Religion, Politics and Gender in Indonesia

Disputing the Muslim Body

Sonja van Wichelen

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2010
• eBook ISBN: 9781136963865
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The political downfall of the Suharto administration in 1998 marked the end of the "New Order" in Indonesia, a period characterized by 32 years of authoritarian rule. It opened the way for democracy, but also for the proliferation of political Islam, which the New Order had discouraged or banned. Many of the issues raised by Muslim groups concerned matters pertaining to gender and the body. They triggered heated debates about women's rights, female political participation, sexuality, pornography, veiling, and polygamy.

The author argues that public debates on Islam and Gender in contemporary Indonesia only partially concern religion, and more often refer to shifting moral conceptions of the masculine and feminine body in its intersection with new class dynamics, national identity, and global consumerism. By approaching the contentious debates from a cultural sociological perspective, the book links the theoretical domains of body politics, the mediated public sphere, and citizenship. Placing the issue of gender and Islam in the context of Indonesia, the biggest Muslim-majority country in the world, this book is an important contribution to the existing literature on the topic. As such, it will be of great interest to scholars of anthropology, sociology, and gender studies.

1
Muslim politics and democratization

The political transition from 1998 to 2004 witnessed a “tandem practice” of Islamization and democratization. The demise of Suharto’s regime brought about democratic change and allowed for a politicization of religion in public life. It marked a new situation that slowly broke with the New Order’s avoidance of identity politics. Issues concerning ethnicity, race and religion were now permitted to be discussed, disputed and contested openly. In this climate, not only Islamists but also feminists took the opportunity to join political debates and to struggle for political recognition.

A tandem practice does not imply that processes of Islamization and democratization work in the same manner. Analytically we can say that they operate in much the same way. While Islamization refers to processes in which citizens increasingly appeal to Islamic virtues, Muslim symbols and Muslim (life)styles, democratization refers to processes in which citizens increasingly adhere to civic virtues, democratic deliberation and pluralist values. Empirically, however, these distinct characteristics are mutually constitutive in Indonesia. Although democratization and Islamization are distinct discursive processes, this does not mean that they are opposing forces. Democratization does not equate with “secular” nor does Islamization necessarily have to equate with “religious.” As democratization in Indonesia is deeply intertwined with Islam and Muslim politics, so too is Islamization profoundly entangled with democratic politicking. The case of Indonesia also shows that these processes do not necessarily follow a progressive line. The fact that expressions of piety are increasing in the public sphere does not automatically imply that political Islam is getting stronger in the political domain.

This chapter maps out the contextual backdrop to the study as a whole and sketches the conditions and circumstances through which the empirical cases of the respective chapters can be set against: how did the Islamic resurgence take place? What were the social and political conditions in which this occurred? What is the impact of the new democratic system in particular and of democratization in general? How do issues of class and culture configure in this dynamic? I emphasize the centrality of gender and sexuality. While the new democracy opened a space for women activists to organize and to be active in the public sphere, issues of gender and sexuality were more openly discussed. Women’s groups actively resisted measures by Islamist and other groups that were deemed sexist and discriminatory. Sketching out different trajectories of Indonesian feminism – influenced by nationalism, democratic processes, global feminism and Islam – I position them in the dynamic of the more recent past.

Unpacking “Indonesian Islam”

Indonesia is the biggest Muslim majority country in the world. In fact, more Muslims live in the Indonesian archipelago than in the combined countries of the Middle East.¹ Most studies on contemporary Islam, however, have ignored their Southeast Asian counterpart. This is likely the case because Western observers have regarded Indonesian Islam as an “Islam with a smiling face” – emphasizing its relative “unproblematic” and “harmless” qualities in contrast to, for instance, Middle Eastern Islam (Azra 2005: 10). It was not until the past decade that academic interest in Islam and Muslim politics in Indonesia increased, which may be explained by a global concern with the rise of a conservative Islamism throughout the Muslim and Western world. While some scholars issue warnings that radical Islamist groups might overtake the more moderate mainstream in Indonesian society, others insist that the Indonesian case proves otherwise, namely that Indonesian Islam remains coupled with democracy, modernity and pluralism.

Indeed Indonesian Islam has a reputation for being a “moderate” form of Islam. It is considered heterogeneous, tolerant and inclusive, compatible with constitutional democracy and seeking to accommodate hundreds of different local cultures. This reputation owes much to the status of traditionalist and modernist Islam that have constituted the Islamic mainstream. Much of the academic literature on Islam in Indonesia have focused on this mainstream form of Islam in Indonesia: in relation to the traditionalist framework (Ramage 1995; Barton and Fealy 1996; Kadir 2000; Meuleman 2001), the modernist framework (Federspiel 1970; Peacock 1978; Van Doorn-Harder 2006), the mainstream’s relation to the state and law (Bowen 2001, 2003; Effendy 2003), the place of Indonesian Islam in colonialism and orientalism (Baso 2005), its connection to global genealogies and discourses (Van Bruinessen 1999; Azra 2002), and finally, Islam’s entanglement with civil society and democratization (Hefner 2000). These studies demonstrated that traditionalist and modernist Islam occupied the mainstream and that they continue to do so today.

