NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century

Aurel Braun

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• ISBN:
  9781134053797
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique

Since the end of the Cold War NATO has redefined its raison d'etre, extending its membership, broadening its political goals and widening its zone of operation. It has also sought to enhance its co-operation with Russia, for example through the NATO-Russia Council, though moves here have coincided with factors which make co-operation more difficult, such as growing uncertainty about the transition to democracy in Russia, a feeling among some people in Russia that NATO enlargement and the simultaneous diminution of Russia's influence were related, and, more recently, Russia's attempts to reassert its influence over its neighbouring states. This book examines the current state of relations between NATO and Russia, examining a number of key areas, and assesses the prospects for future development. It concludes that all parties have a powerful interest in building and maintaining security, and that the growth of the zone of democracy holds out the best hope for solving some of Russia's most seminal security concerns.

SECTION III

7 NATO, the European Union, Russia and the fight against terrorism

Peter R. Neumann

Introduction

The notion of September 11, 2001, as “a day that changed the world” has become a truism. Al Qaeda’s dramatic attacks on Washington, D. C., and New York have led to two wars, a realignment of international alliances and coalitions, as well as – more generally – a distinct and almost instantaneous sense that a new chapter of international relations is about to be written. Indeed, according to John Lewis Gaddis, if the fall of the Berlin Wall signified the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Twin Towers marked the end of the post-Cold War era.¹ It seems almost natural, therefore, that intellectuals and policymakers have engaged in a sustained, though not always systematic, effort to reassess the continued relevance of major actors, relationships and institutions. The EU and Russia are two particularly interesting cases in point. Whereas Russia signified the antagonism of the Cold War era, the European Union came to symbolize the hopes and aspirations in the immediate aftermath of the East–West confrontation – a period in which many believed that democracy and cooperation had eventually won the day.²

While it will be impossible to examine all the complex and sometimes diffuse changes that have occurred in the relationship between Russia and the EU, as well as their respective positions in the wider international system generally, the purpose of this paper is provide a snapshot of some of the issues and dynamics at the heart of this process. First, as terrorism appears to be one of the most significant drivers of Western security policy in the post-9/11 era, I will assess whether Russia has a significant role to play in the fight against it. Second, I will focus on whether the EU can be effective as an institutional mechanism through which to conduct a partnership with Russia on this issue. The argument presented here is that Russia’s role in the fight against terrorism is critical, but that the European Union – for political as well as institutional reasons – is not the channel through which this partnership should be pursued. I will conclude that, though the European Union may have a role to play in facilitating and coordinating assistance, bilateral relationships between EU member states and Russia will remain the predominant mode of cooperation. Indeed, given the EU’s inherent and structural limitations, European countries would be well-advised to look beyond Europe and consider the idea of a pragmatic “division of labor” that would allow for collaboration and partnership with others – principally, of course, Europe’s North American partners – in order to perform tasks that they cannot carry out themselves.

Russia’s role in the fight against terrorism

At first sight, Russia appears to be at the margins of the international campaign against terrorism. Most of the terrorism we are currently faced with is of Middle Eastern origin. And while Russia has a substantial Muslim minority (about 20 million people), it is not generally perceived as a major source of recruits, funding of logistical support for the global Salafi jihad – especially when compared to states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or even some Western European countries. This impression, however, is almost entirely wrong. Indeed, I would argue that Russia’s role in the global fight against terrorism is pivotal, and that much of our success in thwarting the terrorist threat depends on whether we can help (or persuade) Russia to play a constructive role.

In order to appreciate Russia’s significance, it is essential to develop a strategic understanding of the threat. Terrorism is not a definable enemy. It is a tactic, sometimes a strategy, and most experts agree that it is virtually impossible to eliminate it altogether.³ Furthermore, hardly anyone would argue that conventional terrorist attacks like those in Madrid or London represent an existential threat to our way of life, however unnecessary and tragic the loss of life in each of these instances may have been. From a strategic point of view, therefore, the threat is “manageable,” and it will eventually be brought under control by a combination of good police work, increased intelligence capacities, effective risk communication, and a more systematic way of engaging vulnerable communities. The one exception, of course, is the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons. Armed with a nuclear device, terrorists could kill not hundreds or thousands, but hundreds of thousands. They could threaten and coerce even the most powerful states, forcing them to reorder their national priorities and give up on vital interests. Jonathan Schell recently remarked that the use of a nuclear device by terrorists would alter the dynamics of international politics as profoundly as the end of the Cold War, and that – however small the probability – our grand strategy should be geared towards preventing terrorists from obtaining a nuclear weapon.⁴ In fact, there now seems to be a relatively broad consensus among Western scholars and policymakers that stopping the proliferation of WMD tops the list of strategic priorities in the fight against terrorism.⁵

Most of the proposals aimed at curbing the spread of WMD consist of two main elements, both of which underline Russia’s central role. The first is the need to secure loose nuclear materials. Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 35,000 nuclear weapons as well as sufficient weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium to produce another 50,000.⁶ With the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreeing to end their nuclear power status, the main responsibility for dealing with this legacy now lies with Russia. While there have been no confirmed reports of stolen or missing nuclear weapons, experts believe that substantial numbers are unaccounted for. Also, there is ample evidence of a significant black market in nuclear materials, with almost two hundred reported smuggling incidents in the 1990s alone.⁷ Although numerous “threat reduction” initiatives have been undertaken in order to help Russia establish full control of its nuclear stockpiles, the country continues to be seen as the most likely source for terrorist WMD. In early 2004, Graham Allison estimated that half of the Soviet nuclear arsenal “remains inadequately secured.”⁸

The second main strand of most anti-proliferation strategies aims at limiting the number of nuclear powers. In this respect, Russia’s position is almost as significant as in relation to the first. As one of a very small number of states with the knowhow, the technology and the necessary materials to construct WMD, it is critically important that Russia continues to observe the Non-Proliferation Treaty. More specifically, it is not only in the Western interest that Moscow refrains from selling its expertise to the highest bidder, but also that it prevents aspiring nuclear powers from recruiting Russian scientists or infiltrating Russian nuclear installations.

