Disaster Diplomacy

How Disasters Affect Peace and Conflict

Ilan Kelman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9780415679930
• eBook ISBN: 9781136653728
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

When an earthquake hits a war zone or cyclone aid is flown in by an enemy, many ask: Can catastrophe bring peace? Disaster prevention and mitigation provide similar questions. Could setting up a flood warning system bring enemy countries together? Could a regional earthquake building code set the groundwork for wider regional cooperation?This book examines how and why disaster-related activities do and do not create peace and reduce conflict. Disaster-related activities refer to actions before a disaster such as prevention and mitigation along with actions after a disaster such as emergency response, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction. This volume investigates disaster diplomacy case studies from around the world, in a variety of political and disaster circumstances, from earthquakes in Greece and Turkey affecting these neighbours' bilateral relations to volcanoes and typhoons influencing intra-state conflict in the Philippines. Dictatorships are amongst the case studies, such as Cuba and Burma, along with democracies such as the USA and India. No evidence is found to suggest that disaster diplomacy is a prominent factor in conflict resolution. Instead, disaster-related activities often influence peace processes in the short-term—over weeks and months—provided that a non-disaster-related basis already existed for the reconciliation. That could be secret negotiations between the warring parties or strong trade or cultural links. Over the long-term, disaster-related influences disappear, succumbing to factors such as a leadership change, the usual patterns of political enmity, or belief that an historical grievance should take precedence over disaster-related bonds.This is the first book on disaster diplomacy. Disaster-politics interactions have been studied for decades, but usually from a specific political framing, covering a specific geographical area, or from a specific disaster framing. As well, plenty of quantitative work has been completed, yet the data limitations are rarely admitted openly or thoroughly analysed. Few publications bring together the topics of disasters and politics in terms of a disaster diplomacy framework, yielding a grounded, qualitative, scientific point of view on the topic.

1    The Origins of Disaster Diplomacy

1.1 Introduction

The world spends over $1.4 trillion a year in recorded military expenditures (SIPRI, 2009), but less than 1.5 per cent of that on net official humanitarian assistance (GHA, 2009; OECD, 2008). That financial support for war produces results. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2009) listed 37 armed conflicts around the world for 2008, covering approximately one fifth of the world’s countries. Battle deaths in armed conflicts totalled about 10 million from 1946 to 2002, although battle deaths account for only a small fraction of war-related deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005).

With such widespread conflict around the world throughout history, it is likely that non-conflict disasters sometimes strike conflict zones. Examples of non-conflict disasters include earthquakes, industrial explosions, floods, transportation crashes, epidemics, and hurricanes. With conflict undermining governance, livelihoods, and basic services such as health, water, and sanitation, the overlapping conflict and non-conflict disasters are inextricably linked.

A war-weary population with reduced physical and psychological health is more susceptible to a pandemic. A government focusing on war might neglect promulgation, monitoring, and enforcement of earthquake-related building codes. Conflict frequently interferes with or cuts essential supplies such as food, medicine, and building materials, making it difficult for people to keep their homes and communities prepared for floods or storms.

These examples represent the well-known phenomenon of conflict increasing disaster vulnerability and exacerbating disaster impacts. Is the reverse possible? Could some form of non-conflict disaster striking a conflict zone lead to compassion, desire to help, or collaboration in order to deal with that disaster? This book covers some aspects of such ‘disaster diplomacy’.

Basic definitions provide a starting point. As a starting definition, a disaster is ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’ (UNISDR, 2009). Also a starting definition, diplomacy can refer to peaceful conduct of official business amongst sovereign-state governments and other government-related entities involved in world political matters (after Bull, 1977, although this definition is by no means exclusive to the English school of international relations).

From the definition of disaster, all forms of activities related to disasters can be described. Disaster-related activities refer to what happens – for example, investigations, proposals, policies, practices, and actions – before a disaster along with what happens after a disaster. Before a disaster, activities can cover prevention, planning, mitigation, preparedness, and risk reduction. Post-disaster activities incorporate response, relief, reconstruction, and recovery.

