1 Transitions to adulthood
This chapter presents current discussions on transitions to adulthood in postindustrialised societies. My aim is to provide the global context in which my stories can be understood, and to invite readers to consider some of the questions raised below when reading the following chapters. The chapter argues that industrial societies have experienced diverse patterns in transition to adulthood, at least partly due to the institutional variations (e.g. welfare regime, schooling–employment link) under which transition occurs, but have also shared new trends (e.g. prolonged period of education, casual employment, deferment of marriage). Japanese experience a welfare regime in which families are expected to play a substantial role and where there is a close connection in the education–employment link between individual schools and their network of employers. Both of these features contribute to a context that differs from that of the Anglo-West.
Normative and subjective notions of adulthood
In any society, there is a distinction between a society’s dominant notion of adulthood (what it should be), and an individual’s subjective understanding of adulthood (how one feels). The normative concept in Western postindustrialised societies assumes that a defining characteristic of the transition from youth to adult status is the progression from partial dependence on parents to independence, and a reliance by individuals on themselves (and their partners) for resourcing their daily living arrangements, often in the family that they create (e.g. Irwin 1995: 2; Kerckhoff 1990: 2). The concept often specifies role transitions or events that young people are expected to achieve, and which are often used as a benchmark to assess how young people are doing. There has been a conventional consensus on major role transitions in these societies: leaving school, being integrated into the labour market by obtaining a fulltime job, leaving home, marrying (or living in a de facto relationship) and becoming a parent (e.g. Shanahan 2000: 667; Kerckhoff 1990: 25; Cote 2000: 4). Since a society’s normative concept is formed by its history, institutions, and economic and political circumstances, we can expect each society to have a different collective set of expectations of adulthood. Sub-groups within a society (for example, based on gender, ethnicity, locality, sexuality) also attach different meanings to adulthood. At this basic level, Japan and the Western post-industrial societies resemble one another; the transition to adulthood is conceived of in terms of ‘events’ and ‘markers’, and this conception is understood to be normative, often created by the older generation, and having internal variations based on class, gender and ethnicity.
It is in the context of society’s normative notion of adulthood that popular debate on transition to adulthood takes place when young people’s actual experience is discussed. Young people in North America and Europe experience their late teens and their 20s quite differently from their counterparts of three decades ago, and these new trends have attracted research interest in recent years (e.g. Arnett 2004; Settersten et al. 2005; Booth et al. 1999; Furstenberg et al. 2002; Mortimer and Larson 2002; Corijn and Klijzing 2001; Fussell and Gauthier 2005). These studies suggest that young people tend to remain in education longer, try out different casual jobs before settling down in fulltime employment (in particular, in Anglophone societies), experience periods of unemployment, live with their parents, and defer marriage and parenthood. They are less likely to see completing role transitions as the end point to adulthood. They may reverse roles (for instance returning to schooling after periods of employment, and to their parents’ home after leaving home) in order to respond to, for example, changing circumstances of employment (an outcome of structural changes) and romantic relationships. Some spend time travelling overseas and participate in various voluntary or community services before deciding what they wish to do with their lives. For example, in Australia, where I have lived for over a decade, young people undergo a lengthy process to achieve ‘on-going’ employment. According to an Australian study ‘The Life Patterns Project’ (1991–2001), which traced high school graduates of 1991 (conducted over virtually the same period as this Japanese study), only 19 per cent entered the workforce without further study, and eight years after leaving school 47 per cent had made an on-going career for themselves (Dwyer and Wyn 2001: 114–18). While ‘having a steady job’ was still the first priority in their late 20s, these young people attached increasing importance to private interests because of experiences (e.g. overseas travel, unemployment, trying out various jobs) that had led them to form their priorities (Dwyer and Wyn 2001: 186, 198).
There is a general consensus that such trends have resulted from social changes in recent decades (Bynner et al. 1997; Wyn and Dwyer 2000; Maguire et al. 2001; Morrow and Richards 1996), but divergent views exist as to which aspects of change have been most significant. While some see the changing opportunity structure of the economy (and employment) as most influential (e.g. Booth et al. 1999; Roberts 2003; Bradley and van Hoof 2005), others emphasise the changing cultural dynamic, for example the increasing acceptance of cohabitation without marriage, as an equally key driver of change (Modell 1999).
