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Modernization, Social Theory, and the Duality of âUs-and-Themâ
INTRODUCTION
The term âmodernâ is one of the most discussed concepts in the social sciences. Modern, modernity, and modernization are interrelated concepts by which social scientists have tried to refer to an epochal change in human history. Despite some disagreements about the origins and the starting point of the âmodern time,â it seems that there is a common understanding of the European origin of modernity. In almost all cases, the modern is coupled with the emergence and development of the capitalist system that changed the history of human beings (Marx, 1954, 1956). The rapid spread of the modern capitalist system all over the world, has drawn together all regions and countries within a world capitalist system (Wallerstein, 1974).
Modernity is, however, not considered as a merely economic transformation, but also as a revolutionary process that has changed societies and cultures in a global arena (Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1990; Eisenstadt, 1966; Featherstone, 1995). The transformation process from premodern societies to modern ones that came to be called modernization, also entailed disruptions in established social institutions, the disintegration of society, wars over nation borders, internal and external migration, and social movements and revolutions. The chaotic situation in many European countries forced the elites to take action in newly organising their national societies. Although modernization created new problems, it also had the capacity to generate solutions to modern problems (Eisenstadt, 1987a, 1999). The modern disintegration of societies generated new ideas about how to create new forms of integration.
Social scientists tried to provide theoretically rigorous models for understanding the new revolutionary system, the modernity. Among these were the classics, such as Spencer, Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, who developed âmeta narrativesâ for understanding the modern society in order to launch new ideas about the reorganization of new societies. Social scientists situated the modern society in a contradictory relation to premodern ones. The modern stood in contrast to the traditional. All over the world, social theory came to be dominated by a systematic dualism between contrary poles. Theoretical divisions such as traditional/modern, mechanical/organic, gemeinschaft/gesellschaft, and Occident/Orient held sway over classical sociology for a very long time (Kamali, 2006c). Many metanarratives, or to use Agnes Hellerâs comprehensive concept, âmaster narratives,â were attempts to theoretically bring order to a world mostly characterized by a constant move towards disorder.1
Social theory and its founding fathers did not enjoy an âobjectiveâ existence in a value-free âscientific world,â but were part of a changing process where the European powers were engaged in colonial wars and occupations. These wars and occupations were legitimized by a systematic inferiorization of colonized people. This was coupled with the presentation of âUsâ as superiors to âthem.â It was not only political and economic elites that saw themselves as superior to âthem,â but also social scientists who considered Europe to be unique in the world and âthe pearl of the globe,â in the words of Paul Valery:
Such perspectives on history and the place of âEuropeâ and âEuropean civilizationâ in it are strongly shaped by 19th century views. âThis was the formative period of disciplines such as archaeology, art history, philology, sociology and anthropology, as well as the gestation period of European narcissism and imperialismâ (Pieterse, 1994, p. 129). Social theory came to be dominated by efforts to explain the uniqueness of the âwest.â
THE UNIQUENESS OF THE âWESTâ (US)
Uniqueness theory was formulated by Max Weber who tried to generate a theory for the economic development of Europe. He believed that the modern capitalist system could develop only in western Europe. Christian and Protestant Europe had the cultural and religious ground for the development of capitalism as a victorious and modern system that gave European powers their superiority and victories in the world (see Weber, 1978, 1992).
Weber claims that Christianity through Reformation could create favourable conditions for the development of capitalism in the âwestâ in contrast to (amongst others) Islam. He means that: âThe character of the Calvinist church differs from that of all other churches, Catholic, Lutheran, and Islamicâ (1978, p. 1198). Firstly, Weber makes a fundamental mistake when he states that there are âchurchesâ in Islam. Islamic mosques cannot be called churches; there are decisive differences. The mosques have no hierarchical organizations such as those of churches. Secondly, Islam is not a homogenous religion that can be compared with different Christian churches and sects. Islam, as with many other religions, has different branches such Shiâism and Sunnism, not to mention various branches of the two mentioned major branches and Sufism. Thirdly, Islam, as an urban and bazari religion, has always been very positively orientated towards capitalist production and market rules.
Weber claims that it is only in Christianity (Calvinism) that making profits were a sign that âGodâs blessing rests on the enterprise:
This indicates that Weber, in his theoretical constructions of a âwestern explanationâ of capitalist development in Europe, ignores the fact that the same definition of religious belief and capitalist activities could also be valid for bazari merchants and craftsmen in Islamic cities (Kamali, 1998; Arjomand, 1984; Algar, 1969). The wealth of bazaris was a sign of the merchantâs sincere businesses, which is prized by God.
Weberâs discussion of Islam is not scientific nor is it based on fact, but rather is a result of his aim to theorize âdifferencesâ between âwestern Christianityâ and Islam as an eastern religion. He calls Islam âa religion of warriorsâ (see Turner, 1974).
