Ultra-Low Fertility in Pacific Asia

Trends, causes and policy issues

Paulin Straughan, Angelique Chan, Gavin Jones

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• eBook ISBN: 9781134032099
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong SAR are among the very lowest-fertility countries in the whole world, and even China has reached fertility levels lower than those in many European countries. If these levels continue over long periods East Asia will soon face accelerating population decline in addition the changes in age distributions in such populations raise major new questions for planning of economic and social welfare.

This book brings together work by noted experts on the low fertility countries of East Asia with an up-to-date analysis of trends in fertility, what we know about their determinants and consequences, the policy issues and how these are being addressed in the various countries. Its role in bringing together information on policy trends and initiatives of a pro-natalist kind adopted over recent years in these countries is extremely important, as is the fact that the discussion of these pro-natalist policies is set in the context of a thorough analysis of what has driven fertility so low in these countries.

Ultra-Low Fertility in Pacific Asia is invaluable to students and scholars of East Asian public and social policy, as well as fertility studies more generally.

1 Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries

Causes and policy responses

Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan

Introduction

Only 40 years ago, population experts were still worried about a population explosion that would threaten the future of humanity. Fortunately, while population growth is currently largely under control, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia still face massive increases with very serious potential consequences.¹ Paradoxically, however, a new problem is emerging, with its key locus in Pacific Asia (the term used in this book to refer to Asian countries with a Pacific littoral). This problem is ultra-low fertility. Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong SAR are among the very lowest-fertility countries in the whole world, and even China has reached fertility levels lower than those in many European countries. Fertility has sunk so low in many East Asian countries that if these levels continue over long periods, populations will face accelerating population decline not very far into the future. Not only this, but changes in age distributions in such populations raise major new questions for planning of economic and social welfare. The best-recognized prospect raised by ultra-low fertility is population aging, which brings with it an entirely new set of issues, for example, increasing old-age dependency ratios, financing old age and old age health care, continuing familial support of the elderly and elderly political participation. But there are many others, for example, the decline in size and changing age structure of the workforce, and the declining visibility of and perhaps attention paid to the needs and interests of children and young people.

Existing pro-natalist policies do not appear to be having much effect in these countries, and although governments realize that more needs to be done to encourage fertility, exactly what should be done remains elusive. Part of this elusiveness stems from a lack of information on what motivates people in Asia to marry in the first place, and once married, to have, or not have, children. (The route of bearing children without marrying is a little-travelled one in Asian countries, and not socially sanctioned.)

Though the shift in emphasis in population policy from anti-natalism to pro-natalism in some Asian countries over the course of just a decade or two is striking, the underlying issue is the same: whether governments have a legitimate interest in nudging fertility rates in desired directions, and if so, how policies designed to accomplish this relate to family and social policy. Thus, it is of some relevance to recapitulate briefly the history of anti-natalist policies.

The case for fertility reduction in high-fertility countries

The general consensus among economists has been that there are social and economic benefits to be achieved by reducing fertility rates in high-fertility conditions. The literature on this is vast, but three references summarizing the received wisdom are National Research Council, 1986 (which drew very cautious conclusions), Cassen, 1994, and Birdsall, Kelley and Sinding, 2001. Thus, although there have always been dissenters (for example, Simon, 1981), the consensus among most economists over the most active period of family planning efforts was that governments are justified in taking active steps to bring birth rates down—in the interest of the welfare of future generations. The economic case for family planning was bolstered by the arguments of environmentalists, and those dealing with issues of food and water availability (see Pimentel, et al._, 1999; Alexandratos, 2005; Falkenmark, 1997).

Family planning programs were seen as the most direct route to achieving the goal of fertility reduction. They were designed to make information on contraception more readily available, and to facilitate the adoption of contraception by couples wishing to do so (Seltzer, 2002). Studies that estimated “unmet need” for contraception indicated that many couples at risk of pregnancy and who did not want any more children were not doing anything to protect themselves from pregnancy. Satisfying this unmet need was seen as appropriate in both meeting people’s expressed needs and in lowering the overall level of fertility (see, for example, Sinding, Ross, and Rosenfield, 1994; Casterline and Sinding, 2000). Many family planning programs went well beyond the mere supply of information and services, engaging in campaigns to persuade people of the advantages of delayed marriage and small family size.