The new trends in transitions to adulthood, and the society’s acknowledgement of and increasing concern about them, at least partially explain the emergence of the term ‘young adults’ in the media discourse in the West. The term ‘young adult’ has been in use since the 1960s to describe what psychologists identified as the transition period between adolescence and established adulthood (e.g. Bocknek 1980). It has now entered the administrative vocabulary in continental Europe (EGISR 2001; Cicchelli and Martin 2004). In North America, the terms ‘arrested adulthood’ (Cote 2000) and ‘emerging adulthood’ (Arnett 2004) effectively capture not only the experiences of young people but also how they subjectively conceive of their experience of young adulthood.
Do we see a similar debate on young adulthood in contemporary Japan? The equivalent term in the Japanese language for ‘young adult’ is not frequently used. The media and books for parents and young people have variously presented views on what it means to be an adult (otona), such as a biographical account of growing up by a well-known film critic (Sato 1998), advice from counselling psychologists (e.g. Kawai 1996), exploratory accounts by academics (e.g. Kadowaki and Sataka 2001), and a collection of diverse views held by well-known individuals (Kariya 2006). In contrast to the first two examples, which present somewhat normative accounts, the latter two encourage individual initiative and diversity in creating paths to adulthood.
The academic literature on young people tends to centre on the frîtâ phenomenon, which Japanese society sees as ‘problematic’. Instead of entering the fulltime permanent workforce, frîtâ hold short-term contract or casual jobs. While it is common for young people in the Anglophone West to pursue a period of personal development partly by undertaking casual employment prior to starting a fulltime job, this phenomenon is relatively new in Japan where a linear progression from fulltime schooling to fulltime work has been considered as a desirable norm. Critics have sought to identify causes for this phenomenon: for example, individual young people who are said to lack self-discipline; changing employment practices, in which employers are less willing to offer permanent jobs; the nature of employment conditions (e.g. long hours and the kind of commitment to employers which many young people seem reluctant to take on); the apparent failure of institutions such as schools and employment–related companies and government agencies to adapt to on-going changes in employment practices and the lifestyle preferences of their young clients (Tachibanaki 2004; Honda 2005a; Miyamoto 2004; Kosugi 2002, 2003; Nihon-Rôdô-Kenkyû-Kikô 2000a, 2000b). While all acknowledge that these factors in combination have resulted in the emergence of increasing number of frîtâ, they differ in the weight given to the respective elements. Another phenomenon widely discussed is ‘parasite singles’ (Yamada 1999), young people who choose to remain in their parents’ homes in order to enjoy the convenience of rent-free accommodation and being looked after by their mothers, while enjoying the freedom afforded by relatively sizable disposable incomes. Various possible explanations have been suggested: reluctance on the part of those who grew up in affluence to assume less affluent lifestyles on their own incomes, lack of independence of parents who have spoiled their children in nuclear families, and so forth. What is missing is how young people themselves, regardless of employment status and living arrangements, make sense of becoming an adult.
‘Refusal of adulthood’ among the young is a phrase frequently heard in recent years. It suggests that young people’s experiences often do not conform to the normative notion created by the dominant section of the society and by the older generations. It also signals that young people are questioning and even refusing the ‘dominant version of adulthood’ (Maguire et al. 2001: 198). If young people are not content with the normative notion of ‘adulthood’, how do they subjectively conceive of the transition to adulthood, and what ‘adulthood’ entails?
When asked their views of adulthood, the answers of young people in the West indicate that they construct their own notion more in terms of intangible, individualistic, psychological characteristics (e.g. Arnett 1997; Cote 2000; Westberg 2004). This might be more prevalent among middleclass young people, who do not see completion of adult role transitions as central to survival (since their parents are well resourced to assist and support them), or who are not pressured by their families to fully take on adult roles. A longitudinal study of Dutch youth concluded that those from the ‘lower class’ tended to perceive adulthood in terms of securing a job and starting a family, while higher-class youth associated adulthood with individual development (Plug et al. 2003). Indeed, studies suggest that experiences of early adulthood are shaped by social class (e.g. Bynner et al. 1997; Maguire et al. 2001; Johnson 2002; Johnson and Elder 2002; Ferri 1993; Morrow and Richards 1996; Plug et al. 2003), ethnic background (Wulff 1995) and gender (e.g. Griffin 1985; Gaskell 1992; Leadbeater and Way 1996; Valli 1986; Thomson et al. 2004; Fussell and Gauthier 2005). Any combination of the three in a specific national or regional context creates a set of experiences that differ from the mainstream privileged (e.g. Connolly et al. 1992; Shorter-Gorden and Washington 1996; Skeggs 1997; Mirza 1992; Walkerdine et al. 2001; Olsen 1996; McRobbie 1978: Mahaffy 2003).
