Politics and Government in Hong Kong

Crisis under Chinese sovereignty

Ming Sing

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• eBook ISBN: 9781134030903
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the government of Hong Kong since its handover to mainland China in 1997, focusing in particular on the anti-government mass protests and mobilisations in the years since 2003. It argues that Hong Kong has been poorly governed since transferring to Chinese rule, and that public frustration with governmental performance, including anti-subversion laws and slow democratisation, has resulted in the regular and massive protests, which have been rare in Hong Kong's past political development. The book then assesses different explanations for Hong Kong's government problems, including lack of social cohesion, incomplete economic restructuring, structural budgetary deficit, severe social inequality, intensifying cronyism and deficiencies within the political system itself. It goes on to discuss the implications of poor governance for legislative elections, civil society and constitutional development, and considers the prospects for the future. It argues that although in the short-term the Hong Kong government has managed to maintain its popular support ratings, in the longer run it is unlikely to be able to maintain its legitimacy in dealing with the fundamental challenges of government unless the current system is replaced by popular election of the government with appropriate institutional capacity and political powers.

1 Who can mobilize Hong Kong people to protest?

A survey-based study of three large-scale rallies

Joseph M. Chan and Francis L. F. Lee

Introduction

To many government officials, politicians, and commentators, the July 1 demonstration in 2003 was a huge, pleasant, or unpleasant, surprise. Hong Kong used to have a good share of protests, but it is unprecedented to find more than half a million people taking to the streets to protest against the local government. The date “July 1” acquired new meanings, and the so-called “July 1 effect,” no matter whether it really exists or what it can be referred to, has become part of the political discourse in Hong Kong. The demonstration also seems to have sparked off a pro-democracy movement. In the year that followed, a number of large-scale pro-democracy demonstrations were held.

The occurrence of these large-scale rallies raises a number of questions about Hong Kong people’s political participation and mobilization. To state just a few: What are the social conditions that generate the large-scale rallies? How should we understand the rallies in relation to the history of political development in Hong Kong? Do they signify historical breaks or simply the expression of already existing undercurrents in Hong Kong society? Who participated in these rallies and why? How were they mobilized and by whom?

This chapter addresses the latter two questions by drawing upon onsite surveys of participants in the three rallies and two population surveys. Of particular interest is the effectiveness of a number of potentially significant mobilizing agencies—social and political groups, the mass media, and interpersonal networks. We believe the analysis should give us a better understanding of the contemporary social forces that work to shape the future of Hong Kong. It may provide clues to a better understanding of the past as well. In addition, the analysis allows us to revisit several arguments made by some commentators and stakeholders after the July 1 protest. For example, did people protest simply because they were unhappy with the economic situation? Did specific media outlets drive people to protest?

This chapter, in other words, focuses mainly on individual level analysis and on some of the micro-processes involved in the formation of protests. Nevertheless, we begin with a brief review of scholarly discussion about political participation and social mobilization in Hong Kong in order to put the protests into a larger, historical perspective. We then further explicate the focus of our empirical analysis, describe the survey methods, and present the findings. The implications of the results are discussed in the concluding section.

The rallies in historical perspectives

If the July 1 protest was a surprise to many, it was largely because the scene of thousands of protesters shouting slogans provided a stark contrast to the traditional image of Hong Kong citizens who shied away from political activism. This image of an apathetic public originated in the 1970s as part of an attempt to explain the enduring social stability of Hong Kong at the time. One account of this extraordinary stability attributed it to the prevalence of the refugee mentality among citizens, many of whom were themselves refugees from communist China. In spite of the dissatisfaction people might have with the colonial government, Hong Kong was for them the lifeboat. No one would risk rocking it. Other sociologists have come up with more systematic explanations. Most notably, King (1975) attributed the long stability of Hong Kong to the practice of what he labeled “the administrative absorption of politics,” a process by which the colonial government co-opted local political elites into the decision-making and consultative bodies, thereby fostering an elite integration on the one hand and legitimation of political authority on the other. A second major explanation was offered by Lau (1982) who, taking a macro-level approach, identified the lack of integration between society and polity as the cornerstone of social stability in Hong Kong. To him, the “minimally-integrated social-political system” was the result of the colonial government’s self-limitation in its exercise of power on the one hand, and the low expectations of the Hong Kong Chinese toward the government on the other. Social problems were seldom politicized and were often confined to families where private resources were mobilized for their resolution.

