Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Marco Bunte, Andreas Ufen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN: 9780415438933
• eBook ISBN: 9781134070879
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

In May 1998 the fall of Suharto marked the beginning of a difficult and multi-layered transition process. It was accompanied by intensified conflict in the political arena, a dramatic increase of ethnic and religious violence and the danger of national disintegration. Ten years after the collapse of the New Order, Indonesia has made significant progress, however the quality of democracy is still low.

Theoretically innovative and empirically sound, this book is an in-depth analysis of the Indonesian reform process since 1998. Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen bring together a selection of noted Indonesia experts to provide new insights into the restructuring of core state institutions, the empowerment of Parliament, the slow and difficult evolution of the rule of law, and the transfer of power to locally elected regional governments (decentralization).

Based on the results of extensive fieldwork, Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia will be an important read for scholars engaged in research on Indonesia and the politics of Southeast Asia.

Part I
The restructuring of core state institutions

2 The Indonesian legislature and its impact on democratic consolidation

Patrick Ziegenhain

INTRODUCTION

Since the start of the reform era in 1998, the Indonesian legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) has gradually become one of the key actors of political decision-making in the archipelago. However, the debate in the DPR on fuel prices in March 2005 illustrated its persistent shortcomings. At that time, the Indonesian government led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced a hike in domestic fuel prices by an average of 29 per cent. Many factions in the DPR criticized the government’s policy, expressing the popular demand to stop the fuel price hike. A brawl among legislators ended the second day of the plenary session, ‘leaving the public disgusted by the immaturity of their representatives’ (The Jakarta Post Online, 17 March 2005). Those who disagreed with the government’s fuel policy, particularly from the PDI-P opposition, started bombarding the DPR leaders with objections and complained that the plenary session leaders were not taking into account the objections expressed by their faction.

The supporters of the government proposal responded with loud retorts of their own in the general direction of those who opposed. After DPR chairman Agung Laksono (Golkar) unilaterally put an end to the debate, some PDI-P faction members rushed to the raised podium to protest the chairman’s decision. Seeing the DPR chairman physically threatened, a number of Golkar legislators scrambled up on the platform and jostled and argued with the PDI-P members (Wadrianto 2005). Other legislators followed suit and the melee was on, complete with shoving and a few punches by dozens of other legislators eager to join in or diffuse the fray in front of the chairman’s platform. Surrounding the speaker’s dais, ‘their actions and taunts were more akin to professional wrestlers than learned gentlemen entrusted with the affairs of state’ (The Jakarta Post Online, 18 March 2005). The violence lasted for several minutes with some people knocked over, but in the end nobody was seriously injured. That the whole incident was caught on TV cameras and broadcasted hourly on television only made matters worse.

This scenario occurring in the DPR did not befit a legislature’s ideal role but rather depicted the prevailing weaknesses of Indonesian legislators several years after the regime change in 1998. The Indonesians’ trust in their democratic institutions could not have been helped by such behaviour. However, the legitimacy of state institutions is a crucial point for the acceptance of democratic order, particularly in countries that have recently witnessed a democratic transition process such as Indonesia. After the end of the authoritarian Orde Baru in 1998, the power of the once-dominating executive branch of government has been reduced significantly in favour of the national legislature.

The democratization process in Indonesia evolved as a pacted transition, during which moderate opposition reformers made an unwritten compromise with the former elites. The latter, such as the former quasi-government party Golkar were not excluded from the new political system but in fact became powerful players. The Indonesian legislature, in which the transformed Golkar faction was and is a major force, thus played an ambiguous role in the transition process. On one hand, the broad inclusion of the various heterogeneous groups in the decision-making processes of the legislature brought about a relatively smooth and peaceful transition. On the other, critics have complained about the sluggish pace of reform and the continuation of undemocratic political traditions.

As the new democracy in Indonesia is not yet firmly established, further efforts to deepen democracy have to be carried out by the different actors and institutions. It is not only dependent on the performance of the presidency, the military, the media, religious groups and civil society, but also on the Indonesian legislature.

