Chapter 1
Introduction
Joseph Soeters arid Philippe Manigart
The rise of multinational peace operations
In today's globalizing world military organizations are not only becoming more diverse internally, they also operate in an ever more diverse environment. Today's militaries carry out missions all over the world, in culturally, ethnically, and linguistically varying regions. The majority of these operations are conducted by multinational intervention forces, such as UNIFIL in Lebanon, ISAF in Afghanistan and KFOR in Kosovo, or by permanent multinational forces, such as NATO or the Eurocorps. Except perhaps for the US armed forces, national militaries are no longer capable of executing such operations on their own. The current imbalance between demand and resources makes it impossible for most national armed forces to conduct large-scale missions on their own. In addition, the need for legitimacy pushes even the most powerful countries and their armed forces to cooperate with the armed forces of other nations. To be distinguished from joint operating (military services of one country working together), this multinational military cooperation is called combined operating. In general, in the military one sees the same evolution as in the private sector, i.e. the proliferation of joint ventures, strategic alliances and virtual organizations in an international context.
The mass armed forces of the nineteenth and early twentieth centnries were purely national organizations serving their respective nation-states. To the extent that there was a degree of multinational cooperation, it took the form of coalitions in time of war, as for example the coalition that fought Napoleon's armies or the two alliances that fought during the First and Second World Wars. During peacetime, there was hardly any form of multinational cooperation, such as common exercises, training and doctrines.
The Cold War saw the rise of new forms of multinational military cooperation. On the one hand, permanent conventional military alliances – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – were put in place and, on the other hand, the UN carried out the first peacekeeping operations. Both developments were examples of real multinational military cooperation. NATO and Warsaw Pact armies developed common operational and training procedures, common multinational headquarters and sought a certain degree of standardization (interoperability), mostly in the domain of weapons and support systems. The UN peacekeeping operations of the Cold War, such as the one described by Moskos (1976) in Cyprus, were typically conducted after a ceasefire between the warring parties had been negotiated and there was an agreement to send Blue Helmets as interposition or monitoring forces.
If the Cold War was a time of relative stability for armed forces, now in today's world, the rather straightforward bi-polar conflict has given way to a much messier and fuzzier world. Conflicts may be the result of internal state disintegration or civil war rather than inter-state confrontations of the past. In order to respond to such diverse threats and crises, military organizations are now nearly always operating in the context of a multinational framework. This may be under the aegis of the UN or NATO but also, more recently, of regional supranational organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
These multinational military intervention forces, to the extent that they use modular, or package structures made of various national contingents, resemble matrix organizations. These are temporary structures with a dual reporting and control mechanism: a vertical one, the national contingents, and a horizontal one, i.e. the mission. The advantages of matrix structures are that they are more flexible and adaptive than the functional structures of the national armed forces of the past. They encourage cooperation, conflict resolution and coordination. However, as the command structures are twofold (i.e. the command of the mission versus the national line of command), multinational matrix structures come with problems too. In such environments, it is important that individual team members have considerable tolerance for diversity, confusion and ambiguity since a lot of personnel from different levels within the organization are grouped together in an informal environment where lines of communications are loose and unorganized. It therefore requires highly developed interpersonal skills at all levels. If indeed, in the past, military astuteness and a clear picture of the enemy was sufficient, today, the structural internationalization of the workforce (for instance in multinational headquarters), the multinational character of military contingents during deployments as well as the variety of local populations military task forces have to deal with, have become predominant features of military activities. Members of the military must – in diffuse political constellations – negotiate with belligerents from all sides of a conflict and remain neutral, while at the same time being able to defend themselves against aggression. They also have to deal with a host of international actors in the theatre of operations, including representatives of the United Nations, the media and NGOs (Winslow and Everts 2001). And they must do this in a foreign cultural environment, in a country devastated by war, far removed from family and friends. Such conditions demand a high level of intercultural competence.
As said, even the US armed forces, the most powerful and advanced in the world, need allies from around the globe (NATO, Japan) to perform their duties in large-scale operations, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Europe the fact that national armed forces need to work together has already led to the creation of structural bi-national or multinational arrangements. For example, in Belgium, the two Army brigades are fully integrated into the Eurocorps, together with units from the armed forces of Germany, France, Spain and Luxembourg. The German Bundeswehr has been divided into various parts, each of which has merged with other national forces. As a consequence, the first German/Dutch Corps, the Eurocorps, the Multinational Corps North East (containing military from Germany, Denmark and Poland) and others have been formed.
As far as operations are concerned, the picture is equaily clear, For instance, Belgian troops are presently deployed, among others, in Afghanistan as part of ISAF and in Kosovo as part of KFOR. But in the last few years, the same troops, or other units, were part of multinational task forces sent to Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire/Congo, Haiti, Cambodia, Turkey. Dutch politicians have made it clear that they only intend to prolong the Dutch military contribution in Southern Afghanistan on the condition other nations are able and willing to work alongside with the Dutch servicemen. Over the years multinational cooperation has become standard procedure for almost all national armed forces, as may be illustrated by the fact that the newly formed EU battle groups – except the UK battle group – are formally obliged to have a multinational personnel composition (see King 2005).