With these theories as the bases, Siu-kai Lau and Hsin-chi Kuan, among others, have conducted a series of survey studies of political culture in Hong Kong since the mid-1980s. The prevailing image of Hong Kong citizens derived from such studies is marked by political inefficacy, partial understanding of democracy, a negative view about “politics,” distrust of politicians, inclination toward solving problems through personal means, and emphasis on social stability (e.g., Lau 1982, 1994, 1998, 2000; Lau and Kuan 1988, 1995, 1998; Kuan and Lau 2000, 2002; Wong and Lui 2000). As Ku (2002: 348–349) put it, the traditional characterization of Hong Kong people (which she does not agree with) derived from these studies is as follows:

[Hong Kong people are] placing personal gain first, poor in morality and civic mindedness, ignoring or participating reservedly and intermittently in social activities not directly related to their personal interest, resorting to personalized approach and effort to solve their life problems or to improve their living standard rather than employing political or collective action.

Certainly, over the years, researchers have recognized gradual developments in Hong Kong’s political culture. By the early 1990s, Lau and Kuan (1995) argued that many Hong Kong people had already become “attentive spectators” in politics. By the late 1990s, Kuan (1998) acknowledged that years of political transition had given rise to a vibrant political society in Hong Kong. Following this line of research and thinking, public participation in the large-scale protests in 2003 and 2004 may be regarded as signifying a new stage of development in Hong Kong’s civic culture, especially in its participatory dimension.

However, not all scholars share the emphasis on stability and gradual evolution. Lui and Chiu (2000b), for instance, have observed that researchers tend to neglect the social undercurrents for change because of their statistical approaches. Such undercurrents would be more recognizable if more attention was paid to collective actions and social conflicts in Hong Kong. As Hong Kong society is pluralistic and there is a lack of a democratic system that can effectively handle the pluralism, the outbreak of conflicts results. Since the 1970s, Hong Kong has witnessed the growth of collective behaviors as a means for the expression of public opinion and the struggle for interests and rights (Cheung and Louie 1991; Lau and Wan 1997; Lui 1989, 2002).

While recognizing that social movement is subject to the confines of the political environment, Lui and Chiu (2000a) argued that collective behavior can act to change the establishment. Unlike collective behavior in the 1970s that arose in response to purely domestic factors, collective behaviors became more political in orientation during the transition period and in post-handover Hong Kong. The undercurrent for change is also detected in the public sphere where discursive battles are constantly fought. In a study of the public discourse on democracy and handover, Ku (2002) found that Hong Kong people do not just care about economics and ignore politics and that society and polity are not at a safe distance from one another.

In fact, political scientists dissatisfied with the “psycho-cultural approach” to political participation have also pointed out that a large part of Hong Kong people’s apparent voting apathy was actually the result of people’s understanding of the limitations of the political system (Tse 1997). Political culture is not so much a cause as an effect of institutional change (or the lack of it) (Lo 1999). At the same time, scholars argued that the conception of political participation should be broadened to include various forms of informal or non-institutionalized political activity. As Lam (2004: 43) defined it, political participation can be referred:

to lawful or unlawful activities of support, making demands, debates, and other forms of expression communicated verbally and/or through the media targeted at the PRC government, and/or the ROC government, and the Hong Kong government … acts of political participation … also include those targeted at private institutions, such as university administrations and businesses that are designed to pose challenges to existing standards. In terms of the sites where this type of politics takes place, they are relatively peripheral. In terms of the variety of their targets, they are relatively plural. When such a broad definition is adopted, researchers have pointed out that Hong Kong people’s level of participation can be regarded as high even by international standards (DeGolyer and Scott 1996). A “tradition” of political participation during “major events” can also be recognized as stretching back into the 1950s.

If we follow these latter views, then the July 1 protest in 2003 and the subsequent large-scale rallies may actually be understood as manifestations of the undercurrents and social conflicts that have been existing and deepening in Hong Kong society over the past three decades. From this perspective we may even turn the usual question about mobilization on its head. Instead of asking why people can be mobilized in a certain case, we may actually need to ask why people are not mobilized more often. It is our contention that analysis of the actual mobilization processes and the influences of various mobilizing agencies (or the lack thereof) can inform the above perspectives which have structured previous academic analysis on political participation and mobilization in Hong Kong.

