The Muslim Brotherhood

Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology

Barbara Zollner

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• eBook ISBN: 9781134077663
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most influential Islamist organisations today. Based in Egypt, its network includes branches in many countries of the Near and Middle East. Although the organisation has been linked to political violence in the past, it now proposes a politically moderate ideology.

The book provides an in-depth analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood during the years of al-Hudaybi's leadership, and how he sought to steer the organization away from the radical wing, inspired by Sayyid Qutb, into the more moderate Islamist organization it is today. It is his legacy which eventually fostered the development of non-violent political ideas.

During the years of persecution, 1954 to 1971, radical and moderate Islamist ideas emerged within the Brotherhood's midst. Inspired by Sayyid Qutb's ideas, a radical wing evolved which subsequently fed into radical Islamist networks as we know them today. Yet, it was during the same period that al-Hudaybi and his followers proposed a moderate political interpretation, which was adopted by the Brotherhood and which forms its ideological basis today.

1
The Muslim Brotherhood during the years 1949–73

1.1 The Brotherhood in disarray: the legacy of Hasan al-Banna’

Hasan al-Banna’, who was the founder and first General Guide (Murshid al-‘Amm) of the Society of the Muslim Brothers (Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), is seen by his followers as an example of the combination of religious conviction with moral courage and public engagement. Not only in the past, but even today, followers of the Brotherhood portray his leadership as charismatic and appealing to the masses of believers; they describe his ideology as exemplifying Islamic ideals.¹

In contrast, Hasan Isma‘il al-Hudaybi, who succeeded al-Banna’ as Murshid, is a much more controversial figure. There are some brothers who put forward rather negative views on his period as leader. Al-Hudaybi’s policies in the early 1950s were described as disastrous for the future of the Brotherhood; he was accused of weakness, of failing to unify the organisation in its opposition to the political system and of letting down the Brotherhood in its efforts to contain ‘Abd al-Nasir’s despotic exertions. Others depict al-Hudaybi’s style of taking charge of the Brotherhood as autocratic, not permitting the building of democratic structures.² These and other comments about al-Hudaybi’s ability resulted in downplaying of his contribution to the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, since the late 1990s one can trace instances of reconciling al-Hudaybi’s reputation as one of the most important leaders of the first generation. In the same vein, there is a growing recognition that he and his vision of the organisation paved the way for the ideological profile of today’s Society of the Muslim Brotherhood.³ This can be seen in the fact that official statements of the Muslim Brotherhood clearly emphasise non-violence, with an occasional reference to Du‘at la Qudat (Preachers not Judges).⁴ Additional evidence for al-Hudaybi’s legacy is the fact that successive leaders, such as ‘Umar al-Tilmisani, Mustafa al-Mashhur and his son Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, were trusted companions of al-Hudaybi during his prison years.⁵ The influence of al-Hudaybi on the subsequent leadership can be measured by the fact that the current Murshid, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, also refers to Hasan al-Hudaybi as a major influence on his thinking.⁶ Similarly, the now General Secretary Mahmoud Ezzat said that Hasan al-Hudaybi encouraged his followers to read Qutb, but that the Brotherhood ‘should follow the rules mentioned in the research “Preachers not Judges”’.⁷

The success of the founder, al-Banna’, seems to be so pertinent that it was the measure by which his successor Hasan al-Hudaybi was assessed. Not only for this reason is it necessary to engage, albeit briefly, with Hasan al-Banna’s legacy. However, it is not the intention here to present a comprehensive history of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood under al-Banna’, since the topic is beyond the scope of this book and because it has already been done elsewhere in greater detail. What is left to be done here is to focus on the historical circumstances of the late 1940s and to ask what impact this context had on the leadership of al-Banna’s successor. Considering that the government issued an order of dissolution in December 1948 and that al-Banna’ was murdered, it is fair to ask whether the latter’s policies were indeed successful. To put it bluntly: did al-Banna’, despite his success in building up the Brotherhood and its significance as a political mass movement, fail in the end? Was he really the ultimate example of a leader, or was he the root of a crisis which befell the Brotherhood by 1949? Were political circumstances such that the organisation was made a scapegoat for the failures of an ill-functioning political system? Was the Brotherhood becoming too powerful, too much a competitor for power? Or was the Brotherhood an organisational giant which lacked internal command and structure? These and other questions set the tone for the Brotherhood’s prospects after al-Banna’.