These forces (class, ethnic background, gender, geographical region) shape the transition process, directly by providing a concrete range of opportunities and conditions (social, cultural and material), and indirectly by influencing young people’s long-term aspirations, immediate expectations and plans, as well as their daily decision-making. Countering post-modern fluidity and individualisation, Roberts (2003) argues that social origin and structural factors remain crucial for adulthood transitions. People select one course of action from the range of options that they consider to be personally suitable and possible (Okano 1993), which Hodkinson and his colleagues (Hodkinson et al. 1996) call ‘horizons for action’. In what ways were the Japanese women’s trajectories shaped by individual decisions and external conditions?
International variations: institutional explanations
Beyond shared tendencies, there are variations in the transition paths to adulthood in industrialised societies in the Anglo-West and Europe (Heinz 1999). Comparative studies suggest, for example, that young people in these countries are similar at the age of 15 (when few have left school or entered fulltime employment, let alone started their own households and had children) and again at the age of 35 (when many of them have experienced all these transition roles), but the experiences marking the paths between the two ages can vary quite significantly between countries (Cook and Furstenberg 2002).
While young people without tertiary education in Anglophone societies try out jobs in the secondary labour market for a few years before settling on jobs in the primary labour market, German youth experience a more predictable transition via a standardised apprenticeship through the close institutional linkages between schools and the employment system (Heinz 1999). The Swedish welfare system provides a specific youth allowance (generous in comparison to Anglo-Western nations), which means that economic independence is less problematic, and therefore less important, in defining the notion of adulthood (Westberg 2004: 38). In Eastern European nations, which recently adopted the market economy, employment is a prime issue in the transition (Roberts 2003). We see international variations when observing young people’s transition to adulthood in France (Cicchelli and Martin 2004), the Netherlands (du Bois-Reymond 1998; Plug et al. 2003), the UK (Raffe et al. 2001; Thomson et al. 2004; MacDonald 1998), North America (Cote 2000; Arnett 2004) and Australia (Dwyer and Wyn 2001). Existing comparative studies have covered Europe, Anglophone Oceania and North America (EGRIS 2001; special issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 580 (Furstenberg et al. 2000)), but none of them includes Japan, one of the few non-Western post-industrial democracies with a wealth distribution comparable to Western countries. Japan offers an institutional linkage between vocational high schools and employers, not akin to the German apprenticeship system but based on a long-term recruitment relationship between schools and employers.
In explaining international variations, Breen and Buchmann’s attempt is helpful. Using a comparison of the countries of Western Europe and Anglophone Western countries (North America, Australia and New Zealand), Breen and Buchmann (2002: 303) argue that variations in many aspects of the transition to adulthood derive, at least partially, from institutional variations that provide the context in which the transition takes place. Institutional variations offer a set of opportunities and constraints to which young people and other players (e.g. employers and teachers) respond, and contribute to the development of normatively acceptable modes of behaviour. Their analysis conceives institutional variations in terms of: (1) welfare regime types (‘conservative welfare regime’, ‘liberal welfare regime’ and ‘social democratic welfare regime’), (2) the nature of educational systems, and (3) labour market regulations. I will explain these in turn.
First, conservative welfare regimes, which exist in the German- and Frenchspeaking countries of continental Europe, try to maintain status differentials and provide occupational- and status-based welfare programmes that differ in their benefit level. Liberal welfare regimes believe in the central role of the market and minimal interference, which leads to means-tested benefits (often applied in cases of market failure). Social democratic welfare regimes, such as those of Scandinavian countries, attempt to maintain universalistic benefit levels and individual entitlements set at average or middleclass levels (Breen and Buchmann 2002: 290–91). Southern European welfare regimes tend to rely on the family to provide welfare for (and to channel any welfare benefits to) individuals through the head of the household, while maintaining a relatively low level of welfare provision by the state. Social democratic welfare regimes take the society’s collective responsibility for settlement into adulthood to the greatest extent, while liberal welfare regimes have the minimum involvement in the process.
