Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics (RLE: Plato)

William Prior

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781136236020
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Studies of Plato's metaphysics have tended to emphasise either the radical change between the early Theory of Forms and the late doctrines of the Timaeus and the Sophist, or to insist on a unity of approach that is unchanged throughout Plato's career. The author lays out an alternative approach. Focussing on two metaphysical doctrines of central importance to Plato's thought – the Theory of Forms and the doctrine of Being and Becoming – he suggests a continuous progress can be traced through Plato's works. He presents his argument through an examination of the metaphysical sections of six of the dialogues: the Euthyphro, Phaedo, Republic, Parmenides, Timaeus, and Sophist.

1

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE EARLY AND MIDDLE PLATONIC DIALOGUES

As I stated in the Introduction, it is my view that Plato's meta-physics developed from an initial statement of the Theory of Forms and the Being-Becoming distinction in the early and middle dialogues, through a critical examination of those doctrines in the first part of the Parmenides, to an ultimate reformulation and development of them, refined in light of that critique, in the Timaeus and Sophist. In this chapter I shall consider the initial stages of that development, as it is reflected in the text of three dialogues: the Euthyphro, Phaedo, and Republic (with occasional glances at other early and middle dialogues).

Virtually all scholars accept the relative chronological order which stylometric investigation established for these dialogues. This order places the Euthyphro among the early dialogues and the Phaedo and Republic among those of Plato's middle period, with the Phaedo preceding the Republic in date of composition. The Euthyphro contains the most extensive treatment of the Theory of Forms to be found in the early dialogues; it introduces aspects of the theory which are later expounded in greater detail in the middle dialogues. In many respects the Theory of Forms in the Euthyphro is identical to the Theory of Forms in the Phaedo and Republic. I have therefore chosen to deal with the metaphysical content of these three dialogues topically, rather than considering each dialogue in succession.

This topical treatment offers the advantages of clarity and con-ciseness, for all the passages bearing on a single issue can be discussed at once. It does, however, threaten to obscure a matter on which Plato's thought undergoes real development from the early to the middle dialogues. Although the Theory of Forms is as explicitly present in the Euthyphro as in the Phaedo and Republic, the earlier dialogue contains at most the implicit basis for the doctrine of Being and Becoming which is developed in the Phaedo and Republic. In this respect the middle dialogues show an advance over the Euthyphro, and indicate that Plato's thought, even at what I have described as the initial stage of his development, was not static. ¹

For this reason, though I shall deal with my subject topically in this chapter, I shall begin with the topics on which the early and middle dialogues present a more or less common viewpoint, and only when I have discussed these shall I go on to discuss the topics developed in the middle rather than the early dialogues. I shall look first at the question of the existence of the Forms; secondly, at their causal role; thirdly, at their status as paradigms; and fourthly, at the problem of self-predication. On all of these matters the early dialogues as well as the middle have something to contribute. I shall then examine the role of the Forms as objects of knowledge, which gives rise to the Being-Becoming distinction; the separation of the Forms from the phenomenal world; and the problem of participation. The last two topics lead directly to the critique of Plato's metaphysics in the first part of the Parmenides, but the fact is that all of the topics discussed in this chapter are relevant to that critique. ²

I. The Existence of the Forms

In the early and middle dialogues, Plato does not argue for the claim that the Forms exist. He rather assumes that they do and argues from this fact to other conclusions. There is no indication in these dialogues that he regards the existence of the Forms as problematic, as subject to serious philosophical disagreement.

In the early Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro, ‘does not whatever is going tc be unholy have a certain single Form with respect to Unholiness?’ (5d3–5); and, a little later:

Remember, then, that it was not this I asked of you, to teach me one or two of the many holy things, but that very Form by virtue of which all the holy things are holy; for you said that by one Form the unholy things are unholy and the holy things holy …(6d9-el)

Although these questions are expressed in the language of the Theory of Forms {idea is used at 5d4 and 6dl1, and eidos at 6dl1) and, I think, carry the ontological implications that language has in the middle dialogues,³ Euthyphro accepts the questions as unprob-lematic (although he may well not understand them as Socrates does) and does not object to the claims that there exist a Form of Holiness and a Form of Unholiness.

