Social Capital and Peace-Building

Creating and Resolving Conflict with Trust and Social Networks

Michaelene Cox

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN: 9780415776585
• eBook ISBN: 9781135971120
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This new edited collection illustrates the paradoxical power of social capital in creating and resolving conflict.

This is the first book to bring the two faces of social capital together in a single volume, and includes previously unpublished case studies, statistical analyses, and theoretical essays. The book is divided into three sections. The first investigates the role of social capital in inciting and/or furthering violence; the second examines the contributions of social capital to peace building; the third explores the complexities and ambiguities of roles social capital may play in peace and conflict. Policy implications and recommendations are included in many of the discussions in the chapters.

The volume tackles some key issues, such as: to what extent is social capital related to peace and conflict? What forms does social capital take in these associations, and how can the relationships be explained? What impact does this have on the state and/or state relations, and what policy prescriptions might be made in light of the link drawn between social capital and peace/conflict?

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Part I

Social capital as an instrument of violence

1 Shades of orange and green

Civil society and the peace process in Northern Ireland¹

Roberto Belloni

This chapter examines the role of Northern Irish civil society in the transition from conflict to peace and democratic consolidation. Northern Ireland has a strong and well-established civic sector. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) alone are estimated at around 5,000, making this region particularly thriving in civic activities. The vast majority of these organizations promote civic politics instead of ethnic politics, and social and political spaces of dialogue instead of ethnic or national segregation. NGOs and community groups have contributed considerably to the peace process, which culminated with the signing of the Belfast Peace Agreement in April 1998. Most notably, they have been instrumental in creating the underlying conditions favorable to the negotiation, signing and implementation of the peace settlement. In 1992–3 the Opsahl Commission involved the grassroots and changed the terms of the political discourse by coming forward with one of the key principles of later peace negotiations: “parity of esteem.” In the spring of 1998 the nonpartisan “Yes” campaign helped achieve a victory in the referendum that sealed the peace deal between Protestants and Catholics (Guelke 2003). In the post-agreement phase, NGOs continued to provide citizens with avenues for political, social and economic participation (Cochrane 2006).

Yet, this is only part of the story of civil society in Northern Ireland. Different groups and organizations co-exist within the civil society realm. Citizens do not organize only around democratic and liberal values, but also around ethnic, religious and national lines. Not unlike other conflict areas, civil society in Northern Ireland is as polarized as political society (Belloni 2008; Farrington 2002). Many groups and associations organize around particularistic and often sectarian identities. Although most of them may openly reject violence, they endorse and promote a worldview that considers groups’ relations in zero-sum terms, and resist compromise and cooperation. Their very existence can perpetuate the divisions within society and contribute to political polarization and continuing confrontation.

This chapter investigates the role of the two such civil society organizations in Northern Ireland – the Orange Order and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). The Orange Order proclaims itself “primarily a religious organization,” which is “Christ centered, Bible based, and Church grounded.” It stands officially for civil and religious liberty, but remains firmly sectarian. Its members must sign a declaration before joining that both their parents are Protestants, and leave if they marry a Catholic. The Order’s very existence and activities are a continuing source of tension and occasionally of violent conflict. Among these activities, the Order each year celebrates the military triumph in 1690 of Protestant King William III of Orange over the Catholics. Throughout the 1990s, at the time when violence between Catholics and Protestants was declining and a peace agreement was being negotiated, the organization’s parades and marches through Catholic neighborhoods heightened the tension between parts of the two communities. On the Catholic side it is difficult to find a similarly contentious organization. The counterpart of the Orange Order, the Ancient Order of the Hibernians, was a major Catholic Irish nationalist benevolent society with significant following in the early twentieth century (English 2006: 241–2), but its popularity and influence among Catholics never matched that of the Orange Order among Protestants. However, the broader reality of a society divided along exclusivist lines remains. Catholic civil society often reflects the same political preferences of political society. The most popular Catholic organization – the Gaelic Athletic Association – is firmly nationalist, although it is not exclusivist or sectarian. Since its foundation the GAA has condemned British control of Northern Ireland and has frequently advocated for the reunification of the island under the government in Dublin.

