Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy

Positive Neutrality and the consolidation of the Turkmen Regime

Luca Anceschi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN: 9780415454407
• eBook ISBN: 9781134051557
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Turkmenistan, an independent nation since 1991, is a strategically important Central Asian state. This book covers the most significant period of the establishment of the Turkmen political regime. At the core of this book is the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, which, from 1995 onwards, constituted the theoretical backbone for the foreign policy of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The author analyses the reason and aim of the concept, its significance for and impact on the country's domestic and foreign relations, its practical implementation and its transformation into a tool of strengthening of absolute personal authority. Furthermore, he establishes whether Positive Neutrality has to be seen as a 'domestic-oriented' foreign policy, which has been used by the Turkmen regime to reinforce its internal position. .
This is the first book-length and thorough analysis of Turkmenistan's foreign policy. It furthers our understanding of Turkmenistan, and provides an informed background for the study of its foreign policy. It fills a void in the current literature, and it will constitute an essential reference for most scholars and researcher focusing on contemporary Central Asia, Russian foreign policy, Foreign Policy, International Relations and Comparative Politics.

Part I
Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy

1 Establishing a conceptual framework for the policy of Positive Neutrality

Neutralism has been the central element in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy for more than a decade. In the period June 1992–December 1995, the acquisition of international support for neutrality constituted the primary objective of Turkmen operational foreign policy. Following the UN endorsement of Turkmen Neutrality (12 December 1995), the state’s external relations have been reportedly conducted in strict conformity to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality.

Hence, Neutrality characterised Turkmen foreign policy for most of the post-independence era. Turkmen official publications usually presented the adoption of neutrality as an objective constantly pursued by the Turkmen government since the achievement of independence.¹ However, foreign policy declarations issued in the last months of 1991 and in the early post-Soviet era did not hint in any way at the possibility of adopting a neutral foreign policy. In January–June 1992, neutralism was not the keyword in the foreign policy agenda of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. It is therefore possible to suggest that neutralism became an option in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy only after specific policy determinants, linked with the external and/or internal dynamics typical of the post-Soviet era and clearly detached from the political landscape of the final Soviet period, came to the surface of Turkmen politics. One of the main aims of this chapter is to identify these foreign policy determinants. To do so, it is necessary to compare foreign policy documents issued by the Turkmen government prior and subsequent to June 1992 (the date of the earliest declaration on neutrality).

The first section of the chapter will describe in detail the foreign policy declarations issued during the late Soviet era (October–December 1991) by the government of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (TSSR). In these documents, eventually used as outlines for the earliest declarations on foreign policy of the post-independence era, neutrality was neither a significant component of declaratory policy nor a primary objective for operational policy. Reference to the neutral principle is also missing in foreign policy declarations issued during Avdy Ovezovich Kuliev’s tenure of the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January–August 1992). The analysis of Turkmenistan’s international relations during that period will constitute the core of the second section of the chapter, which will also touch upon the first operational steps of Turkmen foreign policy before clarifying the circumstances that led to the removal of the first foreign minister of post-Soviet Turkmenistan.

The third part of the chapter will examine the consequences of Kuliev’s dismissal, and, at the same time, will describe the diplomatic actions through which the Turkmen government accomplished the international recognition of Turkmenistan’s neutral status. This section will present a comparison between strategies and methods typical of the Turkmen foreign policy of early 1992 and those of the period following Kuliev’s removal, to highlight the extent to which operational policy during this period was significantly different from that of the first six months of 1992. The final section of the chapter will present the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, by discussing in greater details its sources and determinants, as well as by analysing its declared objectives and priorities.

Overall, the chapter is designed to assess the extent to which the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality has brought discontinuity into the foreign policy paradigm of post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The detailed examination of foreign policy documents issued before and after June 1992 will illustrate what degree of homogeneity is shared by the foreign policy courses implemented in these two chronological phases. The analysis of pre-neutrality foreign policy will hence be instrumental in highlighting the degree of innovativeness enjoyed by the doctrine, and, further-more, will present a number of elements that will favour a more precise understanding of the political milieu in which the policy itself was formulated.

Turkmen foreign policy in the late Soviet era: statements and objectives

On 1 October 1991, the Turkmen government issued the first official statement on independent policies (Zayavlenie Prezidenta Turkmenskoi SSR S.A. Niyazova i Verkhovnogo Soveta Turkmenskoi SSR ‘O Vnutrennei i Vneshnei Politike Turkmenistana’– Declaration of the President of the TSSR and of the Supreme Soviet of TSSR on domestic and foreign policy).² This document outlined the governmental positions on domestic and foreign policies, and constituted part of the text of the referendum on national independence submitted to the Turkmen electorate on 26 October.³ The historical-political milieu in which the national elite drafted this document strongly influenced the general tone of the declaration, reducing its political significance to a purely symbolic one.

The uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Union, mainly caused by the long and relatively fruitless inter-republican debate on the adoption of a new Union Treaty, led to the release of a text generally pervaded by a high degree of vagueness in describing the development of Turkmen independent policies. Moreover, the unenthusiastic attitude of the national elite (and of the Turkmen population as well) towards the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union motivated the overall tentative tone of this declaration, characterised by constant allusions to the necessity of preserving the Union. It is worth remembering that, in Soviet Central Asia, the accomplishment of full independence (i.e. total emancipation from the Soviet Union) was neither an issue in the political agendas of the republican leaders⁴ nor a political objective shared by the various popular movements active in the region.⁵ This coincidental relationship between the aims of the Turkmen elite and the opinions of the popular masses would prove decisive in determining the outcome of the national referendum.

Nevertheless, this document contained a number of useful, albeit vague, indications of the future course of Turkmen independent political life. A particular interest in Western models of political organisation emerged from the declaration. To begin with, the constant mention of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and of the Soviet Deklaratsiya Prav i Svobod Cheloveka (Declaration on Human Rights and Liberties, issued by the Congress of People’s Deputies in September 1991), suggested that the Turkmen elite was looking at both Soviet and non-Soviet juridical prototypes to base its own constitutional development. As far as economic policy was concerned, the declaration flagged the intention of abandoning planned centralism in a relatively short period of time, in favour of a market-oriented economic system.

Besides a number of general (and highly rhetorical) remarks on the necessity of implementing competitive democracy in Turkmenistan, avoiding social, religious and ethnic conflicts and solving the economic crisis, the TSSR government vaguely announced its foreign policy strategy, by portraying the basic conduct of its international relations as follows: ‘Turkmenistan will not interfere in other states’ domestic politics, will respect international law, will conduct a non-aggressive foreign policy and will build peaceful relations with other nations’.⁶

On 26 October 1991, 94.1 per cent of the Turkmen electorate voted in favour of national independence, while a similarly large majority of voters (93.5 per cent) supported the adoption of the governmental declaration issued on 1 October.⁷ The Supreme Soviet of TSSR convened the same day to outline the draft of a Constitutional Law on Independence. On 28 October, the Konstitutsionnyi Zakon Turkmenistana o Nezavisimosti i Osnovakh Gosudarstvennogo Ustroistva Turkmenistana (Constitutional Law on Independence and on the Fundamental National Structures of Turkmenistan), was adopted.⁸ The document, consisting of 20 clauses, provided rather detailed information on domestic, social and economic policies, and outlined (clause 14) the guidelines of the national foreign policy as follows:

Turkmenistan, as an independent state and as a full member of the international community, will formulate and implement its foreign policy in accordance with the directives of the United Nations and other International organisations; will establish diplomatic, consular, commercial relations [with other states], will exchange diplomatic missions and will be entitled to be part [sic] in international agreements.

(Turkmenskaya Iskra, 29 October 1991)

As far as defence policy was concerned, the Constitutional Law of 28 October included more extensive information (clause 15)⁹ about the aims of the elite, while reaffirming the intention of promoting the creation of a national army.

The Constitutional Law of 28 October 1991 can be considered a benchmark in Turkmen diplomatic history. At the same time, it constituted the last document on foreign policy issued by the Turkmen government in the Soviet era. The proclamation of Turkmenistan as a full member of the international community and the statement of intention to establish full diplomatic relations with other state entities were the first political steps towards the complete emancipation of Turkmen foreign policy from the central control of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Because of its centrifugal implications and its deceptively secessionist tone, this law could be considered as thoroughly inconsistent with the objective of participating in a renewed Soviet Union which, in October 1991, constituted the primary foreign policy objective of the TSSR government. Nevertheless, the necessity of preserving Turkmen participation in the Union emerged as the guiding factor in the reaction of the Turkmen ruling class to the events of December 1991.

