The Political Theory of Tyranny in Singapore and Burma

Aristotle and the Rhetoric of Benevolent Despotism

Stephen McCarthy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• Print ISBN: 9780415653862
• eBook ISBN: 9781134003327
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Filosofia politica

Covering various fields in political science, this new book presents an historical and political-cultural analysis of Buddhism and Confucianism.

Using Singapore and Burma as case studies, the book questions the basic assumptions of democratization theory, examining the political science of tyranny and exploring the rhetorical manipulation of religion for the purpose of political legitimacy.

A welcome addition to the political science and Asian studies literature, McCarthy addresses many of the current issues that underlie the field of democratization in comparative politics and discusses the issue of imposing Western cultural bias in studying non-Western regimes by analyzing rhetorical traits that are universally regular in politics.

1 Introduction

Political scientists have much to learn from Aristotle. In particular, if the field of comparative politics is to be saved from its current intellectual poverty, we will need to revive some ideas from Aristotle. A traditional conflict in political science is the dispute over the relative worth of theoretical generalization and regional, or field, specialization. Bridging the gap between the two has become a perennial problem. This tension surfaces within the field of comparative politics when one attempts to draw general inferences about obstacles to democratization from case studies of very different cultures. In this book, I will show that reviving Aristotelian regime analysis and rhetorical theory would be a good way out of the intellectual crisis facing comparative politics.

Adopting Aristotelian theory to analyze existing regimes improves upon modern political development theory for a number of reasons that will become evident. Most noteworthy among the faults pervading contemporary development theory is a form of democratic determinism that did not exist in the classical account of politics. Modern development theory has been distorted by a bias towards imposing institutions of liberal democracy upon developing nations without first coming to grips with the character of the existing regime, the national character of its people, and the character of their leaders. In his second inaugural address, President Bush for example, having claimed that only one “force of history” could expose the pretensions of tyrants – “the force of human freedom,” then declared that “[It] is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”¹

Classical political scientists would have found this to be a surprising statement, not only because of the potentially enormous cultural obstacles facing such a mission, but also because the mission’s ultimate goal would have been considered theoretically impossible. In addition, the modern concept of legitimacy – whereby the holding of elections and, to a lesser degree, economic success, serve as primary measures of legitimate government and indicators of democratization – would have seemed strange to the classics. Aristotle, for example, did not believe that legitimacy, or constitutional rule, was as important as examining justice and stability within various types of regimes when it came to comparing and classifying them.

Although the problem of tyranny has been raised and popularized in recent public political rhetoric, serious political science continues to avoid examining the topic in any detail. While much of the work in the political culture area of comparative politics, for example, addresses political elite behavior and the cultural obstacles to democratization, there is clearly an aversion to examining the idea of tyranny per se and the rhetoric produced by tyrannical regimes in modern times. That tyranny may remain a possibility is often overlooked, mitigated, or rejected as mythical by modern political scientists as they invent adjectives to describe behavior that the classics would have commonly understood. Aristotle, for example, not only believed that tyranny was real, but that among the variety of tyrannies was a kind where a tyrant was indeed considered to be legitimate. The democratic determinism found in modern development theory, however, denies such a possibility.

Aristotle’s account of tyranny in the Politics provides a defensible framework for modern political science and complements the modern comparative politics literature. The Politics provides a means by which comparative political scientists may classify various examples of past and existing regimes. While modern political theories aim for scientific precision, they often struggle to identify and characterize a regime’s harsher traits. Returning to Aristotle, therefore, is an attempt to unite the sophistication of the ancients with the variety of circumstances that are presently found in many harsh regimes.

To show that classical theory helps to provide a more complete and more reasonable account of these types of regimes, the theoretical framework of this book combines Aristotelian political theory with the more appropriate elements of modern comparative political development theory. Because a key to better understanding a regime is to analyze the political discourse of its leading figures, classical rhetorical theory remains a useful guide for this purpose. Combining Aristotle’s account of tyranny in the Politics with his account of political rhetoric in the Rhetoric provides a useful way to analyze and categorize certain harsh regimes in modern times, many of which are to be found scattered throughout Asia and Africa. Burma and Singapore provide particularly good examples of the former.

