Understanding Modernity

Toward a new perspective going beyond Durkheim and Weber

Richard Munch

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN: 9780415584265
• eBook ISBN: 9781136875632
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

First Published in 1988, this volume works towards a new understanding and exploration of the rise and development of modern society, taking its lead from two classical theorists, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. The key concept of this approach is the 'interpenetration' of different spheres of action.

Richard Münch begins with an exploration of the points of convergence and divergence in the works of Durkheim and Weber. He then builds, from Durkheim, a new theory of social order as a complex set of ordering, dynamizing, identity-producing and goal-setting factors. Münch also constructs a new theory of personality development, based on Durkheim's view of the duality of human nature. He concludes by assessing weber's contribution to our understanding of how modern social order emerged, showing that the unique features of modern society emerged from the 'interpenetration' of cultural, political, communal and economic spheres in action.

Part one
Between positivism, idealism and voluntarism: Max Weber and Emile Durkheim

Parsons made it the central thesis in his view of the development of action theory that there was a convergence in the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, as well as other classic authors such as Alfred Marshall and Vilfredo Pareto, to form a voluntaristic theory of action which could be set apart both from idealism and rationalism, and both from positivism and empiricism, whilst uniting these contradictory positions in a more comprehensive theory. In the following section I would like to adopt this perspective, but also to explore and progress beyond it. For Weber and Durkheim have more than a fundamental convergence between them; there is an equally vital divergence, and I would like to make both tendencies the object under study in the next two chapters. I shall address this theme on four levels:

– First, we shall be concerned with the philosophical foundations of action theory.

– Second, the aim is to anchor the sociological theory of social order in the discipline’s classical tradition. The classics will not be interpreted for the sake of it, but with a view to systematically developing their arguments.

– Third, the theoretical argument will be tangibly illustrated by sketching a historical application to social order in Great Britain and the United States.

– Fourth, suggestions will at least be made as to how the theory can be empirically specified.

The fact that I intend to proceed in this way serves to express my conviction that sociology cannot be fruitfully advanced unless the levels of philosophy, theoretical sociology and historical and empirical investigation are far more thoroughly integrated than is normally the case at present.

1
The convergence between Weber and Durkheim: Interpretation and explanation, the sacred and the profane *

Introductory remarks

Among the classical sociological writers it was Max Weber and Emile Durkheim who contributed most to the development of voluntaristic action theory. Formed by different intellectual traditions—Weber by German idealism, Durkheim by French positivism—they both overcame the narrow confines of their approaches and moved a considerable distance toward an integrated voluntaristic theory of action, even if this was by no means complete and with varying degrees of emphasis. This is why Talcott Parsons was quite right in stating that Weber and Durkheim converge in a voluntaristic theory of action. This thesis of his will now be re-examined in detail in the two authors’ writings. After that we will consider the divergence that exists just as much between them. Our re-examination begins with Weber’s contribution.

1.1 Max Weber: Adequacy of cause and meaning, religious ethics and world

Weber’s work is firmly rooted in the German idealist tradition, and especially its historical variety. Employing its premises, Weber defines sociology as interpretive (verstehende) sociology. Its subject matter is meaningful social action. Weber, however, went further. Toward the end of his life he developed his basic categories of interpretive sociology, in which he defined sociology as: ‘…a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.’¹ In his definition, Weber combines idealistic and positivistic elements, interpretation of meaning and causal explanation. He explains the way he sees this combination by distinguishing and linking adequacy (validity) of cause and meaning as test methods.² Weber says that the causal adequacy of a sociological hypothesis can be tested by investigating whether a statistically significant correlation exists between two social facts such as religion (ascetic Protestantism) and success in one’s occupation or obedience to contractual rules; or between how widespread a religion (ascetic Protestantism) is in an economy and the secure institutionalization of free contractual relations as an economic system, leaving aside the existence of other social facts that could be regarded as relevant.³ Whether one can go beyond a merely statistically significant correlation and determine causality depends on establishing the hypothesis’s adequacy of meaning. This requires meaning interpretation of the correlation. In the examples above, one would have to be able to interpret comparatively greater ambition and a greater willingness to keep to rules in free contractual relations as a form of behavior in professional life that follows from the views and value attitudes of a religious community, and that is consistent with their meaning. Here, an individual’s action is interpreted as a logical deduction from a meaning and value system (religious ethic) under certain conditions of application (professional life). This correlation does not have to be checked empirically or statistically but according to the criteria of adequate interpretation and logical deduction.⁴

Empirical and statistical methods establish causal adequacy. This, in turn, shows belief in a particular religion and the dissemination of that religion to be factors that, when compared with other relevant factors such as level of economic development, political centralization and bureaucratization, constellations of interest and power, etc., correlate significantly with social facts such as ambition in one’s career, obedience to contractual rules and the institutionalization of free contractual relations. Adequacy of meaning, established hermeneutically, enables us to say something about the nature and direction of the correlation. Combined with empirical-statistical methods, it also enables us to say something about the deeper-lying interrelationships at the heart of the correlation between religion and economic action. This can, however, not be done just by empirical induction. What are required are general theoretical models linked interpretively to the empirical generalizations. Religion as a factor is then interpreted in a particular way within the framework of a theoretical model. If, for example, we base our interpretation on the voluntaristic theory of action⁵ we must presume that the institutionalization of modern capitalism’s economic order, particularly as expressed in free contractual relations, cannot be explained purely as a result of constellations of interests and power, which vary substantially over time. The economic order was only able to be institutionalized because it was affectually anchored in a moral community which had kept pace with the spread of economic relations, and because it was discursively anchored in general meaning attitudes and value attitudes which enabled it to retain an identity whilst permitting a large number of detailed changes. On this point, the appropriate structural laws state that a number of functional relationships will exist as follows: the degree to which an order is institutionalized will depend on the degree of communal association; the degree of continuity under change will depend on the extent to which the order is discursively grounded in a consensus on general values; the rapidity of change and dissolution of an order will result from the weight of interest constellations; finally, the extent to which order can be enforced in case of conflict will depend on the concentration of power.