But there are other routes as well—arguably more fundamental ones—to low fertility. Studies dealing with the determinants of fertility show consistently that fertility is inversely related to education of women, for example. In general terms, fertility is inversely related to levels of economic development and (a somewhat different indicator) human development (see UNFPA, 2003: 4), and an ongoing debate is therefore about whether “development is the best contraceptive” (the slogan adopted by many at the World Population Conference in 1974), or whether the urgency of reducing birth rates calls for more direct measures. Finally, to confuse the situation even more, there are countries (Myanmar a notable example) where fertility has fallen to fairly low levels without either much evidence of development or the assistance of an official family planning program.

Two key problems with the family planning approach were:

• In its implementation by governments that perceived (and were pressed by donors to perceive) the lowering of population growth as an overriding goal, the basic rights of the population were often given second place.²
• Family planning programs had limited success in settings in which religious opposition was not effectively counteracted, and where economic development was sluggish and not effectively felt by the masses (examples include Pakistan, the Philippines, and parts of Latin America).

Over the past decade, demographic trends have taken the wind out of the sails of the population-control movement. Fertility rates have fallen consistently across the world, though Africa and parts of South Asia are regions where fertility remains high, massive population increases are still in prospect, and the effect of this on human well-being requires ongoing attention. Still, population projections by the United Nations now show world population peaking at below 10 billion, whereas figures closer to 15 billion had earlier been thought likely.

The collapse of fertility in East Asia and the delayed switch to pro-natalist policies

There is now an interesting mix of situations in the world: in some countries, lowered fertility is arguably crucial to sustainability and the well-being of populations; in others, increased fertility is arguably equally critical to future well-being; in others, a laissez-faire approach to fertility seems justified. In the first two groups of countries, the issue of whether, and if so how, governments should become involved in matters that are frequently argued to be private and confined to the bedroom continues to exercise the minds of government planners.

The second group—countries needing to increase fertility—includes countries such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Over the past five years or so, fertility in the first four of these countries has fallen to levels below those of almost all countries in Europe. There is controversy about where China and Thailand fit: needing to reduce fertility further or needing to raise it. Table 1.1 gives a brief summary of the population prospects faced by some of these countries. It shows that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have now reached such low fertility levels that population declines have begun or are in prospect. The momentum towards a shrinking of population, inherent in the age structure and fertility levels, is well documented for these countries. In particular, they face sharp contractions in numbers in the adolescent and young-adult age groups, the key age groups affecting the size and dynamism of the workforce. Only a sharp rise in fertility or very high levels of immigration (the latter to some extent built into United Nations projections for Singapore and Hong Kong SAR) could prevent population decline. Politicians and planners in these countries are viewing ultra-low fertility as a “crisis”.

It is important to note that some four or five decades ago, four of these East Asian countries with ultra-low fertility (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) were facing high fertility and rapid population growth; all of them were considered densely populated, and their governments were very concerned at the prospect of rapid population growth. It is not surprising, then, that they were pioneers in adopting policies to reduce fertility, including family planning programs (Robinson and Ross (eds), 2007). Japan’s situation was different, in that it had already reached replacement-level fertility at that time. The history of population policies in the other four countries, adopted to deal with a situation contrasting so sharply with the current demographic prospects they face, should be kept in mind in understanding delays in altering policies to respond to changing circumstances, as discussed below.

Table 1.1 Trends in Total Fertility Rates and projected population growth, selected East Asian countries

Governments in ultra-low-fertility countries are now arguing that raising birth rates is crucial for national survival and welfare. But the change from anti-natalist to pro-natalist policies did not come easily. Singapore was the first government in the region to reverse anti-natalist policies. The long lag in recognizing the need for policy change meant that the reorganization of policy was abrupt, and some-what shocking to the general public, who had long grown used to anti-natalist messages. Singapore’s fertility fell to replacement level in 1975, but it was not until 1986 that the first signs of a change in policy were seen, with a government announcement of plans to review population policies and dialogue sessions with the public. Pro-natalist measures were finally introduced in 1987, 12 years after replacement fertility had been reached and with fertility close to 25 percent below replacement level.³ The curious result of the haste in which the policy changes were made was that almost overnight anti-natalist messages were replaced by pro-natalist measures on the nation’s bus stops and other places, presumably to the bemusement of a populace well primed to follow the exhortations of a seemingly omniscient government.