Two free and fair elections in 1999 and 2004 led to the creation of a democratic legislature. However, democratically elected parliaments alone – even when they play a decisive role in the political system – do not necessarily guarantee democracy. Nevertheless, they are one important factor in measuring the democratic quality of a given political system. In this case, it is helpful to analyse the fulfilment of the main functions of parliaments such as representation, legislation and oversight. Additionally, it is necessary to assess the professionalism of the elected legislators, which is indispensable for efficient and effective parliamentary work. In order to analyse the contribution of the DPR to democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the article will start with an outline of theoretical assumptions on the role of legislatures in democratization processes. Then, after a short description of the political role of the DPR since 1998, the fulfilment of the aforementioned parliamentary functions will be evaluated. ¹

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES

Generally, scholars define democratic consolidation, among other factors, as a regime that comprises popular legitimacy, diffusion of democratic values, neutralization of anti-system actors, civilian control over the military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves and judicial reform (Schedler 1998: 91f.). In a mid- to long-term perspective, the alleviation of poverty, economic stabilization, independent media, and an effective education system are also aspects that contribute to the stability of the new democratic order. However, in order to establish a well-working democracy other features are necessary to improve the routinization of politics: an appropriate and transparent organization of functional interests, the creation or modification of political parties, the creation or stabilization of electoral rules, as well as the formation of an efficient and effective system of government in which the state institutions perform their constitutional tasks within a system of checks and balances. One of these state institutions, which is of particular importance for the consolidation of democracy, is the national parliament. Legislatures in developing countries are often regarded by scholars as less important in their respective political systems. Other factors that shape national politics are seen as more influential. The actions of presidents, prime ministers, business executives and military commanders often receive more focus in the analysis of political development. This has led to the premature conclusion that legislatures are sometimes powerful but in most cases they are not the decisive institution for policy output. The research on political development in developing countries is executive-centred; presidents and governments are widely seen as the key actors, whereby legislatures are often neglected. The recent debate about whether a presidential or parliamentary system of government is more suitable for the consolidation of democracy (Lijphart 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997) did not focus on legislatures per se, but rather on the system of checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches of government.

However, it is essential to assess the performance of legislatures since they can contribute decisively to the development of a new democracy. Especially in the consolidation period after the ‘founding’ elections, legislatures can be regarded as one of the foundation pillars of a new democracy and as a main indicator for the progress of democratic consolidation. The study of political institutions is ‘integral to the study of democratization because institutions constitute and sustain democracies’ (King 2003: 7).

This requires that parliaments be a strong factor in the political system since ‘weak legislatures will neither bring accountability, nor guarantee fair representation’ (Close 1995: 14), nor produce a well-balanced and effective legislation. A recently published empirical study of more than 30 post-authoritarian political systems revealed a direct correlation of parliamentary power with democratic consolidation (Fish 2006). According to Steven M. Fish, ‘the strength of the national legislature may be a – or even the – institutional key to democratization’ (Fish 2006: 18).

The political influence of legislatures is closely connected with the degree to which they fulfil their constitutional tasks and duties. The ‘more powerful a legislature, the more comprehensive its functions will be and the more extensive will be its societal impact’ (Smith and Musolf 1979: 44). Conversely, if the parliament does not or cannot fulfil most of its functions, it follows that the political system is either authoritarian or less democratic. The legitimacy of the new constitutional government system as a whole depends to a great extent on parliamentary performance. The efficient and effective functioning of the legislature contributes to public legitimacy of not only the institution itself but for the whole system of government. Connected with the parliamentary performance is political institutionalization, which is a crucial factor for the deepening of the democratization process. Political institutionalization means well-organized and well-functioning state institutions which fulfil their constitutional tasks. This includes the strengthening of the formal representative and governmental structures of a democratic political system. Concerning legislatures, this means that their constitutional and de facto powers enable them to be autonomous and to have significant impact on national political decision-making processes. In order to play such a role, they must be adequately equipped in terms of personnel and financial means. Only then can they become more coherent, independent, and decisive, and consequently more capable, efficient, effective, and binding.

Democratic deepening is thus dependent on political institutionalization. As US scholar Larry Diamond stated, ‘the strength of formal democratic institutions and rules (as opposed to the informal practices of clientelism, vote buying, rule bending, and executive domination) no doubt facilitates the endurance and the consolidation of democracy’ (Diamond 1999: 71).

