Friendship, Altruism and Morality (Routledge Revivals)

Laurence A. Blum

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• Print ISBN: 9780415570909
• eBook ISBN: 9781135156213
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, originally published in 1980, gives an account of "altruistic emotions" (compassion, sympathy, concern) and friendship that brings out their moral value. Blum argues that moral theories centered on rationality, universal principle, obligation, and impersonality cannot capture this moral importance. This was one of the first books in contemporary moral philosophy to emphasize the moral significance of emotions, to deal with friendship as a moral phenomenon, and to challenge the rationalism of standard interpretations of Kant, although Blum's "sentimentalism" owes more to Schopenhauer than to Hume. It was a forerunner to care ethics, and feminist ethics more generally; to virtue ethics; and to subsequent influential interpretations of Kant that attempted to room for altruistic emotion and friendship, and other forms of particularism and partialism. In addition, the work has been widely influential in religious studies, political theory, bioethics, and feminist ethics.

NOTES

I
ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS AND THE KANTIAN VIEW

1 I have in mind some contemporary works on Kant such as Mary Gregor’s Laws of Freedom, Keith Ward’s The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics, and John Rawls’s reading of Kant in A Theory of Justice, as well as increased attention to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals—all of which argue for a less formalist account of rationality, a less severe dichotomy between reason and inclination, the presence of empirical elements in morality, and the like, as part of a sound interpretation of Kant.

2 For support for this view of morality see Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, Joel Feinberg, ‘Supererogation and Rules’; and W.D.Falk, ‘Morality, Self, and Others.’

3 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, pp. 49–50.

4 Ibid., p. 71.

II
ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS AS MORAL MOTIVATION

1 ‘Weal’ (a translation of the German ‘Wohl’) will be useful for my purposes in distinguishing among several concepts of ‘good’ for which the German language provides different words (Wohl, Gut, Güte) while the English does not. It is approximately equivalent to the philosophical use of the word ‘welfare,’ but is somewhat broader in scope. I will also use its opposite, ‘woe’ (in German, ‘Übel’).

2 A fuller account of the cognitive dimension—as well as of the other features mentioned below—of the altruistic emotions is

3 given in my ‘Compassion.’ Nor, I would claim, can emotions be analyzed as dispositions to have such feeling-states.

4 Philip Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics, p. 10.

5 It is worth noting also that, though impulsive, an action might turn out well, because though the agent did not really have enough information to understand his situation adequately, his spontaneous ‘take’ on it turned out to be right (so that it was not merely an accident that it did turn out well). Moreover the sympathetic or compassionate impulse can be admirable even if the act, taken as a whole, is morally defective. That is, it can be a good thing about the agent that he is a concerned person who so wants to help, though it is a deficiency in him that this concern takes such impulsive forms, i.e., that he acts without sufficient understanding or grasp of his situation. These considerations mitigate the defectiveness of impulsive though altruistic action.

6 That there are degrees of the strength of the desire for the other’s good, and thus of the motivation to help the other involved in different altruistic emotions and sentiments, is recognized by Aristotle, in his discussion of eunoia (‘well-wishing’ or ‘goodwill’ in Thomson’s translation) which Aristotle contrasts to ‘friendship,’ philia (Nichomachean Ethics, book 9, chapter 5). Of persons who have eunoia towards others Aristotle says, ‘All they wish is the good of those for whom they have a kindness; they would not actively help them to attain it, nor would they put themselves about for their sake’ (p. 269). The contrast Aristotle is drawing is with friendship rather than with altruistic emotions (which play a minimal role within Aristotle’s ethical theory), but it is the same contrast which I am drawing between well-wishing and altruistic emotions: between a sentiment which does not, and one which does (or does to a much greater degree) involve a disposition to help the other.

7 Important steps in this direction (focused primarily on the concept of generosity)—to which my brief remarks above are indebted— are Lester Hunt, ‘Generosity,’ and James Wallace, chapter 5 (‘Benevolence’) of Virtues and Vices. See also my ‘Compassion.’

8 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 14:398.

9 For a development of this point see Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women.

10 One might perhaps imagine extreme forms of depression in which a person is unable to find virtually anything in the world in which to find meaning or interest, or to which he can form a commitment or attachment. His inability to be touched by the plight of others so as to be moved by sympathy or compassion would then be part of a general inability to value anything, including his own pursuits. But this case, though not without its own philosophical significance, is of a fairly serious form of emotional disturbance. It is much more than a mere state of mind or mood of depression, and so is not strictly relevant to the issue of the effect of negative moods on altruistic feelings.

11 In considering the significance of this admission for the adequacy of altruistic emotions as moral motives, it is important to point out that we are capable of counteracting, or attempting to counteract, this effect. If I know myself to be someone who, when in bad moods, is less sympathetic than usual, and if I desire that this not be the case, then I might be able to compensate for this tendency in myself. When I feel myself to be in a bad mood I can make a special effort to be attentive and receptive to others.

On another level I may attempt to understand what it means about myself that I tend to get into moods which have the effect of closing me to altruistic feelings. There may be deeper sources of this in my personality. Though it may be difficult in particular cases for me to counteract its effects, a more powerful method such as psychotherapy might get at the root of this condition.

12 W.D.Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 144.

13 C.D.Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp. 117–18.

14 Whether one could like or feel affection for another person and yet have no more inclination to feel sympathy or compassion for him or her than if one did not is another issue. All I am arguing here is that sympathy and affection do not always occur together.

15 Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 63:401 (Academy edition page number). Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics p. 239.

16 Kant, ibid., pp. 53:392. 62:400, and Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16:399.

17 Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, loc. cit.

18 See, e.g., Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 15–16:399, and The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 62:400. In the latter passage one sees Kant’s ambivalence about whether to call beneficence from duty ‘love’ at all, or to restrict love to what is a matter of feeling. The former view, seen in the Foundations passage and elsewhere, preserves Kant’s roots in the Christian tradition in which love is a commandment, a duty; the latter view more accurately follows through on the Kantian view that it is strictly only conduct which can be commanded of us, and not feelings at all.

19 Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 63:401.

20 ‘For when incentives other than the law itself (such as ambition, self-love in general, yes, even a kindly instinct such as sympathy) are necessary to determine the will to conduct conformable with the law, it is merely accidental that these causes coincide with the law, for they could equally well incite its violation.’ (Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 26.)

See also Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 6:390, and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p. 57.

21 Bernard Williams articulates this notion of being moral as equally within everyone’s capability as a central Kantian line of thought in ‘The Idea of Equality,’ from Problems of the Self, p. 228.

22 See, e.g., Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 37:379.

23 In this stage of the argument I follow Kant in using the following interchangeably: ‘sense of duty’, ‘sense that (firm conviction that) something is morally right or wrong’, ‘sense of obligation’, ‘sense that one ought morally to do…’, though there are in fact not insignificant differences between them.

24 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 23–4:407–8, and elsewhere.

25 The notion is spelled out explicitly in Thomas ...

Table of contents

• International Library of Philosophy
• CONTENTS
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• I ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS AND THE KANTIAN VIEW
• II ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS AS MORAL MOTIVATION
• III FRIENDSHIP, BENEFICENCE, AND IMPARTIALITY
• IV FRIENDSHIP AS A MORAL PHENOMENON
• V DIRECT ALTRUISM, UNIVERSALIZABILITY, AND CONSISTENCY
• VI ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, REASON, AND PERCEPTION
• VII THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS
• VIII WILL, EMOTION, AND THE SELF
• NOTES
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX