The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics

Successes and Failures

Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Abel Polese

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN: 9780415580601
• eBook ISBN: 9781136951961
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Communism, Post-Communism & Socialism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

During the first decade of the 21st century, a remarkable phenomenon swept through the former Soviet Union changing the political, social and cultural landscape. Popularly known as the 'Colour Revolutions', these non-violent protests overthrew autocratic regimes in three post-soviet republics: the Georgian Rose Revolution (2003), the Ukrainian Orange Revolution (2004) and the Kyrgyzstani Tulip Revolution (2005). This book examines the significance of these regime-change processes for the post-soviet world in particular and for global politics in the 21st century.

Engaging comprehensively with the former Soviet republics, the contributors to this book ask why there wasn't a revolution in a post-Soviet republic such as Russia, despite apparently favourable conditions. They also explore the circumstances that ensured some post-soviet countries underwent a successful colour revolution whilst others did not. Identifying the conditions for successful colour revolutions, this book asks whether there is a revolutionary blueprint that may be exported to other areas around the world that are under autocratic rule. Carefully considering the ideologies of the post-Soviet ruling regimes, this book demonstrates the manner by which political elites integrated nationalism, authoritarianism and populism into public debates. It analyzes the diverse anti-regime movements, discussing the factors that led to the rise of such factions and outlining how these opposition groups were constituted and operated. In addition, it assesses the impact of external forces including the influence of the USA, the EU and Russia. By examining the colour revolution phenomenon in its entirety, this book marks a significant contribution to both our micro and macro understanding of this tide of transformation.

1
Introduction

What’s in a colour?

They wished to use the moment to stage an operation like a “colour revolution”. The events in Belgrade, Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev took place according to such a scenario.

Vladimir Voronin, President of Moldova, 14 April 2009

The end of authoritarian or totalitarian rule and democratization can take many different paths – the death of a dictator, a popular revolution or simply unexpected election results – and lead to a variety of different outcomes. One recent tendency has been the ousting of authoritarian leaders through what have been christened ‘colour revolutions’. The term ‘colour revolutions’ is used to describe as a single phenomenon a number of non- violent protests that succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes during the first decade of the twenty- first century. This has involved thousands of people, wearing coloured symbols, taking to the streets and showing their discontent with the current regime while the opposition, legitimated by such crowds, have been able to negotiate political change with the authorities. Geographically the term has tended to encompass only post- communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, though there is evidence that similar movements for change have been initiated in the Middle East (Lebanon, 2005) and Asia (Myanmar, 2007).

In recent years we have witnessed an increasing number of protest movements, often making use of non- violent techniques, which seek to challenge a political regime and its elite. The most recent events occurred in Iran in 2009 where, at the time of writing, the ruling class is still uncertain whether to re-open the universities, thus giving the students a way to gather informally, or exercise maximum control after controversial elections sparked street protests. Similar non- violent protest strategies had been used in Myanmar in 2007, with the monks marching in the street to protest against a largely unpopular regime. On a minor scale Malaysia has recently seen street protests challenging the government and protesters have supported democratic choices in Thailand several times since the 2006 coup d’état. Closer to the EU, a state of emergency, declared in 2008 when protesters mobilized against unfair presidential elections, left 10 dead in the Armenian capital of Yerevan, while neighbouring Georgia has experienced several election- related upheavals in recent years. More than the political results, it is important that we have witnessed an increasing use of non- violent techniques to challenge undemocratic governments all over the world. This might be correlated with the democracy promotion strategies of the US, and to a minor extent the EU, and the fact that bottom up approaches have assumed a major importance in contemporary politics (Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 2007, Tordjman 2008). However, this may also be due to structural factors (Skocpol 1979) and encouraged by a change in political opportunities, as Tarrow (2005) suggests.

Increasing foreign interest in domestic politics can certainly explain much, and insufficient international assistance has led a number of protest movements to fail, like those that challenged Azerbaijan’s 2005 parliamentary election results. Moreover, Western influences can be, and increasingly are, counterbalanced and where the EU or US try to gain influence they have often found themselves competing with Russia or China. But while external forces have a role, domestic forces, including the common people themselves, are more often decisive.

To establish the distant origins of this phenomenon conclusively is impracticable, for protests are as old as human history. Likewise, if we take non- violent strategies it would be difficult to agree on a starting point. Would it be fair to credit Gandhi for being the first to organize such massive strikes? Should we pay tribute to the nineteeth- century Irish Land League, whose innovative tactics of complete isolation towards Captain Boycott provided fresh ideas for social movements, not to mention a new word to many languages? Or should we go yet further back in time to ­Étienne de la Boétie’s observations in the sixteenth century on ‘voluntary servitude’. There are many precedents for the colour revolution phenomenon recorded in more recent years. Protests aimed at advancing peaceful democratic change were regularly registered in Soviet- dominated Eastern Europe. These took the form of anti- state worker revolts (East Germany in 1953, Poland in 1956 and 1970) or movements that included national communist leaders who favoured weakening domestic authoritarianism and foreign (i.e. Moscow) domination (Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968). The Polish Solidarność (Solidarity) movement, which grew out of the Gdańsk shipyards, broke new ground in the early 1980s, amassing 10 million members in a show of unity that forced the communist leadership to negotiate and offer reforms.