In the Phaedo, Socrates is speaking with two close associates, Simmias and Cebes; these two, unlike Euthyphro, are presumably aware of Socrates’ metaphysical views. Their adherence to the existence of the Forms, though probably more informed than Euthyphro's, is at least as unequivocal. When Socrates asks: ‘What, then, about things of this sort, Simmias: do we say there is something Just itself, or nothing?’ (65d4–5), Simmias responds, ‘We say so indeed, by Zeus!’ (d6). A few pages later, Simmias responds affirmatively when Socrates says:

We say, I suppose, that something is Equal — I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone equal to a stone, or anything else of this sort, but another thing besides all these, the Equal itself; shall we say this is something, or nothing? (74a9–12)

From such exchanges we might conclude that for Greeks of Socrates’ time the existence of Forms was not a strange meta-physical claim but a fact as unproblematic as the existence of tables and chairs. In Republic V, 476b-d, however, Plato shows that he is aware that most people do not accept the existence of Forms. It is significant, though, that even here he presents this fact as a matter of their failure to recognise what the philosopher sees clearly, not as philosophically based scepticism about certain theoretical entities. Diotima represents the failure of most people to apprehend the Form of Beauty in the same light (Sym. 209e–212a).

Yet Plato does also portray the claim that the Forces exist as a hypothesis and as part of a general theory. At Phdo. 92d6–7 Simmias, who has been asked to choose between the view that the soul is a harmony and the existence of the Forms, prefers the latter claim as ‘a hypothesis worthy of acceptance’. Several pages later, when Socrates introduces his own account of generation and destruction in lieu of the physical theories of his predecessors and the Nous (Mind) of Anaxagoras, he presents the claim ‘that there is something Beautiful itself in itself and Good and Large and all the rest’ (100b5–7) as a hypothesis.

Although Simmias and Cebes express no doubts about the truth of this hypothesis, Simmias does raise a general sceptical question at the end of the final argument of the dialogue (107a-b). Socrates points out that the same doubt can be raised about the hypothesis that there are Forms, even if Simmias and Cebes did not raise it; but he holds out the hope that, when the hypothesis is itself examined (and presumably deduced from some higher hypothesis, as is recommended at l0ld-e) and the argument is pursued to its furthest point, a satisfactory resolution of doubt will be found (107b).

Thus, although Plato shows in the Phaedo that he is aware that the existence of the Forms is hypothetical and in some sense subject to doubt, he does not present this doubt as a serious philosophical objection to the Theory of Forms. He clearly believes that any doubt about the existence of the Forms can be resolved in favour of the theory; and, for the most part, he treats the existence of the Forms as unproblematic and the failure of some people to acknowledge it as a sort of intellectual blindness.

II. The Forms as Causes

In the early and middle dialogues the Forms function as the causes, in some sense,⁴ of the characteristics of phenomena. In the Euthyphro, at 6d11-el, Socrates says that it is ‘by one Form’ that unholy things are unholy and holy things holy. If we ask how it is that a Form can have such an effect on these things, the answer of the Euthyphro seems to be that it is by virtue of the Form's being ‘in’ the things affected by it (5dl–2), by virtue of its being a characteristic which the things ‘have’ (d3–5). This sort of explanation seems clear enough, however many problems may arise when we analyse it (cf. Aristotle, Metaph. A. 9, 991al4–19): Whiteness makes something white by being in the thing it characterises.

The fullest account of the causal role of the Forms in the middle dialogues is presented in the Phaedo. Though what he says here has been interpreted in different ways, I shall argue that the account is essentially the same as that given in the Euthyphro: Forms make things to have certain characteristics by being in them; by being, in the language of philosophers, immanent in things.

