Japan's Security Identity

From a Peace-State to an International-State

Bhubhindar Singh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781136189029
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant change in Japanese security policy, as Japan's security identity has shifted from a peace state, to an international state. In this book, Bhubhindar Singh argues that from the 1990s onwards, the Japanese security policymaking elite recognized that its earlier approach to security policy which was influenced by the peace-state security identity was no longer appropriate. Rather, as a member of the international community, Japan had to carve out a responsible role in regional and international security affairs, which required greater emphasis on the role of the military in Japan's security policy.

To explore the change in Japan's security identity and its associated security behaviour, this book contrasts the three areas that define and shape Japanese security policy: Japan's conception (or definition) of national security; the country's contribution, in military terms, to regional and international affairs; and the changes to the security policy regime responsible for the security policy formulation. Further, it seeks to challenge the dominant realist interpretation of Japanese security policy by adopting an identity-based approach and showing how whilst realist accounts correctly capture the trajectory of Japanese post-Cold War security policy, they fail to explain the underlying causes of the change in Japanese security behaviour in the post-Cold War period.

This book is an important addition to the current literature on Japanese security policy, and will be of great use to students and scholars interested in Japanese and Asian politics, as well as security studies and international relations more broadly.

1 Introduction

This book is about the change in Japanese security policy between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. This change is examined in the context of the new security roles (understood as military roles) that Japan’s Self-Defence Force (SDF) has adopted in the post-Cold War period. Three areas especially stand out and have been well documented in the literature. First, Japan’s SDF has incorporated humanitarian and disaster relief duties, including peacekeeping, into its mandate. The foundation was laid with the passing of the ‘Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations’ (also known as the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL)) in 1992, which authorized the deployment of the SDF to United Nations-mandated peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). Second, Japan deepened and widened the responsibilities of the SDF in the context of US–Japan defence cooperation. This was mainly in the form of rear-area logistical support to the United States (US) military during periods of peace and crisis in the Asia-Pacific region following the revisions of the defence guidelines that were passed by the Japanese National Diet in 1999. The bilateral defence relationship saw further strengthening in the first decade of the 2000s through Japan’s proactive participation in the US-led ‘war on terror’. The SDF was deployed to the Indian Ocean for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to support the US and other militaries following the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) in 2001, and was again deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to provide non-combat logistical and reconstruction support following the passing of the Iraqi Reconstruction Law in 2003. Finally, Japan joined other concerned states in combating the rise of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden. It deployed Maritime SDF (MSDF) destroyers off the coast of Somalia to guard vessels from Japan and other countries under maritime police action provision in the SDF Law. To support the MSDF’s long-term commitment to this mission, the Japanese government has set up a base in Djibouti – its first full-scale overseas base.

Compared to its Cold War security policy, these roles indicate a significant shift in Japanese post-Cold War security policy – a shift that points towards a more active security posture for the SDF in regional and international affairs. This point is widely accepted in the available literature on Japanese post-Cold War security policy. However, what is interesting about this shift is that these new security roles adopted by the SDF in the post-Cold War period, while significant, came with restrictions. These roles have largely occurred in non-combat and support areas, and the SDF’s participation has been targeted at international activities that address global security challenges. This research aims to analyse what these changes mean for Japanese security policy and what kind of role(s) Japan would assume in the regional and international security affairs in the post-Cold War period. This research is confined to the period starting from the onset of the postwar period to the end of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s political rule in August 2009 when it suffered an electoral defeat at the hands of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the national general election. The reason for selecting this period is that the foundation for an activist security policy for Japan was laid during the LDP’s dominant tenure of the political system. Nevertheless, the DPJ’s security policy practice will be discussed in detail in the concluding chapter – a discussion that will show that the DPJ is also committed to pursuing an activist or internationalist security policy.

Argument

The underlying premise of the argument proposed here is that the Japanese post-Cold War security policy has undergone a high (significant) level of change compared to its Cold War policy. As will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, this aspect of significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has been captured in the extant literature by works that fall under the realism category published from the 1990s onwards, and especially in the first decade of the 2000s following Japan’s active participation in the US-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Relying on reasons such as the shift in the East Asian balance of power unfavourable to Japanese interests (characterized by China’s political, economic and military rise as well as North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes), Japan’s own economic stagnation and the shift within the Japanese political system towards the right of the political spectrum, the realists have argued for, and rightly so, the significant change between Japan’s Cold War and post-Cold War security policies, namely in terms of an expanded security policy in the military-strategic dimension of the regional and international affairs.