Second, in education systems, the most important variation, according to Breen and Buchmann, is the nature of the link between education and occupation. Such a link is most direct and specific in societies that strictly maintain both standardisation of educational provision and stratification of the system. At one end of the continuum are societies where educational qualifications signal to employers what capacities a potential employee offers in terms of a particular job, as in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. At the other end specific vocational skills tend not to be taught at higher levels in the formal school system (Breen and Buchmann 2002: 291–92).
Third, in relation to the labour market, job security is considered the most important factor in the transition. Employment protection legislation is strong in social democratic and conservative welfare regimes and weak in Anglophone nations. Southern European countries maintain a secure economic position for the head of the household since the family is assumed to provide welfare for its members. Young people face more difficulties in a labour market with strong employment protection since employers are reluctant to employ new workers whom they cannot easily dismiss (Breen and Buchmann 2002: 292–93). These institutional factors create a set of clusters. In Anglophone societies, what is learned at school is not specifically linked to job demand, and employment tenure is precarious. The opposite is the case in German-speaking countries (Breen and Buchmann 2002: 294). These institutional variations provide a set of conditions (both opportunities and constraints) under which young people navigate their decision-making and actions, and which guide them in planning for the future.
Seen in this scheme, contemporary Japan displays some of the features of Southern European welfare regimes, in that the state wishes families to play significant roles in providing welfare for their family members. Although in Japan unemployment benefits are paid to individuals rather than the household head, receipt of the benefits has conditions, such as a certain length of prior employment, and an extended waiting period (usually three months) before payment starts. The link between what youth learn at school and employment is strong for vocational high schools (which produce 25 per cent of high school graduates), but weak for academic high schools. Academic high schools display diversity, ranging from elite schools which send all graduates to high-ranking universities to those which rank even lower than vocational high schools in terms of entry requirements (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 62–74). One of the most important roles that vocational high schools perform for their students is in providing and managing a system of school-based job referral, which is built on long-term relationships between individual schools and their network of employers. Surveys suggest that teenagers at vocational high schools possess clearer post-school occupational plans and less sense of being lost (Honda 2005b). In these institutional settings, how do Japanese working-class young adults make transitions to adulthood, in comparison with their counterparts in Western countries?
2 A longitudinal ethnography
Shino: Of course being a student is easier. Being employed looks demanding. Students can sleep, or take a day off, and you can do what you want if you join a club. You can get teachers to do various things. I guess now that I’m leaving school soon, I can say this. I’d love to be at school another year if I could.
(2 December 1989, three months prior to high school graduation)
People sometimes find themselves unexpectedly in a lasting relationship with a particular town or city. My relationship with Kobecity has been one of those. More than 17 years ago in early 1989, as a novice researcher I chose the city as the location for my PhD fieldwork for nothing more than pragmatic reasons, to carry out my study on working-class high school students’ decision-making about post-school destinations. I was looking for an urban area that offered many employers who absorbed high school graduates, where a relatively large minority population resided (although their presence was not conspicuous to casual observers), and where I could live relatively inexpensively. Since then I have been involved in other projects, and it was one of these projects that again brought me back to this city in 2006 to spend a year on sabbatical. I am extremely pleased that I am writing the final stages of this longitudinal study in Kobecity where it all started. Just being here brings back fond memories of many encounters and conversations over the last 17 years.
In this chapter, I set out the context for what follows. There are three tasks. I will briefly describe Kobecity, where I first met the women in this study as high school students and which is the setting for their lives as detailed in this book. This description includes a brief illustration of the 1995 Hanshin–Awaji earthquake that affected the city and these women and their families in many different ways. I shall then explain my relationship with the women, which has evolved gradually over the years, since this is crucial for understanding the nature of the data that I collected and how I interpreted them.
Kobe: a city in the Hanshin conurbation
Kobe is one of the largest cities in the Hanshin conurbation of western Japan. The city originally stood on a long narrow coastal strip bounded by steep mountains running parallel to the coast; but now covers a much more extensive area, having gradually expanded its territory over the mountains. On a clear day, from the top of the mountain, looking seaward you can see the coastline of Osaka Bay and the Seto Island Sea, and looking inland spreading bushland. In winter the mountain tops are often covered by snow and ponds freeze over, while the coastal suburbs hardly ever experience such conditions.
Kobe is typical of coastal cities in the Kansai region. It is home to an extensive range of manufacturing, high-technology and service industries. High-rise office blocks housing local government and company offices and retail outlets concentrate in the city centre. Department stores and shopping malls and streets near major train stations throng with people of all ages. There are numerous temples and shrines, several Christian churches,...