In this instance we can interpret the relationship between ascetic Protestantism and the institutionalization of an economic order encompassing free contractual relations as a practical case where the general statement applies that the extent to which an order is institutionalized is a function of the extent to which it is communally, culturally and discursively anchored. The features of ascetic Protestantism which then stand out under observation from this perspective are that communal association tends toward the universal, with the individual being inwardly committed to the community’s norms, and that it joins together economic action and a general system of meaning and values; neither of these features has been realized to a comparable extent under other religions. In them, the natural particularism of communities and the tendency to separate the pure in the realm of religion and ethics from the impure which resides in the pursuit of interests in the world are the features which have continued to predominate.⁶ Locating the functional relationship between ascetic Protestantism and the institutionalization of the economic order of free contractual relations in modern capitalism in this way forms part of the process of investigating the deeper causal validity of the empirical generalization involved. The latter, in its turn, is based on appropriate interpretations of the meaning of the factor ‘religion’ in the light of the more general theoretical model. Here again we must ascertain whether it was possible for the economic order of modern capitalism to be integrated in terms of its meaning into ascetic Protestantism’s overall system of meaning and values. We must also ascertain whether, given his attitude to meaning and his values, it was understandable in meaning terms for a Puritan, i.e. logically subsumable under the above attitude and values, that he should work constantly, and be honest, sincere and law-abiding toward all others in economic action.⁷ There must be an interrelationship in terms of meaning between religion and the economy.

The test for causal adequacy is just as closely interlinked with the test for adequacy of meaning on this deeper level as it is on the more superficial level where religion and economic action are empirically and statistically related. It should be pointed out that Weber only partially reached the level of deeper correlations within the frame of reference of a general theoretical model. Many of his statements on the empirical level could fit into a general voluntaristic model even though he did not explicitly construct such a model. As Weber was always, to a certain extent, committed to historicism it was impossible for him to successfully integrate his empirical-historical research into a general theoretical model.⁸

His concept of the ideal type is another example of a synthetic approach on the metatheoretical level that remained just as unfinished. It is designed to integrate analytical abstraction with empirical-historical reality and especially rationalistic idealism with historical idealism. According to Weber, an ideal type is construed by exaggerating particular features of a historical phenomenon to an extreme and by leaving out other concomitant features.⁹ Two varieties of ideal type can be distinguished, one closer to analytical abstraction, the other to historical reality: the analytical ideal type and the historical ideal type.¹⁰ Paradigmatic examples of the analytical ideal type are provided by Weber’s types of legitimate order and legitimate authority: of these, order is legitimated in affectual, traditional and means-end rational or value rational terms; authority is legitimated in charismatic, traditional, rational-legal and, according to his sociology of the city, voluntaristic, associative and democratic terms.¹¹ Paradigmatic examples of the historical ideal type are more concrete types of authority which Weber focused upon, such as patrimonialism, feudalism and the modern mass state under parliamentary democracy, or else types of administration such as modern bureaucracy, or yet again types of economy such as modern rational capitalism. In all these cases key characteristics of concrete orders, systems of authority, administrative or economic systems are brought out of their concrete context and analyzed in terms of their reciprocal relationship.

An ideal type comprises both descriptive portions and propositional ones.¹² For example, the charismatic type of authority involves, in its descriptive portion, a presentation of the relationship between a charismatic leader and his followers, and in its propositional portion it involves statements on the conditions which allow that leader his success, on the relatively short life-span of charismatic leadership and on how it might be more durably institutionalized (i.e. turned into everyday practical life).¹³ Such ideal typical generalizations can apply only to relationships which are analytically separated from concrete reality, for in reality they are inevitably bound up in a special way with other aspects, some of which may be attributable to different ideal types. Because of this, the conditions of application of ideal types are seldom realized in their purest form, and are generally restricted by those of other ideal types, which means that the conditions of application cannot be expected to produce the full ideal typical effect. Pure charismatic leadership, for example, is likely to lead to a breakdown in the system of authority if a series of failures means the leader can no longer assert his charisma. However, in a concrete example of a system of authority it is possible for the charismatic element to be based purely on cyclical variations in individual leaders’ authority whereas the structure of authority is legitimized by tradition; indeed, even the charisma of individual political leaders can be guaranteed by traditional factors such as belonging to an old family, to an established élite, or similar. In such a case the conditions of application for charismatic authority are not completely established, so one would not expect the consequences to follow with their full force either.

When one says that an ideal type is never fully realized, as a rule, in the real world but is always mixed with other ideal types, this does not mean that the corresponding theory is wrong and is never valid for the real world. What is meant is far more that the conditions for analytically pure statements are rarely present in full and that therefore reality always has to be explained by the combination of various ideal types. In order to do so one requires a comprehensive theoretical model that the individual ideal types can be integrated into and in which the relations between the various ideal types can be defined more precisely. Weber did not however reach this deeper level of theorizing. His ideal types form relatively isolated creations and their mutal relations and order remain undefined.¹⁴ This short-coming results directly from the way Weber co...

Table of contents

• Contents
• Figures
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Part one Between positivism, idealism and voluntarism: Max Weber and Emile Durkheim
• Part two Social order and individual autonomy: Emile Durkheim
• Part three The unique nature, formation, development and structural problems of the modern social order: Max Weber
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index of Names
• Subject Index