However, as argued here, these analyses fall short. Japan has not fulfilled the realist expectations of pursuing a solely power-based security policy. This point becomes reasonably clear and even striking in light of Japan’s response to the shift in the East Asian balance of power that is argued to be unfavourable to its national interests. Japan has not increased its defence expenditure; in fact, its defence budget has decreased since the early 2000s. Japan has not pursued the nuclear option even after North Korea’s declaration of its nuclear capability following the tests in 2006 and 2009. Instead, Japan has carved out a security role that contributes to the humanitarian and disaster relief efforts that address global security challenges, such as through peacekeeping activities. To be sure, Japan did strengthen the US–Japan security relationship through greater institutionalization of bilateral defence cooperation and interoperability of the two militaries. However, these new defence roles within the alliance have mainly occurred in support or non-combat military roles, such as the provision of reararea logistical support for the US military, as mentioned earlier. In short, Japanese security roles have expanded but not in line with the expectations that conform to the power-based analyses of realism.

The argument presented here attributes the change in Japan’s security roles to the shift in the role conceptions or identity that determine Japan’s role in regional and international security affairs. Applying an identity-based perspective, this change is explained by a transformation (which is ongoing) in Japan’s security identity from a peace-state security identity (based on the Yoshida Doctrine) in the Cold War period to an international-state security identity in the post-Cold War world. What this means is that the Japanese security policymaking elite recognized that its Cold War approach to security policy influenced by the peace-state security identity was inappropriate in the post-Cold War period. Japan could no longer avoid incorporating a military dimension into its external security policy. Being a member of the international community, Japan had to carve out a responsible role in regional and international security affairs. In particular, this change in perspective within the Japanese leadership resulted in the introduction of a greater military role in Japan’s post-Cold War security policy. These new roles do not fulfil the realists’ expectations of Japan becoming a great power, but they do fulfil Japan’s objectives of contributing to international peace and security as a responsible actor. As argued here, the new security roles are influenced by a new security identity, that is, the international-state security identity.

The change in Japan’s security identity from a peace state to an international state is elucidated by examining the normative context within which Japanese security policy is produced and reproduced. It is contended here that there is a shift in the normative context, which engendered the transformation of Japan’s security identity and its resultant security policy. Three core aspects of the normative context are examined. The first is Japan’s territorial conception or definition of national security in military-strategic terms, namely whether the security policymaking elite applied a narrow (self-defence) or wide (self-defence plus regional and/or international security) conception in formulating its security policy. The second aspect of the normative context is the extent to which Japan’s SDF was active in regional and international affairs in military terms. This refers to whether the SDF avoided involvement in security affairs or became involved in maintaining peace and stability and/or the resolution of military crises in regional and international affairs both within the US–Japan security relationship and outside of it. The final aspect is the security policymaking regime, namely the institutional culture embedded within the policymaking structure that influenced the security policy outcome. This institutional culture is constituted by the agents involved in the security policymaking process, the role of the US in this process and the decision-making structure in the context of security policymaking. These three aspects of the normative context were specifically chosen as they display the most notable changes to Japanese security policy practice when the Cold War and post-Cold War periods are compared.

Under the peace-state security identity in the Cold War period, Japanese security policy was formulated based on a narrow territorial conception of national security. The SDF avoided involvement in regional and international affairs in military terms, as its mandate was defined by self-defence objectives. The institutional culture within the security policymaking regime was resistant to promoting an activist security policy in the military-strategic dimension of external security affairs. The security policymaking structure was dominated by politicians and officials (especially from the economics-based ministries) who adhered to the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine. Those who supported a wider security role for Japan in external security affairs were marginalized and suppressed in the security policy-making process. These features produced a policy that not only prioritized Japan’s economic objectives/interests but also framed Japan’s role in regional and international affairs in mainly economic terms. This approach resulted in a minimalist security policy that limited the SDF’s mandate to national defence and excluded external security affairs. Though there was some participation by Japan in regional and international security affairs, these were mostly a result of US pressure (beiatsu) and led only to cosmetic changes in Japanese security policy.

