Psychology of Self-Regulation

Cognitive, Affective, and Motivational Processes

Joseph P. Forgas, Roy F. Baumeister, Dianne M. Tice, Joseph P. Forgas, Roy F. Baumeister, Dianne M. Tice

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9781138984141
• eBook ISBN: 9781136874307
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

The ability to regulate and control our behaviors is a key accomplishment of the human species, yet the psychological mechanisms involved in self-regulation remain incompletely understood. This book presents contributions from leading international researchers who survey the most recent developments in this fascinating area. The chapters shed new light on the subtle and often subconscious ways that the people seek to regulate their thoughts, feelings and behaviors in everyday social life. The contributions seek answers to such intriguing questions as: How can we improve our ability to control our actions? How do people make decisions about which goals to pursue? How do we maintain and manage goal-oriented behavior? What happens when we run out of self-regulation resources? Can we match people and the regulatory demands of to specific tasks so as to optimize performance? What role does self-regulation play in sports performance, in maintaining successful relationships, and in managing work situations?

The book offers a highly integrated and representative coverage of this important field, and is suitable as a core textbook in advanced courses dealing with social behavior and the applications of psychology to real-life problems.

1

The Psychology of Self-Regulation An Introductory Review

JOSEPH P. FORGAS

University of New South Wales

ROY F. BAUMEISTER and DIANNE M. TICE

Florida State University

CONTENTS

Early Approaches to Self-Regulation: From Adam and Eve Onward

Self-Regulation and Social Life

Self-Regulation in Psychology

Domains of Self-Regulation

Self-Regulation: Conscious or Unconscious?

Goal-Oriented Behavior and Self-Regulation

Individual Differences in Self-Regulation

Types of Self-Regulation

Ingredients of Self-Regulation

Overview of the Book

Part 1: Motivational Processes in Self-Regulation

Part 2: Self-Regulation and Goal-Oriented Behavior

Part 3: Affective and Cognitive Processes in Self-Regulation

Part 4: Self-Regulation and Social and Interpersonal Processes

Conclusions

Author Note

References

The ability to control and regulate our actions is perhaps the quintessential characteristic of human beings. Indeed, the capacity to engage in effective self-regulation is probably one of the defining features of our species. Homo sapiens could just as well be called homo temperans (from the Latin, “the self-controlled man”), as our ability to regulate and control our actions represents a key evolutionary achievement. While some primates certainly display some elements of social thinking (Dunbar, 2007), no other species comes even close to us in its ability to engage in effective self-regulation and self-control in order to achieve distal goals. It may be argued that any systematic thinking and the use of conscious will (and there may not be all that much of it; see Wegner, 2002) largely serves the evolutionary functions of long-term self-regulation and self-control (Forgas, Haselton, & von Hippel, 2007; see also Oettingen & Gollwitzer, Chapter 8, this volume; Carver & Scheier, Chapter 7, this volume).

EARLY APPROACHES TO SELF-REGULATION: FROM ADAM AND EVE ONWARD…

It is not surprising then that interest in the very human ability to engage in self- regulation and self-control has been a recurring theme in both Western and Eastern philosophy for millennia. In Plato’s Republic, the critical quality of philosophers that uniquely qualified them to be leaders of society is their ability to exercise self-control over their basic human instincts and emotions and so remain detached and rational in all circumstances. In contrast, it was the very inability to exercise rational self-control and self-regulation that relegated most others to the lower strata of Plato’s ideal society.

Within Christian thinking and philosophy that most directly influenced Western civilization, the emphasis to engage in conscious self-control and self-regulation has always been regarded as perhaps the most important human virtue. In fact, it can be considered the “master virtue,” because so many of the other virtues rely on self-control. The original fall from grace, Adam and Eve’s failure to resist temptation, is perhaps the oldest and most poignant example of catastrophic self-regulation failure. Within Judeo–Christian theology and philosophy, the ability to engage in conscious self-regulation and self-control has long been regarded as one of the most important values, and one that can be trained and improved with arduous practice (see also Baumeister & Alquist, Chapter 2, this volume). Many of the saints of the early Christian church demonstrated heroic virtue precisely by engaging in uncommon feats of self-control and self-regulation.

The importance of self-control is a recurring theme in the works of major Christian philosophers such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. Regular exercises designed to enhance self-control and self-regulation, sometimes involving highly ego-depleting self-mortification, have long been an important aspect of the daily routine of members of many religious as well as secular Christian organizations. Even today, followers of some Christian groups engage in conscious self-mortification to demonstrate virtue and to train and increase self-control. On a visit to Rome, one can see the Scala Sancta, a long staircase apparently taken from the house of Pontius Pilate, where the faithful need to ascend on their knees. This is obviously a very painful, unpleasant, and tiresome exercise, requiring extreme self-control that is performed to demonstrate one’s faith and virtue. It seems then that there is a powerful Western cultural tradition that regards self-regulation and self-control as morally desirable and often equates self-regulation with moral virtue.