While early influence for traditionalists came from nineteenth century Mecca and Medina, modernists were directly influenced by reformist tendencies from emerging twentieth century Cairo (Azra 2002: 31–32). In Indonesia, they find their respective homes in the two grassroots and mass-based organizations of the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama.

The modernist mass organization Muhammadiyah was established in 1912, and its goal was to reform Indonesian Islam through the central doctrines of mainstream Sunni Islam. They opposed cultural appropriations or hybridizations of culture within Islamic thought. Here, modernists refer to a syncretism in Islam as, for example, observed by Clifford Geertz in Javanese Islam, involving the influence of Hindu–Buddhist (for the urban upper class) or Animist (for the rural poor) elements. The Muhammadiyah, therefore, endeavored to purify Indonesian Islam by strictly adhering to the Qur’an and the sunnah, that is, the traditions of the prophet Muhammad. Muhammadiyah emphasized the importance of technological development and the value of scientific work.²

Traditionalists, subsequently, were worried that modernists would override the extensive long-standing, regionally specific Islamic traditions in the Indonesian archipelago. From the outset of their establishment in 1926, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama acknowledge a secular political approach, and since independence they have stressed their belief and loyalty to the national constitution pancasila. In defense of distinctly Indonesian traditions of Islam, traditionalists believed that the practice of Islam is directly influenced by the cultural diversity of Indonesia. These traditions included, for instance, the belief in the nine saints (walisongo) and the honoring of the dead, which coincided with mystical rituals and beliefs endemic in the archipelago.³

To understand Indonesian Islam is to focus on Islamic education, which started with Islamic boarding schools known as pesantren in the nineteenth century. Pesantren were central to the dissemination of Islamic knowledge throughout the country. Here, Muslim boys and girls were taught to unite religious thought with national and cultural knowledge and ideas. Besides traditionalist influences, it included modernist and reformist education. This extended from the mainstream Muhammadiyah to the smaller but still influential Persatuan Islam (persis) and Al-Irsyad.⁴ But the modernists also established their own network of schools called madrasah, which combined religious teaching with modern educational methods.

According to a survey published in the prominent weekly journal Tempo, 42 percent of Indonesia’s Muslim population of over 200 million aligned themselves with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) traditions and twelve percent with Muhammadiyah traditions. (Tempo 29 December 2001, quoted in Fox 2004). Both modernists as traditionalists have conservative and more liberal factions, but in general they can be labeled as “moderate.” With moderate, most scholars agree that the label entails a reasonable commitment toward religious tolerance, pluralism and gender equality. Both traditionalist and modernist organizations have shown their dedication to these inclusive and tolerant ideas. The structure of these mainstream organizations echoes the system of “pillarization,” a sociocultural structure, conceptualized as aliran by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1976), that Indonesia inherited from the Dutch.⁵ This system implied that the different religious groups provided separate sociocultural organizations and media for their members: religious activities, sports, student movement, political affiliation and cultural membership. However, the Islamic revitalization since the 1970s and the new configurations of Muslim groups since the fall of Suharto have destabilized these mainstream pillars of traditionalist and modernist Islam. Muslims from both groups have joined moderate Islamist movements, militant Islamist groups or progressive Muslim organizations.

Fluidity of Islamist movements

Islamism has often been conflated with fundamentalism or radicalism. Instead of approaching Islamism as a static entity, it is important to place the movement in its dynamic historical and cultural context. In so doing, it becomes apparent how internally fragmented and fluid these groups are (Bayat 2005: 901). This is also the case in Indonesia. Following Göle, I define Islamism as a social movement “through which Muslim identity is collectively reappropriated as a basis for an alternative social and political project” (Göle 2002: 173). Four strands can be distinguished: the Tarbiyah movement, regimist Islam, global splinter groups and the Neo-Salafy groups.

In the 1970s, the Tarbiyah (education) or Dakwah (propagation or proselytization) movement emerged on university campuses all over Indonesian urban centers against the background of the Iranian revolution and often translated in resistance to Suharto’s repressive anti-Islamic measures.⁶ Rather than focusing on political power, they worked toward propagation from below.⁷ Followers of the movement consisted mostly of students who were recruited from campuses all over Indonesia and appealed particularly to men and women from the educated urban (lower) middle class. In the wake of Suharto’s resignation, the Tarbiyah movement established the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI). This student organization embodied elements of Islamism as found in the Muslim brotherhood. Shortly after the fall of Suharto, this same movement established the political party called the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan or PK), which since 2003 was reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS).

