Socialism and Social Science (Routledge Revivals)

Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó (1877-1918)

György Litván, János Bak

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780415684767
• eBook ISBN: 9781136626302
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Communism, Post-Communism & Socialism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The essays and letters of Ervin Szabó (1877-1918) present proof of his critical insight into Marxist theory and of his perceptive analysis of socialism around the turn of the century. His ideals of an engaged social science and an enlightened socialism, his preoccupation with the socialist future, are still relevant today.

The writings selected in this work, first published in 1982, are primarily those which address themselves to general issues of the European working-class movement and socialist theory, but there are also a few pieces that characterize the intellectual and political climate of early twentieth-century Budapest. Szabó was one of the theoretical leaders of a whole generation of progressive thinkers from Oscar Jászi through Karl and Michael Polányi to Georg Lukács and many others. The almost insurmountable conflict between theory and practice that characterized Ervin Szabo's life remains a problem that has to be solved by engaged intellectuals whatever the time and place. Background notes and an introduction by the editors help to place the writings in their historical and political context.

Part I
ON MARX AND MARXISM

ON THE MATERIALIST CONCEPT OF HISTORY

This first major public presentation by Szabó was prepared for the discussion held in January 1903 in the Budapest Sociological Society about Recent Trends in Sociology. The main speaker was the ‘sociologist’ Gustáv Leopold, who represented the ‘teleological school’ of Rudolf Stammler. The debate focused on the merits and shortcomings of the ‘organic theory’, which had been the prevailing approach to society in Hungary. The majority of the speakers criticized this school and the discussion amounted to its final defeat. Szabó’s intervention marked the first occasion of the presentation of Marxism at a scholarly gathering with complete scientific argumentation. At the same time, he included his doubts about the strict determinism, characteristic of the German Marxist school of the age, and thus offered a stringent, but not rigid, system of social laws to the Hungarian social scientists, instead of the obsolete biological model of explanations.

The discussion was published in ‘Huszadik Század’, pt I (1903): Szabó’s address is on pp. 353–60.

Honourable Members of the Sociological Society! You have appraised and criticized the presentation of Mr Gustáv Leopold from various points of view; in particular, the adherents of the organic theory of society, which the speaker has deemed to be on the decline, defended their stand strenuously. I, too, would like to speak in defence of a sociological trend which Mr Leopold has attacked and sentenced to death: the materialist concept of history.

Before I attempt, however, to defend the substance of this theory, I have to rectify two errors of fact, principally because they have a definite bearing on the Marxist theory of society. One of these rectifications pertains to something Mr Wolfner has already pointed out, though I am afraid he misunderstood the speaker. For the speaker did not claim, as Mr Wolfner said, that the conflict between the reformist and the revolutionary socialists extends to historical materialism, but he explicitly stated that the attacks of the reformists are directed against the economic and political tenets of Marxism. This distinction is rather important, because it indicates that socialist economics, politics and tactics can be separated from historical materialism, that is, there is no necessary connection between them. We have seen that in Italy, for instance, Turati, the originator and leader of the reformist tendency, has not rejected the materialist concept of history; what is more, in his famous pamphlet on theory (‘II partito socialista e l'attuale momento politico’) he conceives of the struggle between the two tendencies as a positive factor. On the other hand, it is well known that Ferri, who represents the most rigid orthodoxy in matters of class struggle, tactics, etc., departs considerably from the Marxist doctrine in his basic sociological views. In Russia we note another strange phenomenon: one socialist faction, the so-called ‘ekonomists’, has interpreted the basic tenet of historical materialism – to wit that economic forces are decisive in social conflicts – in such a literal way that it has included in its Marxist programme nothing but the economic organization of the working class, and has thus arrived at an evaluation of the means of class struggle not unlike that of Bernstein, the very leader of reformism! In contrast, another socialist party, that of the ‘socialist revolutionaries’, while definitely rejecting Marxism as a theory, nevertheless, in practice, fights with all the weapons of orthodox Marxism, not excepting its revolutionary slogans. The contradictions in the theories of these two groups, the economists and the social revolutionaries – the latter best described as Lavrovists – are exactly inverted when it comes to their practice.

The other necessary correction of facts regards the oft-held assertion that Marx's theory originated in England and came to light in that country. This assertion, even though wrong, seems, at first glance, hardly worth mentioning. Yet this mistake has led to some of the most alluring arguments against Marxism. It has been claimed that Marx, as he moved from the petty economic life of Germany to the imposing environment of the grandiose British world economy, has naturally been led to conclude in his social theory that economic factors play a primal role as the motor force of social development; hence, that Marxist theory has value only as the product of an almost ephemeral impression. However, even from the point of view of subjective reality (for objectively this makes no difference to the validity of Marxist theory), it has to be noted that the materialist concept of history, and the basic Marxian tenets in economics in general, did not originate in England at all but, as can be deduced inter alia from the Preface to ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, were conceived much earlier – at the time when Marx became the editor of the ‘Rheinische Zeitung’ and first began to concern himself with economic matters. His notions received confirmation and assumed a more definite form during his visits to Brussels and Paris; that is still before his move to England. Thus if Marxism, as some claim, is excessively concerned with the economy, this cannot be debited to England.

