The Making of Détente

Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75

Wilfried Loth, George Soutou

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2010
• eBook ISBN: 9781134075072
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Containing essays by leading Cold War scholars, such as Wilfried Loth, Geir Lundestad and Seppo Hentilä, this volume offers a broad-ranging examination of the history of détente in the Cold War.

The ten years from 1965 to 1975 marked a deep transformation of the bipolar international system of the Cold War. The Vietnam War and the Prague Spring showed the limits of the two superpowers, who were constrained to embark on a wide-ranging détente policy, which culminated with the SALT agreements of 1972. At the same time this very détente opened new venues for the European countries: French policy towards the USSR and the German Ostpolitik being the most evident cases in point. For the first time since the 1950s, Western Europe began to participate in the shaping of the Cold War. The same could not be said of Eastern Europe, but ferments began to establish themselves there which would ultimately lead to the astounding changes of 1989-90: the Prague Spring, the uprisings in Gdansk in 1970 and generally the rise of the dissident movement. That last process being directly linked to the far-reaching event which marked the end of that momentous decade: the Helsinki conference.

The Making of Détente will appeal to students of the Cold War, international history and European contemporary history.

Part I
Background structural problems

1
Cold War, culture and propaganda, 1953 to 1975

Pierre du Bois

In spite of the evolution of the international situation since 1953, East–West relations were still characterized in the ensuing decades by some of the elements inherited from the first years of the Cold War: an ideological struggle, secret war, an arms race and a climate of distrust. Culture and propaganda continued to play a very important role after 1953 in relations between the blocs despite efforts to bring the two closer together.

There was no real ideological disarmament between East and West during the period under consideration. This was particularly true of the U.S.S.R. and the other Eastern states, where the absolute priorities remained defending socialism and showing it off to the world. Both camps, and especially the Eastern one, tended to present reality in black and white and in the process, embellished the virtues of their own cause and discredited those of the adversary. On both sides, propaganda and cultural action were necessarily developed at two levels – inside and outside the camp. In both the United States and in the U.S.S.R., the propaganda apparatus was enormous and, consequently, very expensive.

In the Eastern camp, propaganda was a part of the system. Introduced at the very beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution, it represented a capital instrument of communist construction and expansion. In particular, it was embodied in the agitprop department of the Central Committee. Its importance was recognized as such by the communists. As the Kleines politisches Wörterbuch of 1967 had it, ‘It spreads the ideas of Marxism–Leninism in both oral and written form and is an integral component of the activity of communist and workers’ parties for the political-ideological education of party members and of all workers.’¹ Under the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, the whole camp was mobilized behind constant campaigns to defend its own cause and discredit that of the West. There was no place for cultural or intellectual freedom. Information and culture were strictly oriented and controlled. Even during détente, the ideological struggle remained essential to the cohesion of the camp. Soviet authorities continued to encourage the struggle for the victory of communist ideology in the world: ‘Our party has always affirmed that this fight must be offensive and not only defensive.’²

The propaganda apparatus was enormous, complex and widespread. Almost every country had its propaganda structure – and every Western communist party also had its own. In the U.S.S.R., the departments of the Central Committee were the drivers of the apparatus. The bureaucracy counted thousands of employees. Many other instruments, such as the media, publishing houses, Intourist, the Tass Agency and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, completed the structure. Abroad, the Friendship Associations aimed at reinforcing the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and foreign countries.

Many front organizations were also active on various levels in conformity with the directives coming from Moscow. These organizations included the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Council of Peace, the International Organization of Journalists, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Women’s International Democratic Federation and the International Federation of Democratic Lawyers – and this list is not exhaustive. The network also included Western media organizations, associations and movements subject to communist influence. Finally, there were the ‘agents d’influence’ who worked without raising any suspicions. Everything was coordinated and orchestrated at the highest level to avoid any discordant note. All means were used to lead the ideological battle, which continued until the late 1980s. The U.S.S.R. also attempted to influence Third World organizations. It supported indirectly the Organization for the Solidarity of Afro-Asia Peoples, which was launched in Conakry in 1960.

Media action was carried out via broadcasts in the main Western languages, plus broadcasts directed toward Third World. In 1956 and 1957, Radio Moscow was airing its programs for India in English, Urdu, Bengali and Hindi, its programs for Indonesia in both Indonesian and Cantonese. Radio Peace and Progress, Radio Erevan and other Soviet operations were also broadcasting in the same way. They were accompanied by the radio broadcasters in the satellite states. Moreover, there were operations led by some Western communist parties, including Radio Espana Independiente ‘La Pirenaica,’ which broadcast between 1941 and 1977, and two Portuguese examples, Radio Portugal Livre, transmitting from the Rumanian city of Timisoara since 1962 and Radio a Voz da Liberdade, the voice of the Frente patriotico de Liberaçao nacional, broadcasting from Algiers since 1964. There was the almost comic case of Radio Tirana, the voice of socialist Albania, whose tone and content reproduced the purest Stalinism.