The Society of the Muslim Brothers, generally referred to as the Muslim Brotherhood, was established in 1928.⁸ Founded by Hasan al-Banna’, the organisation developed rapidly from a local circle in Isma‘iliyya to an Islamist mass opposition movement.⁹ The growth of the Society during the 1930s and up to the late 1940s is remarkable. Although it is difficult to give exact figures, the organisation had an estimated number of 1,700–2,000 branches in 1948, with about 1 million followers and sympathisers in Egypt alone.¹⁰

Without going into much detail about the various social, economic and political factors contributing to the Brotherhood’s evolution from a group which was mainly concerned with educational reform into a religious-political movement, it needs to be emphasised that the failure of the liberal political system contributed much to the Society’s ideological and organisational growth.¹¹ The political system of a constitutional monarchy, which Marsot has described as ‘Egypt’s liberal experiment’, was introduced with that country’s declaration of independence on 28 February 1922. During the three decades that followed, national politics was marked by an ongoing internal battle which eventually paved the way for the coup d’etat of 1952. The reasons for the failure of the political system, a failure which became obvious during the course the Second World War and its aftermath, are manifold and are interlinked with the political world scene. To a great extent, however, Egypt’s constitutional monarchy was torn apart by competition between the political forces, namely the king, the British, the parliamentary political parties and the growing power of non-governmental opposition movements, among them the Muslim Brotherhood.¹²

At least nominally, the British Empire ended its protectorate over Egypt in 1922 and released the country to independence.¹³ Yet, Egypt remained under the spell of Britain, which secured its interests through the influence of the High Commissioner and the presence of large quantities of troops. Although the Anglo-British treaty of 1936 restricted the number of troops during peace time, their presence in the Suez Canal Zone remained a thorn in the side of many Egyptians.¹⁴ The endorsement of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty must be seen in connection with the growing possibility of war with Nazi Germany; Great Britain was keen to secure its relations with Egypt as a future ally and as a place of strategic importance. Nevertheless, the treaty was seen by nationalist Egyptians as a warrant for continuous control over Egypt. Anti-British sentiments were on the rise in Egypt when the confrontation between Jewish settlers and Muslim natives in Palestine, a land under British mandate, escalated.¹⁵ The first Palestinian uprising in 1936 became a widely supported cause among Egyptian nationalists as well as Muslim Brothers.¹⁶ With the beginning of the Second World War, feelings against Britain rose to a peak, not only because Egypt was unwillingly becoming a theatre of war, but because Britain now actively demanded power over national politics.¹⁷ Consequently, the constitutional monarchy, its parliamentary system and the idea of an elected government became an empty shell. The inability of the king and the government to withstand British intervention led to widespread disillusionment with the democratic movement and the parliamentary system. Foreign intrusion into national politics was thus a contributory factor in undermining the authority of the state system.

Even after the war, Egypt’s democratic system was unable to recover. Traumatised by the legacy of British intervention, a malfunctioning administration and governance were unable to implement effective policies to address the most pressing social and economic problems. As the political system fell apart, non-governmental opposition movements grew in popularity. Among them were the Muslim Brotherhood, and also nationalist right- and internationalist left-wing movements, some of which were close to political parties. Similarly to the Brotherhood, many of these movements had their own youth organisations, but were also running scout groups and even guerrilla forces.¹⁸