The minimalist security policy based on the peace-state security identity underwent transformation in the post-Cold War period. Japanese post-Cold War security policy was formulated based on a normative context defined by the international-state security identity. There was an increased recognition within the Japanese security policymaking elite that the country’s national security was tied to the larger stability of the regional and international security environment, and hence the defence of Japan’s national security would involve defending the larger regional and international security environment. The SDF’s role expanded in regional and international security affairs in the form of ‘international contribution’ through greater institutionalization of US–Japan defence cooperation and increased participation in humanitarian and disaster relief activities, such as peacekeeping. The security policymaking regime produced an institutional culture that supported an activist security role for Japan in regional and international security affairs. This was made possible by the emergence of the revisionist politicians who replaced the dominance of Yoshida School adherents in the political scene and the security policymaking process. The revisionist politicians occupied top positions within the cabinet and, along with the civilian and military officials from the Japan Defence Agency (JDA)/Ministry of Defence (MOD), secured greater influence in the security policymaking process. This introduced an internal dynamic within the security policymaking elite that reduced the influence of the US on the outcome of Japanese security policy debates in the post-Cold War period.

Importance

The importance of this research lies in two main reasons. The first relates to Japan as the chosen subject of study for this research, and the second reason relates to how this research serves as an important update to the extant Japanese security policy literature in light of the developments in its security roles during the post-Cold War period, both in conceptual and empirical terms.

The first reason essentially is an answer to the question: why is Japan important in the study of East Asian international relations (IR)? Japan is and will continue to be one of the most important actors in the East Asian and global contexts. In IR, Japan’s importance traditionally resulted from its position as the largest economy in Asia (and second largest in the world) and its close security relationship with the US. Japan’s rapid economic ascendancy from the 1960s contributed in significant terms to the economic development of the East Asian economies. Through high levels of investment, trade and aid from Japan, East Asia experienced a period of stunning economic growth, a phenomenon known as the East Asian Economic Miracle. Moreover, Japan’s security relationship with the US since the postwar period has been described as the cornerstone of peace and stability in East Asia. Japan incurred high financial and social costs to maintain the largest US troop deployment in Asia, not only for the defence of Japan’s national security but also for regional peace and stability. In short, Japan’s participation and contribution to regional and international affairs during the Cold War was largely concentrated in the area of economics and through maintaining a strong US–Japan security relationship that included the provision of bases to the US military on Japanese soil.

With the onset of the post-Cold War period, however, Japan was no longer able to pursue the approach as described above, due to both domestic and external factors. In domestic terms, Japan was unable to project a similar kind of economic influence due to the prolonged stagnation of its economy and the simultaneous rise of China’s economy since the 1990s. Externally, the Japanese leadership felt a greater sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis its national security as a result of several security issues that raised the tension levels in the East Asian strategic environment. This is expressed in terms of: the emergence of competitive bilateral relationships in the region (for example, Sino–Japanese and Sino–American); China’s rise in economic, political and military terms both regionally and internationally; North Korea’s advanced ballistic and missile programme, its declaration of being a nuclear state, along with its propensity to repeatedly act in belligerent ways; and the rising nationalisms in all of the three major powers of Northeast Asia (Japan, China and South Korea). All these factors complicate the already delicate security situation in the region and have forced the Japanese leadership to debate new means to contribute to regional and international security affairs starting from the early years of the post-Cold War period.

The outcome of this debate resulted in a push by the leadership for Japan’s greater engagement with the international community. In more precise terms, the security policymaking elite introduced policies that promoted the gradual expansion of Japan’s contribution to regional and international security affairs under the banner of ‘international contribution’. The outcome of this move was an advancement of a more proactive Japanese security policy, in military-strategic terms, over the course of the post-Cold War period. The Japanese security policymaking elite successfully expanded the use of the SDF to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability and to participate in the resolution of military crises in regional and international security affairs, both independently and in the context of the US–Japan security relationship. While the rise of China’s and North Korea’s assertive policies have constantly made headlines, these developments in Japan have received much less attention. This has been a weakness in the current analyses of East Asian/Northeast Asian IR, as the current literature, with a few notable exceptions, tends to either neglect Japan or study Japan in the context of its relationship with the US. However, this book contends that Japan has a crucial role to play in shaping the nature of East Asian/Northeast Asian IR in the near and distant future. Its security policy is in a period of transition and it is important that we carefully study how it evolves in response to the delicate economic, political and security environment in Northeast Asia and East Asia on the whole.