Attempts to emulate these successes in the USSR were met with determined resistance by the Kremlin. Through a number of daring and pioneering protests (of which the ‘Singing Revolution’ was the most innovative) the Baltic peoples broke new ground in the ‘science’ of peaceful anti- state protest. The most spectacular demonstration of collective will occurred on 23 August 1989 when 2 million people linked hands in a continuous chain from Vilnius in Lithuania through Latvia and on to the Estonian capital, Tallinn in what was known as the ‘Baltic Chain’. In 1990 a general strike, gathering workers and students in Kiev, Ukraine, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Masol.

Whatever moment we take as a starting point it is possible to remark that from the second half of the twentieth century, non-violent techniques have been honed and have started to be increasingly used. And while there is always the option of creating an alternative army, leading on occasion to a coup d’état, the strategy of pacific demonstration against ruling elites or political decisions daily gains new adherents.

While cognizant of similar events that have taken place elsewhere, it is noteworthy that in the past twenty years massive protests against undemocratic regimes have been carried out in most former communist bloc countries. Events in the Baltic States, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany from 1989 to1991 prompted scholars to revisit the meaning of the word ‘revolution’ (Bauman 1994) and to ask whether such events, leading to a political change, could be considered revolutions. Subsequently, during the 1990s, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, Croatia and Slovakia, to mention the most famous cases, brought forth the expression ‘electoral revolutions’ (Bunce and Wolchik 2006) for protests organized in the framework of elections.

The phenomenon drifted to neighbouring regions. After a revival in Serbia that ousted President Miloševi in 2000, an impressive number of former Soviet republics experienced, to different degrees, protests in the framework of elections. Exceptions include Turkmenistan, where no protests were recorded, Uzbekistan, where they were triggered by the jailing of popular businessmen, and Russia, where pacific protesters were prepared but never deployed. In some cases protests were attempted several times (like Belarus in 2001 and 2006). In others a similar strategy has been used to challenge administrations empowered by a colour revolution (Georgia 2007–8). Comparable attempts have been witnessed in several locations around the world, such as Lebanon in 2005 (the so- called ‘Cedar Revolution’), Nepal in 2006, Myanmar in 2007 or, more recently, Iran in 2009.

This book explores these new forms of protests, which, we suggest, seem to have much in common irrespective of their geographical and political diversity. They have all witnessed attempts to challenge political elites through mass protests, the use of non- violent protest strategies and unprecedented civil society activism. Similar strategies, however, have not produced uniform results. In some cases the protests have changed, in a short spell, the political history of the country (Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine for instance) in others they have combined dramatic but cosmetic changes at the top (Kyrgyzstan), whereas in yet other cases change has been negligible thus far, though protests may have laid the foundations for future change (Uzbekistan and Belarus).

The question that prompted us to work on this book might be posed thus: why has a protest strategy that has been successful in some cases failed in others despite sharing many common features? A thorough investigation requires us to engage with a set of questions regarding the nature of such demonstrations, the connection between protest movements in different countries, between external and internal actors and the relationship of citizens with state authorities in different social and political environments.

The limits of a book on colour revolutions

Given the variety of protests that emerged throughout the former socialist space, not to mention around the world, a book that tries to deal with all election- related rallies and demonstrations in recent years would require either an inordinate amount of time, pages, and authors or, in a desperate effort at synthesis, an unacceptably superficial focus on each country. In dealing with a methodological choice, we have opted for a qualitative approach which, whilst being open to challenge for not being representative of all relevant protest movements, allows us a deeper level of analysis. Devoting an entire chapter to each country has the advantage of allowing us to thoroughly investigate most of the possible factors that might influence the outcome of a protest process. It allows us to concentrate on the internal and international dimension of these protests, on the negotiation power enjoyed by government and opposition, and to catch the emotional dimension of relevant movements, for such acts may be considered moments of madness when people abandon daily preoccupations to follow a desire, an aspiration – something they would not do when thinking rationally (Thompson 2003).

With the aim of showing how analogous situations can lead to divergent outcomes, we have chosen to concentrate on a specific region, the former USSR, during a specific period for a number of reasons. First, the post- Soviet republics share common features sufficient to construct a good comparative study. After 1991 they all initiated a (usually cosmetic) democratization process with multi-party elections, while continuing an undemocratic, or only partially democratic, tradition, with curtailed liberties. Subjected to constant scrutiny and pressure from the international community, there were several Western attempts to increase democratic standards, through political dialogue and NGO assistance. They were also closely monitored by the Kremlin, which still claimed a special role in the affairs of its ‘near abroad’, and feared that a colour revolution virus might potentially contaminate the Russian body politic.