Beside radio and, later, television networks, newspapers and journals represented another important part of the standard propaganda initiative. Naturally, the press addressed its own camp and also the Western community. It always followed the same scheme of embellishing the Eastern realities and tarnishing the Western ones. Launched in May 1956, Moscow News noted in 1973: ‘Our newspaper is making every effort to fully illustrate life in the Soviet state and the achievements of our brother countries which work in the united family of the federal republics.’³ The range of periodicals was impressive in terms of the number of publications in multiple domains as well as the languages in which they appeared. According to the Novosti Press Agency, more than 6,300 reviews and other periodicals were published in the U.S.S.R.⁴ The purpose was clear: ‘The objective of Soviet periodicals is to teach millions of people Marxism-Leninism, to tell the truth about life in the Soviet state, about its external policy of peace in conformity with the interests of progressive humanity.’⁵ Abroad, the main Soviet embassies had their own newspapers. In London, the press department of the Soviet Embassy published the Soviet News on an almost daily basis. Distributed by embassies, some periodicals were directly aimed at Easterners living in Western Europe and in America. In the satellite states, the range of periodicals translated into French, English and other languages was very broad. Enormous efforts were accomplished in multiple fields. Western intellectuals and academics were often invited to contribute. In the Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne, published in Warsaw, articles by historians Geoffrey Barraclough (British), Martin Broszat (German) and Georges Castellan (French) appeared regularly. A large number of Eastern reviews welcomed Western contributors who were not necessarily communists or fellow travelers.

Publication was one thing, distribution another. Where was it possible to find Soviet materials abroad? The network was essentially limited to the communist apparatus. It consisted of national distributors of books from Soviet Bloc countries – bookshops and agencies belonging to the U.S.S.R., the satellites and the local parties: in Vienna, Globus, Vertrieb ausländischer Zeitschriften, Das internationale Buch and Morawa and Co; in Brussels, the Librairie du Monde Entier; in Paris, the Globe and other bookshops owned by the communist party; in London, Collet’s Buildings Limited and Central Books Limited and in Rome, the Libreria Rinascita. These efforts reached mainly the militants in those societies rather than the ordinary reader. This was certainly one of the real limitations on these dramatic propaganda efforts, which lasted until the collapse of communism without very many changes.

Cultural action represented an important part of the propaganda, with press agencies and publishing houses contributing to cultural communication. Progress Publishers and Novosti Press Agency Publishing printed Russian books and brochures in multiple languages and, sometimes, texts of foreign authors which were in line with Soviet political and ideological expectations and standards. They also worked with Western publishing houses fostering the diffusion of Eastern literature and essays. Some apparently independent houses were clearly pipelines for Soviet influence abroad.

Film was also used to spread an embellished image of Eastern communism. Lenin once said that cinema was, for the Soviets, the most important of all the arts. As the Research and Reference Service of the United States Information Agency noted, movies constituted ‘a major propaganda vehicle’ for the bloc.⁶ In terms of efficiency, they built on the passion for cinema which existed in the U.S.S.R. and elsewhere. Less ideologically oriented, certain movies were not only domestic but international successes. Examples included ‘The Cranes are Flying’ (1957) by Mikhail Kalatozov, a love story set during World War II; ‘The Fate of a Man’ (1959), based on a Cholokhov story; ‘War and Peace’ (1968) by Sergei Bondarchuk and ‘Ballad of a Soldier’ (1959) by Grigori Chukhrai. Coproductions between the East and the West represented another dimension of Eastern cinematographic strategy. Asian and Western directors as well as actors had been working in Potsdam, Moscow and Leningrad since the 1950s.

In addition, there were international festivals and competitions aimed at depicting glowing images of the Eastern countries. Film festivals took place in Karlovy Vary, Moscow and Tashkent. There were also international festivals of modern music in Moscow, Warsaw and Bucharest. The programs and brochures of the festivals bore witness to the importance of ideology. An example from the Karlovy Vary festival reported in 1976: ‘Humanism, understanding between the peoples, peace – these are the ideas on which our festivals are based and everything which is part of their framework.’⁷ Sometimes, a motto signified the tone of the event. Since 1956, the Karlovy Vary festival was dedicated to ‘a generous relationship between men, for a sustainable friendship between the peoples.’ The organizers gave a ‘very precise ideological character’ to the film festivals of Karlovy Vary and Moscow, which took place in alternate years beginning in 1959.⁸

International music and ballet competitions, such as the Tchaikovsky in Moscow, attracted many young Western musicians and ballet dancers.⁹ The visits of Soviet musicians abroad constituted another way of demonstrating the merits of Soviet culture. In many Western capitals, the Soviet image was bolstered by artists like the violinists David Oistrakh and Leonid Kogan, the cellist Mstislav Rostropovitch, the pianists Emil Guilels and Sviatoslav Richter, as well as Soviet orchestras and ballets. In a different realm, there also had been successful tours of the Moisseiev dancers and the Red Army Chorus since the end of th...

Table of contents

• Cold War history series
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Background structural problems
• Part II The problems of the Eastern bloc
• Part III Tensions and recoveries in the Western alliance
• Part IV Security in Europe and the Helsinki process
• Index