1
Overview
(Developments after November 2009 have not generally been summarized in the Overview. Please see the main text.)
The economic reforms themselves have been variously described by China, e.g. āplanned socialist commodity economyā has given way to āsocialist market economyā (1992: formally enshrined in the new constitution in March 1993) as the reforms have proceeded and ideological concessions have become more and more accepted.
China is the best example of a generally successful policy of gradual and partial economic reform. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 was the crucial political event. Since then China, with occasional setbacks, has moved broadly towards a market economy and allowed the non-state sector to gradually play a much greater role. China, however, had no detailed blueprint for economic reform and so groped its way forward.
Those advocating ābig bangā/āshock therapyā for the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union generally argue that, despite the countryās achievements, Chinaās model cannot be adopted in these cases because circumstances are different. Among other things, China was generally in a more favourable position in 1978 than the countries of Eastern Europe/the former Soviet Union generally were in 1989/1991. For example, China had a relatively low foreign debt, did not suffer from severe inflationary pressures and had substantially reorientated its trade towards the West. (China had quarrelled with the Soviet Union; e.g. in 1960 the Soviet Union withdrew its aid personnel.) The structure of the Chinese economy in 1978 was far more agrarian in nature, allowing a vast flow of cheap labour to the towns to boost the export of manufactured goods, including those produced by foreign companies. Chinaās socalled āfloating populationā of rural workers in urban areas is difficult to estimate, but may be of the order of 130 million to 150 million in more recent times. (Woo is an exception in that he argues that āgradual reform in China was not the optimal reform for Chinaā: 1994: 306.)
The discrediting of such extreme and extreme-left policies as the Great Leap Forward (1958ā60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966ā76) has helped keep the policy of gradual reforms on track. There have been occasional setbacks, but there seems to be no chance of any substantial reversal of the reforms which have been gradually introduced since 1978. China is now a key figure in the global economy, as regards both its exports and imports. Entry into the WTO (the successor to Gatt) on 11 December 2001 helped ensure the irreversibility of the general economic reform process.
The policy of gradualism has been influenced by such factors as the consequences of making drastic mistakes in a poor country with a history of natural and man-made disasters, and disagreements within the ruling elite. The Great Leap Forward (1958ā60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966ā76; a chaotic and anarchic period and one which was basically a means of reasserting Maoās personal power after his authority had waned in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward) were the result of extreme-left policies. The discrediting of such extreme and extreme-left policies has had a profound effect, both on the decision to implement economic reforms after the watershed year 1978 and on the basic continuity of the reforms.
Economic reforms have sometimes been put on hold or even regressed, e.g. after the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 and the Asian financial crisis (which started with the attack on the Thai baht in July 1997). Periodic worries about inflation or deflation have led to setbacks and there has at various times been resistance to, for example, agricultural tax reform, housing reform and the sale of state assets. Property and bankruptcy laws were slow in coming.
China adopted a policy of gradual and partial price reform. A ādualā pricing system was used (market prices being allowed for products bought and sold on the market as opposed to state-controlled prices for outputs or inputs forming part of the state plan). Controls have gradually been relaxed over time. Nevertheless, the state still exercises considerable direct and indirect control over price setting. In addition, temporary retrenchment has occurred, such as the reintroduction of price controls to combat inflation (such as in the latter half of 1998, the latter half of 2007 and early 2008) and combat deflation (price floors for a while after October 1997). The unusually severe snowstorms in parts of China that started on 10 January 2008 led to further (temporary) food price controls.
āStarting 1 January [2009] Beijing will allow gasoline and diesel prices to move more regularly in line with the global marketā (www.iht.com, 5 December 2008).
āChina will cut domestic fuel prices on Friday [19 December] for the first time in almost two yearsā (www.ft.com, 19 December 2008).
āChina took a step back from its promise to move towards more marketorientated domestic fuel prices, warning on Friday [8 May] that Beijing would limit petrol, diesel and other fuel price increases when oil prices rose above $80 a barrelā (www.ft.com, 10 May 2009).
ā[Companies such as PetroChina have] benefited from two governmentsanctioned fuel price increases in June [2009] ā part of Beijingās fuel price reforms that guarantee refiners a profit margin if crude oil stays below $80 a barrelā (FT, 29 August 2009, p. 15).
Economic success has been achieved on a broad front, in terms of such criteria as output growth, living standards, poverty reduction and inflation. (See Table 1.)
Chinaās rapid expansion of late (the fastest growing large economy) has been of global significance, such as its important contribution to global economic growth and its effects on the world market prices of commodities such as oil. China came through the 1997 Asian financial crisis in good shape and is coping relatively well with the global financial crisis.
But the costs of rapid growth include horrendous levels of pollution. Party leaders are also concerned about increasing inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth.
In December 2005 China announced that it had upwardly revised its official estimate of GDP in 2004 by 16.8 per cent. The main reason given was the considerable underestimation of the private service sector. In January 2006 China presented revised figures for GDP growth rates. From 1993 to 2004 inclusive only the figure for 1998 remained unchanged, while all the others were revised upwards. (See Table 1.)
āChina could displace Britain as the worldās fourth largest economy this year [2005] after Beijing unveiled a 16.8 per cent upward revision to official GDP that pushed it into sixth place in 2004ā (FT, 21 December 2005, p. 10).
ā[China has] the worldās fourth largest economyā (The Economist, 1 November 2008, p. 67).
āRevised figures published this week show that in 2007 China overtook Germany to become the worldās third biggest economyā (www.economist.com, 14 January 2009).