Strategy in the American War of Independence

A Global Approach

Donald Stoker, Kenneth J. Hagan, Michael T. McMaster, Donald Stoker, Kenneth J. Hagan, Michael T. McMaster

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• eBook ISBN: 9781134210381
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Early American History
• Index: History

This book examines the strategies pursued by the Colonies and the other combatants in the American War for Independence, placing the conflict in its proper global context.

Many do not realize the extent to which the 1775 colonial rebellion against British rule escalated into a global conflict. Collectively, this volume examines the strategies pursued by the American Colonies, Great Britain, France, Spain, and Holland, and the League of Armed Neutrality, placing the military, naval, and diplomatic elements of the struggle in their proper global context. Moreover, assessing how each nation prosecuted their respective wars provides lessons for current students of strategic studies and military and naval history.

This book will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, American history, Military History and political science in general.

Donald Stoker is Professor of Strategy and Policy for the US Naval War College's Monterey Program in Monterey, California. He joined the Strategy and Policy faculty in 1999 and has taught both in Monterey and Newport.

Kenneth J. Hagan, Professor Emeritus, the U.S. Naval Academy, is currently Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College's Monterey Program.

Michael T. McMaster is a Professor at the U.S. Naval War College in Monterey. He is a retired U.S. Navy Commander.

1
Colonial military strategy

Donald Stoker and Michael W. Jones¹

The development and implementation of a successful military strategy proved critical to the colonial achievement of independence. The American colonies emerged victorious not merely as a result of the mistakes of their enemy (which indeed helped), nor just because of the French and Spanish intervention (though this proved indispensable). America won its war by developing suitable and effective strategic responses to the situation at hand.

A strategy founded upon weakness – and a clear objective

British errors and foreign assistance do not in themselves trump the basic weaknesses of the colonial strategic and military situation. The rebelling Americans were an isolated lot, on the ragged edge of the Western, industrializing world, lacking in industry (other than distilleries, a possible center of gravity neglected by the British), divided in loyalties and bereft of any formal army. Their only military force was a militia of infinite utility but dubious quality. Despite all of these limitations, they emerged victorious against the greatest power of the age.

One thing that contributed decisively to this outcome was the great clarity of vision that the political and military leadership developed in regard to how they defined victory: independence. It took more than a year for the Revolutionaries to reach this consensus, but once they did, and actually declared independence in July 1776, they possessed a clear objective for which to fight, and upon which to hang their military and diplomatic efforts, something that aligns with the advice of the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz.

The nature of the war

The outbreak of fighting at Lexington and Concord in April 1775 provided early clues as to the military nature of this war. The irregular warfare pursued by the Americans against the British troops marching back to Boston provided the first glimpse of one approach to warfighting that remained a constant throughout the struggle. Although spontaneous and poorly directed at first, irregular warfare became a key element of colonial warfighting, one George Washington eventually integrated into his strategy for fighting the war.

The British seizure of Boston’s Bunker and Breeds Hills on 18 June 1775 demonstrate a second element of the war’s nature. Here, the British carried the day, driving the Americans from their fixed positions, defeating the enemy in a traditional military manner.² Generally, when the colonials faced the British on the field in a traditional fight, they lost. But the British always paid a price in casualties – a cost they could not afford to pay. Their manpower limits increased their susceptibility to an attritional strategy. Eventually, both of these sides of the military struggle worked against them.

Colonial strategy – the first phase: aggression and consolidation

With Boston besieged by an army that arose spontaneously from the population of the 13 colonies, the Continental Congress searched for a general to lead it. On 16 June 1775, the Congress informed George Washington that they had picked him. Washington was 43, Virginia gentry, a planter, surveyor, politician, militia officer and veteran of the French and Indian War (1756–63), a man who from his youth had been ambitious for military glory. The choice was partly political, an effort to weld the southern states closer to the United Colonies. He was also not really qualified for the job, but neither was anyone else, even though he was the only delegate at the Congress who showed up in uniform.³

Washington took the post when it was offered to him, but though he must have wanted the job, or something similar to it, he approached it trembling. He told Patrick Henry: “From the day I enter upon the command of the American armies, I date my fall and the ruin of my reputation.”⁴ Washington was always an optimist.