In the Politics, Aristotle appears to identify three major kinds of tyranny, two of which are regarded as more moderate than the common brutish form, and two modes by which tyranny is preserved. When we read Book 5 of the Politics, we are obliged to question Aristotle’s motives for providing a detailed examination of the creation of tyranny, the behavior of the tyrant, and the means of preserving his rule. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Aristotle intends to be both descriptive and prescriptive. If we can recognize tyranny where it occurs, then Aristotle may provide the means with which to bring about its downfall, or at least to moderate its consequences.

Of Aristotle’s two modes by which tyrannies are preserved, the first applies to the more commonly perceived form of brutish tyranny of which Burma is a particularly good example. The second is a more subtle mode whereby the tyrant appears to make himself look more kingly, thus allowing him to rule over both the willing and the unwilling. Although this mode may seem to be more appropriate for analyzing Singapore, it is also useful to apply the elements of this second mode to a case study of Burma and note the ruling Tatmadaw’s (army) transition from the first mode to the second by its promotion of Buddhist political rhetoric.

It is particularly important to analyze this second mode of preserving tyrannies today because of the rise of “soft authoritarianism” in East Asia. This is not to say that the former kind of tyranny does not still exist in Asia. Burma, North Korea, and to some extent, the People’s Republic of China are enduring examples. But the brutish variety of tyranny has, in general, managed to manifest itself in longer lasting and less offensive ways. The rise, and demise, of totalitarianism and ideologically based systems of tyranny have, on average, created a need for a more appealing, and more economically viable, form of government. Singapore openly flouts this new form and China has been particularly interested in using Singapore’s model as it proceeds along its own path of economic liberalization.

Being a city-state, Singapore is a particularly appealing example for a case study because Aristotle would not have experienced any scope of government larger than this. Aristotle’s study of 158 regimes was limited to relatively small city-states or polieis, and not empires. Burma, on the other hand, comprises a much larger territory that includes many ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless, the kind of rhetoric that is produced with the aim of preserving Aristotle’s second form of tyrannical regime may be reflected in the enthymematic propaganda campaigns pursued in both nations.

Lee Kuan Yew’s Asian values rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s in Singapore is matched by the Buddhist political rhetoric of the Tatmadaw generals in Burma today. Both serve a common purpose in preserving the regime, and both are designed to make rulers appear to be acting in a kingly fashion. But whereas Singapore lacks the monarchical heritage, the glory days of past kings and dynasties are interwoven into the history and political culture of the Burmese, and this becomes particularly significant when the political elite interpret history to legitimize their rule. It is necessary when assessing the longevity of this new form of tyranny, therefore, to account for the particular social circumstances in Singapore and Burma and the historical grounds for legitimacy used by the ruling elite.

The enthymeme (or rhetorical syllogism) in classical rhetorical analysis is the body of persuasion, and it assumes a central role in political rhetoric. Successful political rhetoric requires that enthymemes – which are reasonable but inconclusive arguments – must appeal to the commonly held opinions of the people. These common opinions, or endoxa, form what is called in the language of modern comparative politics – “the political culture” of a people. Because there is a long theoretical tradition suggesting the use of religion in the service of politics, particularly in tyrannies, then it should not be surprising to discover that enthymemes of tyrannical rhetoric should also appeal to the religious elements in the common opinions of the people, or to an ethical code that is revered as authoritative.

Buddhism assumes this position in Burma, while in Singapore, whose people are predominantly of Chinese origin, political leaders have turned to Confucianism as a means of establishing their Asian identity. While the political rhetoric of potentially benevolent despots may appear to be culturally specific, therefore, by adopting a common strategy with respect to the content and purpose of their enthymemes, they are also generalizeable by being identified as a form of tyrannical rhetoric. In this way, by adopting Aristotle’s understanding of kingship, tyranny, and rhetoric, we are able to better understand, and compare, political rhetoric.

