Intergroup Relations

The Role of Motivation and Emotion (A Festschrift for Amélie Mummendey)

Sabine Otten, Kai Sassenberg, Thomas Kessler, Sabine Otten, Kai Sassenberg, Thomas Kessler

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2009
• Print ISBN: 9780415648677
• eBook ISBN: 9781135430306
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This volume gives a survey of the most recent developments and trends in intergroup research. Diverging from classical approaches that looked at diverse needs and motives (positive distinctiveness, belongingness, etc), the present book focuses not only on the question what motivates intergroup behaviour, but especially on how the motivation of intergroup behaviour functions.

The book focuses on the role of emotion and motivation in the development of intergroup conflict, social exclusion, tolerance and other group related phenomena. The sections demonstrate how classical theories in the field have been further developed, enriched, and more sophisticatedly tested over the years, and summarise research on affect and memory. They also develop a group based self-regulation approach, examine several specific emotions as motivational forces of intergroup behaviour, and look at factors of intergroup relations that lead to social change.

The chapters are short and easy-to-comprehend summaries referring to a broad range of original work, providing a useful resource for advanced students of Social Psychology and researchers in the field of intergroup relations.

Part I
Classical approaches to motivation in intergroup relations

1 Motivations underlying ingroup identification

Optimal distinctiveness and beyond

Marilynn B. Brewer
Ohio State University

Since classic social identity theory had its origins in the minimal group paradigm and the study of ingroup bias, the focus of most of the initial research on social identity was on the consequences of salient social identities for intergroup relations (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975) and intragroup behavior (Hogg, 1992). It wasn’t until some time later that attention turned toward understanding the antecedents of social identity and the psychological processes underlying identification with ingroups in the first place. Self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) provided one answer to the question of origins of social identity, implicating basic social categorization processes (Oakes, 1987). But for many social psychologists, the idea that social identification – with all its significant emotional and behavioral concomitants – is based solely on “cold cognition” was intuitively incomplete. Because group identity sometimes entails self-sacrifice in the interests of group welfare and solidarity, understanding why and when individuals are willing to relegate their sense of self to significant group identities requires motivational as well as cognitive analysis. Motivational explanations are also needed to account for why group membership does not always lead to identification and why individuals are more chronically identified with some ingroups rather than others.

The present chapter reviews some of the motivational theories of social identification, with a focus on Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory. Implications of optimal distinctiveness for intragroup versus intergroup attitudes and behavior are then discussed, particularly how the need for clear ingroup boundaries constrains our capacity for group-based trust and cooperation. Finally, we consider how these constraints might be lifted if we shift our attention from social identity as identification with a single group or social category to social identity as a complex representation of multiple group memberships.

Motivational approaches to social identity

Self-esteem

The motivational concept most associated with social identity theory is that of self-esteem enhancement. And it is true that initial development of social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975) implicated self-esteem in postulating a need for “positive distinctiveness” in ingroup– outgroup comparisons (see also Spears et al., chapter 2 in this volume). However, it is not clear from these writings whether positive self-esteem was being invoked as a motive for social identity itself, or as a motive for ingroup favoritism given that social identity had been engaged. Whatever the original intent, subsequent research on the role of self-esteem in ingroup bias has generally supported the idea that enhanced self-esteem may be a consequence of achieving a positively distinct social identity, but there is little evidence that the need to increase self-esteem motivates social identification in the first place (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). On the contrary, there is considerable evidence that individuals often identify strongly with groups that are disadvantaged, stigmatized, or otherwise suffer from negative intergroup comparison (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984).

Cognitive motives: Uncertainty reduction

Given the inadequacy of self-esteem as an explanation for why social identity is engaged, other motives have been proposed that do not require positive ingroup status as a basis for attachment to groups and self-definition as a group member. One proposal is that group identity meets fundamental needs for reducing uncertainty and achieving meaning and clarity in social contexts (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). In support of this hypothesis, Hogg and his colleagues (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Mullin & Hogg, 1998) have generated compelling evidence that identification and ingroup bias are increased under conditions of high cognitive uncertainty and reduced or eliminated when uncertainty is low. And it is undoubtedly true that one function that group memberships and identities serve for individuals is that of providing self-definition and guidance for behavior in otherwise ambiguous social situations (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). However, group identity is only one of many possible modes of reducing social uncertainty. Roles, values, laws, and so forth serve a similar function without necessitating social identification processes. Thus uncertainty reduction alone cannot account for the pervasiveness of group identification as a fundamental aspect of human life.