After the signature of the Minsk Agreement (8 December 1991), the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the temporary exclusion of the Central Asian republics from the membership of this organisation, Turkmenistan found itself isolated from the former centre of the Union and, consequently, the accomplishment of its primary foreign policy seemed to be seriously compromised. However, in the days following the creation of the CIS a significant diplomatic effort was performed by the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs to persuade the other Central Asian republics to reach a common position regarding the newly born organisation. The Ashgabat meeting (14 December 1991) was the concrete result of this effort. During that summit, the Central Asian leaders clearly stated their intention to join the CIS and their claims would be eventually accepted (21 December) by the three founding members of the organisation (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus). Therefore, Turkmen diplomacy contributed to the establishment of the post-Soviet order.¹⁰ The preservation of vital links with the former centre of the Union was consequently accomplished through the creation of the CIS. The creation of this organisation, however, provoked the break-up of the Soviet Union and formalised the independence of 15 new states, including Turkmenistan.

Turkmen foreign policy in the early post-Soviet era (January–August 1992)

Creating foreign policy ab initio was Kuliev’s main task. Unavailability of experienced personnel and lack of funding were among the main difficulties impinging upon the effectiveness of the Turkmen MID.¹¹ Furthermore, the intention of coordinating the foreign policies of the CIS member states, aired in 1991 during the debate on the New Union Treaty,¹² was not contained in the Agreement on Establishment of the Commonwealth. The text included only vague provisions on the level of coordination of the member states’ foreign policies and did not spell out the creation of supranational structures specifically devoted to the accomplishment of this target.¹³ Therefore, the newly independent states had to formulate their foreign policy objectives simply on the basis of their own diplomatic experience, which, in the case of Turkmenistan, was extremely limited. Further, in early 1992, the Turkmen government turned its attention to the domestic aspects of the state-building process,¹⁴ largely neglecting foreign policy-making. As a consequence, the Turkmen MID was not reformed or expanded, and a comprehensive analysis of objective and subjective foreign policy determinants did not take place. This resulted in the release of a number of foreign policy statements analogous to the declarations of October 1991 and to the implementation of rather linear and unsophisticated operational policies.

In developing Turkmen foreign policy, the first step was to secure international diplomatic recognition for Turkmenistan through the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries and, where possible, the exchange of diplomatic missions. More specifically, the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated a number of countries whose relations with Turkmenistan had to be immediately strengthened, because of their significant strategic importance. They included:¹⁵

• The Russian Federation;
• Other former Soviet republics;
• Neighbouring states, including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Afghanistan;
• Western states.

Turkmenistan’s list of strategic partners approximately coincided with those of Kyrgyzstan,¹⁶ Kazakhstan¹⁷ and Uzbekistan.¹⁸ Similarities in assessing the Central Asian republics’ geopolitical position and in selecting rather obvious strategic partners were not the only common elements in the early stages of their foreign policy-making processes. Analogies in historical determinants, economic priorities, geographical position and, to a greater extent, similar logistic problems in creating their own diplomatic institutions, led the different Central Asian foreign ministries to develop embryonic foreign policy paradigms whose form and content were frequently parallel. In other words, the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia ended up elaborating foreign policy by default.

The analysis of Turkmenistan’s relations with its international partners must necessarily connect with the discourse of foreign models of development, which, in the first part of the 1990s, dominated the scholarly debate on Central Asian politics.¹⁹ This discourse contains a number of naïve arguments and several clichés. To begin with, the initial supposition was that the Central Asian regimes were to engage in transitional processes of economic liberalisation, part of a more general political liberalisation paradigm. A rather linear vision of post-Soviet politics seemed to fascinate several Western scholars and perhaps members of the intelligentsiya of the newly independent states. The initial assumption was based on the idea that the Central Asian republics (as well as other former members of the Soviet Union) wished to become Western-style liberal democracies.²⁰ The long ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• PART I Contextualising Turkmenistan’s foreign policy
• PART II The operational dimension of Turkmen foreign policy
• Appendix
• Notes
• Bibliography