Not only religious thinkers, but also philosophers of the enlightenment from the 18th century onward such as Kant, Hume, and others placed considerable emphasis on the importance of self-regulation. However, rather than emphasizing the value of self-regulation as a means of acquiring moral virtue, the emerging philosophy of rationalism saw self-regulation as perhaps the critical means of realizing the ideal of the rational, independent, and self-fulfilled individual. By the 20th century, self-regulation came to occupy an important role in such popular philosophical movements as existentialism, including the work of Jean Paul Sartre. According to these views, even in the absence of any deity or any other metaphysical point of reference, the mere fact of our existence compels us to realize the supreme importance of our daily choices, and the ability to regulate and control behaviors is thus a key requirement for leading a fully realized life.

Self-Regulation and Social Life

Homo sapiens is also a highly sociable species. We are not only one of the social animals, but we are the only cultural animal (Baumeister, 2005). The astounding development of our mental and cognitive abilities, and our impressive record of achievements owes a great deal to the highly elaborate self-regulatory strategies we have been able to develop in order to manage and coordinate complex interpersonal relationships (Pinker, 1997; see also, this volume, Blanton & Hall, Chapter 16; Finkel, Molden, Johnson, & Eastwick, Chapter 19; Vohs, Lasaleta, & Fennis, Chapter 17). Throughout most of our evolutionary history, human beings traditionally lived in small, close, face-to-face groups. From our earliest hunter– gatherer ancestors almost to the present day, the dominant form of social unit was the intimate “primary group,” and human interaction typically occurred between intimately known others and was regulated by what appeared to be rigid and unalterable social and cultural rules. If self-regulation was at all shaped by evolutionary influences—and there is every reason to believe that it was (see Baumeister & Alquist, Chapter 2, this volume)—then it was shaped by the need to adapt to a kind of social life that was profoundly different from the demands of modern society.

The capacity to self-regulate in order to manage complex social relationships constitutes an essential skill that holds families, groups, and even whole societies together. However, the kind of ancestral small group social environment that shaped this ability has now almost completely disappeared from our lives. The end of traditional, face-to-face society and a fundamental change in human relatedness and social integration occurred in the last few hundred years, since the 18th century (Durkheim, 1956). The emergence of the liberated, self-sufficient individual freed from the restrictive influence of social norms and conventions owes much to the philosophy of the Enlightenment that found its political expression in the French Revolution. Industrialization produced large-scale dislocation and social mobility and the emergence of massive, socially disconnected populations as required by technologies of mass production.

These developments produced new self-regulatory challenges in the way people relate to one another. In modern mass societies, most of the people we encounter are strangers, personal anonymity is widespread, and mobility is high. The fact that most people we deal with are not intimately known to us makes interpersonal behavior far more problematic, and requires far more sophisticated and intensive self-regulatory processes. It is interesting that the emergence of psychology and social psychology as a science of interpersonal behavior pretty much coincided with the emergence of modern mass societies. It is for the first time that social life—once a natural, automatic process—has become uncertain and problematic, and thus an object of concern, reflection, and study (Goffman, 1972). Emile Durkheim (1893/1956), the father of modern sociology, was among the first to identify a fundamental distinction between social relationships based on organic solidarity versus mechanical solidarity.

Thus, the last few hundred years of Western history produced a form of social living that is profoundly different from the kind of life that human beings adapted to throughout previous millennia. Several of the chapters in this volume touch on the regulatory demands of social living (Blanton & Hall, Chapter 16; Finkel et al., Chapter 19; Vohs et al., Chapter 17; von Hippel & Ronay, Chapter 18), and make the point that self-regulation is an essential prerequisite for managing and maintaining social relationships. Understanding the processes and mechanisms of effective self-regulation has probably never been of greater importance than today. It is hardly surprising then that there has been explosive recent interest in self-regulation processes, as contributions to this volume illustrate.

SELF-REGULATION IN PSYCHOLOGY

Despite its venerable history in philosophy, self-regulation has received comparatively little attention in psychology until the last few decades. Although psychologists such as William James already had much to say about human selfhood at the dawn of our discipline, it was not until around 1990 that the consensus among experts came to focus on self-regulation as one of the most important aspects of selfhood and one of the vital keys to understanding the human self. Compared to self-esteem, self-concept, self-consciousness, and other self-aspects, self-regulation and self-control are relative latecomers. The remarkable blossoming of research on self-regulation from 1990 onward has made up for lost time and abundantly confirmed the importance of self-regulation. Indeed, allusions to self-regulation have spread beyond the study of self and are now to be found in studies spanning the breadth of psychological research, including such seemingly distant topics as emotion, mental illness, prejudice, aggression, decision making, crime, and health.