Uncertainty reduction as a theory of social identity places the explanation for group identification in a system of cognitive motives that includes needs for meaning, certainty, and structure. An alternative perspective is that the motivation for social identification arises from even more fundamental needs for security and safety. Consistent with this idea, Baumeister and Leary (1995) postulate a universal need for belonging as an aspect of human nature derived from our vulnerability as lone individuals who require connection with others in order to survive. But belonging alone cannot account for the selectivity of social identification, since any and all group memberships should satisfy the belonging motive. My own theory (Brewer, 1991) postulates that the need for belonging and inclusion is paired with an opposing motive – the need for differentiation – that together regulate the individual’s social identity and attachment to social groups.

Optimal distinctiveness theory: Basic premises

Optimal distinctiveness theory is an extension of social identity theory, developed to account for why individuals seek identification with social groups and to explain the role of social identities in achieving and maintaining a stable self-concept. Briefly, the theory is based on the thesis that distinctiveness per se is a factor underlying the selection and strength of social identities because distinct social groups satisfy basic psychological needs derived from our evolutionary history as a social species.

The theory has its origins in the premise that group living represents the fundamental survival strategy that characterizes the human species. In the course of our evolutionary history, humans have lost most of the physical characteristics and instincts that make possible survival and reproduction as isolated individuals or pairs of individuals, in favor of other advantages that require cooperative interdependence with others in order to survive in a broad range of physical environments. In other words, as a species we have evolved to rely on cooperation rather than strength, and on social learning rather than instinct as basic adaptations. The result is that, as a species, human beings are characterized by obligatory interdependence (Brewer, 1997; Caporael, 1997). For long-term survival, we must be willing to rely on others for information, aid, and shared resources, and we must be willing to give information and aid and to share resources with others.

For individual humans, the potential benefits (receiving resources from others) and costs (giving resources to others) of mutual cooperation go hand in hand and set natural limits on cooperative interdependence. The decision to cooperate (to expend resources to another’s benefit) is a dilemma of trust since the ultimate benefits depend on everyone else’s willingness to do the same. Social differentiation and clear group boundaries provide one mechanism for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence without the risk of excessive costs (Brewer, 1981). By limiting aid to mutually acknowledged ingroup members, total costs and risks of nonreciprocation can be contained. Psychologically, expectations of cooperation and security promote positive attraction toward other ingroup members and motivate adherence to ingroup norms of appearance and behavior that assure that one will be recognized as a good or legitimate ingroup member. Symbols and behaviors that differentiate the ingroup from local outgroups become particularly important here, to reduce the risk that ingroup benefits will be inadvertently extended to outgroup members, and to ensure that ingroup members will recognize one’s own entitlement to receive benefits. Assimilation within and differentiation between groups is thus mutually reinforcing, along with ethnocentric preference for ingroup interactions and institutions (Brewer, 1999, 2007).

If social differentiation and intergroup boundaries are functional for social cooperation, and social cooperation is essential for human survival, then there should be psychological mechanisms at the individual level that motivate and sustain ingroup identification and differentiation. The optimal distinctiveness model postulates just such motivational mechanisms. According to the model, social identities derive “from a fundamental tension between human needs for validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation (on the other)” (Brewer, 1991, p. 477). More specifically, it is proposed that social identities are selected and activated to the extent that they help to achieve a balance between needs for inclusion and needs for differentiation in a given social context.

The basic premise of the optimal distinctiveness model is that the two identity needs (inclusion/assimilation and differentiation/distinctiveness) are independent and work in opposition to motivate group identification. Optimal identities are those that satisfy the need for inclusion within the ingroup and simultaneously serve the need for differentiation through distinctions between the ingroup and outgroups. In effect, optimal social identities involve shared distinctiveness (Stapel & Marx, 2007). Individuals will resist being identified with social categorizations that are either too inclusive or too differentiating but will define themselves in terms of social identities that are optimally distinctive. Equilibrium is maintained by correcting for deviations from optimality. A situation in which a person is overly individuated will excite the need for assimilation, motivating the person to adopt a more inclusive social identity. Conversely, situations that arouse feelings of deindividuation will activate the need for differentiation, resulting in a search for more exclusive or distinct identities.