Many manuals attempt to put disaster-related activities into a sequence or a never-ending cycle. The cycle includes a disaster leading to post-disaster activities that then segue into pre-disaster activities until another disaster strikes. Most such models have been criticised as being culturally biased, unrealistic, or unhelpful for a long-term view. For example, Balamir (2005), Lewis (1999), van Niekerk (2007), and Wisner et al. (2004) indicate frustration with the cycle model and provide alternatives, plus La Red (La Red de Estudios Sociales en Prevención de Desastres en América Latina;www.desenredando.org) has long been debating how to do better than the ‘cycle’ concept.

The reason for the critiques is that, by having a disaster-orientated focus, the cycle could sometimes be interpreted as implying that disasters must always happen and that the disaster part of the disaster cycle can never be changed – whether or not that is the intention or implementation of the cycle. The critics of the ‘disaster cycle’ offer suggestions to explicitly move away from disaster, rather than always including it in the model. Their approach emphasises the importance of pre-disaster activities, rather than being reactive by putting measures in place to prevent the disaster that just happened.

No author denies the need to be ready for disasters and to implement appropriate post-disaster activities. They recognise that, while a world free from disasters would be ideal, current realities seem likely to preclude that for some time into the future. They also accept that it is equally unrealistic to assume that disaster must be an inevitable part of any efforts to deal with disasters.

Instead, disaster-related activities need to be seen as overlapping and connected phases, always with the goal of reducing disaster risk over the long term so that, even when a disaster occurs, it is not as bad as the previous time. That matches UNISDR’s (2009) description of ‘disaster risk reduction’ as ‘The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events’. Improvements are frequently seen in communities being able to help themselves (Ogawa et al., 2005), in educational programmes (Holloway, 2009), and in legal frameworks for supporting disaster-risk reduction (Spence, 2004).

Understanding the ‘disaster’ part of disaster diplomacy must be seen within these wider contexts. All disaster-related activities are covered, pre-disaster activities and post-disaster activities, seeking to break the cycle.

The concept of ‘diplomacy’ also has wide contexts for disaster diplomacy, beyond the starting definition. Rather than referring strictly to bilateral or multilateral relations amongst entities representing sovereign-state governments and other government-related entities involved in world political matters, numerous aspects of international affairs, international relations, peace, and conflict are covered. For understanding ‘diplomacy’ within ‘disaster diplomacy’, those in conflict or collaborating (and sometimes both simultaneously) could be sovereign states, international organisations, non-profit groups, businesses, or non-sovereign territories. Many of the latter are sub-national jurisdictions with their own government such as municipalities or provinces. Scope further exists for individuals to be considered as the entities involved in disaster diplomacy irrespective of their affiliation with governmental or non-governmental bodies.

Bringing together ‘disaster’ and ‘diplomacy’ yields ‘disaster diplomacy’. Is the topic worthy of study? The theme appears to be most popular in the media after a disaster hits a conflict zone or a country which has enemies. An expectation is often implied that disaster should bring peace, whether or not any precedent or realism exists for that expectation. Policy- and decision-makers can be forced to respond to populist pushing for a disaster diplomacy process that they would rather avoid – legitimately or otherwise.

Science tends to be more cautious about leaping into disaster-diplomacy desires or trying to force forward such a process. Instead, the question is asked: does evidence exist to support the hope for disaster diplomacy? By investigating multiple, diverse case studies, from numerous perspectives, this question is addressed at many levels in this book. In doing so, a balance is sought in the argumentation, seeing whether arguments favouring disaster diplomacy are justified – or whether so little empirical support for disaster diplomacy exists that it is a tenuous thread.

The disaster-diplomacy work reported in this book places heavy emphasis on relatively contemporary events and situations. The years 2000–10 are most prominent, although case studies from previous decades and centuries are mentioned. Most of the case studies, contemporary or older, are embedded in the long scientific and practitioner history that led up to the past decade or so of disaster diplomacy investigations.

The case studies and analyses, in fact, draw on the long history of many fields of study that involve disaster-related studies and diplomacy-related studies. All fields, all histories, all case studies, and all literature are not covered – far from it. To be comprehensive would require a volume several times the size of this one. Instead, this book provides a baseline for further exploration of the fields, the histories, the case studies, and the literature. With such a baseline – incorporating a clear inception point and a clear path for expanding knowledge based on previous work – disaster-diplomacy work for this book can be defined and summarised.