Plato's account of the Forms as causes is prompted by an objection of Cebes to the claim that the soul is immortal. It might be very long-lasting, Cebes urges, but not immortal; it might outlast several bodies, as a weaver outlasts several cloaks, and yet eventually perish (86e–88b). Socrates states that an answer to this objection requires a thorough examination of the cause of coming into being and destruction (95e). The Greek word genesis, here translated ‘coming into being’, can refer both to substantial change (e. g. birth) and change of attribute (e. g. the ‘coming into being’ of a red car from a white one by painting). Plato investigates both kinds of change in the following passage, but focuses primarily on the latter kind of genesis.

Socrates rejects two accounts of change before giving his own view. The first is the explanation of change through some sort of physical causation, an explanation of the sort that most of the pre-Socratic philosophers gave. Not only do explanations of this kind give rise to various puzzles (96e–97b), but they seem to be guilty of the same mistake Socrates later attributes to Anaxagoras (98c–99c): they confuse some material condition that it is necessary for a given event or state to occur with the true cause of that event or state (which turns out to be the attempt of Mind or Reason to achieve the best result possible).

The second account he rejects is that of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras had claimed that Mind or Reason, Nous, was the cause of every-thing. Socrates was attracted to this explanation, because it seemed possible to show by means of it that everything was ordered for the best (97c–98b). He rejected it only when he found out to his disap-pointment that Anaxagoras had not put this excellent idea of his into practice but had fallen back on physical causes in his explanation of change. In fact, Socrates says that he would be happy to have such an explanation as Anaxagoras promised but did not deliver; however, he could neither produce one himself nor learn of one from someone else (99c). Thus, his rejection of Anaxagoras’ answer is not like his rejection of the first explanation of change. That had seemed incoherent, confused; this one seems in fact to be the sort of explanation Socrates would prefer to have (he refers to his own explanation as ‘second best’ at 99c-d), but it appears to be unattainable. (The difference between the rejections is significant, for the sort of explanation Anaxagoras promised seems to be the very sort Plato attempts in the Timaeus. )

Socrates’ own explanation is in terms of the Forms. As we have seen above (p. 11), he first hypothesises that the Forms exist. Next, he claims that, ‘if anything else is beautiful except the Beautiful itself, it is not beautiful for any other reason than that it partici-pates in that Beautiful; and I speak thus in all cases’ (100c4–6). Participation in the Form of F, then, is the only cause of a given thing's being F, provided that thing is different from the Form of F itself.

Socrates accordingly rejects all other explanations of a thing's being F: it is not by colour or shape that something is made beautiful, but by Beauty; it is not ‘by a head’ that one person is taller than another or shorter, but by Tallness or Shortness; it is not by two that ten is greater than eight, but by Magnitude (Greatness); it is not by addition that one and one become two, but by Twoness. Other causes are too ‘wise’ for him; he clings instead simply and naively to his own view (100c–101d).

Socrates uses this hypothesis to explain both why things are F and how they come to be F. The first examples he gives (100c–101b) are of something's being F; however, in the example of one and one making two, he switches to the language of becoming:

in these cases you know of no other cause of its coming to be two than participation in Twoness, and anything that is going to be two must participate in this, and whatever is going to be one, in Oneness …(101c4–7)

By granting the Forms a role in the generation of things and their properties, Plato indicates that they are more than merely the formal causes of these things: they do more than give the criterion or standard for being F, or explain what it is to be F. Certainly the Forms, being incomposite and immaterial, do not function as the material causes of things: they are not the ‘stuff out of which things are made. It is unclear, however, whether Plato intends the Forms to function as what Aristotle would call efficient or moving causes of things, the agents that by their actions bring things about; as the final causes, the end states towards which things strive; or in both of these ways or neither. The description of the causal role of the Forms given in this passage fits rather well with the conception of the Forms as efficient causes, but some of the things Plato has said earlier in the dialogue (74d–75b; see below, sec. VII) about phenomena ‘striving to be like’ the Forms suggests that they are final causes.

