Reasoning, Argumentation, and Deliberative Democracy

David Moshman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9781000201994
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Democracy
• Index: Psychology

In light of the latest research from cognitive and developmental psychology, this key text explores reasoning, rationality, and democracy, considering the unique nature of each and their relationship to each other.

Broadening our understanding from the development of reasoning and rationality in individuals to encompass social considerations of argumentation and democracy, the book connects psychological literature to philosophy, law, political science, and educational policy. Based on psychological research, Moshman sets out a system of deliberative democracy that promotes collaborative reasoning, rational institutions such as science and law, education aimed at the promotion of rationality, and intellectual freedom for all. Also including the biological bases of logic, metacognition, and collaborative reasoning, Moshman argues that, despite systematic flaws in human reasoning, there are reasons for a cautiously optimistic assessment of the potential for human rationality and the prospects for democracy.

Reasoning, Argumentation, and Deliberative Democracy will be essential reading for all researchers of thinking and reasoning from psychology, philosophy, and education.

1

Introduction

Research on reasoning has undermined traditional assumptions of human rationality. The concept of democracy, however, assumes that people are rational agents, competent to govern themselves individually and collectively. If humans are not rational agents, we must reconsider the political ideal of democracy.

I argue in this book that, despite systematic flaws in human reasoning, there are three reasons for a cautiously optimistic assessment of human rationality and the prospects for democracy. First, research and theory in cognitive and developmental psychology provide the basis for a more positive assessment of individual rationality. Second, groups of people, under the right circumstances, reason better than individuals. Third, developmental progress toward greater rationality can be promoted through education. Psychological research provides a basis for conceptualizing a system of deliberative democracy that relies on and promotes collaborative reasoning, rational institutions such as science and law, education aimed at the promotion of rationality, and intellectual freedom for all.

I begin this chapter with a nontechnical overview of the book, supporting and fleshing out the argument summarized in the two paragraphs above. This is followed by three sections providing a more technical introduction to 15 central concepts: reasoning, rationality, reasons, persons, bounded rationality, heuristics and biases, dual processing, metacognition, epistemic cognition, developmental progress, developmental process, argumentation, deliberative democracy, education, and intellectual freedom.

Overview

The remaining eight chapters of the book begin with the biological bases of logic and proceed from there to reasoning of several sorts, metacognitive aspects of rationality, rational argumentation, the ideal functioning of democratic societies, the nature of development at individual and social levels, the role of educational institutions in the promotion of rationality, and defending against the Borg.

Chapter 2 (Development of Logical Reasoning) considers the development of logical reasoning, beginning with Piaget’s conception of logic as intrinsic to biological self-regulation. Psychological research reveals a sensorimotor logic of action already developing in infancy and shows that even preschool children routinely make logically correct inferences. The development of logic is in large part the development of (metalogical) understanding about the nature of logic and associated regulation of one’s inferences. Research shows systematic and universal progress in logical reasoning over the first 12 years of life, leading to the ability (beginning about age 11 or 12 years) to determine the logical implications of ideas one deems hypothetical or even false. Development beyond that is much less universal and related more to experience and education than to age. There is extensive evidence that even adults fall far short of logical perfection, with substantial individual differences. Mathematical reasoning, which also involves matters of logical necessity, shows a similar developmental pattern of universal childhood progress over the first 12 years, with substantial individual differences in further development and systematic errors at all ages.

One might think the development of logical reasoning is the basic story of reasoning and rationality. Perhaps all we need to complete the picture is more detail about logical functioning at various ages across the lifespan.

Chapter 3 (Reasoning Beyond Logic) argues to the contrary that, even if we interpret logic broadly to go beyond deduction, reasoning is more than logic. Causal reasoning is discussed as a form of reasoning central to science that cannot be reduced to logic because it involves matters of empirical fact and theoretical interpretation that go beyond logical necessity. Reasoning beyond logic also includes principled reasoning, which is central to morality, and reasoning on the basis of precedent, which is central to social tradition. Logical, causal, principled, and precedent-based reasoning are all concerned with matters of truth and justification, though they conceive of such matters differently. Reasoning is defined as epistemologically self-regulated thinking, meaning it involves a focus on the justification and truth of one’s conclusions. This involves the generation and use of reasons, including but not limited to logical reasons. As with logical reasoning, research on causal, principled, and precedent-based reasoning shows systematic and universal progress in the first 12 years of life. Here too, however, adults show substantial individual differences in the extent of development beyond that, and all fall far short of rational perfection.