Disaster diplomacy examines how and why disaster-related activities do and do not reduce conflict and induce cooperation. Many variations of that definition, scope, and theme exist. This book explains how this summary evolved from principally one specific series of investigations (based on Kelman and Koukis, 2000), along with spin-offs, parallels, and tangents to that core statement.

That neither neglects nor precludes the impressive vastness of work relevant to disaster diplomacy that is separate from the work emphasised here. Rather, this approach achieves a balance of focusing the topic without constraining it, suitable for a single volume. It also assists in sifting evidence for and against disaster diplomacy, to ensure that recommendations can be supported by case studies. The manifestations of disaster diplomacy, the reasons for those manifestations, and the explanations regarding why more manifestations do not occur can now be examined.

1.2 A Brief History of Disaster Diplomacy

Aspects of disaster diplomacy have long been studied and applied. Olson and Gawronski (2010) give a history of the literature on the politics of disaster, mainly from the perspective of the USA, that goes back to 1925. Similarly, Platt (1999) details the history of dealing with disasters in the context of democracy, again from the perspective of the USA.

For disasters across international borders, from the border towns of Eagle Pass, Texas, USA and Piedras Negras, Coahuila, Mexico, Clifford (1956) investigated the Rio Grande River’s flood of 27–30 June 1954. His sociology study detailed patterns of individuals and organisations responding to the cross-border flood disaster. In addition to highlighting the importance of researching during a disaster situation, which was relatively unique at the time, Clifford’s (1956) conclusions focus on the apparent porosity of the border with respect to social interactions. Both informal individual connections and formal institutional connections were seen as being important in helping both of the communities to respond to the disaster. In particular, ‘The disaster acted as a catalyst, in a sense, which suddenly brought many areas of relationships into sharp focus’ (Clifford, 1956: 137).

Twenty years later, Quarantelli and Dynes (1976) listed factors influencing, and consequences of, the presence and absence of different forms of post-disaster community conflict. Most case studies are American and the authors provide an American point of view regarding their expectations for cross-cultural differences and similarities. The study’s conclusions are that most conflicts emerging in post-disaster activities were the same as the pre-disaster conflicts that existed within the community.

The (re)-emergence of these conflicts could be seen as evidence of the community recovering from the disaster. That can even ‘reinforce the community cohesion which is produced during the emergency period’ (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1976: 149). This post-disaster community cohesion along with improved morale due to the disaster and the disaster response are identified in the case studies. Yet the disasters examined do not appear to have had excessive mortality, widespread devastation across the entire community, or more than one community group in intense or violent conflict with many other community groups.

At the same time and from an international perspective, Glantz (1976) delved into disaster politics. Based on drought in the Sahel, his book explains how politics influence why disasters happen and how disasters could be averted. The focus is on disaster-related myths and tackling those myths. Relevant to disaster diplomacy, one myth suggested is that ‘Things will change’ after a disaster. The reality is that improvements and aims for positive change are often hindered by governance inertia. Glantz (1976) sets a baseline for examining misconceptions about the interaction of politics and disaster and how to overcome those fallacies.

Fast forwarding more than 20 years, Lewis (1999) covers several disaster-diplomacy examples. He notes how ‘The November 1970 cyclone, and its subsequent alleged mismanagement, was one of the many influences that triggered the Bangladesh War of Independence which commenced in March 1971’ (Lewis, 1999: 25). He describes how the 1972 Managua earthquake helped the Sandinista rebellion and civil war to gain traction that, seven years later, overthrew the dictatorship running Nicaragua. De Boer and Sanders (2005) provide details on that case study, emphasising the obvious post-disaster governmental corruption that drew powerful support to the previously marginalised Sandinista movement.

Nel and Righarts (2008) summarise and provide earlier references for a long history of disasters impacting conflict. They start with the earthquake that devastated Sparta in 465/464 BC providing the spark for a slave uprising. De Boer and Sanders (2004) cover several volcanic case studies changing physical and political landscapes, from the eruption of Thera, Greece in the Bronze Age to the 1902 eruption of Mount Pelée in Martinique in the Caribbean. Broder et al. (2002) discuss diseases decimating armies at war from Alexander the Great to World War II.