Following an historical account of the rise of Lee Kuan Yew, Aristotelian theory will be applied to locate the Singapore regime and to show how Lee’s rule conformed to Aristotle’s prescriptions in the Politics for preserving this kind of regime. Singapore’s rapid rate of modernization and, at least until fairly recently, economic growth over the past several decades has sparked off one of the great natural law controversies of modern times. The “Asian values debate” is the phrase most often applied to the body of arguments flowing between Eastern and Western politicians and scholars who either support or oppose the existence of a common set of “shared values” within Asia, and which allow some Asian politicians to defend themselves from Western accusations of human rights violations.

It is possible to assess the merits of Lee’s Asian values rhetoric by examining the major Confucian arguments offered in support, by exploring how it attempted to interpret, and circumvent, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and by illustrating how Lee selectively interpreted Confucianism and Singaporean history. Lee’s rhetoric will be analyzed in accordance with Aristotle’s discussion of enthymemes in the Rhetoric, keeping in mind the kind of regime which it helps to preserve in the Politics. Examining the development and content of Lee’s Asian values rhetoric is undertaken with a view to questioning the validity of its implicit enthymeme. To complete our Aristotelian analysis along the lines of the framework suggested, it will be necessary to assess the degree of justice in Singapore and discuss the future possibilities for improving justice, and stability, in the regime.

Aristotle’s third kind of tyranny is neither based on law nor a monar- chic rule over willing persons, but is a sort of counterpart to absolute kingship and is most particularly held to be tyranny. Burma lies within Aristotle’s description of rule over the unwilling and it is possible to illustrate how the Tatmadaw generals have adopted the brutish tactics required to preserve such a regime. Referring to Aristotle’s Politics shows how the rhetoric of the Tatmadaw conforms to the factors that Aristotle considered to be important for explaining how tyrannies are preserved.

Because both the Tatmadaw and the opposition leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, claim to be continuing a legacy of Buddhist traditions – Suu Kyi claiming to continue her father’s (Aung San) work and the Tatmadaw acting as if they were performing the duties of Burmese kings – it is necessary to examine the political rhetoric of the Tatmadaw in relation to this theme. The “kingly right to rule” argument, which has been offered as a justification for Burmese military rule in the past, has been resurrected under the current regime to support their Buddhist political rhetoric.

This form of political rhetoric, which appeals to the Buddhist mass political culture of Burma through the common opinions they hold concerning kingship and Buddhism – whether it is performed by way of speeches or actions – is directed towards achieving some measure of legitimacy among the Burmese people. It is performed not only because Buddhism is the fundamental characteristic in the political culture of the Burman majority, and hence most revered and understood by the greater part of the population, but also, in the case of the generals, because they have failed to achieve legitimacy during times of relative peace through what today are generally considered to be the sufficient measures of legitimacy – popular consent and economic stewardship.

Indeed, legitimacy itself appears to become a debatable question in modern political science only if what is currently taken as the primary precondition and determining factor of legitimacy, elections, is relaxed. Since the Burmese generals chose to ignore the election results of 1990 and yet scholars still debate the legitimacy of the regime on other grounds, examining these other grounds on their own merits could prove to be a more fruitful exercise. This book will concentrate primarily upon the legitimacy that the Tatmadaw has attempted to achieve by portraying themselves as the upholders and preservers of the Buddhist traditions, coming as both a response to Suu Kyi’s actions and writings and in support of their own claims to possess an historical “kingly right to rule.” Of course, to be successful, then as in the case of Singapore, such claims require a particular historical interpretation of the endoxa to support the generals’ performance.

