US-China-EU Relations

Managing the New World Order

Robert Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, Zhang Tuosheng, Robert Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, Zhang Tuosheng

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2010
• eBook ISBN: 9781135272807
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia de China

This volume brings together a group of leading international scholars to discuss how US-China-EU relations will shape the future of international politics.

Arguing that these three powers will play a key role in establishing and managing a new world order, the contributors examine how a future global order is developed by the interaction of these leading actors in the international system. The authors also address how the US, China and the EU promote cooperation and manage conflict of interests on a wide spectrum of issues including new security challenges. By linking the management of international affairs to specific policy issues, the book shows that the US-China-EU triangular configuration is a pivotal relationship for understanding contemporary international relations.

This book offers a comprehensive assessment of US-China-EU interactions and will be of great interest to students of Asian politics, US foreign policy, EU politics and security studies and IR in general.

Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate, John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, Associated Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Senior Advisor, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Øystein Tunsjø is Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.

Zhang Tuosheng is director of the research department and senior fellow at the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies.

1
Introduction

Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø and Zhang Tuosheng

The United States, China and the European Union encompass a substantial part of the military, economic, political and ‘soft’ power in the world. The interaction of these three power centres will have a profound impact on the international system in a period of changing power balances and uncertainty about the future world order. Although each actor is interested in preserving aspects of the contemporary international order that has promoted their respective interests in US preponderance, European stability and prosperity and China’s rise and unparalleled economic growth, there is simultaneously lack of consensus about important aspects of the international order. This volume is about these converging and diverging views within the triangle of the international order. The subsequent chapters consider how Europe, China and the United States can cooperate to both achieve their respective interests and to manage conflicts of interests.

Throughout this volume, the term triangle does not imply resemblance with triangular relationships of the past. The US–China–EU relationship differs from, for instance, the US–USSR–China triangle during the Cold War. The latter was frequently called a ‘strategic triangle’. That is not how the term triangle is used in this volume. Although the United States, China and the European Union are all important global actors, there is not a similar strategic interaction, so that change in one leg of the triangle can affect the vital security interests of the third actor, with the possible limited exception of the chance of European arms sales to China, an issue discussed in various chapters. Accordingly, none of the actors see the relationship between the other two as affecting their vital security interests. Rather than a strategic triangle shaped by balance of power and alignments, the US–China–EU triangle is characterized as a ‘diplomatic triangle’. A ‘diplomatic triangle’ is more contingent than a ‘strategic triangle’ and incorporates diplomatic steps that combine elements of cooperation and competition simultaneously. The US–China–EU triangle, then, is not merely shaped by zero sum and relative gains conflicts. In comparison with the Cold War ‘strategic triangle’, a ‘diplomatic triangle’ allows for absolute gains and mutual cooperation within the triangle. The scholarship in this volume also recognizes that it is problematic to speak of the European Union as a unitary actor in foreign affairs. In this respect, as well, the US–China–EU relationship is distinct from other triangular relationships.

Organization of the volume

The book is divided into four parts. The first part explores each of the three main actors’ preference for the future global order. The second part deals with different interactions within the triangular relationship: EU–China relations, US–China relations, and China’s relations with the United States and the European Union. The third part addresses, from a Western view and a Chinese perspective, how the triangular relationship is managed. The fourth part considers how China affects US–EU relations on security and economic issues.

The chapters in Part 1 reveal differences in conceptualization of world order within the triangular relationship. In short, the European Union approach stresses multilateralism, while China and the US emphasize multi- polarity. There are also differences in the preferred sources of influence in the evolving world order. The United States and China maintain that the future world order will be shaped by traditional capabilities of nation- states and the forces that drive the rise and fall of great powers. Conversely, from a European perspective, the logic of globalization demands more effective forms of international cooperation and integration and diminished state sovereignty.

Robert Art’s chapter (Chapter 2) is structured around US national interests, three plausible future global orders, and US policy towards three key regions: East Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Art argues that the United States prefers a unipolar status for as long as possible. If US dominance is challenged or fades away, the United States will prepare for a multi- polar world order envisioned by China, rather than the post- nation-state-centred world order preferred by the European Union.

Zhang Tuosheng’s chapter (Chapter 3) covers China’s integration into the world order. Zhang emphasizes the changes and evolution in China’s role, observing that China first was forced into the international order created by the Western powers and developed a position as a global rebel challenging the international order, but now has become an active and constructive participant in the international community, seeking to preserve traditional norms of sovereignty.

Chapter 4, by Hans Maull, focuses on the role the European Union can play in creating a new world order. Maull argues that by transcending important principles of state sovereignty, the European Union represents a new type of global actor in international relations that challenges US and Chinese visions for a future world order. Maull recognizes the difficulties in transforming international relations, but argues that the European Union is equipped with sufficient resources to effect international change: role concept and identity; material capabilities; skills and human capital; and the potential to draw on the cooperation of non- European partners.

Part 2 investigates the comprehensive bilateral ties within US–China–EU triangular relations. Attentive to the dangers of treating the European Union as a single actor in its foreign relations, Part 2 begins with three chapters on leading EU states’ China policy: Gudrun Wacker’s Chapter 5 deals with German China policy; James Gow’s Chapter 6 provides a British perspective, and Jean- Pierre Cabestan’s Chapter 7 presents an analysis of French China policy during President Sarkozy’s time in office. The authors acknowledge that their respective countries’ China policy is embedded in EU policy, but they also recognize that the major countries within the European Union covet their diplomatic autonomy when dealing with other great powers.

