Moscow and the Emergence of Communist Power in China, 1925–30

The Nanchang Uprising and the Birth of the Red Army

Bruce Elleman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134002559
• Subtopic: Chinese History
• Index: History

This book examines the emergence of Communist power in China during the interwar period, focusing especially on the role of the Soviet Union and the 1927 Nanchang Uprising. It describes the history behind the alliance between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, the impact of the USSR's military and political advisers, and the success of the Northern Expedition that resulted in the April 1927 purge of the Communists from the Nationalist Party. It explores the debates between leading communists in Moscow, notably Stalin – who thought that China was ready in 1927 for an urban-based Communist revolution, similar to what had happened in Russia ten years before – and Trotsky who opposed it. It goes on examine the seizure of power in Nanchang by the Communists, the establishment of China's first short-lived soviet republic, and the reasons why the soviet soon collapsed. It explains the consequences of the rising, including the adoption by the Communists of guerilla warfare, the foundation of China's second soviet, and after moving to northwest China during the 1930s, the rise of Communist power throughout all of mainland China which culminated in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The book stresses the importance of the mythology that evolved around the Nanchang Uprising: since criticism of the Nanchang Uprising would open themselves up to accusations that they were Trotskyites, the Chinese Communists created the myth that the Nanchang Uprising was a success, and later dated the origins of the People's Liberation Army to this event.

1 The origin of Soviet factional battles over the China question

As the Chinese national revolution intensified during 1925 and 1926, China’s importance in the eyes of the Soviet leadership soared—to the point where the Chinese national revolution was proclaimed by some as the most important hope for the future of world revolution. Because of China’s large geographical size and immense population, it was thought that a successful national-bourgeois revolution could potentially disrupt the capitalist countries and might even deliver their long-awaited death blow. Perhaps what the Bolsheviks had failed to accomplish so far in Europe could be accomplished in Asia.

With so much riding on the ultimate success or failure of the Comintern’s actions in China, marked differences of opinion soon arose over the formation and execution of this policy. The intensity of these debates—both in the Soviet Union and in China—threatened to tear the Bolshevik party apart and was fated to cause similar turmoil later on within the United Front between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. As important as these debates were at the time, however, it is difficult to piece together all of the relevant arguments, mainly because in the aftermath of Stalin’s victory all dissenting opinions were repressed, and many of the publications discussing the China question were either destroyed or relocated to restricted archives.

As this chapter will show, between mid-1925 and early 1926, a large number of opinions appeared in the Soviet press, and most importantly in the pages of the main Comintern journal, Communist International, attempting to evaluate policy goals and to devise proper methods in order to bring the Chinese revolution to fruition. To begin with, the two major “schools” of thought on China included those who supported the continuation of the United Front policy in China unchanged and those critics who claimed that China’s position as an Asiatic state meant that it was not yet ready for a socialist revolution; by extension; this meant that the United Front policy was ill-timed and could lead only to failure.

The first group was initially led by Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Bukharin—and, later, by Stalin alone—and were often referred to as the “Centrists.” The second group eventually included Leon Trotsky, Karl Radek, and Gregory Zinoviev under the name “United Opposition.” The intense intra-party debate over the China question, although initially of a scholarly and academic nature, would prove to have important long-term repercussions in both countries. This chapter will outline some of the earliest debates over the Comintern’s China policy during 1925–26, debates that preceded and eventually helped to create the United Opposition.

The Soviet Union in spring 1925

With the deaths of Lenin in January 1924 and Sun Yat-sen only a little over a year later in March 1925, the United Front between the USSR/CCP and the Guomindang began to show signs of strain. In the Soviet Union, there was a sharp debate over whether the international revolution was most important, or whether the USSR had to be prepared for a period of isolation that would require it to stand on its own. Encapsulated by Trotsky’s theory of “Permanent Revolution” versus Stalin’s “Socialism in One Country,” the outcome of such a debate would have a direct and immediate impact on the Comintern, and thereby on the future of the United Front policy in China.

Following Lenin’s death in early 1924, a new ruling triumvirate was formed with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin at the helm. This triumvirate broke down near the end of 1924, with Zinoviev using his position as the head of the Comintern to criticize Stalin and his isolationist policy of “Socialism in One Country.” According to Robert Daniels, during April 1925 Zinoviev opposed Stalin’s view that world capitalism had stabilized and that the long-awaited world revolution should not be expected anytime soon: “The world position as a whole … remains revolutionary.” Zinoviev further denounced the “right sickness” of thinking that capitalism was too stable and urged that more “fresh, leftward-leaning leaders” be put in charge of Communist parties in the Comintern.¹

Stalin fought back when he succeeded at the Fourteenth Party Conference, later during that year, in having an obscurely worded statement accepted that seemed to support his doctrine of “Socialism in One Country.” Invoking Lenin’s legacy, Stalin said:

Lenin is opposed to the contention that the relatively backward economic condition of Russia would make it impossible for that country to realize socialism … Were this true, there would have been no sense in our seizing power in October 1917 and bringing about the revolution. For if … we exclude the possibility and necessity of building up a fully socialized system of society in Russia, then the October revolution has no meaning. He who denies the possibility of inaugurating socialism in one country alone, must, if he be logical, likewise deny the expediency of the October revolution.