While comparing the political use of Buddhism, or Buddhist political rhetoric, among Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Tatmadaw is revealing, the primary focus of this book will be the Buddhist rhetoric of the regime’s current leaders. Buddhist political rhetoric, as used by the military elite, is of a very rudimentary form when compared with the Buddhist rhetoric of Aung San Suu Kyi. Well-developed theoretical arguments and mental, or meditational, practices are usually absent from their rhetorical public displays. But what the military lacks in theoretical substance, they make up in show, and there has been a plethora of Buddhist political rhetoric on show recently which is regularly recorded in public newspapers and journals.

The generals’ rhetoric may appear either in written form – as speeches, articles, and commentary, or in visual form – as photographic evidence or artistic presentations. The findings of this case study will show that, since the coup of 1988, the Tatmadaw generals have not only been promoting Buddhism as part of some kingly duty but have increased this promotion and have responded to Suu Kyi’s Buddhist rhetoric with their own version. They have come full circle since 1962 by actively promoting Buddhism as, if not the state religion, then the next closest thing resembling one. As in the Singapore study, applying Aristotelian theory provides a unique assessment of the degree of justice in Burma and allows us to comment upon the possibilities for improving justice and stability in the regime.

While it would be fruitful to analyze in further detail the rhetoric produced in Singapore and Burma according to Aristotelian principles, the objective of this book is not simply to conduct a study in rhetoric per se, but to apply these general principles of rhetorical persuasion in order to show how this particular rhetoric substantiates Aristotle’s account of tyranny in the Politics. Applying Aristotle’s elements of rhetorical logic shows how the rhetoric of these regimes may be understood as conforming to the principles of rhetorical deduction (enthymemes addressing the endoxa) and rhetorical induction (manipulating the endoxa with selective historical examples). This rhetoric is not randomly contrived but follows a pattern developed by the ruling elite which conforms to their enthymemes and to the general principles of enthymematic reasoning, as understood by Aristotle, and are supported by inductive examples and historical arguments. Based on the nature of the historical arguments or of the argument (logos) itself, it is possible to reveal the sophistic character of this rhetoric, as befits one who gives a fine performance in the role of a kingly ruler.

The objective of analyzing the rhetoric of the political elite in Singapore and Burma, therefore, is threefold: to show that by addressing the common opinions of the many, their rhetoric conforms to the principles of enthymematic persuasion in the Rhetoric; to challenge the examples used to support their enthymemes and the truth of the common opinions upon which they are based; and to show that their rhetoric conforms with Aristotle’s advice for preserving regimes in the Politics. While comparativists interested in the procedural formalities associated with modern democratization theory often neglect the rhetoric produced by authoritarian regimes, this rhetoric should be regarded as an important element of regime analysis.

It is also the intention of this book to show that applying Aristotelian practical observations to areas where modern comparative theory remains deficient helps bridge the gap between theoretical generalization and regional specialization. Employing an Aristotelian conceptual framework for examining tyranny and the rhetoric of preservation allows one to examine modern, culturally specific, examples of political rhetoric while supporting general theoretical conclusions concerning politics. Using Singapore and Burma as case studies illustrates how this can be done.

2 The intellectual crisis in comparative politics

Modern comparative development theory suffers from a number of fundamental ills which make a return to the classical study of politics seem an attractive alternative. The subfield of political culture theory attempts to address some of these ills, though it too falls short in many respects. It is revealing to show how modern comparative pol...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• 1: INTRODUCTION
• 2: THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
• 3: THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF TYRANNY
• 4: TYRANNY IN SINGAPORE?
• 5: THE RHETORIC OF ASIAN VALUES
• 6: STABILITY AND JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE
• 7: TYRANNY IN BURMA
• 8: BUDDHIST POLITICAL RHETORIC
• 9: STABILITY AND JUSTICE IN BURMA
• 10: CONCLUSION
• APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY – BURMA CASE STUDY
• APPENDIX B: FINDINGS – BURMA CASE STUDY
• NOTES
• BIBLIOGRAPHY