One might think this expanded conception of reasoning, in which logical reasoning is one of several forms, provides a comprehensive framework. Perhaps all that remains is to flesh out the picture with detailed research on the development and functioning of various sorts of reasoning.

Chapter 4 (Metacognition and Epistemic Cognition) argues to the contrary. Taking into account the psychological reality of logical inferences in very young children, it makes the case that the development of reasoning is in large part the development of metacognition, expanding on the discussion in Chapter 2 about the development and role of metalogical understanding. Of particular importance to reasoning is the aspect of metacognition concerned with the justification and truth of beliefs—epistemic cognition. The chapter traces the development of epistemic cognition in childhood and beyond. Drawing on a variety of theorists, it suggests there is a theoretical consensus that epistemic development is largely a process of recognizing subjectivity and then re-establishing a basis for objectivity (at least as a meaningful ideal) in multiple domains and at multiple levels of abstraction. Looking across Chapters 2–4, cognitive development is presented as progress toward rationality, thus distinguishing it from other cognitive changes. A distinction can be made between basic development, referring to the universal progress in rationality across the first 12 years of life, and advanced development, referring to further progress that is highly variable across individuals.

Again one might think we now have the basic framework of reasoning and rationality with only specifics left to be filled in about our understanding and regulation of our various inferential processes across development. What more could there be?

Chapter 5 (Argumentation as Collaborative Reasoning) notes that the picture so far presented, consistent with the literatures of cognitive and developmental psychology, construes reasoning as a process that takes place in an individual mind. An emerging literature, however, suggests that argumentation among people can be construed as a process of collaborative reasoning. The chapter reviews evidence that when small groups engage in reasoning they are sometimes more rational than any of their individual members. Of course it is also true that groups can be less rational than their members. Examination of the conditions that foster group rationality suggests the importance of respect for reasons and persons. It appears that rationality can be enhanced through argumentation, but the possibility and quality of argumentation depend on the size, circumstances, and functioning of the group, including the respect of group members for each other’s intellectual freedom.

Having supplemented the standard individualistic picture of reasoning and rationality with a social picture, it might appear that the account is now comprehensive. Again, what more could there be?

Chapter 6 (Democracy as Collaborative Rationality) adds another whole dimension to the discussion by distinguishing two meanings of social (following Piaget and many other theorists): (1) interindividual and (2) societal. Argumentation among individuals in small groups (the topic of Chapter 5) addresses the social aspect of reasoning only in the first sense. What remains is the nature and role of society. Many theorists in philosophy, law, and political science (especially neo-Kantians such as John Rawls) have construed democracy as a project of collaborative rationality based on respect for reasons and respect for persons, and some in this tradition have specifically advocated “deliberative democracy” as the ideal form of democracy. This chapter connects democratic theory to research on reasoning and rationality. Along the way, it examines identity as a theory of oneself that coordinates the personal and the social, notes the dangers of identity for rationality and democracy, and proposes a concept of rationalist identity consistent with deliberative democracy. Argumentation is crucial to social institutions, such as legislatures, law, and science, that play important roles in the rationality of democratic social systems. Intellectual freedom, seen in Chapter 5 as crucial to argumentation, is correspondingly crucial to democracy, especially deliberative democracy.

We now have an account of reasoning and rationality extending from the biological bases of logic early in Chapter 2 to the ideal functioning of democratic societies and rational institutions in Chapter 6. Now, one might think, we must surely be done, unless we want to talk about rationality across the galaxy or in nonbiological forms. But the picture remains incomplete even if we remain on Earth and stick to human rationality.