Evidence for competing social motives comes from empirical demonstrations of efforts to achieve or restore group identification when these needs are deprived. Results of experimental studies have shown that activation of the need for assimilation or the need for differentiation increases the importance of distinctive group memberships (Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002), that threat to inclusion enhances self-stereotyping on group-characteristic traits (Brewer & Pickett, 1999; Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997), and that threat to group distinctiveness motivates overexclusion (Brewer & Pickett, 2002) and intergroup differentiation (Hornsey & Hogg, 1999; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993). Further, assignment to distinctive minority group categories engages greater group identification and self-stereotyping than does membership in large, inclusive majority groups (Brewer & Weber, 1994; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Simon & Hamilton, 1994). Thus there is converging evidence that group attachment is regulated by motives for inclusion and distinctiveness.

Optimal distinctiveness: Some qualifications and clarifications

Although hypotheses derived from optimal distinctiveness theory have been tested by different researchers in many different contexts, some aspects of the theory are frequently misunderstood. Importantly, the model does not postulate that optimal distinctiveness is a property of some groups rather than others and that individuals directly seek identification with such optimal groups. Rather, optimality is an interactive product of current levels of activation of the opposing motives for inclusion and differentiation and group properties that determine its level of inclusiveness and distinctiveness. This leads to three important principles that are essential to understanding optimal distinctiveness.

First, optimal distinctiveness is context specific. Context affects both the activation of motives or needs and the relative distinctiveness of specific social categories. Consider, for example, my professional group memberships. In the context of an international psychology conference, categorization as a “psychologist” is far too inclusive, and a subcategory such as “social psychologist” is more likely to be optimally distinctive. On the other hand, in the context of my local community, my identity as a social psychologist is too highly differentiated and, instead, categorizing my occupation as an “academic” is optimal. Identifying myself as an academic or a university professor places me in a social group with a significant number of other members of my community who share that occupational status and yet distinguishes us from neighbors who belong to other professions or occupational categories. “Shared distinctiveness” is contextually defined.

Second, optimal distinctiveness is a dynamic equilibrium. Even within a given context, optimality is not necessarily fixed because inclusion and differentiation motives are also subject to temporal influences and change over time. When one enters a new group, for example, the awareness of one’s marginal status as a newcomer may enhance the need for inclusion relative to the need for differentiation, but as time goes on and inclusion is more secure, differentiation needs become more salient and maintaining group distinctiveness assumes a higher priority. Groups also exhibit dynamic shifts across time in their relative focus on enhancing inclusiveness or reestablishing distinctiveness and exclusiveness.

Finally, identity motives vary across situation, culture, and individuals. Asking how “strong” an individual’s inclusion motive is like asking how strong is the individual’s hunger motivation. Like any need or drive, inclusion and differentiation motives vary as a function of current levels of satiation or deprivation. However, individuals may differ in how sensitive they are to changes in levels of inclusiveness. Just as some individuals start feeling ravenously hungry after an hour or two since they last ate while other individuals don’t even notice they haven’t eaten all day, so some people will react strongly to a slight loss of inclusiveness (or slight expansion of group boundaries), whereas others will be more tolerant of a range of ingroup inclusiveness. Thus, although the principles incorporated in the optimal distinctiveness model are presumed to be universal, the model can also accommodate individual, situational, and cultural differences in the relative activation of inclusion and differentiation needs and the nature of optimal identities.

Put more formally, the model (as depicted in Figure 1.1, taken from Brewer, 1991) has four important parameters – the height (intercept) of the need for differentiation, the height (intercept) of the need for inclusion, the negative slope of the need for inclusion, and the positive slope of the need for differentiation. Of these four, one is presumed to be fixed. The intercept (zero activation) of the need for differentiation is assumed to be at the point of complete individuation (the endpoint of the inclusiveness dimension). All of the other parameters are free to vary; any changes in the intercept or slope of the inclusion drive or the slope of the differentiation drive will alter the point of equilibrium that represents an optimal identity. Thus, the model depicted in Figure 1.1 is just one member of a class of models containing all possible variations in these parameters, and differences across situations, cultures, and individuals can be represented in terms of variation in the slopes of the two drives (which can vary independently). (See Brewer & Roccas, 2001, for a discussion of how cultural differences can be reflected in model parameters and the point of equilibrium.) Again, the overall point is to emphasize that optimal distinctiveness is not a fixed property of groups ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of contributors
• Foreword
• Introduction
• PART I Classical approaches to motivation in intergroup relations
• PART II ecent approaches to motivation and intergroup relations
• PART III Emotions and intergroup relations
• PART IV Motivated change in intergroup relations