Many observers were suspicious of the Tarbiyah movement and their associated student and political organization, conflating it with a militant Islamism that was not compatible with democracy. More accurately, however, both KAMMI and PKS can be seen as symbolizing a new generation of (young) Muslims who promote “an uncompromising purification of Islamic belief and strict adherence to religious morals, while simultaneously pushing for political modernization” (Miichi 2003: 22). The KAMMI joined the secular prodemocracy movement in 1998 to overthrow Suharto. Together with the Prosperous Justice Party, they are renowned for their well-organized and disciplined demonstrations, where great masses of men and women assemble to convey their views. These demonstrations were always peaceful and communicated to the public an ethical or moral force (Kraince 2000).

Although the Justice Party scored poorly during the 1999 elections, in the 2004 elections, they came out as the biggest party in Jakarta, which confirms an increasing popularity. With their slogan “clean and caring” (bersih dan peduli), the Prosperous Justice Party distinguished itself from other parties by appealing to the complete and radical elimination of corruption, collusion and nepotism. Since their victory in Jakarta, party members stated that their aim was not the establishment of Islamic law (shariah) as such but to challenge and Islamize Indonesia within the context of multireligious and multicultural Indonesian society. According to the party’s leader, Hidayat Nur Wahid, the Prosperous Justice Party aspires to be a centrist party following the logics of democracy (Collins 2003: 17).⁸ These new political positions seemed to alleviate the concern that existed among some political observers, journalists and activists.

This is different for the groups attached to what Hefner terms “regimist Islam,” better known in Indonesia as the (new) Masyumi. In the colonial past, the Masyumi party was a relatively moderate party consisting of a diverse group of Muslims that worked together to counter the Dutch colonial occupier. Sukarno’s Old Order, however, with its flirtations with communism, eventually banned the party and jailed its leaders for fear of political Islam reaching too close to the seats of power. Although it released their leaders, Suharto’s New Order did not allow the reestablishment of the party. Instead, like the Mosque movement, the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (DDII) was formed with the goal of Islamizing Indonesian society from the ground up through Islamic propagation (dakwah) (Collins 2003: 5). By that time, partly as a result of many forms of repression, moderate voices within the former Masyumi were cleared away while conservatism dominated (Hefner 2002: 757). This is especially evident in their conservative and widely read daily newspaper Media Dakwah.⁹

Aligned to DDII is the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World (Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam or KISDI), an ultraconservative group belonging to the militant wing of DDII. When KAMMI students joined the prodemocracy movement, the DDII and the KISDI supported Suharto and the New Order (Collins 2003: 14). Their associated political party, the Crescent Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB), fully integrated into the New Order system and enjoyed the patronage of the regime. KISDI supporters included members of the Interuniversity Muslim Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus or HAMMAS) and were radical in street politics. In June 2000, for instance, this group joined in an attack on the National Commission of Human Rights (KOMNAS) to protest what was said to be a biased report on the shooting of Muslim demonstrators in the Tanjung Priok affair.¹⁰ According to Van Bruinessen (2002) groups such as KISDI only became dominant in the public sphere in the late New Order and would not have utilized street politics in the 1980s. DDII, Media Dakwah and KISDI strongly believe in conspiracy theories in which the Western, Jewish and Christian world is out to destroy Islam. They often target Chinese and Christian Indonesians as well as nominal Muslims.

The Hizbut Tahrir is a global splinter group and is a good example of a transnational fundamentalist Islamist movement, whose aim is to create an Islamic caliphate (khilafah). It does not, however, condone violence in its quest for an Islamic state. Although very vocal and visible in the public sphere, their numbers are relatively small.¹¹ Neo-Salafy groups receive the most attention in media coverage. The sociologist Olivier Roy (2004: 232) defines these groups as “neofundamentalist” and distinguishes them from other conservative Islamist groups in that they “reject the idea that there can be different schools of thought and consider themselves the only true Muslims, refusing to be labeled as one specific group among the others.” In Indonesia, according to Collins, the neo-Salafy groups are strongly connected to the Institute for Islamic and Arabic studies (LIPIA) and the Yemeni charity ...

Table of contents

• Routledge Research on Gender in Asia Series
• Contents
• List of figures
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 Muslim politics and democratization
• 2 The debate on female leadership
• 3 Formations of public piety
• 4 Contesting masculinity
• 5 Sexualized bodies and morality talk
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index