The Orange Order and the GAA are more representative of civil society than any other organization in Northern Ireland. While NGOs often embody the values of the liberal elite of society, both the Order and the GAA reflect the popular sentiment. For a Protestant child joining the Order is a quite ordinary thing to do, particularly in rural areas. Similarly, for young Catholics membership in the GAA is very common. Membership in both the Order and the GAA and participation in their activities express individual and collective identity. By marching the Queen’s highway or playing Gaelic games, participants contribute to develop their “imagined community” (Anderson 1991; see also, on Ireland, Comerford 2003). Each time they confirm and recreate their national identity, historical traditions, and social and cultural political aspirations. Moreover, through the use of symbols and rituals they effectively mark the boundaries between members and outsiders, while heightening members’ awareness and sense of belonging to their national group. The very existence of these civil society organizations preserves an “everyday sectarianism” that quietly reinforces the divisions between Protestants and Catholics.² Neither the Orange Order nor the GAA are a single entity, but big and multifaceted organizations. At their best, these organizations allow for the expression of legitimate cultural needs arising from the life experience of several generations of its members. But the case of the Orange Order also shows that sectarian organizations can provide a channel for the expression of rowdy and occasionally violent forms of communal identity.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the context where the divisions between Protestants and Catholics play out. Second, it describes the historical background, mission and structure of both the Orange Order and the GAA. Third, it examines the two main recent controversies which have involved these two organizations. In the years preceding and immediately following the 1998 Belfast Peace Agreement, both the Orange Order and the GAA faced a difficult dilemma: how to protect their respective historical legacy and identity at a time when the evolution of the peace process and the broad backing it enjoyed among both Protestants and Catholics seemed to demand a more conciliatory attitude. Overall, this chapter argues that organizations structured along ethnic, religious or national lines (such as the Orange Order and the GAA) are neither a force for peace nor one for discord, but incorporate and reflect the political trajectory of the peace process.

Context

With the seventeenth-century Ulster Plantation thousands of English and Scottish settlers moved to Ireland. Over three centuries the Plantation had created a working and middle-class population in Ulster that identified with the British Empire. Almost a million Protestants today are generally unionists, wanting the six Northern Irish counties to remain in the United Kingdom. By contrast, most of the about 700,000 Catholics in the province identify with the Republic of Ireland, and many are nationalists who want the six counties to be part of the Republic. Both groups have extremist paramilitary factions, known as loyalists and republicans, who are ready to defend their views through violence rather than to engage in dialogue to achieve a compromise with the “other side.”³

The relationship between the Protestant and Catholic community in Northern Ireland has never been particularly harmonious, although there have been long periods of peaceful co-existence between the two groups. The recent Troubles (as they are known in Northern Ireland) started in the late 1960s when the discriminated Catholic minority, inspired by the American civil rights movement, began demanding equal rights in public housing. Non-violent Catholic marches were disrupted by unionists and by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the overwhelmingly Protestant police force, and some ended in violent and bloody clashes.⁴ In August 1969 the British Army arrived to established order, but the conflict continued to escalate with a growing number of casualties on both sides. The suspension of local institutions in 1972 and the imposition of direct rule from London prevented political parties from devising and implementing public policy. In this vacuum, a highly diverse civil society was formed and often replaced local institutions in service delivery.

In December 1993 British Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds issued the Downing Street Declaration, inviting the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to refrain from violence and participate in peace talks. In August 1994 the IRA announced a complete ceasefire, followed by similar announcements by loyalist groups. Formal talks between the parties began, but disarmament of all paramilitary organizations remained the most prominent stumbling block. As the peace process moved forward amid tensions and setbacks, Protestant parades and marches (organized by various organizations, including the Orange Order, the Apprentice Boys of Derry and others), grew increasingly contentious and often led to outbursts of violence.

The May 1997 election of the Labour Party in Britain gave a new momentum to the peace process. In September of the same year Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, joined the peace talks, followed shortly thereafter by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) – the political expression of moderate Protestantism. Despite continuing extremist violence, in the small hours of Saturday, April 11, 1998, the parties reached a peace settlement, commonly known as the Good Friday Agreement. Three strands were included in the deal. First, a 108-member Assembly was created to terminate direct rule from London and restore local self-government. Elections in June were won by the UUP and by the moderate, predominantly Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Second, a North–South Ministerial Council was established to address cross-border issues such as, among others, transportation, urban planning, tourism and EU programs. Third, the British–Irish Council operated to address east–west issues involving the entire British Isles. In May 1998 referendums confirmed the presence of peace constituencies throughout the island. In the Republic Irish voters agreed to delete articles 2 and 3 of the constitution calling for a “united Ireland.” In Northern Ireland a majority of both Protestants and Catholics voted in favor of the Belfast Agreement (MacGinty and Darby 2002; Wilford 2001).

