The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976

Series III, Volume V: Documents on British Policy Overseas

Keith Hamilton, Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, Patrick Salmon

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781135776244
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

A fascinating collection of British foreign policy documents covering reactions in Whitehall to political change and revolution in the Mediterranean basin from 1973 to 1976.

This volume contains many previously unpublished documents, including Joint Intelligence Committee papers, which cast new light on key events, such as the international crisis triggered by the coup against Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus, Turkey's military intervention in the island, the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Portugal, and the death of Franco in Spain.

During 1973-76, years generally associated with East/West détente in Europe, NATO's southern flank was plunged into crisis by a revolution in Portugal and a coup d'état in Cyprus. Political turmoil in Portugal, Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus, the collapse of the military government in Greece, and the threat of a Greco-Turkish War, all emphasized the vulnerability of the alliance to regime change in the Mediterranean. The Western allies had also to prepare for the death of two ageing dictators in Spain and Yugoslavia, and the possible entry of Communists into government in France and Italy. This volume draws upon the records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence, to document the reactions of Harold Wilson's Labour government to these developments.

This book will be of great interest to all students of contemporary British history, international history, European history, international relations, politics and diplomacy.

Chapter I

Cyprus: Prelude to Intervention 24 October 1973–11 July 1974

No. 1

Mr. S.L.J. Olver¹ (Nicosia) to Sir A. Douglas-Home²

[WSC ½]

Confidential

NICOSIA, 24 October 1973

Summary …³

Sir,

Cyprus: The Enlarged Intercommunal Talks

In his despatch of 27 August, 1971, my predecessor reviewed the course taken by the intercommunal talks during the fourth phase, which ended in deadlock in the late summer of 1971. The prospects for the enlarged intercommunal talks, which began hopefully in June 1972,⁴ are now uncertain and deadlock is once again a real possibility. The purpose of this despatch is to analyse the main problems at issue, and to discuss the likely developments in the immediate future. I enclose at Annex A⁵ a summary account of the stage now reached in the discussion of each of the major issues at Annex B⁵ a chronological record of the enlarged talks.

A Measure of Progress

2. The enlarged talks have had some success. The presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Cyprus and the Greek and Turkish Constitutional Advisers has been beneficial. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have felt the need to appear constructive in front of the outsiders. The outsiders themselves have contributed some useful ideas, in particular Mr. Osorio-Tafall’s suggestion of a divisible House of Representatives to legislate on matters of communal interest. On a number of questions, advances have been made beyond the point reached in 1971. However, the agreements so far reached will remain provisional until a package deal is achieved: there will be no piecemeal settlement.

A Unitary State

3. The talks are intended to find a fresh, mutually acceptable constitution for a sovereign, independent and unitary Republic of Cyprus. However, each side differs in its interpretation of these fundamental terms. The differences spring from the Turkish Cypriots’ fear for their physical security and for their continuation as a community, as against the Greek Cypriots’ desire for a Greek dominated State which would have complete freedom of action internationally. The Turkish Cypriots insist on full control of their own affairs, and recognition of their status as partners in a bi-communal State. Provided they get the substance of local autonomy, the Turkish side do not much mind what constitutional form it takes. It might be an autonomous local government structure reporting direct to a joint commission at the highest level, such as they requested in 1970; or enhanced powers for the Turkish Cypriot branch of the House of Representatives; or enhanced powers for the Vice-President of the Republic; or a combination of these. There are several permutations, each intended to lead to the same result, and each of which would make minor concessions possible in other areas (e.g. the reduction of Turkish representation in the Council of Ministers and Republican Civil Service from 30 to 20 per cent). All this is contrary to the Greek Cypriot concept of a unitary State. As Archbishop Makarios⁶ told me when I presented my Letter of Commission, the Greek Cypriot side are prepared to accept, to a certain degree, a form of local government for the Turkish Cypriots, but not such as might lead to the establishment of a cantonal or federal system, which in turn at a later stage could develop into partition. According to the Turkish Cypriots, the 1960 Constitution did in fact create a unitary State:⁷ a State which recognised the existence of two communities, gave them certain autonomous rights in local affairs, (chiefly in religion, education and personal questions such as marriage and divorce) and granted them partnership on agreed terms at Government level. The Turkish Cypriots maintain that anything less than this would mean mere minority status and that it is the fate of minorities always to be at the mercy of the majority. But there seems to have been a steady escalation in their demands, which are now a good deal more far-reaching than the rights assigned to them under the 1960 Constitution.

