German Unification 1989-90

Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume VII

Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, Stephen Robert Twigge, Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, Stephen Robert Twigge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• eBook ISBN: 9781135238643
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

This volume is comprised of a collection of diplomatic documents covering British reactions to, and policy towards, the collapse of the German Democratic Republic and the unification of Germany in 1989-90.

The peaceful unification of Germany in 1989-90 brought a dramatic end to the Cold War. This volume documents official British reactions to the collapse of East Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the evolution of British policy during the 'Two plus Four' negotiations that provided the international framework for the merger of the two German states. All of the documents fall within the UK's 30-year rule and have therefore not previously been in the public domain. Most are drawn from the archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but there are also a large number of Prime Ministerial files from the Cabinet Office archives. These are of particular interest for the light they throw on the views of Margaret Thatcher. Taken together, the documents show that despite Mrs Thatcher's well-known reservations about German unity, the United Kingdom played a vital and constructive role in the negotiations that helped to bring it about.

This volume will be of great interest to students of International History, British Political History, and European Politics and International Relations in general.

Patrick Salmon is Chief Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Keith Hamilton is a Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Senior Editor of Documents on British Policy Overseas.

Stephen Twigge is a Senior Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CHAPTER I
10 April – 9 November 1989

No. 1

Sir C.Mallaby (Bonn) to Sir G.Howe

[WRG 020/3]

Confidential BONN, 10 April 1989

Summary … ¹

Sir,

The Federal Republic of Germany: How Reliable an Ally?

1. There is another burst of doubt in NATO capitals about the reliability of the Federal Republic. This despatch considers which doubts are justified.

2. It would be hard to find any responsible observer in the Federal Republic, German or foreign, who sees any prospect of the Federal Republic leaving the Alliance or of an early move to achieve reunification. But there is debate about how far there is a danger that the lure of detente or a prospect of reunification could one day weaken Federal German alignment in the West. And there are concerns about present attitudes in the Federal Republic. Two worrying trends have recently grown. The first is uncritical enthusiasm for Gorbachev and a willingness to believe that the Soviet threat has gone. The second trend, related to the first, is growing public impatience with defence activities in Germany, above all low flying and other military training. The question is whether the causes for concern will grow, and the Federal Republic become an increasingly difficult partner.

A Special Psychology

3. The history and psychology of the Federal Republic are different in important ways from those of our other Allies. German history is full of uncertainties and late political development. Until the founding of the Federal Republic there was little experience of democracy: only the heavily authoritarian version left by Bismarck and the feebly unstable one of the Weimar Republic from 1919 to 1933. Stability has been unusual in German history, and was not present in this century until after 1945. Even the extent of Germany has never been decided. Unity came only in 1871 and lasted but 74 years. Today, the Eastern part of the Germany of 1871-1945 is lost and the remainder is divided. So the Federal Republic is less than half

¹ Not printed.

the size of Bismarck’s unified Germany. The appalling crimes of Nazism, which many still remember, cause a lack of self-confidence and a tendency to guilt. Germany has a history of looking East as well as West. For centuries Germans colonised areas stretching eastwards to places which are today within the Soviet Union. More recently, the Nazi-Soviet pact was the worst but not the only example of the Eastern connection prevailing for a time over the Western.

4. One of the effects today of this combination of past factors is that the West Germans are prone to emotional surges of hope whenever things seem to be improving in East-West relations. One reason is the division of Germany and the aspiration to reunification and of course the position of Berlin. Another is Angst about another war, caused by memories of the last one and by the Federal Republic’s geographical position as the West’s frontline state, bound to suffer terrible destruction in any East-West conflict. Another factor in the wish for reconciliation with the East is guilt, because of Nazi aggression and atrocities. Guilt is strong in the Federal Republic’s view of Poland and an element in its view of the Soviet Union. Even West Germans who are agnostic about reunification want to help the East Germans, who are seen as suffering much more for Hitler’s wrongs than the free and prosperous Federal Germans.

5. Adenauer’s contribution was to establish the principle that the Federal Republic’s integration into the West must take priority over efforts to achieve reunification. The aim of reunification was written into the Federal Republic’s constitutional law, but the implication was that it was a long term objective. Freedom was to be the condition of reunification not the price. A strong Federal Republic, profiting from the Western connection, would be better able to influence the question of Germany’s future. That has remained the general view. Today opinion polls show that a majority, even among the young, still think of the Germans as one people. No-one questions in any serious way the heavy subsidies that are essential to Berlin’s viability. But in 1987, 72% of West Germans were found not to expect reunification in the foreseeable future. In 1986, less than half of people in their twenties thought it worth continuing to state the long term goal of reunification. Polls are only indications. But it is safe to conclude that, for most West Germans, the European status quo is a matter for questioning discussion, and for a considerable number it is unsatisfactory as a lasting arrangement. Reunification is still an aspiration of many people, but definitely not a worked out policy.