Socrates goes on to consider a single example of the Forms as causes, an example that reveals much about the relation between Forms and phenomena. If Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, then both Tallness and Shortness must be in Simmias (102b4–6). It is not by virtue of being Simmias that he is taller than Socrates and shorter than Phaedo but by virtue of the Tallness and Shortness he happens to have. (In Aristotelian terms, Tallness and Shortness are accidental properties of Simmias. )

Although Simmias can have both Tallness and Shortness at the same time (though in relation to different things), Tallness and Shortness are in different situation. Socrates remarks:

It seems to me that not only will Tallness itself never be willing at the same time to be both tall and short, but also the Tallness in us will never receive the Short or be willing to be overtopped, but will do either of two things: flee and depart whenever the opposite, the Short, approaches it, or perish when it approaches. It will not be willing to be different from what it was, remaining and receiving Shortness. (102d6-e3)

Tallness, unlike Simmias, cannot receive Shortness; it excludes Shortness by its very nature. Shortness, likewise, excludes Tallness (102e–103a).

It is worth stressing, in part because it has been denied,⁵ that Socrates throughout this passage explains facts such as Simmias’ tallness by appeal to the presence of the Form in its instances (e. g. the presence of Tallness in Simmias). He appeals to the immanence of the Form several times. We have already seen that he explains the fact that Simmias is larger than Socrates but smaller than Phaedo by stating that ‘both Tallness and Shortness are in Simmias’ (102b5–6). In 102d-e (just quoted above), he speaks of ‘the opposite, the Short’ (i. e. Shortness) approaching Tallness in Simmias and causing it to depart or perish. Later, at 104b7–10, when modifying in an important way the theory of causation pre-sented thus far, he puts his auxiliary claim thus: ‘not only do those opposites not receive each other; but also whatever things, not being opposites to each other, always have opposites, are not likely to receive the Form (idean, b9) which is opposite to that which is in them.’ At 104d he speaks of things which ‘force whatever they occupy to have not only their own Form (idean, d2), but also that of some opposite always’. In the lines immediately following he cites the Form of Three (hē tōn triōn idea, d5–6) as an example of something that occupies an object and makes it not just three but also odd and in so doing excludes from it the opposite Form (hē enantia idea, d9). Not all the things that enter something bringing with them one opposite and excluding another are Forms; Socrates speaks of fire bringing heat to a body and fever bringing illness (105c). His account of causation thus covers things other than Forms; but it should be clear from the passages cited above that Plato regards Forms as among the things which enter bodies and bring characteristics with them.

The passages quoted above indicate how Socrates expands his account of causation from its initial, ‘safe and ignorant’ form (as he refers to it at 105c), the account given at 100b–103a, to the ‘more elegant’ (kompsoteran, 105c2) version explained at 103c–105c. According to the first version, it is the presence of an opposite (usually but not always a Form) in a thing that gives that thing a certain characteristic: Beauty makes a thing beautiful, Tallness makes it tall. According to the refined version, it need not be the opposite itself which is referred to in the explanation; another entity may be cited as the cause of a thing's having a characteristic, so long as the thing mentioned always brings that opposite characteristic with it to whatever it occupies. Thus the presence in a thing of the Form of Three makes that thing odd as well as three, and the presence in something of fire makes that thing hot.

The point of Socrates’ presentation of this causal theory is not to show how the Forms function in causal explanation; it is, rather, to establish the immortality of the soul (which is Socrates’ aim throughout the dialogue). Accordingly, Socrates concludes by adapting his theory to the case of the soul. The soul, while not the opposite of death, brings that opposite, life, to whatever it occupies. Thus the soul itself will never admit death, and is there-fore immortal and imperi...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Dedication
• Acknowledgements: Second Edition
• Introduction
• 1. The Metaphysics of the Early and Middle Platonic Dialogues
• 2. The Challenge of the Parmenides
• 3. The Response of the Timaeus
• 4. The Sophist
• Appendix: The Doctrinal Maturity and Chronological Position of the Timaeus
• Bibliography
• Index