Two forms of multinational military cooperation may be distinguished, i.e. horizontal and vertical multinationality. The former, traditional, type of interaction within multinational military contingents consists of a simple lining up of individual national units within a battle group. Direct work-related contacts between military personnel from the various national contingents therefore occur only at the level of headquarters (Klein and Kümmel 2000: 316 and Klein 2003: 309). Vertical multinationality, on the other hand, implies a greater degree of cooperation and interaction between the various national components and takes the form of mixed bi- or multinational contingents. Here, work-related interactions between personnel occur at the battalion or even company level. Another dimension of military multinational cooperation is the degree of specialization – simple or advanced – between the various national contingents. In simple integration, there is no task specialization between the various national components constituting the task force and cooperation takes the form of a simple juxtaposition of the national units, while in advanced cooperation, there is a certain degree of specialization.
If one crosses these two dimensions, one obtains four distinct forms of multinational military cooperation: simple horizontal (for instance, the Eurocorps) advanced horizontal (operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan) simple vertical (ISAF) and advanced vertical (no example yet; but perhaps one day, some form of an integrated European army).
International management in the business sector
International cooperation is not a phenomenon that is unique to the military. In the world of international business, it has become clear that management in an international context has its own peculiarities. International managers need to take into account that consumers and workforces in different countries are alike in many aspects but unlike in many other. If multinational companies fail to translate these differences into their production and marketing policies, they will undoubtedly face serious difficulties in their global operations. This phenomenon is so pervasive that at today's business schools international management and business are taught in separate courses and programmes.
These programmes are based on empirical knowledge indicating that people differ with respect to values and attitudes along national borders. In repeated studies and overviews (Schwartz 1994; Adler 2002; House et al. 2004; Vinken et al. 2004; Hofstede and Hofstede 2005; Smith, Peterson and Thomas 2008) systematic national differences have been demonstrated with regard to the way people deal with hierarchies and rules in organizations as well as with gender differences, decision-making, communication styles, and employees' orientation to work. In many studies these differences have been linked to national cultures. Despite globalization and McDonaldization, those national cultures seem to be fairly persistent. But there is more than just values, attitudes and cultures. Even though supranational developments – for instance in the European Union – tend to harmonize national rules and regulations (Drezner 2001), the institutional aspects of multinational cooperation in business remain fairly stubborn and not always easy to deal with. National differences in reward and co-determination systems, for example, can hamper effective decision-making and productive cooperation across borders, even when this occurs within the context of one multinational company (Peterson and Thomas 2007).
Even though business is currently one of the most international phenomena, there have been quite a number of experiences pointing at mutual misunderstanding, conflictual collaboration or even straight failures among business organizations working together. In 1996 estimates were that only half of the business endeavours to cooperate internationally were successful (Cartwright and Cooper 1996). One may argue that since that year learning experiences may have had an ameliorating impact, but still one should not be overly optimistic. In 1998 the German car producer Daimler Benz merged with USA-based Chrysler. From its very inception this bi-national automotive giant experienced difficulties that the partnering organizations never faced when they operated from within their home country only. Almost immediately, experts pointed at differences in national cultures and a lack of balance in the power distribution between the partners. In August 2007 the bi-national automotive giant faced the final curtain: it dissolved into two separate national companies again. This is not to say that multinational cooperation will never be successful; on the contrary, workforce diversity helps to develop more creative solutions to problems, and famous examples of strategic international alliances – for instance in the airline industries – are conquering the world. Yet, cases such as the Daimler/Chrysler venture remind us that multinational organizational arrangements – even though the logic behind them is undisputable – do not always automatically lead to satisfying results.
National differences between military organizations and their impact on multinational military cooperation
This is important for the military to keep in mind when starting multinational operations or creating permanent multinational military organizations. A study replicating Hofstede's influential work in the commercial sector (Soeters 1997) has shown that in the military national cultural differences do exist too, and to a large degree these differences are similar to what has been found in business life. However, there was also another remarkable finding: even though significant work-related cultural differences between national armed forces were revealed, there was also something like a supranational military culture. This military culture is – compared to civilian life – more collectivistic (uniforms!), more hierarchy-oriented and less salary-driven than the average civilian working culture. The consequence of this is that military personnel of different origins can often function and get along with each other without too many problems (Elron et al. 1999; Ben-Ari and Elron 2001). Famous scholars such as Charles Moskos even claim that military personnel from different countries seem to be better suited to work together than with civilian personnel from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or local agencies. Not surprisingly, the military often regards people from NGOs as "strange bedfellows" (Winslow 2002).