To regulate literally means to change, but it is more than that. It refers to a specific kind of change: change to bring thinking and behavior into accord with some often consciously desired rule, norm, goal, ideal, or other standard (see also Oettingen & Gollwitzer, Chapter 8, this volume). Self-regulation is regulation of the self by the self. Thus, it means changing oneself, or some aspect of oneself, so as to conform to some idea or concept (standard). The standard may have been chosen by the self or prescribed by the social environment. Either way, self-regulation denotes a vital source of flexibility within the self. Without self-regulation, the self could not easily adapt to the demands and opportunities of a complex social environment.

One reason for the remarkably fast blossoming of research and theory on self-regulation is its practical importance. Indeed, many researchers who were concerned with practical problems had begun to recognize the importance of self-regulation in their own domains before social psychologists had begun to appreciate the theoretical impact (see also Unkelbach, Plessner, & Memmert, Chapter 6, this volume). When Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice (1994) surveyed the research literature, they found abundant research relevant to the topic, but it was widely scattered across different domains and traditions, and the many and various researchers were often unaware of what the other was doing. But researchers on eating and dieting, smoking, drug addiction, crime and violence, emotional control issues, and others had furnished useful data on self-regulation within their specific domain. Once social psychologists began to turn their interest to self-regulation, they found a strong foundation on which to build.

In fact, most major social and personal problems that afflict people in modern, Western cultures have some degree of self-regulation failure as a core part of the problem. Inadequate or misguided self-regulation is involved in drug and alcohol addiction, eating disorders, obesity, crime and violence, prejudice and stereotyping, cigarette smoking, underachievement at school and work, unwanted pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, debt, failure to save money, gambling, domestic abuse, and many more. The solving of many social problems thus assumes that individuals are capable and willing to self-regulate.

If the preceding seemed negative and depressing, then one can turn to the positive value of self-regulation for health, happiness, and optimal human functioning. People with good self-control do better than others in many well-documented ways. One of the most impressive demonstrations was by Mischel and his colleagues, who measured children’s self-regulation in terms of their ability to postpone gratification when they were only 4 years old and then tracked these participants until they grew up. The children who were better at delaying gratification at age 4 grew up to become more successful than others as adults, both in terms of work (success in college and job) and social life (popularity and good relationships; Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990). Other work has confirmed that good self-regulation contributes to getting better grades, avoiding trouble and pathology, staying out of trouble, having better relationships with others, doing better at sports, and a host of other benefits (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2003; Wolfe & Johnson, 1995; see also Unkelbach et al., Chapter 6, this volume). The ability to self-regulate, and in particular, to regulate affective states, also lies at the core of blossoming research on emotional intelligence phenomena (Ciarrochi, Forgas, & Mayer, 2006; see also Koole, Chapter 13, this volume; Tice, Chapter 12, this volume).

As we have argued, it is not unrealistic to propose that psychology has thus far identified only two main variables that contribute to human success across almost the full range of human striving. These are intelligence and self-regulation. Intelligence was identified early in the history of psychology as an important adaptive trait and has received extensive study, but self-regulation is gaining ground. Moreover, and crucially, decades of research have largely failed to find any way of causing lasting improvements in intelligence, whereas self-regulation does appear to be amenable to interventions designed to increase it (for review, see Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006). Self-regulation thus represents one of the best hopes for psychology to make a broad, positive contribution to human welfare. It is therefore no accident that the so-called positive psychology movement has embraced the importance of self-regulation (see Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

Although we have indicated that social psychology’s interest in self-regulation began to blossom in the late 1990s, two important precursors deserve mention, for they laid the foundations for basic research and theorizing. We have already mentioned the first of these, namely, Mischel’s (1974, 1996) studies on delay of gratification. The capacity to forego immediate pleasures and resist current impulses to secure greater but delayed rewards is a hallmark of the pursuit of enlightened self-interest (something Adam and Eve were apparently unable to do). Indeed, one could speculate that this ability has been so critical for human welfare that it may have contributed to the evolutionary pressures that were selected in favor of the improved capacity for self-regulation. Although the benefits of delaying gratification in prehistoric hominid life may not resonate today, it is still abundantly clear that the capacity to delay gratification is vitally important to human well-being. Agriculture, for example, would be impossible without delaying gratification, as would saving money or food for the future. Likewise, the long educational process that enables people to achieve great things within and for human culture depends on the capacity to del...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• List of Contributors
• 1 The Psychology of Self-Regulation An Introductory Review
• Section I Motivational Processes in Self-Regulation
• Section II Self-Regulation and Goal-Oriented Behavior
• Section III Affective and Cognitive Processes in Self-Regulation
• Section IV Self-Regulation and Social and Interpersonal Processes
• Index