Weber, in coordination with the established Orientalist discourse of the 19th and early 20th centuries, created the concept of âSultanismâ as an Islamic state formation that was a hindrance for democratic development in the âeast.â Weber wrote about the Ottoman Empire without real knowledge and research of the Ottoman governance. He claimed that no independent institution or organ could develop in the Empire because of the absolute power of the sultan. This proved to be a wrong assumption, even during the lifetime of Weber. The researcher who had adequate knowledge about the Ottoman Empire and its governance at the early 20th century was Albert Lybyer who wrote his classical work, The Governance of the Ottoman Empire in 1913. He illustrated that although the sultan had a relatively substantial influence over the Ottoman Empire, the exaggeration of this power is misleading. Several sultans have been removed from the throne by other governmental and even civil institutions. This means that the Weberian and Orientalist concept of absolutism cannot be used fairly for governance in Muslim countries, such as the Ottoman and Persian empires. I have also shown elsewhere that the sultan, as the sovereign exerted power, in many cases did make the important decisions in matters significant for the continuation of the Empireâs existence; but the sultanâs freedom in making such decisions was limited by other influential groups of the ruling strata and groups in civil society (Kamali, 2006c).
Weberâs discussions on Islam and Christianity can be counted among those social scientistsâ efforts that, consciously or unconsciously, âotherizeâ non-European countries and people. This is clear in many of his generalizations about the âOrientâ and the âOriental church,â in comparison to his writings on the âOccidental churchâ and âOccidental cultureâ that are considered unique in the world. He means that the ârationalization of hierocratic dominationâ is very âwesternâ and has to do with a âwestern traditionâ originating from âancient Roman traditionsâ that helped develop capitalism:
This is a fallacy that occurs in Weberâs work and in many other classical sociological texts. As is now known, science and jurisprudence were much more developed in Islamic empires than in Europe during the medieval period (Saliba, 2007; Huff, 2003; Turner, 1997; Sardar, 1984).
Even in matters of political thought and political science, Islamic scholars were engaged in much more developed discussions and research concerning governance than in Europe (Corne, 2004; Hoexter, Eisenstadt, & Levtzion, 2002; Kamali, 2001, 1998). Social sciences in Islamic empire in the medieval period had more favourable circumstances to flourish than in Christian Europe. The sociological works of Ibn Khaldun is just one example.
The recent research on the Islamic history of Muslim empires and countries shows that even Weberâs assumption of relation between hierocracy and state in Muslim countries and Europe is another example of constructing discursive differences between Europe and Islamic countries. He claims that:
It is known that after the death of the Prophet in 1632 AD, the matter of government led to internal conflicts and division among Muslims. Some groups of Muslims such as Shiâis were moved to the civic sphere of society and created opposition to the state. The tension between Shiâis and Sunnis was just one tension between the political leaders of the Islamic Arabic empire and other Muslim groups. Since the 11th century, and the creation of many local Caliphs (such as that of Spain, Damascus, and Baghdad), tensions emerged between the political and the religious leader, the ulama. This became even more evident in the Islamic Ottoman Empire and Shiâi Persian Empire since the reign of Safavids (1501â1722). The Islamic civil society has from very early Islamic reign âlived in a state of tension with the political power and constituted its major restraint,â to use the words of Weber (Kamali, 1998, 2001, 2006c; Arjomand, 1984). Weberâs claim and generalization is a clear example of the otherization of Muslims and indeed many other groups, such as the Chinese and Indians.
Weberâs historiography and sociology suffers from a Eurocentric bias, which is common for many social scientists writing in the 19th and early 20th centuries. If any contribution of the âOthersâ to the âEuropean civilizationâ was acknowledged, it was in relation to European themes, as in âJudeao-Christian civilization,â or circumscribed and white-washed, as in the âAryan modelâ of history, in which everything paled into significance next to the creativity and drive of the âNordic racesâ (Pieterse, 1994).
Another social scientist who very clearly declared the superiority of Europeans to all other people (who he referred to as âracesâ), is Herbert Spencer. He writes consequently about âwild and uncultivated racesâ and âcivilized racesâ (Spencer, 1878). He makes the âdifferencesâ between âracesâ appear natural and biological:
Europeans are considered by Spencer as a biological category, because of the differences in climate and other âcircumstances,â different from âall other races.â
Spencer was highly influenced by a social Darwinist perspective to the âevolutionâ of human societies. He, in his work, A System of Synthetic Philosophy (1862), constitutes a range of distinctions between âthe civilizedâ societies (that interchanges often with Europeans) and uncivilized people and societies. The civilized people, in every aspect, are situated at a higher end of the range than are the uncivilized people, according to Spencer. His social Darwinism had no limits, and he went as far as to propagate the use of deadly force in âcivilisingâ the âuncivilizedâ people. Inspired by Charles Darwinâs evolution theory, he believed that the âuncivilizedâ will either disappear or follow the European example and become civilized. This is evident from his early publications such as Social Statica (1851) and A Theory of Population (1852) and Progress: Its Law and Cause (1857). He believed that modernization, and modernising forces (who he believed were Europeans), will eliminate those sectors of humanity that stands in its way. In other words, all humans and natural hindrances to modernization and civilization will be removed by Europeans (see also Lindqvist, 1992).
Bound with the deterministic understanding of Darwinist evolution theory, Spencer concluded that there are even psychologically determined differences between different âracesâ (Richards, 1997). Spencer is considered to be one of the major scientists who provided the theoretical and scientific basis for âscientific racismâ (Richards, 1997). Spencer, like Weber, believed in the uniqueness of Europeans, and upheld a notion of Europe as the sole site of rationality, reason, development, modernity, and civilization. All other people of the world were considered to exist somewhere long âbehindâ Europe. They were to subordinate themselves to the European civilization and follow its example in order to adapt themselves to civilization and leave their uncivilized lives.
Many classical social theorists (including Marx, Weber, Spencer, Locke, and Durkheim), believed strongly in the uniqueness of the âwestâ that...