Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons

Bhumitra Chakma

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780415408714
• eBook ISBN: 9781134132546
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Pakistan is a vitally important country in the contemporary global political system. It is a de facto nuclear state, and a pivotal country in the War on Terror. This book provides a comprehensive study of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, investigating the implications of its emergence as a nuclear weapons state.

Setting out the historical background of Pakistani nuclear development, the book examines the lessons for proliferation that can be drawn from the Pakistan case. It explains the changes and continuities of Pakistan's nuclear policy, assessing its emerging force posture and the implications for Pakistani, South Asian and global security. It also considers the extent to which Pakistan can be said to have a nuclear doctrine, the Pakistani nuclear command and control system, and the relationship between Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation regime. Addressing the issue of whether Pakistan should be viewed as a proliferator, and the implications of a nuclear Pakistan for global terrorism, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons is an important study of all the major issues surrounding Pakistan's emergence as a nuclear power.

1 Introduction

This is a second nuclear age. … the first nuclear age that was defined and driven by Soviet-US superpower antagonism definitively is dead.

Colin S. Gray¹

The second nuclear age

The first nuclear age that began in 1945 with the American possession of nuclear weapons has ended and we now live in a new nuclear era – the Second Nuclear Age.² Generally, the first nuclear age is thought to have been coterminous with the Cold War period and ended with the termination of the Cold War in 1991. However, India and Pakistan’s overt nuclear tests in May 1998 marked the actual beginning of the new nuclear era.³

Interestingly, the transition from the first to the second nuclear age was not automatic or straightforward; that is, the second nuclear age did not emerge immediately following the end of the first one. Indeed, the second nuclear age emerged gradually, and in a sense surreptitiously, in the context of ‘horizontal nuclear proliferation’⁴ and the rise of nuclear issues and deterrence systems in certain regions of the world, particularly in Asia.⁵ Paul Bracken argues that the second nuclear age rose ‘out of a hodge podge of unrelated regional issues’.⁶ In the process of the gradual rise of the second nuclear age, the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan marked a watershed because those explosions challenged the established nuclear order based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, those tests threw the NPT into a state of crisis.⁷ They also symbolised the rise of a new category of nuclear powers – de facto nuclear weapons states with proven possession of nuclear arsenals. Despite this development and the rise of regional nuclear rivalries and deterrence systems, which in some ways highlighted emerging structural features of the new nuclear era, it is important to note that the structure of the second nuclear age at that point was yet to take a concrete shape. Indeed, it is still evolving.

The defining structural feature of the first nuclear age was the overarching nuclear rivalry between the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. Other acknowledged nuclear powers – Britain, France, and China – played only marginal role, if any, in that structure (let alone covert nuclear weapons possessors – Israel, India, South Africa, and Pakistan). Indeed, the superpower rivalry hardly accommodated any meaningful autonomous role for the other medium-sized nuclear powers in the nuclear politics of the first nuclear age. The breakdown of this structure in the wake of the USSR’s implosion and the demise of the Cold War brought the first nuclear age to an end.⁸ An overwhelming nuclear rivalry between superpowers that defined the first nuclear age is obviously absent in the new nuclear era.

While the second nuclear age can be understood by a conspicuous absence of awesome superpower nuclear rivalry, beyond that there is less certainty about the new nuclear era. Indeed, its defining features are yet to take a definite shape except, perhaps, that regional nuclear rivalries are an important feature of the new nuclear age. More proliferation of nuclear weapons in the coming years is all but certain,⁹ and regional nuclear issues are likely to remain, at least in the foreseeable future, as important factors in the nuclear politics of the second nuclear age.

It is not that regional nuclear issues and the potential for more nuclear weapons proliferation are typical for the second nuclear age; in fact they existed in the preceding nuclear era and during the Cold War period. But the key difference is that while in the first nuclear age regional nuclear issues were smothered by the awesome superpower strategic rivalry, in the second nuclear age they dramatically ascended to strategic significance and have emerged as important factors in the global security agenda. For example, the implications of North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons are potentially highly destabilizing for the strategic stability of the north-east Asian region. Particularly for Japan the implications of North Korea’s nuclear test and its possession of nuclear weapons are uncertain. It could even lead to a Sino-Japanese arms race in the longer run if Tokyo decides to review its traditional security and defence policy in reaction to North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons.¹⁰ Iran probably is ready to acquire nuclear weapons and the implications of Iran’s nuclear weapons acquisition for nuclear proliferation and strategic stability in the Middle East will be profound. As a result, a number of countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, are likely to initiate their own nuclear weapons programme.¹¹ South Asia is generally considered to be a nuclear flashpoint and the implications of South Asia’s nuclear tests for global nuclear proliferation are formidable.¹² Also alarming is the possibility that these weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists; the likelihood of this is greater in the second nuclear age than anytime in history.¹³ These examples highlight the significance of horizontal nuclear proliferation and regional nuclear issues in the contemporary global security structure.

