Koizumiâs media strategy
Prime Minister Koizumi gave a great deal of consideration to acutely impressing the average person with his image. He attached greater importance to making his appeals directly to the general public and winning their support than to building up his power base within the LDP. A political style aimed at gaining favour with the public in this fashion is commonly termed âpopulismâ in politics. While Koizumi was hardly the first Japanese prime minister to use this approachâone notable example being Hosokawa Morihiro, who held office from August 1993 to April 1994ânone had been as successful at it as he was.
The victory Koizumi achieved against almost everyoneâs predictions in the spring 2001 LDP presidential contest was based on a landslide win in the party primary against the backdrop of his national popularity. His support in opinion polls immediately after taking office reached then-unheard-of highs of above 80 per cent.
As prime minister, Koizumi spoke to the public in a clear-cut language dubbed âone-phraseâ (
wanfurzu ) by the Japanese media for the curtness of his remarks. At times he would dramatize confrontations with his political enemies in a calculated effort to arouse public interest. His skilful use of such methods to keep his administration afloat successfully maintained its public support at high levels. The 50 per cent support rate his cabinets averaged was the second highest in the postwar period, bested only by the 68 per cent achieved by the Hosokawa Cabinet, which lasted for only nine months.
1 This support sustained his administrationâs long term in office, the third longest for a postwar prime minister.
Koizumiâs populist approach was characterized by his media strategy, his penchant for casting issues as matters of good and evil, and his patterns of speech. First of all, it was only because Koizumi had a media strategy that his methods could achieve maximum efficiency. The essence of this strategy lay in making aggressive use of media that had so far stood on the fringes of the established political press corps.
Under the 1955 system, newspapers formed the core of the press corps covering politics. Newspapers relied for their coverage on beat reporters, called
bankisha , who collected information by forming close relationships with politicians. Television reporters remained on the outside of these insider groups comprised of politicians and reporters on the political beat.
2 It was coverage of the political reforms and realignments that occurred during the early 1990s that built momentum for the role of television media to gain increased attention.
An excellent example of this new awareness of televisionâs role is how the Hosokawa administration came to be labelled the âKume-Tahara Coalition Governmentâ (after Kume Hiroshi, then anchorman of the popular weekday evening
News Station television programme and Tahara S
ichir
, moderator of the long-running
Sunday Project current affairs talk show) based on the widely held perception that television reports critical of the preceding LDP government had been a factor in its demise. This example illustrates the dramatically expanded role played by television in contemporary politics that has led some to speak of âtelepoliticsâ. Koizumi saw this situation clearly and used television aggressively and to great effect.
First of all, Koizumi completely changed how
burasagari (âhanging in towâ) press briefings were carried out. Until this point,
burasagari usually referred to the prime minister answering reportersâ questions while on the move around the Kantei (prime ministerâs official residence) or the Diet. Koizumiâs method, however, was to stop where the television cameras stood and talk.
Under Koizumi, such press briefings were held twice a day, once at midday and once in the evening. The midday briefing was conducted without television cameras, primarily with the newspapers in mind. The evening briefing, on the
other hand, held as Koizumi was about to leave the Kantei for the day, was conducted with the cameras rolling.3 Koizumi often came out with some deeply striking comment at this evening event, a scene that would then be broadcast on the evening news programmes. Koizumiâs pronouncements and public assertions were effectively diffused among the populace through this routine.
Among the print media, Koizumi favoured the weekly tabloid magazines and sports newspapers, which heretofore had stood on the fringes of the political press corps, over the major newspapers (the so-called âquality papersâ). He put a premium on appearing in such publications, would hold informal talks with the magazinesâ editors and reporters, and forced the cabinet press club to admit sports newspapers. The sensational, dramatized reporting such publications favoured suited Koizumiâs populist style.4
Pitting good vs evil
The term âpopulismâ generally refers to the position that popular opinion ought to be indulged or accommodated, but we can define it here with greater precision. According to political scientist Otake Hideo, populism is characterized by a âtheatricalâ political style that presupposes binary oppositions between âthe average personâ and âthe eliteâ, âgood guysâ and âbad guysâ, or âfriendsâ and âenemiesâ. The leader is cast in the role of the âheroâ who, standing firmly on the average personâs side, leads them in confronting and doing battle with âthe enemyâ.5
In fact, Koizumi called the
zoku lawmakers and bureaucrats who opposed such reforms as his efforts to eliminate public corporations and to privatize the
highway public corporations âforces of resistanceâ (
teik seiryoku ). He constructed an oppositional framework in which they were âbadâ and he was âgoodâ. The way he dramatized the confrontation between himself and the âforces of resistanceâ was grist to the mill of television variety programmes, which normally did not cover such topics, and attracted the attention also of those who normally had little interest in politics. Koizumiâs structural reforms picked up a strong tailwind of popular support owing to the spread of this black-and-white view of the world among the public at large. In contrast, the anti-reform faction found itself presented in a morally negative light.
6Having made postal privatization the only contested issue in the 2005 general election, Koizumi vowed to not endorse any politicians who opposed the draft of his privatization bill, and dispatched carpetbagger candidates to run in their districts as what the media dubbed âassassinsâ (
shikaku ). Koizumi again painted a black-and-white picture that pitted good against evil, with rebel lawmakers in the role of the âbad guysâ blocking reforms and injuring the public interest, while Koizumi and his âassassinsâ were playing the part of the âgood guysâ pursuing reform. The strategy paid off and the LDP scored an unprecedentedly massive victory, thanks in particular to this strategyâs enormous appeal to independent voters.
As Koizumiâs achievement of postal privatization by these means demonstrates, depicting issues in black-and-white terms in an effort to mobilize public support allowed him to increase his influence over the policy-making process to a marked degree. Koizumi achieved greater policy transformations than any prime minister before him thanks to his effective use of populist techniques and a string of reforms to the political system and government structure that preceded his term in office. I will return to these points.