Olson and Drury (1997) and Drury and Olson (1998) are examples of quantitative investigations from the long history of disaster-conflict studies. They statistically analysed data between 1966 and 1980 to seek connections between disasters and political unrest. To be included, disasters had to kill more than 1,500 people during the study period. Other data for each case study needed to be available for two years prior to the disaster and for seven years after it. That produced a sample of Bangladesh, China, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, and Turkey.

Olson and Drury (1997) showed that worse disasters can lead to more political unrest, especially by creating an opportunity for critics to tackle a regime. In that sense, disasters ‘can be seen as democratizing in some respects’ (Olson and Drury, 1997). In parallel, using a combination of political and developmental variables, Drury and Olson (1998) concluded that increasing development, increasing income equality, and increasing regime repressiveness all led to less post-disaster political strife.

Even though the interactions amongst disasters and the topics of diplomacy, peace, and conflict were being researched and published on, the phrase ‘disaster diplomacy’ seems to appear infrequently prior to 2000. In a practitioner piece on communications for disaster response, Silverstein (1991) states only that ‘Communications networks are the routes of international disaster diplomacy’ (p. 3) without further discussion or analysis.

In the purely academic literature, Dove and Khan (1995) quote the phrase ‘disaster diplomacy’ from a media article of that title, a 1991 piece in the ‘Dhaka Courier’ from Bangladesh, but they do not describe or analyse the phrase’s meaning. Dove (1998) quotes the same article, briefly discussing it in the context of how the Bangladeshi media and government frame disasters in their country.

Then, Kelman and Koukis (2000) started an effort to systematically document and analyse disaster diplomacy through editing four papers. The papers are Ker-Lindsay (2000) examining the Greece–Turkey case study, Glantz (2000) detailing Cuba–USA, Holloway (2000) covering Southern Africa during the 1991–93 drought, and Comfort (2000) completing a comparative analysis of the three case studies using a complex adaptive systems framework. Each of these papers is detailed in later sections of this book.

The publication by Kelman and Koukis (2000) was originated by Theo Koukis who proposed a special section of the journal Cambridge Review of International Affairs. His suggestion was based on the ongoing Greek–Turkish rapprochement that appeared to result from the earthquake in Turkey in August 1999 and the earthquake in Greece in September 1999. From media discussions, Koukis suggested the title of ‘Earthquake Diplomacy’. The journal’s editor at the time, Charlotte Lindberg Clausen (now Charlotte Warakaulle), suggested expanding the section’s scope and title to ‘Disaster Diplomacy’. I then joined the team editing the ‘Disaster Diplomacy’ section, leading to the publication of Kelman and Koukis (2000). Based on this work and the interest generated by the publication, in January 2001 I launched the disaster-diplomacy website now at www.disasterdiplomacy.org.

2 Moving Forward with Disaster Diplomacy

2.1 What this Volume Offers

From the origins described in Chapter 1, many more disaster-diplomacy case studies have been examined. These investigations involved numerous authors, interests, and disciplinary approaches. This book details and analyses that work. The focus, although not exclusively, is on one particular dimension of ‘disaster diplomacy’: that of the work over the past ten years or so that is related to Kelman and Koukis (2000).

This focus in no way denigrates, dismisses, or ignores pre-2000 work or post-2000 publications covering overlapping topics without disaster diplomacy as the core. In contrast, this book needs, uses, interprets, and references some (actually a small part) of that work. But that material is not the principal part of this volume, nor is that material addressed comprehensively. Any publication must scope itself. This book does so by limiting itself to disaster-diplomacy work from mainly 2000 to 2010. This scoping also assists in ensuring this book’s originality, rather than repeating the deep, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of tables
• 1. The origins of disaster diplomacy
• 2. Moving forward with disaster diplomacy
• 3. Hypotheses and research questions
• 4. Empirical evidence: Case studies
• 5. Analyses and typologies for disaster diplomacy
• 6. Explaining disaster diplomacy’s successes
• 7. Explaining disaster diplomacy’s failures
• 8. Spin-offs
• 9. Limitations
• 10. Principal lessons for application
• 11. Filling in the gaps
• 12. The future of disaster diplomacy
• References
• Index