But the real purpose of my intervention is to defend historical materialism against the attacks by our colleague, Mr Leopold. The speaker has grouped the arguments against historical materialism into some ten categories. It is not clear from his presentation whether these are also his own objections, or merely a collection of the most powerful arguments. But since in his conclusion the speaker has arrived at a notion of sociology that is diametrically opposed to Marxism, I am inclined to consider these as his own objections to Marxism. In order to observe the limits of the debate, I will forgo the tempting occasion to expound here historical materialism and attack the opposing theories, and will rather restrict myself to a rebuttal of Mr Leopold's arguments.

It is, however, true that it would be necessary to provide a systematic explanation of Marxist social theory since we do not have a fully elaborated, systematic discussion of historical materialism in all its ramifications. There are works on historical materialism, but none of them summarizes the views of Marx and Engels, the founders of the doctrine. This lack explains – and excuses – the fact that the critics of the materialist concept of history rarely attack, as they should, the doctrine in its latest and most complete form. They rather focus on quotations torn out of context. The speaker is guilty of the same mistake: it is obvious that the historical materialism he had in mind was but its first conception, merely the kernel of the subsequent theory, in which the autocracy of economic forces was still being emphasized in a rigid, one-sided way. True, the doctrine has been applied in this manner by some of Marx's disciples. But there is no longer any excuse for such a procedure. Today we are familiar not only with Marx's Preface to ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, but also numerous later declarations by Engels on the subject. I am referring in particular to those letters published quite some time ago, which have been recently reprinted by Bernstein.

But even if these materials were not available to us, we should consider, in my opinion, not whether the doctrine did receive a systematic elaboration, but whether it is capable of elaboration, whether it has the potential of being developed further? We shall see that noteworthy attempts have taken place in this sense, that the doctrine has evolved considerably beyond the frame in which it had been attacked in the past, and that these more recent additions have by no means detracted from the original doctrine. Just the opposite: they have widened its base and thus strengthened it. I grant that to some orthodox adepts of Marxism these additions appear sacrilegious, and they reject them firmly. Such rejection, however, does not diminish in any way the intrinsic value of those additions; Engels himself warned against some of these young ‘Marxists’.

Now let me address myself to the speaker's attacks point by point. I have little to say about his first point. I am not well acquainted with Hegelian philosophy; hence I cannot give a fair estimate of its significance. I would say this much, however: in my opinion Hegelian dialectics are not so essential to historical materialism that they cannot be dispensed with. The materialist concept of history remains true whether we construct it according to the rules of dialectics, or otherwise.

It seems likewise unnecessary to reflect at length on the second argument of the speaker, that Marxists have not yet demonstrated the validity of their doctrine by historical research. First of all, this is untrue since, in addition to the works mentioned by the speaker himself, to which I would add Marx's ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’, there is a whole series of historical works and studies based on the method of historical materialism. Among these we may list the socialist histories of the French Revolution, of the Viennese Revolution, and of the Commune. But even if all these had not been written, this would not suffice to forge an argument against a theory that today is almost exclusively represented by socialists; that is, by persons who do not dispose of the material means, the time, or the scholarly apparatus needed for historical research which are provided only by universities to their professors. I am convinced that this gap will be bridged as soon as the number of such people as Werner Sombart and Karl Lamprecht will increase.

As his third argument the speaker pointed to great inventions which have come about, he argued, independently of economic conditions. Possibly so. In my opinion, however, it would be too mechanistic an interpretation of historical materialism if this was a valid counter-argument to it. The materialist concept of history does not deny the possibility of individual invention or discovery but holds that, from the point of view of social progress, such discreet occurrences have little significance. This is best demonstrated by the commonplace of the inventor's tragic fate: many inventions have acquired practical significance only when they coincided with the economic necessities of the age.

The fourth objection – a favourite argument against historical materialism – is that religion has evolved from animism, that is for a psychological reason. Yet if we study the relationship between religion and the economy we must make strict distinctions between the various phases of their evolution. The origins of all religion have to do with puerile notions of nature and of man, and, indeed, it would be difficult to show the influence of economic factors at this stage. True enough, these origins are no more than the product of a fear derived from utter ignorance regarding nature and man, from superstitions in which the influence of the economy is at best negative: the primitive economic activities are in harmony with primitive perceptions, including primitive religious notions. But at the higher stage of religious development, when religion broadens into a world-view and becomes the metaphysical code of a total system of ethics and government, it becomes clear that the commandments or prohibitions of religion are closely related to the prevailing economic and social conditions, and actually represent their powerful sanctions. Undoubtedly, however, certain religious teachings tend to develop roots and continue to hold man captive long after the original economic and social base has been whittled away. How religions can be transformed, retaining their name, is, in turn, evident from a comparison of present-day and primitive Christianity.

