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Imperialism, Race, and Genocide at the Paulskirche
Origins, Meanings, Trajectories
Brian Vick
It might at first seem strange to find an essay on the Frankfurt National Parliament and the 1848 Revolution in a volume on German colonialism, as indeed, for obvious reasons, most histories of German imperialism and colonialism begin in about 1880, or perhaps the late 1870s, at about the same time as the rise of racist doctrines, and at least a couple of decades before the first episodes of modern genocide. Some scholars, however, have attempted to trace the history, or pre-history, of German imperialist thinking back into the early decades of the nineteenth century, and the present discussion is at least in part intended as a contribution to that literature. The 1848 Revolution and, even more particularly, the Frankfurt National Assembly have in this context been seen as the abortive âmoment of birth of German imperialismâ (in Hermann Hieryâs phrase), when plans for extensive expansionist policies overseas and for handling the problem of German mass emigration were for the first time loudly and seriously canvassed in a political setting, if without concrete results. Hans Fenske has even gone so far as to suggest that, had the Frankfurt liberals remained in power at the head of a united German nation state, they would have pursued an imperialist and colonialist course that might have triggered the competitive imperialist land-grab of the 1880s decades earlier.1
In what follows, I hope to offer a somewhat more nuanced view of these empire-related debates in Frankfurt in 1848 and at the same time to illuminate the intellectual and cultural background to the emergent discourses of race and of racial conflictâeven of genocideâin the German-speaking world. As we shall see, the two areas of focus were intimately related, and often not in the ways one might have expected. The pursuit of empire, and the potential sites of racial conflict, ultimately drew the attention of Frankfurt delegates much more to the east and southeast along the Danube than they did to the farther-flung reaches of the globe or to those who lived there. The Frankfurt delegates applied racialist rhetoric above all to the Slavic-speaking peoples, in fearful expectation of some kind of âRaçenkriegâ, or race-war, and in chauvinist hopes of imperial Germanic expansion to the East. Imperialist dreams of world power were therefore certainly present at the Paulskirche, as, too, were early iterations of racist civilizing missions or radical ethnic conflict, yet they tended to play out within older conceptions of empire and German supremacy of the Mitteleuropa sort, rather than in the framework of overseas possessions.
In the English-speaking world, the semantic and etymological connection between the terms imperialism and empire seems clear enoughâperhaps too much so, even confusingly so, to the extent that imperialism and empire simply seem to go together, with the pursuit of empire entailing the pursuit of imperialist goals, including the projection of power overseas and the acquisition of formal or informal overseas colonies and possessions as a part of the enterprise. In the German context, however, the connections between the notions of Reich and of Imperialismus, while still potentially present, are by no means necessarily so close. Indeed, for Hiery, the problem is rather to explain how, when nineteenth-century nationalists came to revive the Reich ideal in the decades after 1815, they managed to do so in ways that incorporated overseas imperialist visions that had never been prominent in the old Holy Roman Empire, yet without becoming wholly unfaithful to that older model.2
There is, however, both somewhat more and somewhat less to explain about the nature of âReich-ismâ and imperialism in Germany in the decades before 1850. The term empire carries connotations of autonomy, self-assertion, and to an extent also of power; the notion of âReichâ does, too, as well as triggering reminiscences of ostensible German medieval splendor.3 In his analysis of German imperialism before 1866, Hans Fenske highlights three main motives or lines of argumentation behind German imperialist or colonialist desires in this period, the first having to do with matters of nationalist prestige and medieval imperial memory, the second with considerations of world power and Realpolitik, and the third with problems of society and economy, particularly overseas trade and mass emigration. Of these, Fenske thought the second probably the most important.4 Each theme can be found in abundance in the Frankfurt debates, but without adding up to a recipe for overseas expansion. Showing the flag, defending the rights of Germans abroad, and securing favorable trading concessions were all part of the program, but desires for the acquisition of colonies were much less clear, or at least less vocal.
From the literature on the pre-history of German imperialist ideologies, one would think that there were, to quote WoodruffSmith, âextensive debates about emigration and colonialism at Frankfurt in 1848.â Smith also asserts that âcolonial expansion became in 1848 part of a rather violent and multifaceted formal imperialism that caught hold of the imagination of nationalist liberalsâ; and he is not alone in this view, as Winfried Speitkampâs recent survey history Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte attests, or for that matter the studies of Fenske and Hiery.5 But this was not really the case. There were significant if brief discussions about the construction of a German navy, and about the problem of Auswanderung or mass emigration that had grown so desperate by the âHungry Forties,â but not about colonies as such. These two strands of discussion did provide the evidence usually cited in support of the idea that imperial expansion was high on the Frankfurt agenda, but in each case adumbration of colonial acquisitions was relatively by-the-by, and when the issue was raised, it was more likely to involve the German drive into Southeast Europe than the possibility of German possessions in the Americas, Africa or the Pacific.
