1 Ideological reform and political legitimacy in China
Challenges in the post-Jiang era
Heike Holbig
1.1 Ideology in decay?
There is a widespread conviction among Western China scholars that economic reforms in the PRC over the past 25 years have rendered ideology obsolete. According to conventional wisdom, economic performance is left as the only factor to bestow regime legitimacy to the Chinese party-state, implying that Communist one-party rule will immediately plunge into a serious legitimacy crisis should economic success one day falter. Ideology, on the other hand, is said to have degenerated from a set of formerly quasi-religious beliefs into a mere façade of a âCommunistâ regime that has long taken the âcapitalist roadâ.
This conventional wisdom contrasts with the enormous resources spent by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) day by day for the production, reproduction and reform of official discourse and ideology. Taking into consideration the time-consuming, labour-intensive practices to âspread the wordâ and make sure that relevant multipliersâmedia representatives as well as political, economic and social elitesâgrasp the âspiritâ of current discourse and know how to implement it correctly, one has to wonder indeed how these huge investments should ever pay off if ideology remains, at best, an object of popular cynicism.
The following chapter challenges this conventional wisdom and argues instead that in present-day China, ideologyâunderstood as a unified system of meanings for which political actors claim exclusive authority (cf. Herrmann-Pillath 2005: 13)âdoes indeed matter as an important factor for the ruling party to uphold its regime legitimacy. Based on Douglass Northâs theory of institutional change and on David Beethamâs theory of political legitimation, the chapter introduces a theoretical model to explain the mechanisms of generating regime legitimacy for one-party rule under the conditions of rapid economic transition. Using empirical data from the ideological campaign of the âThree Representationsâ introduced in early 2000 under party leader Jiang Zemin and reinterpreted under his successor Hu Jintao since fall 2002, the chapter goes on to demonstrate the relevance of ideological discourse in the real world of present-day China.
1.2 Ideology matters: the path-dependence of ideological and institutional change
In his theory of institutional change and economic performance, Douglass North emphasizes the role of ideology1 as an important factor shaped by, and at the same time, shaping the process of institutional change.
Ideas and ideologies matter, and institutions play a major role in determining just how much they matter. Ideas and ideologies shape the subjective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world around them and make choices. [âŚ] Peopleâs perceptions that the structure of rules of the system is fair and just reduce costs; equally, their perception that the system is unjust raises the costs [âŚ].2
According to Northâs theory, ideological change is determined by relative prices, i.e. the costs and benefits of maintaining an ideology. At the same time, due to their subjective nature ideologies mediate the very perception of relative prices, thus assuming a partly autonomous role in institutional change. In other words, by influencing the perceived costs of institutional change and the choices individuals make, ideology has a direct impact on institutional change (North 1990: chapters 9â11 passim).
To understand this basic relation between ideological and institutional change, case studies of countries undergoing rapid economic and social transition seem most fruitful. Transition-type systems are not only characterized by a high speed of institutional change, but at the same time by a high volatility of social perceptions of this change. Applying Northâs theoretical approach to transition-type systems, the perceived costs of institutional change can be expected to depend very strongly on subjective assessments of relative prices of institutional change, thus giving ideology a most crucial role in mediating these perceptions.
The rapid economic and social transition we are witnessing in many post-Socialist and some remaining Socialist countries today poses a difficult test to regime legitimacy as social expectations of future institutional change are facing fundamental uncertainty. Specifically, transition challenges the perceived capacity of existing political institutions to guarantee compensation to the âlosersâ of transition. In this situation, the provision of a stable ideological discourse can play an important role, as it may support the perception of sufficiently stable political institutions capable of arranging redistribution between different social groups. In other words, ideological continuity can help to stabilize social expectations and reduce anxieties and resistance, particularly of those who find themselves among the less privileged in the transition process (cf. Herrmann-Pillath 2005). At the same time, however, official ideology has to be flexible enough to adapt to changing social values and expectations in order to support the perception of a âsmoothâ transition. If properly designed, ideological reform that is able to mediate the subjective assessments of the costs and benefits of transition may create manoeuvring space for adapting institutional arrangements and enhance social tolerance of incremental institutional change.
In transition-type systems, the social perception of institutional change appears to be conditioned to a particularly high degree by ideological change, which itself is determined by the perceived costs and benefits of maintaining the existing ideology. In this sense, we observe a path-dependence with regard to ideological change, which in turn impacts upon institutional change. In other words, ideological change is a path-dependent process, which can be seen to circumscribe the corridor of institutional change.
1.3 Ideological reform and political legitimacy in socialist systems
According to the classical work of Seymour Lipset, legitimacy can be most broadly defined at the macro level of political systems as âthe capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the societyâ (Lipset 1981: 84). While Lipsetâs research has concentrated on democratic systems and processes of democratization, this definition of legitimacy with its focus on political institutions can be applied universally to all kinds of political systems, be they democratic, authoritarian or positioned somewhere within the wide range of hybrid or transition-type regimes. However, if we agree with Douglass North that institutions have to adapt to an ever-changing environment, political legitimacy has to be constantly reproduced. Therefore, a dynamic version of the notion of legitimacy is necessary to allow for the conceptualization of institutional change.
David Beetham has presented a more detailed model of political legitimacy, which takes into consideration the ongoing process of âlegitimationâ in terms of communicative interaction in society aiming at reproducing regime legitimacy, and of the role of ideology in this process. According to Beetham, irrespective of the political system, power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that (i) it conforms to established rules (conformity of rules), (ii) the rules can be justified by reference to shared beliefs (justifiability of rules), and (iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation (legitimation through expressed consent).
