Classical integration theories
Classical integration theories evolved during the 1950s and 1970s. The main empirical focus here was on the evolving European project.1 The development of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) stood as reminders of the liberal challenge to the âtimeless wisdom of realismâ (Buzan, 1996) with its emphasis on the perpetual security dilemma and the inevitability of use of force as a determining feature of the Westphalian state system. The narrative of the development of classical integration theories is well rehearsed and is textbook stuff for every student of European integration.2 Classical integration theory is often depicted as the debate between state-centric/intergovernmentalist and supranational approaches (Bache & George, 2006, p. 8). This carries the danger of oversimplifying a body of very diverse literatures and assumes that there are two coherent schools of thought in the form of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, which is not the case (Rosamond, 2008, p. 82). And yet, such a representation has its merits, especially from a pedagogical perspective. The classification and condensation of certain key literatures into particular categories enhances the accessibility and communicability of a very complex body of scholarship. This is by no means restricted to the study and teaching of European integration and regionalism. The development of International Relations theory, for example, is often being represented through the lens of several great theoretical debates forming and shaping the discipline (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 31). Here, the âdebateâ between the realist/neorealist spectrum and liberal/neoliberal approaches has dominated the teaching of International Relations for a long time. Classical integration theory is very much part of this debate and, therefore, a reflection of International Relations scholarship. At its core is the liberal notion of the potential for progress in form of a peaceful and stable international system by subjecting states to appropriate international institutions, effective laws and durable organisations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 34). The most influential approaches arising out of that context include federalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism, transactionalism and intergovernmentalism (Rosamond, 2000).
At the heart of the liberal spectrum of International Relations theory sits a deep-rooted suspicion of concentrated forms of power. Here, this refers to the modern/Westphalian state with its monopoly of force and violence. From a liberal perspective, the endemic conflict that characterises world politics is not so much a reflection of a far from perfect human nature but rather the consequence of domestic and international institutions inducing such behaviour. Focusing on the international level, the problematic institution is the nation-state. The division of the world into such states cements the anarchic structure of world politics which, in turn, tends to generate a competitive logic of power politics as a reaction to systemic insecurity. This is driven by the same imperatives for survival that are motivating human beings in Hobbesâ state of nature with the same consequences â the propensity to use of force.3 National self-interests and the pursuit of power tend to dominate under such conditions (Buzan, 1996).
The liberal tradition believes that this system can be reformed by altering the institutional causes of the security dilemma (at the domestic and the international level of analysis). To achieve that, the liberal reform programme for international relations promotes ideas such as collective security, the spread of liberal ideas and values (such as democracy and justice) and the establishment of international institutions (formal and informal) (Rosamond, 2000, p. 21). This rests on a domestic analogy, i.e. the belief that norms and institutions rendering relations stable and peaceful at the domestic level can be exported to the international level and achieve similar results.
The first comprehensive plan for this domestication of the international plane has generally been attributed to Immanuel Kantâs Perpetual Peace (Kant, 2002). It took the catastrophe of the First World War (1914â18) to serve as catalyst to translate these and similar ideas into an actionable reform programme. The so-called âGreat Warâ had unleashed the horrors of industrial-scale warfare, and traditional foreign policy mechanisms such as alliance systems and balance of power constellations had failed to prevent the tragedy. Furthermore, the use of military force was increasingly regarded as futile and obsolete in an economically interconnected world (Angell, 2007). For liberal thinkers then, the time had come to fundamentally reform the international system to prevent a repeat of the calamity that was World War I, setting in motion an intellectual and institutional re-engineering of the international system based on liberal values. President Woodrow Wilsonâs 1919 14 points speech, the creation of the League of Nations and various other international institutional efforts bear testimony to that. Alas, the onset of the Great Depression led many states to turn away from liberal internationalism during the 1930s.4
Fertilised by the bloodshed of World War II, the period between 1945 and 1950 offered a renewed breeding ground for the seeds of liberal internationalism to prosper. Federalists, such as Altiero Spinelli were convinced that the path to durable peace and prosperity in Europe required a reconstruction of Europe along federal lines (Spinelli, 1972). Federalism, a diverse intellectual tradition, traces its heritage to Kantâs proposal of a federation as the most appropriate constitutional safeguard against war (Rosamond, 2000, p. 25). It proposes the creation of a form of political community built on strong supranational and legal foundations to confine nationalism and the capacity of states to go to war. Critics, however, have pointed out that the federation of Europe would merely result in transferring the security problem to a different level rather than solving it. David Mitrany (1966), for example, had no time for regional blocs. Instead, his focus was on the global level. The founders of the League of Nations had taken a step in the right direction, but they did not go far enough in restricting nationalism and the propensity of states to resort to the use of force. Mitranyâs vision proposed the creation of a global network of supranational functional organisations. These technocratic institutions, designed to coordinate specific tasks such as, for example, international railway timetables, were thought to be more efficient providers of specific public goods and welfare. The ever-increasing density of a network of such trans-national agencies would result in the transfer of popular loyalty away from states and reduce the likelihood of military conflict between states.
What unites scholars along the liberal spectrum is the intrinsic belief that war is not an inevitable feature of international life and that peace can be achieved and nurtured. Indeed, Karl Deutsch and his collaborators observed in the Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (1957) that there always have been clusters of countries whose relations have been characterised by peaceful conflict resolution methods. Hence, progress in international relations is possible, provided we understand the conditions under which peaceful cooperation can be achieved and sustained. Deutsch begins by breaking open the âblack boxâ of the state. For him international relations are dominated by communities rather than states. He considered degrees of identification among people with and between communities. Degrees of high identification among people diminish the likelihood of violent conflict (Puchala, 1981, p. 151). Thus, lasting peace emerges out of the establishment of communities; groups of individuals sharing certain features. While there are many forms of community, a minimum expectation would be that any conflicts are resolved by non-violent means. This is the essence of a security community.