According to Stalin, therefore, a true Bolshevik must believe in the viability of “Socialism in One Country” and he claimed that the Soviet Union was already “building under the sign of socialism.”²

Throughout 1925, Bukharin vocally supported Stalin’s position and criticized Zinoviev, lumping him together with those Bolsheviks who supported Trotsky’s doctrine of “permanent revolution.” According to a later description of these events, Bukharin thought such people doubted that socialism could be built at all:

Why did we expose at that time the theory of permanent revolution? We exposed it because it seemed to us … that the errors of the United Opposition concealed within them the embryo of doubt as to the possibility of building socialism in our country.³

Not surprising, considering his position as head of the Comintern, Zinoviev continued to disagree with Stalin and Bukharin. He argued instead that: “The final victory of socialism is impossible in one country … The final victory of the socialist order over the capitalist will be decided on an international scale.” Claiming that the creation of the Comintern was one of the greatest victories of the international working class, Zinoviev agreed that one could begin to build socialism in a single country, but to complete the building of socialism required international participation:⁴

We are in dispute only over whether it is possible to complete the building of socialism … in one country … We are not in dispute over whether the building of socialism is impossible: the numbers of the effective proletariat in the Soviet Union are sufficient for this, the economic prerequisites are present, the general political circumstances are altogether favorable for building socialism very successfully, it being remembered that we have the support of the international working class, that our building of socialism will be finally completed on an international scale.

To Zinoviev, revolution on the international sphere—and especially in Asian countries like China—could hold the key to the USSR’s future.

Although the word “China” never appeared in these early debates on the direction of the Soviet revolution, it was in fact the developments in China that were being considered. In particular, following Sun Yat-sen’s death in March 1925, the United Front policy in China seemed to have reached a dead end. Some Bolshevik leaders even argued that the funds being sent to China to foment revolution could be better spent in constructing socialism in the Soviet Union. These doubts were cut short, however, by the unanticipated rise of a new phase in the Chinese workers’ movement during the spring and summer of 1925 popularly called the May 30th Movement. As the next section will show, the ongoing debate in the USSR soon shifted from whether to support the Chinese revolution to intensive discussions over how this movement could be best organized to achieve maximum results.

The May 30th Movement in China

Following the outbreak of the anti-foreign May 30th Movement in China, advocates of active support for international revolution—such as Zinoviev and Trotsky—appeared to be correct. The May 30th Movement began in Shanghai after two Chinese workmen died at the hands of foreign police in the International Settlement on 15 May 1925. Workers’ unrest rapidly increased, and by late May this incident had turned into an anti-imperialist movement that appeared to many to represent the early stage of a widespread Nationalist revolution; ultimately, a Nationalist revolution might evolve into a socialist one.

Comintern reports on the revolutionary situation in China were widely read in Russia. To many, the workers’ movement in China appeared even more politically motivated following a second incident on 30 May. One such report, entitled “Awakening China,” appeared under the initials F.F. and stated:

With their volleys [of gunfire], the English and Japanese imperialists have stirred up and set in motion a wide section of the Chinese masses with much greater success than could have been accomplished by even the most eloquent Comintern agitator. As a result, the movement, which began with a simple economic strike, has passed into the wider arena of political struggle, causing it to collide face to face with the most cruel oppressors of the Chinese people—the foreign imperialists.⁵

As support for this thesis, the following five political demands, adopted by the leaders of the May 30th Movement on 31 May 1925, were listed:

(1) the abolition of all unequal treaties; (2) the restoration to China of all foreign concessions; (3) the dismissal of all foreign police and substituting Chinese in their place; (4) transfer to China of the Shanghai municipality; (5) freeing those arrested.

The author of this report then optimistically concluded: “It is possible to say, that the national liberation movement in China now really does include the whole nation.”⁶

The Soviet leaders were excited and pleased by these signs that world revolution was not dead. Instead of looking solely to Europe to spark revolutions throughout the colonial world, it was now hoped that countries like China might soon become the new vanguard. The Soviet press even went so far as to predict: “Today China has woken up, tomorrow Indo-China and India will awaken. Today Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing and Canton have risen up, tomorrow Calcutta and Madras will rise up.”⁷