However, as said, there are also substantial cultural and institutional differences among the armed forces of different countries (Soeters, Poponete and Page 2006). As in civilian cultural studies (e.g. Ronen and Shenkar 1985), clusters of countries closely resembling each other have been identified. In the military – as in civilian life – an Anglo-Saxon cluster consisting of former British colonies (UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) can be discerned as well as a Latin cluster (France, Italy, Spain) and a Germanic cluster. Notwithstanding these results pointing at a certain degree of national heterogeneity, additional empirical research has also demonstrated that the armed forces from NATO countries are culturally more homogeneous than those from so called Partnership for Peace countries, i.e. countries from the previous communist alliance (Soeters, Poponete and Page 2006). Hence, the following observation seems to be valid; armed forces (from NATO) are alike in many aspects but they are unlike in many others. But is all this of more than theoretical and academic value? We would argue it is.
Various previous studies have demonstrated and argued that these facts indeed impact on the way operations are conducted. A number of qualitative case studies have made clear that national differences exist with respect to the influence of national politics on the conduct of operations, the way armed forces deal with conflicts including setting more or less ambitious operational goals as well as with respect to operational styles, the use of violence and force protection. Besides, there are clear work-related differences such as in leadership styles, rule orientation, work and living conditions and, more specifically, work load. Finally, there are clear differences in how various national military organizations relate to and communicate with the local population in the area of operation (see, for instance, Duffey 2000; Caniglia 2001; Fitz-Gerald 2003; Olonisakin 2003; Soeters et al. 2004b, 2006).
It may even be induced that as a consequence of such differences varying results in effectiveness and (societal) outcomes in the area of operations may be achieved. Of course, the link between differences in operational styles and final results is difficult to ascertain. In peace operations there are simply too many variables in play to make such unidimensional causal inferences. Yet, an observation by Stewart (2007), who acted as a high civil servant in the British area in Iraq right after the invasion in 2003, may be illustrative here. During his work in the area he more than once praised the British forces for their experienced, courageous and pro-active behaviour in the streets. He was much more critical in these aspects of the conduct of the Italian armed forces, who "occupied" another province in the same area of operation. Stewart deemed the Italian units to be too passive. Nonetheless, during his return to the region – one year after he had handed over his position to his successor – he came to an astonishing conclusion:
I found that Dhi Qar, [...] where I believed the closure of our office and the passivity of the Italian troops would lead to inchoate anarchy [...], had become one of the most secure provinces in Iraq, while Maysan, where the British had fought a prolonged and bloody battle for reform, was highly unstable. The Italian policy of inaction had produced a better result because it had forced Iraqis to take responsibility for their own affairs.
(Stewart 2007: 402)
Of course, this is only one observation, but it is illustrative of the idea that differences in operational styles may lead to differences in outcomes, and sometimes this is happening in surprising ways. What is more, differences in organizational and operational styles may lead to less than optimal cooperation in a multinational military setting. In the civilian business sector this has been observed often, as we saw before. This – the dynamics of multinational military cooperation – is what this volume is about.
Volume’s aim and content
Our ambitions in this volume are modest. We will not try to ascertain which national operational styles – under which conditions – lead to the best results. It is much too early to express such bold ambitions. Instead, we want to stick to providing an inventory of the knowledge with respect to military cooperation in multinational peace operations. We will focus on military–military interaction –including its political context – and leave the interaction between the military and NGOs and other local agencies to other publications (e.g. Rietjens and Bollen 2008). But even our modest goals are important given the fact that multinational cooperation is getting increasingly important in today's peace operations, as it does in international business. In the field of international business numerous publications and journals on cross-cultural management have appeared, and continue to do so. As far as we know this has not been the case so far in the field of multinational military cooperation. With this volume we aim to fill this void.
The volume consists of three parts. The first part contains four thematic overviews, delving into academic and practical knowledge from all sorts of studies and case descriptions concerning one specific facet of organized, military life in a multinational context.
The Canadian scholar Donna Winslow gives us an overview of UN operations, with a focus on African missions. She focuses on how the UN over the last decade has tried to improve the effectiveness of these operations. Given the systematic multinational character of these missions, ensuring interoperability and creating common operational styles (including ethics and legal issues) are crucial to enhance the overall effectiveness of these operations. The UN has formulated a number of policy changes in order to deal with these issues.
Israel-based expert Efrat Elron pursues on Winslow's work on the UN and focuses on the organizational level integration mechanisms used by peace operations to overcome the challenges of cultural and national diversity. To support her ideas she looks at a variety of UN missions in the Middle East and beyond through the eyes of their officers and commanders. The unique case of cooperation developed between UNIFIL, the Israeli Defence Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces is presented as an example in which lessons learned serve as the basis for the coordination and liaison between the armed forces on the two sides of the bor...