There are two principle forms of security community â an amalgamated and a pluralistic one. Amalgamated communities typically feature common institutions and may look like a federation or a state. In contrast, pluralistic communities remain fragmented. People are integrated into a security community but remain divided into several independent political communities (for example, sovereign states). Integration into a security community is the result of increasing levels of communication and transactions across national boundaries. This approach is more commonly known as transactionalism (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 8).
While the primary focus of these early approaches was the perennial question how to avoid war, a new line of scholarly enquiry emerged during the 1950s aiming at explaining integration. Building on Deutsch and Mitranyâs normative foundations, neofunctionalism established itself as the most well-known approach within the spectrum of classical integration theory, especially European integration. Strongly associated with Ernst Haas (1958), Leon Lindberg (1963, 1966) and Phillippe Schmitter (1970), neofunctionalism develops a pluralistic theory of international relations and an analytical project seeking to explain the dynamics of regional integration. While the empirical emphasis had been on European integration, it is first and foremost an approach of international relations. Indeed, it can be regarded as a dedicated effort to formulate a coherent theory of regionalism: âWhile Mitranyâs functionalism was driven primarily by a normative concern to apply de-ideologised, rational and technocratic design to the governance of human welfare needs, CIT [classical integration theory] was an analytical project seeking to explain the dynamics of regional integration through standard processes of theory-building and hypothesis-testingâ (Rosamond, 2008, p. 82).5 The aim was to explain regional institution-building not only in Europe but also in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. Neofunctionalists emphasised the creation of regional institutions to solve common problems.
Like Deutsch, neofunctionalists did not regard international relations as a playground for states. Instead, they opened up the state, casting light on the various actors lurking beneath its surface. Accordingly, foreign policies are the outcome of a pluralistic domestic political process whereby various political, social and economic interest groups compete for influence with each other and with bureaucratic actors. Furthermore, these interest groups and government offices establish links with similar groups and departments abroad, bypassing official governmental channels. Regional institution-building and further integration is facilitated by a series of reinforcing processes. Once the decision has been taken to transfer authority in a particular sector to a functional supranational agency, integration will be further advanced through a complex set of âspilloverâ processes.
The interconnectivity of different policy areas encourages functional spillover from one area to another. In addition, elites will, in time, shift their loyalties and redefine their identities, actively demanding further integration (political spill-over) (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 8). Haas defined political integration as:
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.
(1958, p. 16)
During the 1950s and 1960s neofunctionalism emerged as the most credible challenge to the realist tradition (Rosamond, 2000, p. 73). Neofunctionalism expected crises to interrupt integration. In the long run, however, integration has an upward trend. This is induced by path-dependence: institutionalisation has long-term consequences making it difficult to deviate or reverse course even if a crisis makes the status quo untenable (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 3).
Other scholars focused on economic institution-building. The theoretical foundations of economic regionalism were laid down by Jacob Viner (1950) and Bela Balassa (1961). Similar to his functionalist and neofunctionalist political science colleagues, Balassa conceptualised integration as a gradual stage-by-stage process of ever closer economic cooperation beginning with the establishment of a free trade area, proceeding to a customs union, the creation of a common internal market, economic union, complete economic and monetary union culminating in complete economic integration and political union.
Neofunctionalist arguments were not left unchallenged. Critics drawing from the intergovernmentalist spectrum pointed to the continuing relevance of the states and national interests within regional institutions. European integration was the outcome of particular systemic factors encouraging closer cooperation.6 Moreover, national governments remained in firm control of the integration process and were ultimately guided by the desire to maximise their own national interests. In this way, states are strengthened through regional institution-building (Milward, 2000). Integration may happen in areas of âlow politicsâ such as the economic sector, but a spillover to âhigh politicsâ such as defence and security was much more difficult due to the particular nature of these areas (Hoffmann, 1964; 1966). Indeed, Hoffmann offered a more sophisticated account of the state than found in most realist or neorealist arguments. He acknowledged that the formulation of foreign policy and national interests involved various non-governmental actors and was a construct âin which ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all play a roleâ (Hoffmann, 1995, p. 5). National governments, however, remain in a special position possessing political legitimacy and sovereignty. Integration was possible, but it was not swept along by its own dynamics, remaining an intergovernmental process.
This emphasis on states and governments as drivers of integration is shared by scholars associated with complex interdependence liberalism (see Keohane & Nye, 1977) and liberal institutionalism (see Keohane, 1984; 1989). Welfare, rather than mere survival, is regarded as the primary goal of human activity as well as the main motivator driving national interests. It is this concern for welfare that enables progress in form of enhanced levels of international cooperation. Governments, facing a collective action problem in an anarchical international environment, create institutions to facilitate cooperation. Such institutions, among other things, alleviate the lack of trust associated with information asymmetry, moral hazard problems and potential dishonesty in a setting without central government and mechanisms to enforce rules. International institutions (at the regional level and beyond), therefore, create gains for the participating states ensuring a vested interest in continuing cooperative behaviour. They restrain state behaviour and allow for socialisation, thus, minimising the risk of conflict (Haggard, 2014, p. 7).
Building on these insights, Moravcsik (1993) formulated a comprehensive intergovernmental approach to European integra...