The Korean government showed a similar reluctance to modify policies after fertility fell below replacement level in 1984. By 1990, fertility was well below replacement level, prompting a debate on population policies.

Those supporting continuation of fertility control argued that the current level of low fertility is mostly due to the strong population control policies and the change of policies would bring the fertility level up resulting in rapid population growth again, slowing down economic growth and effecting heavy burdens on environment and resources. Those supporting the relaxation of fertility control policies argued that the socioeconomic conditions of Korea have changed greatly resulting in changes in attitudes and values towards preference for small size families. They also argued that further decline in fertility would result in rapid population aging and increasing burden of support for the elderly.

(Choe and Park, 2005: 8)

It was not until 1996 that the emphasis of population policy was shifted from population control to quality and welfare of the population, one of the aims being to prevent fertility from declining further from its level of 1.7 at that time.

Taiwan’s fertility had been below replacement level for eight years before a new population policy statement was issued by the Executive Yuan, calling for raising fertility to replacement levels. However, there were no explicit proposals as to how to raise the marriage rate or the birth rate. In an assessment of this policy, Freedman and Freedman (1993: 28) wrote: “We see nothing in the new policy statement that is likely to have an effect on fertility levels, one way or the other. Therefore, the balance of the existing pro-natalist and anti-natalist influences in the society are likely to determine what actually happens”. It was not until 2006, 22 years after fertility fell below replacement level, that any national-level pronatalist policies were introduced, although a few county-level administrative units had introduced small-scale pro-natalist measures.

Japan followed a different fertility trajectory, having experienced below-replacement-level fertility over the 1970s and 1980s. Although, unlike the other countries, it did not have anti-natalist policies to reverse, it was not until it reached a record low TFR of 1.57 in 1990 that the government started looking into possible measures to reverse the downward trend.

As for China, the implementation of the “one-child policy” after 1979 has been greatly modified over time, and the “one-child policy” these days applies to only 35 percent of China’s population (Gu, Chapter 4, this volume). Nevertheless, China’s population policy remains clearly anti-natalist. There is controversy over China’s current fertility levels, but it is clear that fertility is so far below replacement level that China is actually in much the same position that Singapore was in 1975: namely, of having succeeded in the policy of fertility reduction, but being slow to “take off the brakes” when fertility slid well below replacement level. In China, many interpret the slide in fertility to well below replacement level as a sign of success. On the other hand, the population structure, aging and other issues arising from recent low fertility levels (compounded by the distorted age structures inherited as a legacy of past events—notably the planning disaster of the “Great Leap Forward”—and changing population policy) have been well publicized in the literature. Many demographers and economists are now arguing that pro-natalist policies are needed (Wang Feng, 2005; Zeng Yi, 2007). But government leaders and the population-control establishment have been slow to change their mindset. In February 2008, the Vice Minister of the National Population and Family Planning Commission did announce that China is considering “incrementally” lifting limits on the number of children a couple can have—an announcement that appeared to be subsequently rebutted by Premier Wen Jiabao (Straits Times, March 6, 2008). But even the initial announcement indicated a weakening of anti-natalist measures, rather than foreshadowing a switch to pro-natalism.

There is therefore a fascinating history with respect to the change of government policy in East Asian countries in response to changing demographic circumstances. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China all had long-standing policies to lower ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of figures and maps
• List of tables and appendices
• Contributors’ biographies
• Definition of terms
• Preface
• 1 Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries: causes and policy responses
• 2 Explanations of low fertility in East Asia: a comparative perspective
• 3 Japan’s declining fertility and policy responses
• 4 The arrival of low fertility in China
• 5 Socioeconomic development and fertility in the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea
• 6 The 1997 Asian economic crisis and changes in the pattern of socioeconomic differentials in Korean fertility
• 7 Ultra-low fertility in Hong Kong: a review of related demographic transitions, social issues, and policies to encourage childbirth
• 8 Ultra-low fertility in Singapore: some observations
• 9 From population control to fertility promotion—a case study of family policies and fertility trends in Singapore
• 10 Fertility in Pacific Asia: looking to the future