By creating or establishing permanent structures and procedures for political conflict mediation, institutionalization enables political forces to improve their cooperation and dialogue. If the major political actors discuss and eventually solve problems with the inclusion of binding, authoritative political institutions such as legislatures, democratic political culture is enhanced. Therefore, political institutionalization is decisive for the deepening of democracy since it is crucial for the formation of a democratic political culture and, consequently, the legitimacy of the new democracy.

Of equal importance for democratic deepening is the overall regime performance to which legislatures can contribute positively or negatively. The new democratic order should produce at least a certain degree of positive policy outputs which are tangible to broader segments of society in order to strengthen its overall political legitimacy. People hope or expect that the new political system will produce sustained economic growth resulting in better individual living conditions and standards. Additionally, they demand that the new political order relieves the most urgent social problems such as minority suppression.

In the eyes of most people, the government bears primary responsibility for these issues. But parliament also contributes to the overall regime performance by improving legislation and taking into account the interests of all segments of society. On the contrary, they can also ‘pass abusive laws, defend the establishment, and wilfully ignore the needs of the weak and marginalized’ (Close 1995: 6). For developing countries such as Indonesia, in which a large majority of the population lives in rather poor living conditions, the legitimacy of the legislature is also dependent on if people and their interests are adequately represented and what kind of attitude the national legislature adopts in the policy formulation of the government.

Three main functions of parliaments can be singled out in a plethora of scholarly literature² on this subject: the representative function, the oversight function, and the legislative function. The representative function refers to the function of parliaments as the embodiment of people’s sovereignty. Therefore, parliaments should represent and express the interests and opinions of all societal segments. The following indicators thus give an impression of how the representative function of the legislature is fulfilled: What kind of people become members of the DPR? What is the mechanism of selection? To what extent do the people’s representatives care about the interests of the general public? To which degree are the legislators accountable to their constituents?

The legislative function, which is the traditional and oldest right of parliaments, refers to the creation or deliberation of general and compulsory rules for all citizens. In a state, which is – actually and not only rhetorically – based on the rule of law, legislation is therefore of utmost importance. In order to evaluate the performance of the Indonesian DPR in the area of legislation it is necessary to check the number and the quality of the laws passed in the legislature in recent years. Was there sufficient expertise to deal with complex political questions and was there a certain bias during the legislation process?

The capacity to control the potential excesses of executive initiative and power is considered another basic task of legislatures. This oversight function means to watch and control the executive, or more specifically the government. Especially in new democracies disproportionate executive dominance, which is a typical legacy of authoritarian regimes, can be diminished by a critical and effective parliament. The oversight function of parliaments is of special importance in order to consolidate the young democracy. The weakness of a legislature in regard to the executive branch of government undermines horizontal accountability. Considering weak post-authoritarian judiciaries, the legislature ‘is the only agency at the national level that is potentially capable of controlling the chief executive. Where the legislature lacks muscle, presidential abuses of power […] frequently ensue’ (Fish 2006: 12f.). For the assessment of the oversight function it is necessary to evaluate to what extent the legislature has had influence on the decision-making process of the government. Does the legislature possess and exercise certain prerogatives to counter executive ambitions in a system of checks and balances?

Additionally, a legislature needs a certain professionalism in order to work effectively and to demonstrate its ability to deal with relevant social and economic issues. If its decision-making procedures and capabilities fail to produce significant results, the legislature’s reputation will suffer, especially if it only delays and obstructs reform-oriented legislation and policies. A well-functioning legislature in a system of checks and balances, however, can serve as a symbol for the consequent implementation of principles of democracy, representation, people’s sovereignty and participation. Thus, the legitimacy of the parliament is determined by its values, actions and effectiveness.

THE INDONESIAN LEGISLATURE DURING THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

The end of the authoritarian Orde Baru (1966–98) of President Suharto marked a crucial turning point not only for the country but for the legislature as well. In the Orde Baru, parliament exercised virtually no control over the government. Since most of its members received their seats as awards for their loyalty to the Suharto clan or the military leadership, the DPR legislators did not challenge the government’s policies in general. During the Suharto presidency the Indonesian legislature ‘never drafted its own legislation and has never ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contributors
• Abbreviations and glossary
• Introduction
• PART I The restructuring of core state institutions
• PART II The intermediate level: Political parties
• PART III Resistance of New Order stalwarts
• PART IV Civil and ‘uncivil’ society