Not least, given its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia could play a vital part in making global anti-proliferation policies effective. Only with the full support of Russia will it be possible to present aspiring nuclear powers – especially, of course, Iran – with a united political front (including the possibility of sanctions under the relevant Chapters of the United Nations Charter), as well as pursue a coordinated and internationally legitimate approach vis-à-vis anti-proliferation and anti-terrorism generally. Unfortunately, Russia’s attitude towards Iran’s nuclear programme is highly ambiguous: whilst condemning Iran’s breaches of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Russian companies continue to supply the regime in Tehran with the expertise and technology to make it work.

Russia’s strategic significance in the global fight against terrorism extends beyond the nuclear issue. Among experts in terrorism and insurgency, it is almost universally agreed that terrorist groups and movements are more persistent and dangerous if they have a sanctuary or safe haven at their disposal. If based in a hostile environment, terrorist operations, recruitment, relations with the public, as well as the acquisition of arms and funds all need to be carried out in strict secrecy. Individual members are forced to lead double lives or cease their ordinary existences altogether. This has a significant bearing on the terrorists’ effectiveness: the need to conceal one’s activities consumes much of the terrorists’ resources and is generally considered a distraction from their principal objective, namely to fight the perceived enemy. With a safe haven – usually in a jurisdiction different from that of the enemy – the terrorists can train and operate freely; there is no need to hide one’s identity or set up safe houses; the terrorists group may even hold press conferences and maintain open relations with the public. Arguably, the twenty-five-year-long campaign of the Irish Republican Army could not have been sustained had the organisation not had the possibility of retreating from Northern Ireland to a less hostile environment in the Irish Republic. The same is true for Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), which maintained strategic bases in southwest of France, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which found an operational safe haven in Jordan and – following its forceful expulsion in September 1970 – Lebanon. From a counter-terrorist perspective, therefore, eliminating such sanctuaries is a strategic priority to which considerable military and diplomatic efforts need to be dedicated.⁹

Russia, of course, has no intention of offering sanctuary to a terrorist group. Yet parts of its territory have been at risk of becoming lawless zones in which jihadist groups could set up operational bases. This has been true, in particular, for Chechnya and – more recently – neighbouring territories, which militant Islamists have considered not only as a potential safe haven but also as a jihadist battlefront in its own right. Like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, they have interpreted Moscow’s attempts to put down the separatist uprising as an effort to encroach upon Muslim lands.¹⁰ In early 1995, a small group of “Afghan Arabs,” who had sided with the Afghani mujahideen in the 1980s, arrived in Chechnya to lend their support to the Chechen insurgent movement. Led by a Saudi national, Amir Khattab, the International Islamic Battalion consisted of around 300 men, which fought alongside the rebels and took part in some of the most daring operations during the First Chechen War (1994–96).¹¹ While relatively small in numbers, their participation had a profound impact on the dynamics of the conflict. It added a group of experienced and highly committed fighters to the Chechen cause; it radicalized and brutalized the Chechen insurgency as a whole; and it facilitated access to the immense financial resources of the global jihadist movement, including significant contributions from Islamic charities and wealthy individuals in the Arab Gulf states.¹² Most importantly perhaps, it introduced an Islamist agenda into an otherwise local conflict. For Khattab, the issue was not Chechen independence, but the creation of an Islamic republic on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, when Russia withdrew from Chechnya in 1996, Khattab set up training camps for young Muslims from across the Caucasus, preparing them “for a never-ending jihad that was far greater in scope than the micro-republic envisioned by Chechnya’s nationalist leadership.”¹³ The destabilizing influence of this presence was demonstrated in September 1999, when the incursions of Islamist militants into the neighbouring Republic of Dagestan ignited the Second Chechen War.

The Caucasus assumed even greater significance following the removal of the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. In the years prior to 2001, Afghanistan had been the principal operational sanctuary for the Salafi jihadis. When it ceased to exist, the Al Qaeda leadership and hundreds of foreign jihadis from across the world needed to find a new home. While, for most, the most obvious choice were the tribal areas of Pakistan, others concluded that this could not be a permanent solution, especially given President Pervez Musharraf’s support for the Western coalition. The Caucasus was an attractive alternative. It was ideologically sound, as there was an ongoing jihad in which one could participate. At the same time, there existed a jihadi infrastructure with training camps and practically no functioning state authority that would interfere with their operations. As a result, Chechnya and the neighbouring territories – especially the Chechen-inhabited Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and, more recently, the Russian Republic of Dagestan¹⁴ – came to be seen as “the next Afghanistan.” Indeed, there is some evidence that these places developed into a major base not only for the fight against the Russian presence in Chechnya, but the global jihad generally. For instance, Interpol and Western intelligence agencies believe that Al Qaeda’s “mad scientist,” Abu Khabab, moved his operations from Afghanistan to the Caucasus, with sightings of him reported across the region. Furthermore, in August 2002, Georgian security forc...