Pakistan's Security and the India–US Strategic Partnership

Nuclear Politics and Security Competition

Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781032115993
• eBook ISBN: 9781000176629
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia militare e marittima

This book explores the relationship between the developing India–US strategic Partnership and Pakistan's security. It assesses India and the US's areas of cooperation to show that the partnership will bring drastic changes for India's military capabilities and modernization of its forces.

The book shows that, in addition to enhancing India's domestic nuclear stockpiles through the nuclear cooperation agreement, collaboration in high-tech areas such as space and innovative technologies will enable India to acquire sophisticated delivery systems as well as surveillance capacity. The author argues that these advancements will enable India to destabilize the strategic balance in the region. The book also briefly explores the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan that provide an insight into the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining deterrence in the region. To understand the power dynamics caused by the strategic partnership and their impact on strategic stability in South Asia, the author utilizes the Balance of Power and Power Transition theories.

A timely analysis of the India–US Strategic Partnership with a Pakistan angle, the book will be of interest to academics working in the fields of Asian security, Asian politics, especially South Asia, strategic studies, international relations, political science, nuclear non-proliferation, conflict studies, arms control, and security studies.

1 Introduction

Due to the dynamic nature of this universe, each entity in the world continues to transform with the passage of time. This process of transformation has evolved the hunter-gatherer human groups into civil society, which culminated in the creation of the institution of the state. The whole process of creation of the institution of the state, if analyzed, aimed at the welfare of individuals. Initially, the basic element of individual welfare was considered the security of life and possession without which no human could work for prosperity in other fields of human life; therefore, security became the cornerstone of human thought processes. By creating the institution of the state, humans achieved the security of life and possession to some extent and then became able to devote their wisdom to progressing in other spheres of life. Since the basic purpose of the creation of the state was human welfare, with the passage of time, it became the liability of the institution of the state to take responsibility for human development. In this surge of human development, economic interests entered into affairs of the state whereby states were aiming at maximum possible economic advantages in their favor, which ultimately resulted in the horizontal expansion of economic activity around the world. The clash of economic interests gave birth to different ideologies like Capitalism and Communism, which determined the course of world politics throughout the twentieth century. Although, after the collapse of the USSR by the end of the twentieth century, US unilateralism with the Capitalist ideology became dominant in world politics, the inherent characteristics of Capitalism, as Marx had suggested, began to deteriorate the Capitalist world in its quest for maximization of profit, which consequently created an environment of economic competition among various economic powers.

This economic competition gave rise to states’ eagerness to capture control over natural resources like oil and marketplace acquisition for the sale of manufactured products. A large part of oil supplies and international trade are transacted across international waters, which supplemented the competition for control overseas to ensure freedom of navigation. The search for control over land and seas made military strength a necessity for survival. These competitions brought human society to the verge of the same situation that occurred at the time of hunter-gatherer societies. It rejuvenated the human need for security from emerging threats and necessitated states to develop their military capacity. In comparison to the ancient situation of hunter-gatherer societies, the contemporary issues of security have become very dangerous because of the sophisticated arms acquisitions by various states in the world. The most dangerous of these arms acquisition competitions occurred during the Cold War era marked by nuclear competition between the US and USSR. However, this competition established that nuclear-armed rivals cannot afford a full-fledged war. This lesson from the Cold War era transformed the concept of full-scale warfare into the limited wars and escalation control measures which consequently convinced states to maximize their ability to deter the enemy. Maintenance of deterrence again required arms acquisition and sophistication, which consequently brought in the idea of miniaturization of weapons and damage control. Apparently, states do not want to go to war in light of the Liberalist paradigm but, practically, they continuously keep themselves prepared for war as per Realist thoughts.