Robert Sutter argues in Chapter 8 that security issues frequently dominate the agenda of US–China relations, but that the United States and China enjoy a positive relationship because of extensive interdependence. Cooperation on North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan and possibly on the Taiwan issue can be a source of consolidated bilateral ties. Nonetheless, there is also potential for conflict over economic issues, values, security, nationalism and sovereignty. Sutter argues that, currently, the most significant factor in US–China relations is US domestic politics because popular American attitudes towards China are becoming more negative.

In Chapter 9, Wu Baiyi focuses on Chinese perceptions of the West. Wu argues that official Chinese perspectives on United States and the European Union are increasingly influenced by academia’s view of such issues as US hegemony, US economic and security policy towards China, European integration, NATO and the transatlantic relationship, value-oriented diplomacy, and the European Union’s economic and trade policy towards China.

Part 3 elaborates on findings presented in Part 2 by examining the differences in Western approaches toward China and by exploring Chinese perspectives of great- power relations. In Chapter 10, Wang Yizhou discusses various factors shaping the future world order and presents three major national interests guiding China’s foreign policy: 1) enhancement of China’s comprehensive national strength; 2) management of relations with numerous neighbours and various sovereignty disputes; 3) integration of China into the international community. Rosemary Foot’s chapter (Chapter 11) compares and contrasts European Union and US approaches towards China. In Foot’s view, differences between the policies of the EU and the US towards China can be attributed to: 1) different conceptions of world order; 2) different global roles; 3) variations in forms of power that can be brought to support the global roles; and 4) the different ways in which the global roles of the United States and the European Union are interpreted by China. Foot argues that different conceptions of the global order can explain the differences between EU and US approaches towards China.

Part 4 examines how the rise of China affects the transatlantic relationship in the economic and security realms. In Chapter 12, Andrew Walter focuses on management of global current account imbalances. Walter argues that US–China currency negotiations have harmed the European economy by contributing to the European trade deficit with China. Bates Gill’s chapter (Chapter 13) considers where the three powers, especially the United States and the European Union, need to act in concert to promote stable relations. Gill notes the differences between US and EU approaches toward China, but identifies three broad areas for US–EU cooperation: 1) a deepened transatlantic dialogue on China; 2) an increased understanding of each other’s comparative advantages when engaging China, where the ultimate goal is to increase the transparency of China’s military; 3) the building of effective mechanisms on trilateral cooperation for action on global security questions.

The concluding chapter (Chapter 14) draws together the scholarship in this book to consider the many factors that shape US–China–EU triangular relations, the policy outcomes attributed to triangular interactions, and the potential for greater cooperation.

Part I

2
The United States and the future global order

Robert J. Art

Measured in terms of both economic and military power, the three weightiest actors in international politics today are the United States, China, and the European Union. The first two are states; the last is union of states that is more than a confederation but less than a federation. China is growing more rapidly economically than the other two, and is significantly modernizing its military power. The European Union has been coalescing to a degree politically and is proceeding to develop a more coherent, if not integrated, defense posture and foreign policy. The United States is the central actor in this triangular configuration, not only because it is the weightiest in both the economic and military dimensions, but also because it has extensive military entanglements with the other two that the latter do not have with each other. The United States is allied with twenty- six European states through NATO, and it is a military rival with China because a significant part of America’s defense budget, military forces, and contingency planning is directed at China’s growing military power in East Asia. China and the European Union have extensive economic relations, but, to date, no military relations of any consequence.

The interactions among the bilateral relations between the United States and the European Union, between the United States and China, and between China and the European Union are complex and nuanced. So, too, are the views of each political actor towards these three sets of bilateral relations.¹ For starters, China favors the further integration of Europe on both economic and power politics grounds. The more Europe integrates economically, the better market it becomes for Chinese exports and the more it reduces China’s technological dependence on the United States and Japan.² The more cohesive Europe becomes militarily, the more independent it can be of the United States and the more it can help offset US military dominance.

For its part, the EU favors continued Chinese economic growth (because that is beneficial to Europe’s exports), although not necessarily the growth of Chinese military power because of the destabilizing effects it could have on East Asia and the EU’s trade in the region. Today, the European Union is China’s single largest trading partner, measured in terms of exports and imports, surpassing the United States in 2003 as China’s second- most important trading partner and Japan in 2004 as China’s most important trading partner, while China is the EU’s second- largest trading partner, behind the United States.³ Both China and the European Union favor a multipolar world, meaning an enhancement of Chinese and EU power vis- à-vis the United States, because that reduces US dominance and gives each of them more political leverage.

For its part, the United States prefers to keep its unipolar status for as long as possible.⁴ It also has a mixed view of Europe’s progress towards a more cohesive foreign and defense policy. It favors that development if it means Europe becomes a more effective military partner of the United States, but opposes it if Europe will be better able as a consequence to thwart America’s freedom of action. The United States favors a richer China because that makes China a better market for US goods, but not if it means a China that will rival the United States in economic and military power.

How these current interactions and attitudes evolve over the next decade will significantly affect, even if they will not wholly determine, the future shape of international politics. Especially important will be whether these three actors will interact in concert or mostly in contention with one another. How they interact, moreover, will depend, in turn, partly on the vision each has for the future global economic and security order (and its regional implications), partly on how their respective visions interact, and partly on the power each can put behind its vision.

The purpose of this chapter is to lay out America’s vision for both the future global security- economic...

Table of contents

• Asian Security Studies
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• 1 Introduction
• Part I
• Part II
• Part III
• Part IV
• Index