The West has tended to regard democracy with near idolatry, putting it on a pedestal as the definitive answer to how states should be run. The word is bandied about and proudly offered to the world as a panacea for all ills. Yet a precise definition of the word democracy is elusive. The word itself derives from the Greek demos, meaning people, village, administrative unit, and kratos, from the Sanskrit kratu, denoting strength, might, dominion.1 I accept the general sense of the word as defined by Abraham Lincoln: âgovernment of the people, by the people, for the people.â Democracy is the notion of rule by the people instead of rule by one person, one family, one group, one party â autocracy of any kind.2
Democracy is, however, an extraordinarily difficult form of government. It contains built-in incoherence and is ill-equipped for the decision-making needed by government in an incredibly complex world. Jason Brennan has written a carefully-considered book entitled Against Democracy about the great problems concerning democracy. He considers that âequal, universal suffrage is in many ways on its face morally objectionable ⌠universal suffrage incentivizes most voters to make political decisions in an ignorant and irrational way, and then impose these ignorant and irrational decisions on innocent people.â3
Brennan develops his argument regarding American politics. He considers that citizens fall into three main groups: hobbits who are âmostly apathetic and ignorant about politicsâ; hooligans who are ârabid sports fans of politics with strong and largely fixed world-viewsâ and vulcans who âthink scientifically and rationally about politics.â He considers that âmost Americans are either hobbits or hooligans, or fall somewhere in the spectrum in between.â4
His view reflects the judgment of two eminent political philosophers. Ronald Dworkin began his 2006 book Is Democracy Possible Here? with the words:
American politics are in an appalling state. We disagree, fiercely, about almost everything ⌠These are not civil disagreements: each side has no respect for the other. We are no longer partners in self-government; our politics are rather a form of war.5
Dworkin echoed what Jeffrey Stout said two years earlier in his book Democracy and Tradition: âIt will take all of the intellectual and organisational creativity that the next generation of democrats can muster to sustain recognisably democratic forms of public discourse in contemporary circumstances.â6 Both were remarkably prescient regarding the way in which American politics was developing.
Brennan argues in favour of epistocracy, the rule of the knowledgeable. The notion resurrects something akin to Platoâs vision of the philosopher-king shorn of its despotic associations. Plato taught that only a wise person could govern society well. If this is so, how likely is it that all those who elect a democratic government are wise? If they are not wise, is there any guarantee that those they vote for are wise? Are there not factors in democracy which actively discourage wisdom in its rulers? Recent events, such as the huge Brexit controversy in Britain, present a real challenge to democracy.
A concern for truth can easily become a casualty for several reasons, such as the following:
* Dependence on securing votes can promote easy reliance on slogans, jargon, captions and the like, which are designed to appeal quickly to peopleâs emotions and discourage actual thinking.
* The need to convince huge numbers of people can encourage the trading of truth for influence or the promotion of bullshit, fake news and a general lack of trust â all marks of a so-called âpost-truthâ society (to be discussed further in Chapter 2).
* The danger of populism is ever-present. For instance, the manipulation of the masses, not just by charismatic speakers but by such elements as much-publicised opinion polls, plays on peopleâs general wish to go along with the crowd and keep up with the Zeitgeist.
In more subtle ways forms of dishonesty may be built into the system. In order to establish any structure for decision-making, some form of grouping of those holding possible policies seems to be inevitable and leads to the setting up of political parties. Yet, packaging together views on a great variety of topics discourages independent, genuine thinking and makes it highly unlikely that voters who actually think for themselves will totally agree with anything that is presented to them.
Such discouragement applies with especial force to those elected. Some politicians fail to express any personal opinion. As the Gilbert & Sullivan operetta Iolanthe expressed so humorously, yet unfortunately still relevantly, over one hundred years ago:
When in that House M.P.s divide,
If theyâve a brain and cerebellum, too,
Theyâve got to leave that brain outside,
And vote just as their leaders tell âem to.7
This is bad news for the pursuit of truth upon which a flourishing democracy depends. We need politicians who think for themselves. Voting for what a person does not wholly agree with offends that personâs integrity. Of course, the principle of necessary compromise comes to the rescue, but unless resorted to in an intelligent way, it also serves to discredit the idealism responsible for democracy in the first place.
Other factors discouraging responsible democratic government include:
* The illusion of power which the right to vote gives. Voters are so remote from actually making decisions or having to be seen as being responsible for their outcomes that taking part in elections can become a low priority or seem to be a charade.
* The ease with which voters can lose trust in politicians on the grounds that they âare just out for themselvesâ.
* Short-term power can promote short-term thinking, such as the idea that there is no need to bother about the effects that political decisions may have in a few yearsâ time.
* Needing to get elected can promote bloated egoism, especially if the individual is successful. Egotism, in turn, can lead to irresponsibility in making judgements or decisions, which is in direct contrast with Edmund Burkeâs ideal: âYour representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinionâ.8
* The danger of tyranny by the majority, whereby minorities are trampled upon or oppressed.
The problems facing any kind of meaningful democracy are immense. The political scientist James Fishkin summarises the reality well: âWe live in a world of relentless advocacy, massive financing of the persuasion industry, the viral spread of fake news, social media discussions among the like-minded, and the pressures of political competition built into our practices of democracy.â9
What can democratic government offer to counteract these threats and difficulties? Fishkin quotes E. E. Schattschneiderâs short, widely-read book, The Semisovereign People: âThe people are a sovereign whose vocabulary is limited to two words, âYesâ and âNoâ. This sovereign moreover can speak only when spoken to.â10 Schattschneider argued that, as generally practised, democracy is far from being universal in scope; it is unbalanced in favour of a fraction of a minority.
Fishkin expresses the problem clearly:
If elites or other political actors manipulate public opinion or mass political behaviour, then even if the public appears to be exercising popular control, it is not. It is not in control of itself. Someone is pulling the strings. Furthermore, if manipulation works, then there will be incentive for political actors to engage in it, whether they are candidates, parties, or political operatives with partisan or interest group leanings. After all, the incentives within competitive democracy are all about winning, and not much about truth-telling.11