A Sovereign and Independent State

4. Archbishop Makarios regards the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance⁸ as invalid, having renounced them unilaterally in 1963 and 1964 respectively. He has said that after a solution of the constitutional problem through the intercommunal talks, the Treaties, which represent the external aspects of the Cyprus problem, will be discussed at a later stage and at another level. He wants the Greek, Turkish and British rights of intervention to be abolished, and the Contingents of the Greek and Turkish armies to be withdrawn. He wants the guarantees against Enosis (and, incidentally, partition) to be dismantled. Only then in his view, will the Cyprus Republic be truly sovereign and independent. If the Turkish Cypriots insist on continuing guarantees of their minority rights these could be provided by the UN.

5. I shall return below to the question of whether or not the Archbishop really wants union with Greece; but the abolition of the two Treaties would unquestionably remove the legal barriers to ‘self determination’ which, in the Greek Cypriot language designed for foreign and UN consumption, means Enosis. The Turkish Cypriots, who are morbidly aware of this, insist that there can be no discussion of the Treaties and that the presence of the Turkish mainland Contingent is not negotiable. They maintain that it is only the state of affairs guaranteed by the Treaties which has kept Cyprus independent; otherwise, the island would long ago have been swallowed up by Greece. The Turkish Cypriots say that the Greek Cypriots have every right, if they wish to opt for Enosis; in which case, the Turkish Cypriots would unite with Turkey. This would mean the partition of Cyprus, or ‘double Enosis’. As a variant, the Turkish Cypriots sometimes hint that they are considering the proclamation of a Turkish Cypriot Republic. They always maintain, however, that these threats are only a riposte to Greek Cypriot talk of Enosis; that they would prefer an independent Republic (on their own terms naturally); and that partition, for them, is a last resort.

Enosis and Partition

6. For more than 20 years Archbishop Makarios has, with few exceptions, spoken of Enosis as a goal which he would like to see achieved in his lifetime. This is a record whose consistency cannot be ignored. However, by putting his terms for Enosis impossibly high, the Archbishop has in practice worked for the continuing independence of the Cyprus Republic. He has done so deliberately. He is determined that Enosis, if it is ever achieved, will be on the terms and at the time of his choice, and in his own best interests. In the meantime, he enjoys being Head of State and is content to rule over a purely Greek community. He summed up his policy characteristically in a letter which he sent in confidence to General Grivas⁹ on 4 May 1972, and which Grivas has recently published. ‘In present circumstances the struggle of Cyprus Hellenism is rather defensive. We are defending ourselves against the imposition of an unacceptable solution … We refuse to accept a solution which would fetter our national future.’ In other words, the Archbishop is not prepared to barter away the status quo.

7. Enosis is an ancient and honourable ambition. It is understandable that after eight centuries any Greek Gypriot would feel deep guilt if he renounced it permanently, and it is significant that since Independence no leading Greek Cypriot has ever ventured to denounce it publicly and in principle. No single newspaper or party supports Independence in terms. The Turkish Gypriots, for their part, have no wish to become Greek subjects. They might without much difficulty be induced to accept that in a new constitutional settlement no fresh guarantees against Enosis were necessary, provided that the Treaty of Guarantee and Article 185 of the Constitution (which excludes Enosis and partition) remained unchanged. But until the Archbishop and other Greek Cypriot politicians give a lead to their community by ceasing to talk of Enosis and by committing themselves publicly to independence (without the escape hatch of ‘self-determination’), the Turkish side will not be prepared to believe in Greek Cypriot and Greek good faith. It is no great exaggeration to say that the intercommunal talks are only about the symptoms of the disease. The real problem remains the political question of Enosis as against independence.