The Chinese Communist Party was also heartened by these events. Prior to the outbreak of the May 30th Movement, the CCP was considered a junior partner in the Communist—Nationalist United Front. Now, according to the Chinese Communist leader Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, the May 30th Movement signified the real “beginning of the Chinese national revolution.” Comintern advisers, like Gregory Voitinsky, would later even divide the history of the Chinese Communist movement into three stages based on this event: (1) from its birth in 1921 to the Shanghai events of 1925; (2) from May 1925 to the 1927 split with the Guomindang; (3) and then up to 1930. Voitinsky even credited the May 30th Movement with leading to the enormous expansion of the Chinese Communist Party.⁸

The Soviet labor representative Sergei Dalin also referred to this movement in a 1926 book:

Only after the death of Sun Yat-sen did the Chinese working class appear on the historical stage as a powerful force, and only after his death did the peasants’ mass organization begin, and by creating these organizations the Canton government began to fortify and envelop all of Guangdong province.⁹

Later, in 1928, Dalin further stated that it was “from May 30, 1925, that the proletariat began its struggle for hegemony.”¹⁰

Widespread enthusiasm for the Chinese revolution pushed to one side discussions of “Socialism in One Country.” Under Zinoviev’s leadership, the Comintern acted quickly to capitalize on these events. On 17 June 1925, a telegram was sent to the Communist parties in France, Italy, the United States ordering them to organize protest meetings and to use the slogans:

(1) Get the Imperialists out of China; (2) Abolish China’s infamous unequal treaties; (3) Abolish extraterritoriality; (4) Satisfy the striking workers; (5) Immediately try those responsible for and guilty of shooting workers and students in Shanghai, Hankou, Qingdao and other places.

Later, on 6 July, the Comintern’s Central Committee also sent a letter to the CCP urging them to intensify the revolution by forming local committees to organize workers and peasants. The peasantry was especially important, and the Comintern described them as China’s “decisive strength” and a group that “properly organized and armed would make the Chinese revolution invincible.”¹¹

Instead of ordering the CCP to work through its own party organization, however, the Comintern instructed them to use the Guomindang’s. Only by working through the Nationalist Party could the CCP “immediately start urgent preparations to organize and lead peasant unions reliably.” Such actions could remain under CCP control, but it was necessary to “pass a red thread through all of the work of the Guomindang’s peasant department and the activities of all of the peasant unions” so that “the organization of armed detachments from the peasant unions would be completely in their hands.” The Comintern was well aware that such measures might disrupt the United Front, even warning that the “right wing of the Guomindang would inevitably use all measures to … hamper the work of drawing the peasantry into the revolutionary movement.”¹²

In reality, the Chinese Communists were being ordered to use the Guomindang’s party organization as a cover for their own work. Open conflict with the Guomindang’s right wing at this stage had to be avoided at any cost. Therefore, it was important that the CCP “continue its line of world-wide expansion and the intensification of the national revolutionary movement, united around the slogans of liberating China and a National assembly of the workers’ and peasant masses along with students, intellectuals, petty merchants, artisans, etc.” At the same time, however, it must “reveal in all of its work its basic class orientation, and unite in its ranks the workers and leading peasants.”¹³

Such Comintern orders were highly contradictory, since the Chinese Communists could not possibly keep their actions secret and take a leading role at the same time. These instructions stemmed from a basic misunderstanding of the Guomindang’s revolutionary history. As one Comintern specialist explained, the Guomindang after Sun’s death was merely a “national revolutionary bloc” and was not really a party at all. According to this view, the CCP had not “become absorbed into the Guomindang, but on the contrary, has come forward as a united group with well-defined Communist views.”¹⁴

Accordingly, in a manner that was similar to the Right Guomindang faction, the Chinese Communist Party wanted to become a “predominate influence” within the United Front, but the party of the working class cannot be the “left wing” of a bourgeoisie party and so could only form a “tactical bloc” with the Left Guomindang. Based on this analysis, the Comintern article warned:

a split within the Guomindang, or it would be more correct to say, the breaking off of the Right Guomindangists, is absolutely inevitable … The task of the young Chinese Communist Party is not to force this split, but in every way possible to delay the moment of its coming and to do all that is...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Introduction
• 1 The origin of Soviet factional battles over the China question
• 2 Chiang Kai-shek’s 1926 political coup and the formation of the United Opposition
• 3 The Northern Expedition and the United Front
• 4 Rocky shoals ahead—the realignment of forces in the United Front
• 5 Chiang’s April 1927 purge and the United Front
• 6 The United Opposition’s spring 1927 campaign against the Centrists
• 7 The failure of the CCP–Left GMD stage of the United Front policy
• 8 The final stage is set: Stalin orders the Nanchang Uprising
• 9 The Nanchang Uprising and the CCP’s “false” line
• 10 The Canton Commune and Trotsky’s expulsion from the Bolshevik party
• 11 Bukharin and the Right Opposition
• 12 The 1929 Sino-Soviet War and the creation of the Stalinist state
• Conclusions: China and the victory of “Socialism in One Country”
• Notes
• Bibliography