Regional nuclear rivalries and regional deterrence systems in the second nuclear age are not necessarily linked with each other. For example, North Korea’s nuclear weapons have no relation whatsoever to the Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence system. Neither is there any strategic implication of North Korea’s nuclear weapons for the Israeli nuclear arsenal. However, the extra-regional implications of regional rivalries and regional deterrence systems relate to, and bear significance for, the West and in particular for the only remaining superpower of the post-Cold War era. A reflection of this implication can be observed in the USA’s contemplation of a national missile defence system.

The contemporary global nuclear power architecture is diffused and highly hierarchical. It is composed of a single superpower – the United States – with its awesome military power and abundance of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,¹⁴ a number of middle-range nuclear weapons states – Russia,¹⁵ China, Britain, France, and India, and some strictly regional nuclear powers, such as Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. As noted above, Iran probably is ready to join the club of strictly regional nuclear powers, and perhaps not in the distant future.¹⁶ A recent study assessing governmental policy approach and public opinion in a number of countries concluded that South Korea, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria might join the proliferation ladder in the future.¹⁷ In the environment of the second nuclear age, we may have entered into another round of nuclear weapons proliferation.

‘How to Deter?’: deterrence dilemmas in the second nuclear age

The chief function of nuclear weapons is to deter an adversary from undertaking aggressive or coercive acts harmful to one’s own core values and goals that it cherishes. Regardless of the possessor (be it superpower, medium-size, or strictly regional player), nuclear weapons perform this function for all the possessors of nuclear weapons at all times. However, different nuclear ages are bound to differ on the question of ‘how to deter’ or on how the act of deterrence is performed. This is so because the context under which deterrence functions is different in different nuclear ages. To be certain, the context and the conditions under which deterrence functioned in the preceding era have drastically altered in the second nuclear age. Also, there are national variations in undertaking the act of deterrence or ‘engaging in deterrence’.

As the context and conditions under which deterrence is to function have altered in the second nuclear age, all nuclear weapons possessors will need to formulate or reassess their nuclear strategies depending on their own circumstances and strategic assessment and priorities. The old, Cold War practice and assumptions of nuclear deterrence may provide some lessons in the formulation of national nuclear strategies, but their wholesale application is simply out of question. For the United States, for example, the central function of nuclear weapons today is not to deter a superpower, as was the case during the Cold War period, rather their chief purpose is to deal with an environment of asymmetric nuclear threat (including the potential threat of a terrorist nuclear bomb). In the words of Keith Payne:

compared to the Cold War era, the list of provocations and opponents we now hope to deter has expanded, the contexts within which we hope to deter are far more variable, as are the stakes involved and the priority we may attach to deterrence … much of our Cold War-derived thinking about deterrence now needs to be reconsidered.¹⁸

And dealing with all these asymmetric threats may be more complex and demanding than the Cold War experience was for the USA. As Payne posits, ‘deterring their deterrent’ in some cases may be a ‘much more stressful mission than we confronted during the Cold War’.¹⁹ James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also reached a similar conclusion: ‘we have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.’²⁰ In the environment of the second nuclear age, the USA, therefore, will have to deal with a variety of asymmetric nuclear threats and plan for an all-encompassing and capability-based nuclear strategy, which deals with a myriad of situations. Jason Ellis calls it a strategy of ‘full-spectrum response’ entailing traditional non-proliferation measures, and a denial strategy ‘to defeat and defend against, and operate in the context of NBC (nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons and, if needed, overcome the effects of NBC use’.²¹ However, the critical point to ponder is that, as the second nuclear age unfolds, the USA is still far from certain about the exact nature of the threats that it confronts and the behaviour of new deterrers.

Medium-size nuclear powers face predicaments similar to those of the USA in the reassessment of their nuclear strategies in the second nuclear age. In the context of Britain, for example, ‘whatever role nuclear weapons may have today, it is not the purpose for which they were first acquired and then maintained for nearly 40 years.’²² That is, the deterrence function that the British nuclear weapons played in the past has drastically altered in the second nuclear age. However, Britain, similar to the USA, is yet to fully grapple with the context and the conditions of the second nuclear age under which its nuclear deterrence is to operate. Sir Michael Quinlan asserts that British nuclear deterrent today rests ‘on long-term uncertainties rather than near-term possibilities’, addressed ‘to whom it may concern.’²³

The question of ‘how to deter’ is more vexing for the newly emerged regional nuclear powers. Variation in their deterrence postures is all but certain, and each will seek to attain different objectives ranging from preventing conventional attack to denying coercion and blackmail by regional or extra-regional powers. North Korea’s objective for acquiring nuclear capability is not to deter an American nuclear attack, but to prevent America from undertaking acts of coercion. Tehran’s primary reason for building nuclear weapons is also to discourage the USA from pursuing a coercive strategy against Iran.²⁴ In contrast, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to deter perceived Indian military aggression, while India’s motives are mixed and much broader and range from ensuring security to obtaining global power status.²⁵

‘How to deter’ necessarily entails constructing, amongst other things, nuclear use doctrine, force posture, command and control systems, and a myriad of other structures to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. All new nuclear powers will need to erect these structures. While the experience of the first nuclear age will be of some assistance when erecting these structures, in view of the altered context and conditions of the second nuclear age, it will more or less be a new exercise altogether. And, needless to say, the way the new nuclear powers undertake these tasks and the type of structures they build will have a critical bearing on regional deterrence stability and global security in the years to come.

As the new nuclear powers contemplate their nuclear postures, various factors, both anticipated and unforeseen, will impinge on the formulation of their deterrence policies. These unforeseen factors may significantly constrain the new nuclear powers’ abilities to construct robust nuclear strategies. The new nuclear weapons states are mostly small-size powers (with an exception of India), economically and technologically less advanced, and some of them are politically highly unstable. The stability of emerging regional deterrence systems will depend on how the new nuclear powers are able to overcome these constraining factors and build robust deterrence systems.

The challenges and dilemmas of building robust nuclear forces for new nuclear weapons states derive primarily from resource constraints, unavailability of relevant technologies, and configuration and dynamics of domestic political forces. A prerequisite for a credible nuclear deterrence is a robust, retaliatory nuclear strike force. The new nuclear powers are likely to confront significant impediments in building such forces. How they will overcome these impediments is an interesting question; how they do it will have profound impact on regional deterrence stability.

The new nuclear powers will confront formidable challenges, stemming from resource constraints and technological weakness, when building their nuclear command and control structures. Pakistan and India, as analysts conclude, are confronting formidable difficulties in building their command and control structures as a result of resource constraints and lack of up-to-date technologies.²⁶ Inability to build fail-proof command and control system may impair deterrence stability, which will result in the increased probability of inadvertent and accidental use of nuclear weapons.

The second nuclear age is still in a state of flux and is still evolving. It is not very clear how the small nuclear powers will actually behave and what will be the exact nature of their deterrent postures or how far will they be able to construct robust command and control structures. What the small nuclear powers do will have significant influence in shaping the structure and dynamics of the second nuclear age. The implications of the deterrent postures and nuclear behaviour of the new nuclear powers for the traditional nuclear weapons states are also unclear. As David Yost points out: ‘it is widely conceded that the western “deterrers” have a poor understanding of the motivations and decision-making of the governments and organisations they would hope to influence.’²⁷ It is in the above context that this study on Pakistan is undertaken; it examines Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour and evolving nuclear posture in order to better understand the undercurrents and evolving dynamics of the second nuclear age.

The study: objectives and structure

This is a study of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture, and the implications of a nuclear-armed Pakistan for understanding the nature and dynamics of the second nuclear age. Nuclear postures of the new nuclear powers and their nuclear behaviour, as posited above, are not yet clearly known. This study analyses Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture in an attempt to ascertain the likely nuclear behaviour of small nuclear powers in the new nuclear era. It pays particular attention to Pakistan’s contemplation of a nuclear doctrine, force-building strategies, and plans for constructing a command and control system.

The new nuclear powers are confronting, and will continue to confront, formidable challenges and dilemmas in the building of their nuclear postures. This study analyses the challenges and dilemmas that Pakistan confronts in constructing the building blocks of its nuclear deterrence. It also illuminates the implications of Pakistan’s policies for the future of the global non-proliferation regime and the challenges that stem from Pakistan’s nuclear weapons for the international community’s effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Including the Introduction and the Conclusion, this book has eight chapters. The Introduction (which is Chapter 1) lays out the framework for analysis and describes the objectives, structure, and significance of the study. Chapter 2 illustrates Pakistan’s nuclearization process in an attempt to sketch the rise of the second nuclear age. The second nuclear age rose in the context of ‘horizontal’ nuclear proliferation and the rise of regional nuclear issues. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons provides valuable insights about the process of nuclear proliferation that gave rise to the second nuclear age.

Chapter 3 analyses Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture and the challenges and dilemmas that Islamabad confronts in building it. It also discusses Pakistan’s pre-tests nuclear strategy and doctrinal issues so as to highlight the changes and continuity in its deterrence strategy in the post-tests era. Furthermore, it assesses the factors that have influenced, and will continue to affect, the evolution of the Pakistani nuclear posture.

Chapter 4 assesses Pakistan’s current nuclear deterrent capabilities. It attempts to infer the country’s current level of nuclear warheads ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Pakistan’s nuclear evolution: a chronology
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Pakistan’s Nuclearization Process: Proliferation Lessons and the Rise of the Second Nuclear Age
• 3 Pakistan’s Emerging Nuclear Posture and Doctrinal Contemplation
• 4 Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent: Force Level and Missile Capabilities
• 5 Command and Control System
• 6 Pakistan and the Global Non-proliferation Regime
• 7 Proliferation Control Challenges, Nuclear Terrorism, and Pakistan
• 8 Summary and Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index