While the political system showed signs of disintegration, the Muslim Brotherhood grew under Hasan al-Banna’s leadership to become a non-governmental force and an opposition with immense influence. The Brotherhood’s official line regarding party politics was rather negative. Labelling it as ‘hizbiyya’, which could be translated as the rule of party politics, al-Banna’ argued that the existing parliamentary democracy merely followed party interests rather than the demands of the people and the guidelines of Islam.¹⁹ Despite the official rhetoric, political influence was exerted on a number of levels. It is well known that al-Banna’ twice stood for election, once in 1942, when he withdrew his candidacy after reaching an agreement with the Wafd, and once in 1945, when he was defeated.²⁰ Real political influence was, however, played out behind the scenes. Under al-Banna’s guidance, the organisation gradually built up contacts with notables and party representatives. The Society had broad support among individuals, mainly from the middle class, and was successful in building an effective network.²¹ The sympathies of the middle class secured considerable financial funds and opened the doors to a political network which reached both the political top level as well as the working masses. Hence, while leading Brothers negotiated with the government they also called on their supporters to express their political protest. Through mass demonstration, organised rallies and meetings, the Brotherhood evolved into a political pressure movement. As it competed successfully for the backing of the general public, the organisation became increasingly feared by the official parties, the government and the British. Through a flood of leaflets and articles in various Brotherhood-owned magazines, the organisation clearly targeted the opinion of the wider publics.

While the Brotherhood’s critique of the government grew bolder, the parliamentary system was unable to reassert itself. This was particularly the case after the Second World War. In the chaotic state of affairs which was marked by domestic instability, minority government and the rule of martial law, the Muslim Brotherhood clashed increasingly with the political powers.²² Lacking popular support, constantly changing governments eventually turned to repressive methods which far exceeded the legal framework.

Like a snowball effect, political violence accelerated violence. Ultimately, it is thus impossible to place blame for the collapse of political stability on a particular actor or factor. However, there can be no doubt that the Brotherhood started to use its paramilitary force against the Egyptian government in this situation of unrest.

The Secret Unit and violence

Like other political movements of the time, the Brotherhood had its own paramilitary unit, which was known as the Secret Unit (al-Jihaz al-Sirri) or the Special Organisation (al-Nizam al-Khass).²³ The beginnings of the combat unit go back to the year 1936, when the Brotherhood sent volunteers and arms to Palestine in support of the uprising. From then on, the organisation ran camps, where volunteers were instructed in guerilla warfare. The Brotherhood’s youth, sports, rover and scouts divisions furnished the unit with potential recruits. They were then trained and prepared ideologically, mentally and physically.²⁴ The established camps were the location of exercises, and a number of veterans returning from Palestinian combat were responsible for instruction, logistics and eventually for the command of the recruits.

The chosen clique of members kept their affiliation to the Secret Unit covert; even fellow Brothers knew nothing of its members. Internally, the unit was structured around cells which operated almost independently, fighters not knowing about the activities of other clandestine cells. The vertical chain of command was short and had a tight hierarchical structure. Members gave their oath of obedience to the commander of the group; the commander reported to the Head of the Secret Unit, who took orders only from the Murshid, Hasan al-Banna’.²⁵ The first Head of the Secret Unit (Ra’is al-Nizam al-Khass) was Salih al-‘Ashmawi. An indication for al-‘Ashmawi’s personal influence within the Brotherhood and the growing influence of the paramilitary unit within the wider movement is that he was nominated the Deputy (Wakil) of the Brotherhood in 1947. The command of the Secret Unit was then passed on to ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi. Maintaining close relations with al-‘Ashmawi, but less so with al-Banna’, al-Sanadi transformed the Secret Unit into an autonomous combat unit which acted without directions from the organisation’s administration and leadership.²⁶

It would be wrong to assume that the Egyptian government did not know about the existence of the Secret Unit. On the contrary, it was aware of training camps run by the Brotherhood and in fact tolerated its activities, at least throughout the years of the Second World War and for as long as fighters were engaged in the Palestinian conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian war.²⁷ However, in the environment of increasing political chaos after 1945, the Secret Unit was not just a paramilitary group which was used outside Egypt. It now became the Brotherhood’s spearhead through which the organisation tried to push its agenda on the national scene.

In the year of 1948, the struggle between the Brotherhood and the then ruling Sa‘adi government, under Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi, accelerated into a state of near-persistent violence. Mitchell’s scholarly work on the history of the Brotherhood provides a comprehensive picture of the increasingly anarchic situation, during which the Brotherhood and its Secret Unit became known for their terror activity.²⁸ Without recapitulating details, there is no doubt that the Brotherhood was linked to a number of assassination attempts, to the incitement of terror and to growi...

Table of contents

• Routledge Studies in Political Islam
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The Muslim Brotherhood during the years 1949–73
• 2 The discourse of the prison years
• 3 Preachers not Judges
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index