Concurrently, the international strategic environment is being overwhelmed by security-centric policies where states’ security imperatives and economic interests supplement each other. None can flourish without the others. Economic security requires military strength while military strength requires economic prosperity to continue. This cycle of security-economic interdependence is driving the whole gamut of international politics. In this context, the India–US Strategic Partnership emerges as the exemplary annotation that connotes the above-cited cyclic process of international politics being practiced. The US hegemony in world politics, the potential rise of China with its rapidly increasing economic influence around the world, and India’s eagerness to get the status of a “great power” in world politics are the major variables, which will determine the future course of world politics. Pakistan enters into the equation due to its strategic location, which is very significant for China for its Belt and Road Initiative. The US–China rivalry over trade balance and other regional issues is well known to the world while India has compromised its traditional foreign policy toward the US for the purpose of obtaining strategic interests, and the US has also shunned its strict nuclear non-proliferation policies in order to accommodate India. In this context, the India–US Strategic Partnership becomes a very interesting subject to be explored.

The India–US Strategic Partnership became a highly important and controversial subject of discussions among various academic and political circles in the world from the very first days of its inception. There have been intense debates on this partnership regarding its various aspects at various levels. At the international level, it provoked non-proliferation concerns, while at the regional level it triggered a debate about its implications for China and the emergence of India as an Asian power, a counterweight to China. There has been no significant account of its implications for Pakistan, which not only is an important regional actor in itself, attempting to maintain a strategic equilibrium with India, but also has close strategic cooperation with China, affecting the regional balance of power. More significantly, Pakistan perceives itself as the country most directly affected by the India–US Strategic Partnership. This partnership entailing a nuclear deal and space cooperation raised huge concerns regarding non-proliferation at the international level.

Discussing its implications for non-proliferation, the Carnegie Endowment expert Mark Hibbs said, “The landmark U.S.-India nuclear deal damaged the global nonproliferation regime and has exacerbated nuclear tensions in South Asia” (Hibbs 2010). A report by the Council on Foreign Relations says that “the deal fundamentally reverses half a century of the US nonproliferation efforts, undermines attempts to prevent states like Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, and potentially contributes to a nuclear arms race in Asia” (Bajoria and Pan 2010). Sharon Squassoni writes in a Congressional Research Service report on India–US nuclear cooperation, “There are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India’s nuclear weapons program” (Squassoni 2005). Henry Sokolski of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center says, “We are going to be sending, or allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India—including yellowcake and lightly enriched uranium—that will free up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more bombs than they would otherwise have been able to make” (Bajoria and Pan 2010). Dhanapala termed the deal as “A disparity that vividly illustrates the inconsistent application of non-proliferation norms” (Dhanapala 2007). Zafar Nawaz Jaspal writes, “The global nuclear order, which has kept the nuclear proliferation regime intact, is based on the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954; Non-Proliferation Treaty; the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group” (Jaspal 2008). This nuclear deal has caused a serious blow to the principle contours of non-proliferation regimes including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by introducing country-specific amendments in their fundamental principles.

There is also no profound guarantee about the non-diversion of nuclear technology toward military purposes by India. The claims about India’s track record are also questionable on the ground that the NSG was created as a response to India’s 1974 nuclear tests (Joshi 2010) when it had diverted “atoms for peace” to its nuclear weapon development. Heinrich describes it as “India’s shock 1974 nuclear test explosion, using reactor technology provided by Canada in the 1950s supposedly for peaceful energy development” (Heinrich 2008). India can make qualitative and quantitative improvements in its nuclear arsenal through the transfer of nuclear technology. There is no assurance that India would not use transferred technology for military purposes through newly trained personnel equipped with advanced US nuclear technology. India has a proven history of betraying the trust and confidence of its benefactors by diverting technology provided for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for clandestine production of nuclear weapons. Given its track record, India may use the supply of nuclear technology and foreign fuel supplies, meant for the “civil nuclear program” to accelerate its weapons program. Moreover, India can refuse to comply with the so-called moratorium on nuclear testing on the basis of unconvincing excuses regarding security issues. This is evident in the words of India’s prime minister at the time, Manmohan Singh, mentioned in the Washington Post: “[T]he country would retain its right to carry out future nuclear tests despite a civilian nuclear deal with the United States” (India Said to Retain Right to Hold Tests 2006). According to the report, Singh said in Parliament, “There is no scope for capping of our strategic (nuclear) program. It will be decided by the people, government, and Parliament of the country and not by any outside power” (India Said to Retain Right to Hold Tests 2006). Describing the India–US nuclear deal in his article “Good day for India, Bad for Nonproliferation”, Strobe Talbott writes:

India and the United States have both shown a penchant for going it alone.… If the Indian and American versions of unilateralism reinforce one other, it will work to the detriment of institutions like the UN and risk turning treaties like the NPT from imperfect but useful mechanisms into increasingly ineffectual ones.