Another reason to concentrate on the post-Soviet region is the time framework. Since 1989 protests in Eastern Europe became increasingly frequent, but it is during the period 2003–6 that they reached an unprecedented regularity. In little more than three years a politically relevant protest was carried out at least once in most countries in the region. Given the frequency of the protests, their interconnection, and the fact that after 2004 even ruling autocratic regimes have tried to emulate colour revolution techniques to counterbalance the protests, we have chosen to make the turbulent years of 2003–6 the primary focus of this book.

Sticking to these criteria – limiting the analysis in time and space – has meant leaving out a number of interesting case studies. For one thing, the Baltic States were part of the USSR and might be considered relevant. However, these three republics experienced protests before the end of the USSR and were extremely keen to leave Moscow’s sphere of influence, prompting them to quickly implement a number of fundamental reforms. By the time of the Rose Revolution in 2003, the Baltic States were consolidated democracies on the cusp of EU membership, minimizing the possibility of similar protests there.

There is little doubt that the Baltic protests helped systematize a methodology of protests that future activists were to use. It helped them understand how to deal with Soviet- style structures, while minimizing the risk of street riots during non- violent protests, but, in our opinion, they are a precedent – an experience that suggested how to deal with similar cases – rather than early colour revolutions.

Another questionable choice is to start our examination with the Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003. A prototype of a colour revolution had already been unveiled to the world in 2000, when the ‘Bulldozer Revolution’ shook Serbia, changing its political fate and ousting Slobodan Miloševi, Serbia’s dominant political figure since 1989. Opposition victories in the 1996 municipal elections, which Miloševi only recognized after three months of wrangling, had provided anti- Miloševi parties access to institutional resources vital to mobilizing the population. For the 2000 election, the opposition rallied behind the popular Vojislav Koštunica and vigilant election monitoring and exit polling suggested that he had taken more than half of the vote in a five- man race. When official results did not tally, ten days of protests followed. These included a general strike and reached a crescendo on 5 October, when hundreds of thousands of people converged on Belgrade to join existing demonstrations. Activists broke into and occupied the federal parliament and state television station, while the police withdrew and the Yugoslav army stayed in barracks. Bowing to the inevitable, Miloševi resigned on 6 October and Koštunica was sworn in as President the following day.

Since then, Serbian activists have been invited to lead training in non- violent resistance in many other countries. Belgrade now hosts the Centre for Applied Non- Violent Action and Strategies, whose tasks include explaining and training how to ‘make a revolution’ and whose activists have been declared persona non grata in several countries threatened by a colour revolution (Krivokapic 2005). The Serbian Bulldozer Revolution was not, however, the first time an ‘electoral revolution’ strategy was used, only the first time that it led to mass protests. Bunce and Wolchik (2007) report at least four other cases that helped to perfect this strategy: Serbia in 1996–97, Romania in 1996, Bulgaria in 1997, and Slovakia in 1998. Although all four cases are noteworthy, it is the latter one that has most relevance for our analysis of protests movements. In Slovakia, parliamentary elections in 1998 were seen as the last chance to regain international credibility. Though political activism in Slovakia was low during the 1990s, the NGO sector had thrived since independence and in February 1998, 35 NGOs initiated Civic Campaign ’98 (Obianska kampaň OK ’98) for free and fair elections. The campaign estimated that the incumbent Prime Minister, Vladimír Meiar, was highly unpopular but that only a massive turnout would succeed in giving victory to the opposition and thus actively sought to mobilize the largely untapped reservoir of youthful opposition to the government. In 1994 less than 25 per cent of eligible young voters had participated in elections and in 1998 young and first- time voters were a potentially powerful oppositional force. The anti- Meiar campaign was based on monitoring government activities and the election itself, and an aggressive information campaign. Amongst the activities organized to increase awareness was a fourteen- day march, live performances and public meetings. In major cities national artists emphasized the importance of electoral participation and delivered their message at numerous rock concerts, while an election bus visited 17 cities in September 1998 to promote the value of voting. As a result of these myriad activities, 84 per cent of voters went to the polls (the 1994 elections had seen a 75.65 per cent turnout) and Meiar was replaced by Mikuláš Dzurinda, leader of the Slovak Democratic Coalition. In atte...

Table of contents

• Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• Foreword
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Georgia
• 3 Ukraine
• 4 Kyrgyzstan
• 5 Moldova
• 6 Armenia
• 7 Azerbaijan
• 8 Belarus
• 9 Russia
• 10 Uzbekistan
• 11 Tajikistan1
• 12 Kazakhstan
• 13 Turkmenistan
• Conclusion
• Index