Chapter 7 (The Rational Construction of Rational Agency) turns our attention to processes and patterns of development. Previous chapters described the course of developmental progress in logical reasoning (Chapter 2); in scientific, moral, and social conventional reasoning (Chapter 3); and in the metacognitive basis for reasoning (Chapter 4). Chapter 7, however, looks more directly at fundamental processes of developmental change and general patterns of progress in rational agency. Drawing on Chapters 5 and 6, moreover, it considers the role of argumentation and democratic institutions in the development of individuals and the possibility that groups and societies might themselves show developmental change. I argue that rationality is neither inherent in the human genome nor learned from human environments, though genes and environments are obviously important. Rather, rationality is constructed over time by increasingly rational agents through rational and social processes of reflection and coordination. Subjectivity is inevitable but reflection on subjectivity enables progress to metasubjective forms of objectivity and increasingly rational self-governance at individual, social, and societal levels.

And what remains beyond this seemingly comprehensive account of the development of reasoning and rationality? What more is there to be said?

Chapters 2–7, even as each went beyond the previous one, remained focused on describing and explaining reasoning, rationality, and development. What remains for Chapter 8 (Education for Rationality) is the question of how we can promote the development of reasoning and rationality. The chapter begins with the concept of critical thinking, which has long been popular in education and, although variously defined, is closely connected to rationality in its concern for reasons. Peer argumentation is proposed as an educational approach that promotes the development of rationality. The chapter also notes the prevalence of indoctrination in curriculum and instruction, especially in elementary and secondary education. Extending previous discussions about the role of intellectual freedom in collaborative reasoning (Chapter 5), deliberative democracy (Chapter 6), and the development of rational agency (Chapter 7), Chapter 8 addresses the central role of intellectual freedom in any educational program aimed at the promotion of rationality. The chapter concludes with a brief sketch of the ideal rational agent.

And finally, I do turn to questions of rationality across the galaxy and in nonbiological forms. But my focus remains on human rationality on the planet Earth, which I now reconsider from the perspective of science fiction.

Chapter 9 (Reasons and Persons) begins with the Borg, a collective entity introduced in the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation. The Borg is composed of biomechanical life forms with limited individual agency. Within the Star Trek universe, the Borg is a fearsome threat because it assimilates all societies and civilizations it encounters. In the real world, I suggest, the more immediate threat is not that the Borg will arrive from elsewhere and assimilate us, but rather that we ourselves will turn into the Borg. Resisting that tendency requires active reflection on rationality. It also requires efforts to support reasons and persons, neither of which can exist without the other. I illustrate the importance of personhood with two legal cases in which a court faced specific questions as to whether a particular individual was legally a person. In 1879, the Ponca chief Standing Bear was found in a federal court in Omaha, Nebraska to be a person within the meaning of the law and thus entitled to determine where he would live. Nearly five centuries later, the android Data is likewise found, in an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, to be a person with the right to make his own choices. Turning finally to an episode from the original Star Trek, I illustrate the centrality of truth and justification. The alternative to the Borg is a world of persons and reasons.

Reasoning and Rationality

In the remaining three sections I introduce the major concepts of the book. First, I consider the nature of reasoning, especially in relation to rationality. I then turn to cognitive and developmental psychology, which have generally focused on the reasoning, rationality, and development of individuals. This individualist account is then supplemented by social considerations of argumentation and democracy that extend and enrich standard cognitive and developmental accounts of reasoning and rationality.

I begin with reasoning, a central concern of philosophy at least since Aristotle and a major topic of psychological research since the 1930s. The study of reasoning raises questions of rationality, leading to further discussion concerning the nature and role of reasons, agency, and personhood.

Reasoning as Epistemologically Self-Regulated Thinking

I use the term “reasoning” in much the way it is used both in ordinary discourse and in the scholarly literatures of philosophy and psychology. Although reasoning has been defined in a variety of ways, I attempt here to capture what I believe to be something close to a consensus. Reasoning is generally seen to be (1) inferential; (2) under the control of an agent; and (3) aimed at reaching conclusions that are true or at least justified. With respect to the first, reasoning is generally seen as a process by which we infer...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Development of Logical Reasoning
• 3 Reasoning Beyond Logic
• 4 Metacognition and Epistemic Cognition
• 5 Argumentation as Collaborative Reasoning
• 6 Democracy as Collaborative Rationality
• 7 The Rational Construction of Rational Agency
• 8 Education for Rationality
• 9 Reasons and Persons
• Glossary
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index