(Talbott 2005)

At the regional level, major concerns about India–US strategic cooperation are thought to be China-centric but China followed a policy of ambiguity regarding its response to the India–US deal. China’s response was given through a Chinese national daily that is considered the mouthpiece of the Chinese government. An editorial in the Renmin Ribao (or People’s Daily) says:

This would be a hard blow on America’s leading role in the global proliferation prevention system as well as the system itself.… A domino effect of nuclear proliferation once turned into reality, will definitely lead to global nuclear proliferation and competition.

(China Attacks Indo-US Nuclear Deal 2005)

According to a report by the World Security Network:

China’s foreign ministry said that the current international safeguards on nuclear weapons were the hard-won product of many countries’ efforts and should not be weakened by exceptions … China hopes that concerned countries developing cooperation in peaceful nuclear uses will pay attention to these efforts.… The cooperation should conform to the rules of international non-proliferation mechanisms.

(Srivastava 2006)

China was believed to halt the deal on the NSG forum but it did not obstruct the approval of the NSG due to its policy to improve relations with India and other economic and national interests. However, Pakistan expressed serious reservations about the India–US strategic cooperation agreements. Pakistan considers the strategic partnership as detrimental to the regional security architecture in general and to Pakistan’s security in particular. Discussing the implications of the India–US strategic pact on Pakistan, Agha Shahi wrote:

It poses formidable challenges to Pakistan’s policymakers in the diplomatic, political and security fields in maintaining the balance of power in the region.… The pact confirms that the US has decided to accord higher priority and greater importance to its fast-growing relations with India which it has come to accept as the dominant power in South Asia than to those with Pakistan … [The US pledge to help India become a major power] would enable the latter to project its power in its neighborhood and beyond with the apparent strategic aim of countering the growing weight of a rising China in Asia.… In pursuit of the goal of accelerating India’s rise to a global power status as a counterweight to China, the US has disregarded the imperative of a strategic balance in South Asia.

(Shahi 2005)

Highlighting the regional implications of the nuclear deal, Adil Sultan Muhammad writes:

[T]he Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement if implemented without checking India’s potential to increase its fissile stocks and eliminating any possibility by India of improving its nuclear weapons could lead to arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India, and China, thus destabilizing the entire region.

(Muhammad 2006)

On March 20, 2006, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson said: “We believe that this deal is not helpful to the stability in South Asia and to the international non-proliferation efforts” (Record of the Press Conference by the Foreign Office Spokesperson 2006). Commenting on the India–US nuclear deal, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson said on July 23, 2007, “[W]e share the concerns of security analysts that the agreement would help bolster India’s nuclear weapons capability” (Record of Press Briefing 2007). The National Command Authority (NCA), the apex body of the nuclear command and control system in Pakistan, noticed the nuclear and defense cooperation between India and the US, and showed its concerns by stating that the “US–India Civil Nuclear Energy Deal, which would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors, may ignite an arms race and have implications on strategic stability in South Asia” (IPCS News Archives 2007). The NCA noted in its sixteenth meeting, held on January 13, 2010, that:

India continues to pursue an ambitious militarization programme.… Massive inductions of advanced weapon systems, including installation of ABMs [anti-ballistic missiles], the build-up of nuclear arsenal and delivery systems through ongoing and new programmes, assisted by some external quarters … and similar accumulations in the conventional realm, tend to destabilize the regional balance … Pakistan cannot be oblivious to these developments.