Mobilization and mobilizing agencies

Theorists studying social movements have recognized that protests may be best understood as produced by a confluence of macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors (McAdam et al. 1988; Snow and Benford 1992; Zuo and Benford 1995). Adverse macro-level social and political conditions would lead to grievances among citizens, which in turn become the bases for protests. At the same time, the characteristics of the political system would structure the range of opportunities and possible routes of actions for citizens. At the meso-level, the role of civic associations, social organizations, political parties, and media institutions in the formation of protests have to be considered. At the micro-level, individuals’ decisions to participate in demonstrations are likely to be driven by a number of social and psychological factors. At the same time, interpersonal communication among citizens within their social networks may facilitate the flow of social influence and information related to the protests.

Macro- and meso-level factors are certainly important in explaining the occurrence of the three large-scale demonstrations concerned. Since the Asian Financial turmoil in late 1997, Hong Kong citizens have experienced years of continual economic decline. The Hong Kong government was generally considered as incompetent in dealing with a range of social and political crises. In early 2003, Hong Kong citizens’ grievances were further aggravated by the SARS outbreak and government performance throughout the controversy on national security legislation. Before the first July 1 demonstration, a deep legitimacy crisis of the Hong Kong government had been in place (Chan and So 2003; Ku 2001, 2002). These situational factors constituted the macro-level conditions for the large-scale demonstrations to take place.

At the meso-level, years of political development in Hong Kong have contributed to the rise of a political society in the city (Kuan 1998). A key part of this political society is a range of civic associations, pressure groups, and political parties (Lui 1999). Some of these groups act as organizers of political activities for citizens to participate. However, a widely recognized weakness of many pressure groups and political parties in Hong Kong is that they have neither large memberships nor strong group or party “machines” (Choy 1999). Apart from a few leftist organizations and political parties, the mobilizing power of pressure groups and political parties in Hong Kong is very limited.

Nevertheless, this weakness is partially compensated by the news media. As the media treat pressure groups and political parties as major news sources, they legitimize the groups and parties as spokespersons on social and political matters (Chan 1992; Fung 1995). At the same time, researchers have found that Hong Kong people, no matter whether they are politically active or not, do pay close attention to public affairs via the mass media (Chan and Lee 1992; Lau and Kuan 1995). Information and persuasive messages from social and political groups, therefore, can be effectively transmitted to the wider public via the media.

The above paragraphs, admittedly have provided only a very brief description of the macro- and meso-level conditions for the large-scale demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2003 and 2004. Yet they provide the context for the current study, which focuses on the micro-level processes that occurred under such conditions.

Every rally has a formation process. Central to the formation process are social interactions and various kinds of communications. Information has to be transmitted; common frames of reference and shared meanings have to be constructed; the rights and wrongs of controversies have to be debated; calls to action have to be issued and listened to. Given certain macro- and meso-level conditions, social interactions and communications can create a “mobilizing social atmosphere” that generates large-scale participation among the populace. Arguably, this social atmosphere existed before the July 1 protest in 2003.

Mobilizing agencies are key actors in the pre-protest social communication processes. In this chapter, mobilizing agencies are broadly defined as any individuals, groups, or organizations which act to encourage other people to participate in a political activity. Different mobilizing agencies could have many different reasons or motivations to mobilize others. A political party may want more people to show up to support a political cause, while some people may call upon friends to participate just because they want companions. But no matter what their interests are, their abilities to call upon others to act would largely affect the scale of a political activity.

As stated at the beginning, the current ana...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Hong Kong in crisis under Chinese sovereignty
• 1 Who can mobilize Hong Kong people to protest? A survey-based study of three large-scale rallies
• 2 Civil society’s dual impetus—mobilizations, representations and contestations over the July 1 march in 2003
• 3 Governance crisis and social mobilization of the Christian churches in Hong Kong
• 4 Social cohesion and governance problems in the Tung Chee-hwa era
• 5 Hong Kong at the crossroads: public pressure for democratic reform
• 6 The days after the end of the Asian miracle: the budget crisis of Hong Kong
• 7 Social mobilization, blame avoidance, and welfare restructuring in Hong Kong
• 8 The external challenge of Hong Kong’s governance: global responsibility for a world city
• 9 Electoral structures and public opinion in the 2004 Hong Kong legislative council elections
• 10 An unexpected chapter two of Hong Kong’s constitution: new players and new strategies