The Federal Republic’s Achievements

6. This 40th anniversary year is a time to recall the impressive achievements of the Federal Republic. It is the one successful democracy in German history, and has already lasted 3 times as long as Weimar. The Federal Republic has achieved security and peace for a period longer than the tragic stretch from 1914 to 1945. It has achieved great prosperity, building Europe’s largest and the world’s third largest economy. It has gained considerable international respect and self-respect. For many years people spoke of the Federal Republic, with its economic miracle, as an economic giant but a political dwarf. Today the voice of the Federal Republic in the West and its role in East-West relations have brought the dwarf to normal height, though there still are limitations deriving from the war—for instance the FRG is not a Permanent Member of the Security Council and still has serious inhibitions about military activities or exports outside NATO. The Federal Republic’s successes have helped to prevent reunification becoming a major issue in this country. The successful development of contacts of many kinds with East Germany in the past 20 years has contributed to that effect.

7. After 40 years, democracy, stability and prosperity are taken for granted. The great successes of the Federal Republic are often left unsung. As the head of the Deutsche Bank put it to me: ‘Man doth not live by bread alone, especially when he hath plenty of it’.² People seem to focus on further wishes for the future. The West Germans are always yearning for something and will, I think, continue thus. Sometimes this restlessness is expressed in bouts of emotion about particular issues. The focus seems to change once or twice a year. Sometimes it is an environmental question, such as acid rain. Low flying by military aircraft is a current example. The latest is intense concern about pressure on housing and jobs from the wave of immigrants of German stock from Eastern Europe. But it is possible that the West German need to yearn will focus in due course on something of far greater international importance. Intense pressure for progress in relations with Gorbachev’s Soviet Union is a likely candidate. Reunification could theoretically be one in the longer term.

Federal German Interests

8. The Soviet threat was the biggest factor in causing the Federal Germans to bind themselves to the West. But even if it was lastingly reduced, freedom and prosperity ought to provide reason enough for not tampering with the Western connection that has brought such successes. Public opinion polls show high support, around 75%, for NATO. Support for the Bundeswehr is even higher. But attitudes are muddled: one frequent result of opinion polls is to show a majority for deterrence and a majority against nuclear weapons. And the support for NATO coexists with the new intolerance of aircraft noise and of other corollaries of credible military preparedness. A threat to freedom or security would bring public opinion back firmly to support of NATO, defence and the American connection. In safer times opinion is uncertain and inconsistent, and in a prolonged period of East-West calm it could become more so.

9. The absence of the nation as a focus of identity, a major element in the West German need to yearn, caused the Federal Republic in its early years to seek success in other things. Prosperity was one. The European Community was another. In the fifties and sixties, the European cause caught the imagination. Today it is still a popular theme, though somewhat dulled by familiarity and by years of press reports about the daily grind in Brussels. While enthusiasm has diminished, German integration into the Community has of course advanced, and today permeates innumerable aspects of every day life from the German passion for tourism via measures to reduce pollution to day to day foreign policy. Another popular cause was and is the new friendship with France, referred to in speech after speech here as a cornerstone in the construction of European Union. The West German public are grateful that the hereditary enemy, which Germany invaded three times in a century, offered unqualified reconciliation. Almost no-one here would question that the Community and Franco-German reconciliation are precious achievements which must be preserved because they are essential to the interests, indeed the very nature, of the Federal Republic.

10. On the economic side, things are clear. The Federal Republic’s prosperity depends on exports. Of these 86% go to the Western world, 54% to the Community. Exports to CMEA countries, at 3.5%, are small by comparison. The

² Alfred Herrhausen (assassinated 30 November 1989).

rate of growth of exports to the Western world is also higher. Indeed the amount by which they grew in 1988 was double the total of Federal German exports to the CMEA countries in that year. As described in my despatch of 27 January, there is great interest in increasing trade with the CMEA countries. But there is no way that the Federal Republic can afford a foreign policy that would jeopardise its economic integration in the Western system, and no voice in the Federal Republic is arguing that there is.

Other Important Factors

11. America is still seen here as the home of democracy and prosperity. The usual German view, since Vietnam, has ceased to be uncritical but still is a generally admiring one. Anti-Americanism exists in certain sections of opinion and was at a high point in the early Reagan years. It could grow again. A separate factor in Federal German attitudes to East-West relations is the perception that America’s interest is shifting away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific. The Federal Chancellor is a strong believer in this view. Most people expect some withdrawals of American forces from the Federal Republic within a matter of years. Kohl’s reaction is that everything should be done to hold on to the Americans while efforts are made at strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. The left is not greatly concerned. All believe that the prospects of a greater German contribution to defence in the Alliance are slight and that it will be hard enough to maintain the present strength and effectiveness of the Bundeswehr.

12. Another significant and growing trend is insistence th...

Table of contents

• WHITEHALL HISTORIES: FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE PUBLICATIONS
• CONTENTS
• PREFACE
• ABBREVIATIONS FOR PRINTED SOURCES
• ABBREVIATED DESIGNATIONS
• LIST OF PERSONS
• CHAPTER SUMMARIES
• CHAPTER I 10 April – 9 November 1989
• CHAPTER II 10 November 1989 – 13 February 1990
• CHAPTER III 14 February – 30 November 1990
• APPENDIX THE PRIME MINISTER’S SEMINAR ON GERMANY, 24 MARCH 1990
• CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
• INDEX