The speaker's fifth argument, the reference to Belfort Bax and the specific development of the British labour movement, has always had a strange sound to me. Not merely because, as you know, for many years Bax has been hurling anathema at Bernstein and continually demanding his expulsion from the Socialist Party, but because it was also Bax who selected as the motto of his journal ‘The Social Democrat’ that ‘in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organisation necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of the epoch’. As far as I know, it was in accordance with this principle that Bax found the causes of the specific development of the British labour movement in the particular international economic position of Great Britain; namely, in the fact that when British industry and commerce dominated the world markets, it was its interest in the continuity of exchange and the undisturbed profiting from the continuous boom which prompted the British bourgeoisie, by means of concessions, to take away the edge of those conflicts which threatened the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and which, when prosperity receded – as it did quite recently – broke out again and again. Class conflict and class struggle – though in forms different from those on the continent – did exist in Great Britain as well, and this is crucial. That British national character and traditions may also have been obstacles to the spread of socialism in that country is not denied even by the most dogmatic Marxists, but those are hardly crucial issues.

I must to a large extent agree with the speaker when he argues that Marxism leads to fatalism and quietism; but I prefer to discuss this matter when I speak of the relationship between Marxism and Lavrov.

In contrast, I definitely disagree with the speaker as regards his seventh objection, according to which Marx was guilty of scientific carelessness in tying his entire social philosophy to his materialist world-view even though materialist philosophy had been shaken to its very foundations.

This is undoubtedly one of the most interesting issues in connection with historical materialism. Materialism and idealism have been of such lively interest for so long to philosophers and laymen alike, and especially to the ‘political man’ – after all, historical materialism is eminently practical, being a theory that actualizes itself in day-to-day political struggle – that we must speak of it in some detail.

Here I must begin by warning, however, not so much the members of this Society but rather those outsiders who do not as yet have a clear idea of the meaning of these concepts: when speaking of materialism and idealism one must always distinguish clearly between the two as philosophical concepts and as ethical concepts. It should be obvious that philosophical materialism can coexist well with idealism in its ethical sense, while philosophical idealism is far from constituting a guarantee against an ethically rather materialistic life. The superficial contrasting of these two terms originated with the German philistine who attempted to camouflage his lack of ethical idealism by praising philosophical idealism to the skies.

Furthermore, I should emphasize that it would be a most futile undertaking indeed – as my friend Oscar Jászi pointed out in his recent work – to continually contrast materialism and idealism. Everybody agrees by now – Belfort Bax as well as Haeckel, for instance – that this would be an artificial dichotomy and, considering monism, totally unnecessary. There can be no matter without force (spirit, idea), and no force without matter. Thus, if we take into account Marx and Engels rather than the writings of the modern Marxists, the issue is simply: what kind of materialism was theirs? I dare to assert as an undebatable fact that Marx and Engels have modified philosophical materialism in certain rather essential respects and that, furthermore, their materialism has nothing to do with the rather crass materialism of a Buchner, a Vogt, or a Moleschott. Engels directed sharp criticism against their view, calling it mechanistic, as it disregards the chemical and organic processes, and takes no cognizance of the continual transformation of matter. Granted that Marx and Engels have retained the terminology of materialism, and maybe more of it than we are inclined to accept nowadays; but that theirs was something altogether different from vulgar materialism can easily be demonstrated.

Along these same lines, the materialist concept of history not only should be distinguished from materialism in general; it actually allows, from the very start, for the operation of ideological factors in social life. It might be almost enough to refer to the fact that both idealist Utopians and orthodox Marxists believe that the determining influence of economic factors, that is their influence on all aspects of intellectual life, will cease once socialist society is established. As far as the past and present are concerned, however, we may also quote from Marx, who wrote that when necessity, that is the compulsion of economic needs, does not operate, because these needs of the society have been met, then ‘human effort, which is an end in itself, the true realm of liberty, will begin’. It is then that the intellectual, aesthetic life of man, a life he already had in him originally in germ form, can truly begin.

And this is where we reach the objection most often raised against the materialist concept of history; namely, that it would exclude the influence of ideological factors on social life.

It should be clear from what precedes that Marx's philosophy of history has certain temporal limits. Just as in his theory of values he has found the key, not to human economy in general but to capitalist economy in particular, his historical theory does not apply to man in isolation – as does the value theory of the Menger-Jevons school – but only to society; second, he considers the economic factor of primary importance only as long as the economic needs of a sizeable group of persons remain unsatisfied. Because this has always proved to be the case ever since the end of primitive communism, and will be as long as there are classes and class struggle, in the final analysis it is the economic factor which determines the social, political and intellectual contents and tendencies of an age. To be sure, by economic factors we do not mean ‘the iron determinism of economic relations’, as the speaker has described it, but rather the prevailing mode of production, exchange and reproduction of goods. All this, however, certainly does not exclude the influence of ideological forces. In a society based on private property, classes emerge as a result of the division of labour, and develop conflicting interests. Among these classes struggle ensues including, of co...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Editors’ introduction
• Part I: On Marx and Marxism
• Part II: On The Socialist Movement
• Part III: On Social Science, History and Literature
• Index