Conformity to established rulesâbe it formalized rule of law or informal conventionsâis a necessary but not sufficient criterion for legitimacy. A breach of rules, however, will result in the perceived illegitimacy of political power (i). The second criterion implies the normative justification of these rules in terms of the rightful source of political authority and in terms of the proper ends and standards of government. In most âmodernâ states, according to Beetham, the propagation of governing for the âcommon interestâ of society holds an important position in the justification of power. A legitimacy deficit will arise to the extent that the rules cannot be validated in terms of shared beliefs (ii). According to the third criterion of legitimacy, the withdrawal of popular consent, or the active articulation of dissent, will lead to the delegitimation of political power (iii) (Beetham 1991: 15â16) (cf. Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 The three criteria of legitimacy
All three criteria have to be fulfilled in order to safeguard the legitimacy of political power. The erosion of political legitimacy might start in one dimension and then proceed to affect others, resulting in a vicious cycle. The collapse of Communist systems in the Soviet Union and in other East European countries suggests a specific pattern of potential legitimacy âbreakdownâ: the process is typically triggered by a perceived failure of governments to effectively pursue the âcommon interestâ and other performance criteria (ii). The growing legitimacy deficit accentuates the lack of conformity of state power to constitutional or otherwise established rules (i), and thus, further undermines its legitimacy. Lacking conformity to rules provokes active articulations of popular dissent (iii) which, in turn, escalate into open breaches of established rules by state power. This eventually leads to a widely perceived illegitimacy of political power (i) and to the total withdrawal of popular consent (iii) (Beetham 1991: chapters 1, 2).
To maintain regime legitimacy and to avoid this vicious cycle of legitimacy breakdown in Socialist-type systems, ideology is assigned a crucial role: first, it has to provide the normative foundation for the rightful source of political authority; second, ideology has to define the performance criteria of government, particularly the âcommon interestâ of society and how this goal should be pursued; and third, it has to serve as a stimulus to mobilize popular consent or, at least, assent of social groups relevant to legitimizing state power.
1.2.1 The rightful source of political authority
Ideological doctrines used in Socialist countries to define the rightful source of political authority have always been characterized by a formal paradox. While the dominant Communist Party claims the monopoly of political power, formal principles of âdemocracyâ and âpopular sovereigntyâ are emphasized at once as important fundaments of this claim. This seeming paradox of âpopular sovereignty under Communist one-party ruleâ can be resolved, however, by reference to the political analysis of Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe by Brunner and Markus in the early 1980s.
Georg Brunnerâs distinction between âautonomous-consensualâ and âheteronomous-teleologicalâ legitimacy doctrines is particularly helpful here. Brunner uses the notion of âheteronomous-teleologicalâ legitimation to describe the typical legitimacy doctrines propagated in East European countries to justify the authority of the party under Communist one-party rule. Thus, in official ideology, historical materialism (âhistomatâ) serves to establish the historical mission of the working class to carry out the Socialist revolution, exercise leadership and realize the visionary goal of Communism as an objective, quasi-transcendental law. Building on this general social-philosophical context of legitimacy, the âScientific Communismâ shaped by Leninâs âdoctrine of the partyâ confers a monopoly of knowledge on the Communist vanguard party (and an advanced consciousness vis-Ă -vis the population), which is then translated into a monopoly of leadership. Brunner characterizes these doctrines as âheteronomousâ, since they appeal to âobjective lawsâ and thereby justify authority independently of any human decision; and as âteleologicalâ, as legitimacy is derived from the projection of the eschatological goal of the classless Communist society (Brunner 1982).
This top-down mode of âheteronomous-teleologicalâ legitimation has been supplemented in all East European countries by a mode of âautonomous-consensualâ legitimation, that is, the bottom-up legitimation of state authority through the proclamation of the principle of popular sovereignty. In Brunnerâs words, âstate authority is legitimate because it rests on the consent and the consensus of the peopleâ. This claim has been enshrined in national constitutions of all Socialist countries in Eastern Europe (Brunner 1982: 33) and, in China, even in the national appellation (Peopleâs Republic of China). The typical âprocedures used for producing autonomous-consensual legitimacyâ identified by Brunner in various East European countries are: elections to popular representative bodies at different administrative levels, which rarely afford the possibility of choice between political alternatives, but rather serve the goals of integration, mobilization and the demonstration of the unity of the people; public discussions of important draft laws; consultative referendums; reports to electors; and, last but not least, petitions and submissions by citizens.
(ibid.: 36â42)
It is very interesting to note here that the two modes of legitimation have been combined most neatly in the constitutions of most Socialist states in Eastern Europe, as well as in the PRC: While the preamble of the Chinese constitution, for instance, elaborates in much detail the historical mission of the Communist Party and explicitly states its leadership monopoly (the âheteronomous-teleologicalâ legitimation according to Brunner), the main body of the constitution does not mention the Communist Party at all. Here instead, the principles of popular sovereignty, culminating in the role of the National Peopleâs Congress as the âhighest organ of state powerâ, are reflected in a neat institutional order of civil rights and representative state organs (Brunnerâs âautonomous-consensualâ legitimation).
While this pattern of normative justification of the Communist Partyâs rightful source of authority has been basically the same in all Soviet-type systems, efforts to adapt these doctrines to a changing environment have varied over time and across states. In the Chinese case, Communist ideology has been reformed in the post-Mao era and particularly in recent years by emphasizing formal elements of popular sovereignty, legal norms and constitutionalism. The explicit goal of these reforms, however, is not to signal an institutional shift to a multiparty democracy and rule of law regime, but to strengthen the normative and functional basis of one-party rule and the âpartyâs capacity to governâ. ...
