, ideological motives and other biases (Bland and Ross 2008).

Why link peace to justice?

Linking peace to justice is an old demand. It seems natural, normal and necessary that peace and justice live in harmony, as recalled in the Bible, in Psalm 85: 10 – “Mercy and truth are met together; justice and peace have kissed.” Lederach, who refers to these four concepts as “a conceptual framework for reconciliation” (not as a conceptual framework for peace), maintains that justice represents the “search for individual and group rights, for social restructuring, and restitution” and is linked with peace, “which underscores the need for interdependence, well-being, and security” (Lederach 1997: 29).

Article 3 of the first chapter of the UN Charter also emphasizes the link between peace and justice, but also adds security: “All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered.”

We can differentiate between two current sub-approaches, which insist on tightly linking peace with justice. The first sub-approach will be defined as “procedural justice”, while the second sub-approach is defined as “corrective justice.”

The procedural justice approach

The procedural justice approach argues that peace negotiation and peace agreement should be managed by principles of justice, equality and fairness. Negotiations and peace should be based on voluntary acceptance, without the use of threats or rewards, and without any coercion and imposition, and even without exploiting asymmetrical power relations, while applying the principles of procedural justice and distributive justice (Deutsch 2000: 41–44; Albin 2001). Justice and fairness are “what can freely be agreed on by equally well-placed parties”, in the sense of being able to veto an agreement (Barry 1995: 51).

It is reasonable for concerns about justice to be included in the negotiations and in the peace agreement: “such concerns provide the lenses through which information is evaluated and preferences determined” (Bazerman and Neale 1995: 106).

These concerns are especially related to asymmetrical power relations and negotiations, because they may enable the strong side to exploit its power for maximizing its gains at the expense of the weak side. Indeed, the weak side will often question whether the structure and the process of negotiations could produce anything fair and just, because of its inability to advance its interests and to guarantee a balanced agreement. The link of justice to peace is therefore crucial in asymmetrical power relations, and it should be based on principles of procedural justice, distributive justice and compliance with commitments assumed in the agreement (Deutsch 2000; Albin 2001).

The principles of procedural justice include the following: fair treatment, respect and dignity; a freely agreed and balanced negotiation process, such as agenda-setting and the nature and ordering of issues to be negotiated, the structure of the negotiation (balancing power relations by a veto power of the weaker side, free choice of the participants); and fair negotiation procedures (freedom to introduce inputs, claims, and proposals and to reject proposals without being subjected to coercion).

Agreements are just and fair if they are based on terms agreed by the parties and provided they are mutually beneficial: “The rules of justice are those that would be advantageous to all if generally adhered to” (Barry 1995: 48). Justice, therefore, is based on mutual advantage as well as on reciprocity. Reciprocity is a criterion for justice. “Justice as reciprocity” combines mutual advantage “as the criterion for rules with a motive for keeping them as a sense of fair play” (Gibbard 1990: 261–64; Barry 1995: 46). Reciprocity also requires mutual responsiveness to each other’s concessions.

Linking justice to peace is also based on principles of distributive justice, such as identical or comparable gains and costs (equal concessions, equal sacrifices, comparable exchange of concessions). Linking justice to peace also refers to the implementation phase of the agreement. Compliance with the commitments taken according to the content and the spirit of the agreement is an integral part of justice-making (Albin 2001: 9–10, 25). Although the weak side has a veto power over negotiation, and over the signing of a peace agreement, without its willingness no agreement is possible: securing the principles of procedural and distributive justice is significant for concluding and maintaining a peace agreement.

The corrective justice approach²

The “corrective justice” approach argues that linking justice to peace is required, especially in an internal or in an international conflict, when the basic rights, needs and identity of one or both sides were violently deprived or v...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Introduction: The study of just and durable peace
• PART I Just peace in theory
• PART II In search of just peace in practice
• Conclusion: rethinking just peacebuilding in theory and practice
• References
• Index