The second reason for the importance of this research is that it serves as an important update to the extant Japanese security policy literature in both conceptual and empirical terms. Japan’s enhanced security role in the military-strategic dimension of regional and international affairs has resulted in the dominance of the realist approach in capturing contemporary changes in Japanese security policy. This research aims to contest realism’s dominance by applying an identity-based perspective as a means to capture the significant changes taking place in Japanese security policy. According to this research, the contemporary developments in Japanese security policy are a result of a shift in Japan’s security identity from a peace state to an international state. The initial adoption and the gradual strengthening of the international-state identity have facilitated the widening of the SDF’s mandate and contribution to external security affairs. While the realist analyses correctly captured the trajectory of Japanese post-Cold War security policy, they failed to push their investigations far enough to explain the underlying causes of the change in Japanese security behaviour in the post-Cold War period that lie beyond material explanations. As a result, Japan’s security policy development has not conformed to the realists’ expectations – a point that is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Apart from these realist-based works, this research also updates the social constructivist understanding of Japanese security policy. It challenges the existing social constructivist works that base their analyses on the unchanging (read as low/limited) nature of Japanese security policy practice and the continued application of the peace-state security identity to Japan’s post-Cold War security policy. This book argues that the normative context based on Japan’s peace-state identity dominant in the Cold War period is gradually being replaced by one that is based on a new identity which promotes a more active security role for Japan – recognized here as the international-state security identity. It is important to note that peace as an idea remains and will continue to remain as an important objective in Japanese security policy and an important element in its security identity. However, the means to achieve peace for Japan have evolved. While the peace-state conception continues to define Japan’s approach to global security affairs, this conception has been expanded to incorporate security roles for the SDF that would bring peace not only to Japan but externally (regionally and internationally) as well. This research serves to update this idea of peace as applied in Japanese post-Cold War security policy.

Structure

The book is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the traditional principles of Japanese security policy, which are encapsulated in the Yoshida Doctrine. It goes on to provide a detailed literature review of the existing works published on Japanese post-Cold War security policy that apply IR theory in their analyses. These works are divided between those that argue for a low (limited) level of change and those that argue for a high level of change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy as compared to the Cold War period. This chapter ends with a defence of the argument put forward here that there has been a high level of change, and a discussion of why existing analyses have been insufficient to explain the changes in Japanese post-Cold War security policy. Chapter 3 introduces the conceptual framework used in this book. It is divided into four main parts: the first provides a detailed discussion on the features of security identity; the second part is a comprehensive discussion on the origins of the peace-state and international-state identities and the reasons for their resilience; the third provides a detailed discussion of the three aspects or areas of the normative context that are used to demonstrate change in Japanese security identity; and the final section is a brief discussion of the core features of the empirical chapters.

Chapters 4–6 focus on each aspect of the normative context that shaped Japanese security identity. The chapters are divided into three main sections: Japan’s security policy under the peace-state identity, the challenge to the peace-state security identity, and finally, Japanese security policy under the international-state security identity. Chapter 4 focuses on the first aspect of the normative context – Japan’s territorial conception of national security. It shows how Japan’s conception of national security expanded from a narrow (self-defence) conception under the peace-state identity to incorporate the regional and international environment under the internationalstate security identity. Chapter 5 focuses on the SDF’s involvement in regional and international security affairs. During the Cold War, the SDF avoided involvement in regional and international security affairs under the peace-state security identity. However, under the international-state security identity, the SDF has assumed wider security roles in regional and international security affairs. Chapter 6 provides a discussion on the final aspect of the normative context – the security policymaking regime in Japanese security policy. It...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Realism, mercantilism and constructivism
• 3. Security identity and Japan’s security policy
• 4. Territorial conception of national security
• 5. Regional and international (global) security
• 6. Security policymaking regime
• 7. Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index