When Washington arrived outside Boston on 2 July 1775, he inherited a Sisyphean task: build an army from nothing in the face of a skilled opponent. He proceeded to do this twice during the nearly year-long siege because the short enlistment period of the first members of this new Continental Army meant that most of them went home on New Year’s Day 1776.⁵

Washington’s realization that not much militarily was going to happen at Boston led him to recruit privateers to raid British transports. The first sailed in September 1775; others followed in October. Their primary task: seize the ships bringing fresh provisions from Nova Scotia and Canada to the British troops in Boston. But no one would be displeased if they took any other British ship, especially if it carried arms or powder, both of which the Americans desperately needed.⁶

The Congress, though restrained at first, quickly developed an aggressive streak in regard to Canada. The most ambitious American leaders saw it as a potential fourteenth colony and determined to have it from the beginning. By early June 1775, Congress had information from Canada “that the French are not unfriendly” to the American cause. Plus, the Americans had the perfect jumping-off point for an invasion: Fort Ticonderoga, which they had seized in the opening days of the struggle. Congress passed resolutions on 27 June 1775 that boiled down to calling on Major General Phillip Schuyler, the American commander at Ticonderoga, to drive the British out of Canada – if he found it feasible – and if the Indians and Canadians did not object. This was a change. Previously, on 1 June, Congress forbade any troops from entering Canada. Receipt of a letter detailing British Governor General Sir Guy Carleton’s boat-building efforts at St. John (Jean), 15 miles to the east of Montreal, and that the Caughnawaga Indians had decided to fight for King George, changed the congressional minds.⁷

Washington soon became a supporter of Congress’ campaign against Canada. On 20 August 1775, he proposed supplementing it with what became Benedict Arnold’s expedition up the Kennebec River to Quebec. To Washington, this would divert Carleton from the primary American offensive.⁸

The command of the other prong of the offensive devolved upon the very capable Brigadier General Richard Montgomery, who departed Ticonderoga for Montreal in September at the head of 1,000 men. He took the city’s surrender on 13 November. On New Year’s Eve, the Americans attacked Quebec in the midst of a blinding snowstorm. The operation proved a debacle. Montgomery was killed, Arnold wounded. Defeat, though, did not end the colonists’ Canadian ambitions.⁹

Washington looked beyond just the capture of Quebec, and even of Canada itself. He looked for a way to win the war, to remove the burden of the army’s support upon his country “by some decisive Stroke.”¹⁰ But his immediate concern remained Boston.

Washington found the British in Boston strongly entrenched and protected by the guns of their fleet, not a situation to his liking, but one he could do little about, though he would certainly try. Congress had instructed him to expel the British from Boston and as he built, and then built again, an American army, he and his subordinates considered a number of risky schemes for attacking the city, something Washington dearly wanted to do. Fortunately for the American cause, his generals talked him out of them. But the right plan eventually emerged: they would place guns on Dorchester Heights, thus threatening the entire garrison, and the British ships in the harbor. Hastily, on 17 March the British sailed from the city, bound for Nova Scotia.¹¹

Colonial strategy – the second phase: the war of posts

While still embroiled in the siege of Boston, Washington worried about Britain’s intentions. In January of 1776 he looked down from the heights around Boston to see the British fitting-out their fleet for an imminent departure. But where were they going? To Washington, the lateness of the season meant that the British could only conduct operations south of Boston. The previous October, he received intelligence from Britain insisting upon future British operations aimed at New York City and the Hudson River. Washington well knew the Loyalist proclivities of the residents of New York and Long Island, and the strategic importance of the great city at the mouth of the Hudson. In his mind, this fleet had to be destined for New York or Long Island. Washington believed it was critically important to keep the British from gaining control of New York City and the Hudson River, thus giving them “command of the Country, and the Communication with Canada.” Hence, after discussions wi...

Table of contents

• Cass military studies
• Contents
• Illustrations
• About the editors
• Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Colonial military strategy
• 2 The birth of American naval strategy
• 3 British military strategy
• 4 British naval strategy
• 5 The King’s Friends
• 6 Ambivalent allies
• 7 French strategy and the American Revolution
• 8 Spanish policy and strategy
• 9 Dutch maritime strategy
• 10 The League of Armed Neutrality, 1780–83
• Select bibliography
• Index