When the question of the German fleet came up on 8 June 1848, the rapporteur for the newly established Naval Committee, the conservative Prussian general Joseph von Radowitz, did raise the more far-reaching function of a German navy in the projection of power overseas. âThe first German warship,â he declaimed, âwhich appears, and lays to before the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, will show the numerous Germans living there that they no longer depend exclusively upon the arbitrary whim of a tyrant, but that rather a people of forty million souls stands behind them.â Radowitzâs rhetorical flourish earned him a âlong-lasting bravoâ indicative of the similar sentiments of most other delegates. But, while his statement showed the intent to maintain connections and even a certain national feeling among Germans abroad, he did not actually mention colonies as a part of the plan.6 Of the speakers in this matter when the report came up for debate on 14 June, in fact only one, the Prussian law professor Johann Ludwig Tellkampf, brought up the colonial question, noting rather in passing among his list of benefits that would follow in the wake of a German navy that a fleet was necessary âfor the acquisition and maintenance of a colony.â That was all he had to say on the matter, seeming more intrigued by the possible role of a strong navy in keeping a nation âyoung and powerful,â and in supporting its progress in civilization and its liberal-democratic institutions. The other directly imperialist function of a fleet in Tellkampfâs speech had more to do with commerce, as he observed that a strong naval presence made it easier to secure favorable trading contracts, as the United States had been able to do in China.7
In general during the fleet debate, it was trade and national prestige rather than colonization or settlement that provided the areas of strongest rhetorical consensus; on the whole, this was still an informal type of imperialism. Beyond that, it was, of course, the matter of national defense and the immediate defeat of the minor naval power Denmark in the on-going war over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein that figured as the prime concern. Some attention was already given to Great Britain as a potential opponent (hence the desire to learn from the United States about how to compete with the British upon the seas), but most delegates followed the line of the Naval Committee in pushing such plans into a later stage of naval development, and concentrating upon smaller ships rather than ships of the line in the nearer future.
Similarly, in the debate of March 1849 over the proposed law to regulate emigration, the matter of colonies and imperialist rhetoric generally came up rather less than one might imagine given the portrayal of the Frankfurt Parliament in the literature. The Economics Committee, in charge of drafting the law in this instance, instead emphasized that âthe question of colonizationâ would have to wait for another occasion, and that even the issue of how to support emigrants in their new lands would be excluded from the provisions of the present law. The committee also made it clear that, while they had no intention of attempting to restrict emigration to the Americas, they in theory found it preferable that the wave of Auswanderung should travel east and southeast rather than overseas. Until such time as migration could be conscientiously promoted in that direction, however, they simply had to do what they could to cope with the existing problem, namely, improving the lot of those seeking passage across the Atlantic. The committee report did claim that they hoped to bolster the feeling of German nationality among emigrants as a means of maintaining connections with them in future, and profiting from it. Their primary concern was therefore to ensure
Other accounts of early German imperialism do acknowledge that demands and desires sometimes stopped short of full legal colonization, instead positing autonomous or semi-autonomous areas of contiguous, consciously and nationally German settlement with continued ties to the homeland.9 The kind of connections envisioned in the Frankfurt committee report, however, seem to fall short even of such a notion of Ersatz-colonies.
Several speakers criticized the lack of provision for colonization in the draft of the Auswanderungsgesetz, but primarily with an eye to the East. The Jewish-born Johann Jacob Herz of Vienna, for example, referred to migration along the Danube as âthe highest task of German culture,â and did not in any case think it likely that the German element in North America would have much chance of influence in face of the predominant English-speaking population there. In this emphasis on southeastern migration, Herz was joined by the Freiburg professor and Catholic spokesman Franz BuĂ, who was also noted for his related concern with the âSocial Questionâ and pauperism.10 Even the Gymnasium professor Friedrich Schulz of Weilburg, often rightly cited as among the principal agitators for colonial expansion both in the period generally and at the Paulskirche, while still raising the possibility of active German settlements in the United States and even of a German possession in western North America, made it equally clear that the preferred solution was colonization in southeastern Europe. His speech in this debate produced the oft-quoted line, âThere on our borders is our Texas, our Mexico.â For that reason, Schulz wanted the new Reich Emigration Office to work with the Austrian government to establish âa regulated colonization system for the lands of the Danube.â âThe old German oak,â Schulz thought, âis still putting forth fresh branches and leaves.â The implication of such organicist imagery here clearly seemed to be that planting new German trees elsewhere in the world was less necessary. Moreover, though adverting to the possibility of settlements or colonies of some kind in North America, even Schulz expected a considerable degree of assimilation among German immigrants in America, short of completely forgetting their homeland and mother tongue. In this, he shared the attitudes of the Prussian Party leaders Heinrich von Gagern and Friedrich ...