8. It is hard to judge how genuine are the Greek Cypriot fears of partition. Given Turkey’s proximity they may be justifiable, but most Greek Cypriots, including the Archbishop, tend to dismiss the possibility of a Turkish invasion. Few Turkish Cypriots would in fact welcome partition, whether it took the form of absorption into Turkey or the declaration of a mini-state. The preparation, execution and consequences of partition would be painful and involve great dislocation of their life. Apart from the movement of population, the community would risk being deprived, at least for a time, of electricity, food supplies, currency and banking facilities. Most educated Turkish Cypriots have no wish to be absorbed into Turkey, whose lower cultural and living standards they despise and the interference of whose representatives they dislike. They would probably welcome an intercommuncal settlement provided it gave them concrete guarantees. Nor would this be contrary to Ankara’s interests, since my impression is that the Turkish authorities strategic aim is to ensure that Cyprus shall never come under Greek or other hostile foreign control.

Can the Status Quo Continue?

9. So far as the Greek Cypriots are concerned, there seems no pressing practical reason why the status quo should not continue. Archbishop Makarios knows how to wait. I believe that time is not for him; but it is equally not much against him—at least in the short term—and he knows the problems faced by the Turkish Cypriot community. Internationally the Cyprus Government are occasionally annoyed or embarrassed by the Turkish Cypriots’ political pretensions, as during the negotiations for the EEC Association Agreement.¹⁰ Internally, their amour propre is hurt from time to time by the activity of the ‘Turkish Cypriot Administration’. But the compensations and inevitability of the status quo are compelling enough, as a rule, to restrain them from any precipitate action. The economy prospers, although tourism could be dealt a severe blow by any recrudescence of intercommunal fighting. Most Greek Cypriots are not greatly inconvenienced, either personally or financially, by the continuation of the Cyprus problem. Many would resent having to make way for Turkish Cypriot civil servants and to pay some deference to Turkish Cypriot susceptibilities, as would be necessary in the event of an intercommunal settlement.

10. Matters are very different for the Turkish Cypriot community. Although material conditions have eased since 1968, there are signs of war weariness. The hands of the Turkish military and Mr. Denktash’s apparat lie heavily upon the community. The subsidies from Turkey are barely enough to keep the community afloat, while at the same time embarrassing the Turkish Government; and prices in the Greek Cypriot economy which dominates the Turkish Cypriot economy continue to rise. Few Turkish Cypriots feel any optimism about the future of the community. If there is a settlement, they fear that they will be swallowed up economically by the Greek Cypriots. They may try to secure economic guarantees through the intercommunal talks, but it is impossible to have a guarantee against every eventuality in life. Mr. Denktash sometimes has private doubts even about the readiness of the Turkish Air Force to come to the aid of the community,¹¹ should Turkey suddenly weaken internally or internationally. If there is no settlement the community will continue its depressing and restricted existence. Either way, the more enterprising young people will continue to emigrate, probably in increasing numbers, if they can still find somewhere to go in Western Europe. Despite all this, there are no signs of desire for an intercommunal settlement at any price. R...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Preface
• Contents
• Abbreviations for Printed Sources
• Abbreviated Designations
• Chapter Summaries
• Chapter I. Cyprus: Prelude to Intervention, 1973–74
• Chapter II. Cyprus: Coup d’État and Intervention, 1974
• Chapter III. Cyprus: Sequel to Geneva, 1974–75
• Chapter IV. Political Change in Portugal and Spain, 1974–75
• Chapter V. Political Change in Portugal and Spain, 1975–76
• Appendices
• Index
• Map Cyprus, 1974