(ISPR 2010)

Expressing Pakistan’s reservations about the discriminatory treatment policies of strategic export-control regimes, the NCA held in its meeting on December 14, 2010:

Such policies, detrimental as they are to international peace and security, undermine the credibility of the existing non-proliferation regime and are inconsistent with the national laws and international obligations. Revisionism based on strategic, political or commercial considerations accentuates asymmetries and would perpetuate instability, especially in South Asia … peace and security are indivisible and … the goals of non-proliferation could only be advanced by ensuring equal and undiminished security for all states. Regional balance and strategic stability in South Asia are indispensable for peace, sustained development and prosperity for the region and beyond.

(NCA Meeting 2010)

The NCA had noted in the earlier meeting in January 2010 that “the India-specific exemption made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and subsequent nuclear fuel supply agreements with several countries, would enable India to produce substantial quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons by freeing up its domestic resources” (ISPR 2010). The NCA reiterated its criticism regarding discriminatory behavior with the international non-proliferation regime in its meeting on July 14, 2011, and cautioned that “such policies represent a regression in the non-proliferation regime and tend to erode the strategic balance in South Asia” (NCA Meeting 2011). Discussing the South Asian strategic environment in its meeting on September 5, 2013, the NCA declared that:

Pakistan would not remain oblivious to the evolving security dynamics in South Asia and would maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of aggression.… The NCA also reviewed the developments at the international level and took note of the discriminatory trends and policies.… It reiterated that Pakistan would continue to oppose any arrangement that is detrimental to its security and strategic interests.

(NCA Meeting 2013)

Without naming India–US strategic cooperation, the NCA meeting on September 9, 2015, noted the increasing conventional military asymmetries and declared it would maintain the full-spectrum deterrence within the ambit of the “credible minimum deterrence”. It noted the regional strategic developments and reaffirmed that:

[T]he State remains fully cognizant of the evolving security dynamics of South Asia and will take all measures to safeguard its national security.… In view of the growing conventional asymmetry, the NCA reiterated the national resolve to maintain “Full Spectrum Deterrence Capability” in line with the dictates of “Credible Minimum Deterrence” to deter all forms of aggression, adhering to the policy of avoiding an arms race.

(Express Tribune 2015)

While highlighting the global discrimination with reference to participation in global non-proliferation regimes during its meeting on February 24, 2016, again without naming India–US strategic developments, the NCA claimed that “Pakistan has the requisite credentials that entitle it to become part of all multi-lateral export-control regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, for which Pakistan seeks adoption of a non-discriminatory approach” (NCA Meeting 2016). The twenty-third meeting of the apex body took place in December 2017, noting the alarming transformation in a regional security environment where “massive arms build-up in the conventional domain, the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region and plans for the development/deployment of BMD [ballistic missile defense]” were seen as detrimental to regional security (NCA Meeting 2017).

It is observable that none of the meetings of the top security policy authority of Pakistan remained oblivious of emerging security threats in the wake of India–US strategic cooperation and each meeting showed its concerns regarding strategic developments in the region and reiterated its commitment regarding maintenance of a credible minimum deterrence against any sort of aggression aimed at the national security of Pakistan.

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has been coping with grave security threats from India to ensure its existence and survival as an independent state. The newly born state of Pakistan was carved out through the division of British India into two independent states because of religious, social, cultural, and economic disharmony between the two major religious groups, i.e., Hindus and Muslims. The Muslims of India, being a minority, were suspicious about their existence as an independent nation in the wake of the dominant majority rule of Hindus after the departure of British colonial rule. Therefore, they demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India and succeeded in the creation of Pakistan as an independent Muslim state. Hindus, having a dominant majority, were against the division of British India and the creation of Pakistan, but they failed to stop it. However, they tried their best to create difficulties for the newly born state in its infancy by involving it in a lot of disputes. Since...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The conceptual framework
• 3 History of India–US relations
• 4 The strategic partnership and nuclear cooperation
• 5 India–US nuclear deal and nuclear non-proliferation
• 6 The strategic partnership and defense cooperation
• 7 Taxonomy of Pakistan–India strategic rivalry
• 8 Pakistan’s security calculus and strategic equilibrium with India
• 9 Pakistan’s security concerns
• 10 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index