Despite the remarkable achievement, two major clauses of the agreement caused serious tensions: the decommissioning of all paramilitary groups and the early release of political prisoners. In particular, Protestant skeptics argued that the prisoners’ release should have been made conditional to the full disarmament of the prisoners’ respective organizations. However, the Good Friday Agreement did not set a timeframe for decommissioning and as prisoners were set free, paramilitaries remained fully armed (Mcinnes 2006). Moreover, other controversial issues lingered to taint the peace process. Sinn Féin demanded the disbanding of the predominantly Protestant RUC. As we shall see below, the GAA was indirectly involved in the controversy over the transformation and future role of the police force. On the Protestant side, civil society continued to be more a reason for violence than a force for peace. Orange parades provided a reason for confrontation with both Catholic/nationalist residents and the police.

Ascriptive civil society

In both Northern Ireland and more broadly in conflict areas, civil society institutions, including religious and community organizations, NGOs and recreational groups are often as divided as the society in which they are included (Belloni 2008; Farrington 2002). Membership in these organizations is frequently determined by ascriptive criteria, such as national and religious belonging. Similarity and cultural homogeneity provide an initial basis for trust, which in turn is the foundation for successful cooperation. These types of organizations and groups may provide their members with a sense of ontological security, and thus create the conditions for reaching out across the ethnic/national/religious divide.

At the same time, ethnic, national and religious groups are often predicated upon exclusivist values and norms that fit uncomfortably with democratic practices. Civil society built on ascriptive criteria is frequently based on exclusion of and conflict with others, particularly in regions with a history of war. A worldview that regards identity as closed, fixed and inherently conflictual underpins a politics of belonging. Separation and exclusion are put forward in the name of national purity and as a pre-condition for neighborly co-existence. When civil society organizations are not civic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious their contribution to democracy and peace might be spurious. Intra-group cooperation based on a sense of belonging and kinship may become the vehicle of ethnic and parochial interests undermining social cohesion, fragmenting society and pitting one group against another (Colletta and Cullen 2000). Thus, although ascriptive groups can contribute to peacemaking and peace-building, such groups may also reinforce national and social differences and perpetuate and even strengthen the divisions and cleavages existing in society – instead of fostering and sustaining a public sphere hospitable to democratic and civic life. Organizations with little or no national or religious diversity tend to reinforce the views of its members and strengthen people’s sense of difference from other communities, dangerously perpetuating stereotypes about outsiders.

In sum, civil society is a terrain that both reflects the dynamics of communal conflict and contributes to perpetuate it. As Gramsci (1971) argued, civil society is best understood as composed by a set of semi-autonomous institutions, such as the church, media, leisure and cultural groups, and other areas of popular culture. No effective political arrangement is likely to arise at the level of the state unless the majority of citizens and the institutions where they experience public life give their consent, openly or implicitly, to the existing social order. Northern Ireland, however, is profoundly divided between two main communities with alternative worldviews, values and aspirations. In this context, civil society constitutes an arena where groups articulate and disseminate their views and engage in a contest for recognition. As confirmed by the controversial role of both the Orange Order and the GAA, this contest reflects and incorporates Northern Ireland’s wider political conflict.

The Orange Order

Created in 1795 in County Armagh, the Orange Order is a Protestant fraternal organization with lodges primarily in Northern Ireland and Scotland, but also throughout the Commonwealth and in the United States. Nominally a hierarchical organization led by a Grand Lodge, it is in practice a diverse association with a tradition of local autonomy. Members must be Protestant with a belief in the Trinity (thus excluding Unitarians) and must leave if they marry a Catholic. The Order’s essential nature is that of an ethnic association representing the Ulster-Protestant people (Kaufmann 2007: 2). Its central mission is the promotion of Protestantism and the principles of the Reformation (Orange Order 2007a).

Since its creation, several of the Order’s activities involved opposition to the Catholics. Many Orangemen sided with the government to fight the Irish rebellion of 1798. In the early nineteenth century they opposed and fought the Ribbon men, a Catholic secret society. The Order’s role in fomenting sectarian tensions in Ireland led to its supp...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• PART I Social capital as an instrument of violence
• PART II Social capital as a catalyst for peace
• PART III Ambiguities of social capital in peace and conflict